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EDUCATION AND YOUTH EMPLOYMENT IN JAPAN

Hidetoshi Kato

A STUDY PREPARED FOR THE
CARNEGIE COUNCIL ON POLICY STUDIES
IN HIGHER EDUCATION



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The Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education, 2150 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California 94704, has sponsored publication of this report as part of a continuing effort to obtain and present significant information for public discussion. The views expressed are those of the author.

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number LC 78–72971

International Standard Book Number ISBN 0–931050–07–3

First Edition

Education and Youth Employment in Contemporary Societies

A Series of Special Studies

BELGIUM *Henri Janne*	GREAT BRITAIN *Stuart Maclure*
JAPAN *Hidetoshi Kato*	MEXICO AND SOUTH ASIA *Alberto Hernández Medina and Carlos Muñoz Izquierdo, Manzoor Ahmed*
POLAND *Barbara Liberska*	SWEDEN AND DENMARK *Gösta Rehn, K. Helveg Petersen*

THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Klaus von Dohnanyi

These publications are available from the Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education, 2150 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California 94704.

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Foreword

This is one of seven publications presenting studies commissioned by the Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education as a means of providing a global perspective for education and youth employment in contemporary societies. The remaining publications will be concerned with education and youth employment in Belgium, by Henry Janne; Mexico and South Asia, by Alberto Hernández Medina and Carlos Muñoz Izquierdo and Manzoor Ahmed, respectively; Poland, by Barbara Liberska; Great Britain, by Stuart Maclure; Sweden and Denmark, by Gösta Rehn and K. Helveg Petersen, respectively; and the Federal Republic of Germany, by Klaus von Dohnanyi. Margaret M. Gordon, associate director of the Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education, is the general editor of the series. To the authors of these studies, and to Hidetoshi Kato, whose work appears in this volume, we express our deep appreciation.

The German Marshall Fund generously provided support for two international conferences on education and youth employment which were attended by several of the authors of studies for this series and which have contributed significantly to the Council's deliberations on this subject. The International Council for Educational Development, under the direction of James A. Perkins, coordinated the conferences and arranged for the participation of the essayists in this project. We acknowledge this contribution with profound thanks.

We also wish to extend our thanks to Mary Pernell Frederick and Diana Lorentz for their editorial contributions, and Sylvia Zuck for coordinating manuscript preparation.

CLARK KERR
Chairman
Carnegie Council on Policy Studies
in Higher Education

1

The Role of Education in Modern Japan

One decisive factor in the incredibly rapid industrialization of Japan over the past 100 years has been the consistent emphasis on and efforts given to education by successive governments. Even though the contemporary term "manpower" was unknown until recently; what the policy makers of this country successfully implemented during the past century was in actuality a carefully designed "manpower strategy."

The leaders of modern Japan who emerged after the Meiji Restoration of 1868 recognized the importance of education in building a new nation and took strong initiatives in instituting a nationwide school system. As early as 1868 the first primary school was inaugurated, and in 1871 primary-school education became compulsory throughout the country. Institutions of higher education were also encouraged by the government. A medical school and a foreign-language school, which had continued from the pre-Restoration period, were integrated and transformed into a new university system in 1868. The university was totally financed by the government and in 1877 was reorganized as Tokyo University.

There seemed to be two major targets in the education policy of the Meiji government. The first was to make primary schooling widely available so that everyone could become literate. The second was to use higher education as a means of developing the talents of a small number of highly competent people. In a word, the government believed that both a literate public and an intellectual elite were essential to the development of the nation, which was far behind the West.

The government did not hesitate to invest a considerable amount of money in education, especially higher education. To speed up society's adoption of advanced science and technology as well as the sociopolitical institutions of the West, the government invited to Japan hundreds of scholars, doctors, and engineers from Europe and the United States, paying them salaries much higher than those of Japanese ministers, including the prime minister. At the same time, after careful examination and screening, the government sent some 400 bright young people abroad to study every year. As a result of such extraordinary investments, Japan was able to become self-sufficient in human resources in the 1890s. It is no exaggeration to say that the education policy of Japan in the middle nineteenth century produced one of the most radical and dramatic experiments in the history of education.

The most important aspect of this promotion of higher learning was the underlying philosophy that evaluation and recruitment of youth was based strictly on achievement rather than on social status. A young man, regardless of his family background and social status, could be selected as a prospective member of the country's elite if he demonstrated intellectual excellence. The youths selected were given full support for their academic pursuits, often including the opportunity to study abroad. Upon graduation from the university or their return from abroad, the government, as well as the business community, usually provided these young people with responsible positions. Their status, of course, was accompanied by good economic compensation and social respect. It is not surprising, therefore, that many ambitious young people took the official examination to enter universities, especially the prestigious Tokyo Imperial University.

Indeed, it was in this context that Yukichi Fukuzawa, an eminent thinker and educator of the nineteenth century, wrote his famous book *An Encouragement of Learning* (1872). The book began with a clear and crisp paragraph:

> It is said that heaven does not create one man above or below another man. This means that when men are born from heaven they are all equal. . . . Nevertheless, as we broadly survey the human scene, there are the wise and the stupid, the rich and the poor, the noble and the lowly, whose conditions seem to differ as greatly as clouds and mud. The reason for this is clear. In the *Jitsugokyo* we read that if a man does not learn he will be ignorant, and that a man who is ignorant is stupid. Therefore, the distinction between wise and stupid comes down to a matter of education.

This book had an incredible circulation (3.4 million copies) and a wide reputation in the latter half of the nineteenth centrury. It strongly encouraged upward intellectual and social mobility. It is hard to find a level of "achievement motivation" as high as that of Japanese youths of the nineteenth century.

The policy of evaluating and recruiting youths by their achievement was, though it may sound strange, inherited from the Chinese system. Since the sixth century, government officials in China had been recruited by examination, and the only criterion was achievement, regardless of the candidate's birth, locale, and social class. Opportunities were provided on a literally egalitarian basis. Great respect for intellectual achievement and intellectualism was built into Chinese society. Both Japan and Korea adopted this philosophy, and quite contrary to the popular assumption that Japan was traditionally a rigidly structured society, in reality social mobility was extremely high in the academic and intellectual areas even during the feudal period. The new Meiji government wisely reactivated the system and combined it with the modern egalitarian philosophy of the West.

Aspiration toward intellectual achievement was thus mobilized, and ambitious Japanese youths with a variety of social backgrounds came to the academic and intellectual centers of the country, especially Tokyo, to take the entrance examination for prestigious institutions. Hundreds of thousands of young people traveled to Tokyo from every corner of the country, many on foot—sometimes with bare feet. Metaphorically speaking, what happened in Tokyo in the late nineteenth century was comparable to the "gold rush" in the United States. The difference between the American "gold rush" and the Japanese "university rush" was that in the former people looked for tangible objects by chance, while in the latter they sought intangible achievement by skill.

The competition to enter Tokyo Imperial University was very severe. It was not unusual that only one out of thirty applicants would be finally taken after the three-day examination. Those who were accepted were given full governmental support, encouragement, and above all, a bright future. Many who failed still looked for a second chance; they stayed in town, working during the daytime and attending preparatory school in the evening. The Japanese youth of that period might be seen as exemplifying McLelland's "achievement motivation" theory (1961).

The tradition of intellectualism and an egalitarian examination system have been preserved—or at least have survived—throughout the modern history of Japan. It is still the firm belief of the majority of the Japanese people that higher education is the only means through which one can get a good job, a stable income, and reputable social status. Parents who missed educational opportunity often stress to their children the need to be equipped with higher education. Recently, a cartoon depicted an "education-oriented" mother telling her unwilling son: "Don't be like your father. He is a loser who could not enter Tokyo University."

In reality, of course, it is a modern myth that a college diploma is an assurance of success. In 1976, almost 100 percent of middle-school graduates in Japan entered high school, and approximately 38 percent of the high school graduates were accepted by colleges and universities. As will be discussed in detail in the following chapters, society can no longer guarantee "success" for the half-million youths who graduate from universities annually. But belief seems to be much stronger than objective facts, and more and more young people are competing for the better universities. Educators forecast that more than 50 percent of any given age group will go on to the universities before 1990.

The zeal, or craze, for higher education in Japan is somewhat hard to believe for outsiders, but for many Japanese youths, the entrance examination to universities is a matter of life and death, at least socially. During the period of the entrance examination (February–March), the mass media calculate the "competition ratio" of each university, and weekly magazines publish special issues devoted to the entrance examination, with information on average scores, trends of tests, and so forth. Major hotels near the big academic centers, such as Tokyo and Kyoto, are fully booked by the applicants during the season. Also, it is not unusual for high school graduates who failed the examination to wait another year or two in order to challenge the intended university again. To accommodate those who failed, hundreds of "preparatory schools" are in business, and the more eminent ones are commercially very successful. They even give their own entrance examination, and Japanese high school graduates must withstand severe competition to be accepted by preparatory schools as well.

In reviewing the pattern of development of higher education in Japan over the past two decades, however, one very important feature emerges in comparison with similar development in the United States. According to government statistics, the percentage of university graduates in Japan in the over-65 age group is 3.9 percent, while in the United States it is 10.1 percent. For the 25 to 29 age group, the percentage of university graduates is 16.9 percent in Japan and 25.6 percent in the United States. The implication is that the gap between older and younger age groups is more drastic in Japan than in the United States. Also, it should be noted that in the United States, it took some 20 years (1940–1960) for the rate for the over-25 population to grow from 5.4 percent to 9.7 percent, while in Japan a similar growth from 4.5 percent to 10.1 percent was achieved in only ten years (1960–1970). In a word, the rate of higher education's growth in Japan has been twice as fast as that of the United States. This rapid growth, as will be discussed later, had a sudden impact upon many areas of society, including the labor market and employment structure.

The belief in higher education is extremely wide and deep in Japan today, and youth as well as their parents still anticipate very good occupations upon graduation—in spite of the fact that opportunities have almost reached the saturation point for university graduates. Higher education in Japan is still expanding, while opportunities for university graduates are declining. It is true that university graduates, until several decades ago, were almost unconditionally guaranteed full employment in the managerial sector of the society, but it is doubtful that even 10 percent of today's graduates will finally attain managerial positions in either public or private organizations. It is against this historical and social background that the relationship between education and employment must be reexamined and that realistic educational planning must be developed. The following sections will introduce some of the facts and problems in this area, with special emphasis on the alternatives of education and employment for contemporary Japanese youth.

2

Contemporary Youth Problems

The diffusion of higher education has been one of the most remarkable characteristics of the contemporary youth culture in Japan. The change in the educational structure naturally has had a tremendous impact upon employment in recent years. Table 1 shows the drastic change in the composition of those entering the labor force in the past 15 years.

Table 1. Educational Background of Persons Entering the Labor Force

	Junior high	*Senior high*	*College/Univ.*
1965	44.5%	44.9%	10.6%
1970	21.7	58.3	20.0
1975	12.3	57.0	30.7
1980 (estimate)	8.3	53.2	38.3

SOURCE: Japan, Ministry of Education, 1976.

In 1965, college and university graduates formed only 10 percent of those entering the labor force; they were a minority. However, it is estimated that in 1980, only 8.3 percent of the new labor force will consist of those whose education stopped at the junior high level—they will be the new minority. In a word, the figures for junior high graduates and college graduates are almost reversed, while the proportion of senior high graduates remains relatively stable. Indeed, in 1975, the absolute number of junior high graduates who went straight into the labor market was only 100,000 throughout Japan. It is safe to say that those who take jobs upon graduation from the nine years of compulsory education, at the age of 15 or 16, are almost negligible in number. Most youths tend to start working after completing either senior high school or university education.

Like other industrial countries, Japan faced an economic crisis after 1973, and the employment situation also became difficult. However, in comparison with most of the countries in the West, the degree of unemployment has been less serious. According to the recent edition of the *White Paper on Labor*, the rate of unemployment in 1976 was 2.4 percent. The figure was much worse than the 1.1 percent in 1969, but much better than the unemployment rate in western Europe and the United States in the same year. The socioeconomic and politicocultural background of this relatively low unemployment ratio is complex. The lifetime employment system of Japanese organizations, the financial adjustments and subsidies of the economy by the public sector, the profitable export market, and many other factors have helped keep employment stable. In any event, Japan has been successful in avoiding a serious unemployment problem.

As far as youth are concerned, employment opportunities are very promising, at least statistically. The ratio of demand to supply was 5.9 for junior high school graduates and 3.4 for senior high graduates in the labor market in 1975. In other words, the labor market is a seller's market for Japanese youth today. Though the ratio is more severe for university graduates, they are also free from the unemployment problem if they are willing to take any kind of job. It is safe to say that Japanese youth today enjoy full employment, though they may not be quite satisfied with the jobs they have.

There are some youthful minorities who are not given equal opportunities for employment. For instance, women are generally handicapped in finding jobs. Many firms recruit only men for managerial positions, and unemployment among women college graduates is potentially serious. Though Japan does not have much of an ethnic problem, Korean and Chinese youths are not likely to be given equal opportunities. They are, in spite of their Japanese citizenship, more or less discriminated against by employers as well as by the general public.

An additional problem is that though employers are willing to hire the young, they are not necessarily pleased with their education. Employers are astonished by the fact that new graduates have not had enough professional training to meet the requirements of practical work; they also find young people immature. Therefore, it is a common practice for employers to provide special training programs for newly recruited young employees. In some cases, to substitute for apprenticeship systems and to satisfy the educational aspirations of junior high school graduates, employers have established their own senior high schools to give the necessary vocational and general education to future employees. These company-owned senior high schools, though few in number, are approved by local education commissions and authorized by the Ministry of Education, and their graduates receive a diploma equivalent to that of a regular high school.

The social change that has taken place in Japan in the past three decades is so revolutionary that there seem to be more discontinuities than continuities between traditional culture and youth culture today. For example, on the level of material culture, it is found that the younger generation prefers meat and "Westernized" foodstuffs, while the older generation is more fond of fish and other traditional foods. An opinion survey showed that youth today seek happiness and a leisure-oriented life-style for their future, while the youths of 30 years ago saw as their mission a contribution to the betterment of their nation. Though family ties in Japanese society are much stronger than in other industrial countries, the role of the family as a socializing agent has been replaced by other agents, especially mass media. Generally speaking, youth today look for a model in the mass media rather than in their parents. Furthermore, contemporary Japanese youths are often labeled "young aristocrats," meaning that they have the most flexible disposable income in the society. They are the children of affluence, with few obligations, and they do not hesitate to spend their earnings for overseas travel and for expensive commodities and services which their parents in their 40s and 50 cannot afford. Marketing experts have been very successful in selling goods and services to this "youth market."

The mass media find in youth their largest audience, and it is no exaggeration to say that the primary target of radio broadcasting is young people. Moreover, thanks to freedom of speech, certain media have been trying to sell sex and violence, responding to the naive and curious minds of youth. Observers may be struck, for instance, by the poor quality and bad taste of comic magazines widely read among young people in Japan today.

Relative to the impact of mass media, it is important to note that juvenile delinquency has gradually become a social problem. In 1975, some 160,000 young people under 20 years of age were arrested for violations of the criminal code and another 210,000 for traffic violations. Juvenile crimes include violence, sexual crimes, prostitution, stealing, blackmailing, and so forth, and criminologists point out that youth today tend to commit more violent crimes than those of ten years ago. Some high school dropouts in urban areas have even belonged to underworld gangster organizations, and while the use of drugs is almost unknown among Japanese youth because of severe police control, among younger teens, paint-thinner "sniffing" is often found in urban centers.

As suggested earlier, the severe competition in schooling peculiar to Japan borders on the pathological. The entrance examinations to colleges and universities—even high schools—are extremely competitive, and the method of examination is generally rigid. An applicant, for instance, is expected to give the exact year when Buddhism was imported to Japan. The correct answer is 538, and such answers as "the 530s" or "the early sixth century" are rejected. Preparation for the entrance examinations thus requires a lot of memorization, often without much relevance. A young person who wants to be accepted by a college must memorize exact historical chronologies, names of various places in the world, formulas in mathematics, physics, and chemistry, and so forth. A person is never tested for his or her creativity and imagination. The entrance examination, therefore, is an irritating and frustrating experience for all young men and women intending to enter colleges and universities.

Senior high schools function essentially as preparatory schools for the university entrance examination, so the high school curriculum is also affected by the methods and contents of the entrance examination. As many critics have pointed out, the high school in Japan today is a "cannery" where fragments of knowledge are canned and packed. High school, for many Japanese youths, is a gloomy place.

Problems with the education system do not stop here. Those fortunate students who are accepted by universities have another problem: When they were preparing for the entrance examination, they at least had a goal. But with that goal achieved, it is rather natural for a sensitive freshman to wonder why he or she came to a college or university. At the beginning of a new academic year in April, students are full of joy and excitement. But after several weeks, they find that university education is not what they had expected, and some of them become neurotic. What is known as "May syndrome" takes place.

For those who failed the entrance examination, there are several alternatives. Many ambitious young people enroll at once in another preparatory school, hoping for a second chance the next spring. Less ambitious people, or those who have a different philosophy, may decide to enter a professional or vocational school to become stenographers, television mechanics, cooks, and so forth. Another group of young people may decide to work. As mentioned before, there are huge demands for high school graduates in the labor market; it is not difficult for them to find jobs. But among those who failed the entrance examination, there remains a frustrated and desperate group of young people. Some of them commit suicide—though the number is declining in recent years. Others become "spontaneously unemployed," losing their ambition and aspiration for either school or work. They spend meaningless hours at home or on the street, doing nothing. With the increasing affluence of the society, this group is becoming a new pathological problem.

Working conditions for youth are generally good in terms of both income and work load. But there is a gap between those who are working for big industries and those who have jobs in small-scale organizations. As will be discussed in Chapter 4, as far as income and working hours are concerned, the differences between the two groups are nominal; but the employees of big industries enjoy incomparably better fringe benefits than those in smaller firms. For instance, the former have access to a clean and inexpensive cafeteria, a good company hospital, and dormitories or vacation houses in the mountains and on the beach, while the latter have none of these. In Japan today, there is no class distinction in the traditional sense, but it is apparent that there is a distinction between big industries and minor firms in terms of fringe benefits; often the term "fringe" is an understatement.

A recent Japanese phenomenon related to working conditions is groups of "motorcycle crazies" who speed dangerously through the main streets of metropolitan areas. It has been found that they consist of high school dropouts and the employees of minor firms. Driving a motorcycle is a catharsis for young people who feel that they are "underdogs." Their frustration, even hostility, against those who have obtained a "ticket for success"—university students and employees in more prestigious organizations—lead them to show off with their shiny motorcycles and dangerous driving, even to the extent of racing police cars. They have very little feeling of loyalty to or solidarity with the organization they belong to, and this group is part of the "alienated youth" of contemporary Japan.

Neither university students nor high school students have much difficulty getting part-time jobs; for example, small retail shops, restaurants, and service stations are suffering from a labor shortage, but do not want permanent full-time employees because of the fluctuation in their business. Depending on the nature of the job, a student can earn the equivalent of $1.25 to $3.00 per hour. Another job possibility emerges from the entrance examination itself: many parents of high school students are more than willing to have private tutors at home. University students, including graduate students, if they are bright, will not find much difficulty getting jobs as private tutors for $5.00 an hour. According to a survey conducted by the Ministry of Education, some 80 percent of university students have taken part-time jobs to earn extra income, creating an area where very flexible and informal labor transactions take place. This part-time work, interestingly enough, is called "arbeit" (or *arubaito*) by students, because the students of three decades ago used this German term to show off their intellectual sophistication. In the early 1950s, university students were an elitist minority, and the general public were sympathetic to those young intellectuals engaged in "arbeit." The social context has changed, but the term itself survived, and of the millions of young "arbeiters" today, it is doubtful that 1 percent can speak German.

Unemployment social security is generous in Japan. Those who lose their jobs can receive approximately 60 percent of their previous income from the local Employment Security Office every month, and they also receive counseling when they come to the office to pick up their checks. Because of high demand, it is not difficult for young workers to find new jobs through the Employment Security Office. However, youths of today are very particular about the kinds of jobs they take. In 1975, some 250,000 employees under 20 years old left their job of their own volition. The major reason was either that the job "did not fit them" or that they did not like the "human relations" in the office or factory they had worked for. Surprisingly, very few people left their jobs because of "low income." In a word, youths today are more concerned with relationships in their work than with their incomes.

As is widely known, the Japanese salary system is characterized by a "bonus" paid to almost every employed person, including civil servants. The amount of the bonus varies, depending on the policy of each company and on the company's earnings in each year. If a company has made a huge profit, the management may decide to pay a bonus amounting to more than 10 months' salary to every employee. The bonus is usually paid in June and December, and since the amount is so substantial, both white-collar and blue-collar workers can use the extra income for the purchase of durable goods, overseas travel, and other unusual expenditures. In the case of civil servants, it has become established practice for them to receive the equivalent of 2.25 months' salary in June and 2.75 in December. In other words, a worker is usually paid 17 months' salary annually. This institutionalized extra income makes the Japanese economy unique, and in the case of young people, the bonus comprises very flexible disposable income.

However, it may be misleading to assume that youth are uncritical spenders. It is true that the "youth market"–consisting of clothes, cosmetics, stereos and other durable goods, travel, and so forth–has been prosperous, but at the same time, youth are very savings oriented. A survey revealed that as of September 1975, 89.3 percent of youths had their own savings accounts, with average individual savings equivalent to $2,300. The major purpose of saving, according to the respondents, was "to prepare for marriage." On the average, they set their savings goal as $9,000, and this amount seems to be feasible, considering the extra income from bonuses. Furthermore, among urban middle-class youths it is a common practice for them to live with their parents until they get married and to save most of their own income. In some cases, they may contribute a nominal amount of money for the household, but parents tend to encourage their children to save their money in preparation for their future independence. Therefore, especially among young urban middle-class women who commute from their parents' home to their offices, it is not unusual to find savings amounting to more than $10,000.

Opinion surveys conducted by the prime minister's office show that the ideal of the majority of Japanese youth is a peaceful and cozy middle-class life-style, and that the political radicalism that prevailed in the late 1960s seems to have disappeared. Certain groups of political extremists who were active from 1968 to 1970 find themselves totally isolated in their early 30s today. They reached a "point of no return," however, and in desperation they still engage in occasional subversive activities. It is worthwhile to note that, without exception, the activists who engage in urban bombing, hijacking, and other political crimes are not youth any more—they are aged 32 to 35. However, it is also important to observe that whenever these "aging" radicals take the initiative—in demonstrations, for instance—they still can attract a considerable number of followers. The followers usually are temporary sympathizers, but depending on conditions and the historical context they may turn out to be new activists. Their potential cannot be underestimated, especially in view of the fact that, as discussed before, there are frustrated deviant youths who are handicapped either in education or in employment.

3

Youth and Unemployment

Unemployment among youth in Japan is not a serious social problem. According to the White Paper on Youth (Japan, Office of the Prime Minister, 1976), the absolute number of working youths in 1975 was 7.9 million, indicating that 96.9 percent of youths (except those in school) had jobs. Further, the apparent 3.1 percent unemployment rate is incorrect, because there were young people who did not want to be employed, including many young women who preferred to stay at home helping their mothers with housework.

Among those 7.9 million working youths, 1.6 million (20.4 percent) were in the 15 to 19 age group, and 6.3 million (79.6 percent) were 20 to 24 years old. Obviously, the majority of working youths were over 20, and the number as well as ratio of working young people under 20 has been declining as a result of the diffusion of higher education. Among the 7.9 million, 4.2 million (52.6 percent) were men, while 3.8 million (47.2 percent) were women. The young labor force accounted for 15.2 percent of the total working population in 1975, and there was a decline of 1.3 percent in comparison with 1974.

The majority of working youths (89.9 percent) are employed outside the family; 7.7 percent are household workers (for example, young men working on family farms); and 1.8 percent are self-employed. In terms of the sectors of the economy, the majority of youths are working in manufacturing, sales and distribution, and service industries. The number of youths in the primary sector of the economy (agriculture, fisheries, and so forth) is apparently becoming more and more negligible, especially among women. Figure 1 shows the occupational distribution of youths in 1975.

The recent economic recession, especially since 1973, has had a serious impact upon employment. In 1975, the number of unemployed reached almost one million, and the unemployment rate rose to 1.9 percent. In January–March of 1976, the unemployment rate temporarily went up to 2.4 percent. As Figure 2 shows, these figures were the worst in the past 10 years. Obviously, the postwar Japanese economy, which has enjoyed a high growth rate for two decades, is now coming to a turning point in terms of production, consumption, and employment.

Relatively speaking, however, younger people were less affected than others by the economic recession. As a matter of fact, demand exceeds supply in the youth labor market, and employers compete in the recruitment of promising young people, especially those in the 15 to 19 age group. It is almost impossible for many employers to find junior high school graduates who are willing to work rather than to go to senior high school. For example, in the Tokyo metropolitan area in the spring of 1977, some 260,000 young people graduated from junior high school, but only 2,500 of them–less than 1 percent–decided to take jobs upon graduation. The rest, the overwhelming majority, entered senior high school without paying much attention to the alternative of work. Indeed, since the middle 1960s, when more people started to go to senior high, employers began to refer to junior high graduate workers as "golden eggs," valuable yet difficult to obtain, and it is customary for employers to make "journeys in search of golden eggs." They visit small rural junior high schools where fewer graduates are heading for senior high, and try to persuade the young people to come to their offices and factories. Therefore, in the past 10 years, a consistent 30 percent or more of those taking jobs upon graduation from junior high school at the age of 15 migrated into the employment area, especially urban centers, from

Figure 1. Occupational distribution of young workers; ages 15 to 24, 1975



their home districts. As the following figures shows, the ratio of demand to supply in the employment market for 15-year-olds has been very high, even during the economic recession. In a word, the chances are only one out of five or six that employers can get a 15-year-old worker.

Job Opportunities for 15-year-olds (Demand/Supply)

	Men	*Women*
1971	7.5	6.3
1972	5.9	5.2
1973	5.9	5.7
1974	6.9	6.5
1975	6.2	5.7

Figure 2. Unemployed rate and number of unemployed persons, 1965–1975



Furthermore, in 1975 33 percent of those who decided to work at the age of 15 also enrolled in senior high school, either in night classes or by correspondence. Thus, roughly one-third of junior high graduates working in offices and factories are working for senior high diplomas simultaneously. This number, according to estimates of various government agencies, is increasing rapidly; by 1980, it is expected that 50 percent of the workers aged 15 to 19 will be working senior high school students. As will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6, with the inauguration of the Broadcasting University scheduled in 1978, working youths may have even more opportunities for higher education.

The majority of junior-high graduates work in the secondary sector of the economy, that is, in manufacturing industries as blue-collar workers: 71.8 percent of the men and 60.7 percent of the women who took jobs at the age of 15 in 1975 are in manufacturing industries, followed by service industries.

The shortage of labor among 18-year-olds (senior-high graduates) has also been severe. The ratio of demand to supply in the labor market for this group has been very high. Though the ratio is lower than that among 15-year-olds, demand significantly exceeds supply. The following figures show the labor-market trends for senior-high graduates, who might be referred to as "silver eggs."

Job Opportunities for 18-year-olds
(Demand/Supply)

	Men	*Women*
1971	5.3	2.9
1972	4.0	2.5
1973	3.9	2.6
1974	5.0	3.1
1975	4.3	2.7

However, the distribution of occupations is different in the case of senior-high graduates who get jobs at the age of 18 from that of junior-high graduates. In 1975, among some 600,000 senior-high graduates who found employment, men and women inclusive, those young people who were employed in manufacturing industries amounted to 31.3 percent, while 24.3 percent took jobs in wholesale/retail services, and 11.7 percent in banking, insurance, and real estate. Among men, 38.3 percent obtained jobs in the secondary sector (manufacturing), while 25.0 percent of the women worked in this sector—significantly lower figures than those for junior-high graduates. Among senior-high graduates who take jobs upon graduation, an almost equal number go to both the secondary and tertiary (trade and service) sectors of the economy.

In the 18-year-old group, too, the geographical balance between demand and supply is uneven. Such urban centers as Tokyo and Osaka have to recruit senior-high graduates from communities all over Japan, and approximately 30 percent of the workers in this group are migrants from rural districts to more urban areas. Every spring, hundereds and thousands of young people, including junior-high graduates and senior-high graduates, are brought to industrial centers of the country, often by chartered trains.

Obviously, junior and senior high school graduates at ages 15 or 18 are quite secure as to job opportunities; ironically, it is among college and university graduates that there is insecurity about employment. In 1974, among 430,000 college and university graduates, 330,000 took jobs, 25,000 decided to enter graduate school, and 3,000 worked at hospitals as medical interns; but for the rest—more than 50,000 in number—what happened after graduation is unknown. Some of them went to vocational schools for further training; some may be working on their own; and some women may have become housewives. But it is not unlikely that a considerable number of university graduates are unemployed—most of them by choice. Many university professors in Japan today are familiar with graduates who do not take jobs simply because they feel that the opportunities offered to them are not appropriate to their diploma. For example, a graduate in economics may feel that the only position becoming to him is in the banking business. If he fails to get one and is offered a job as a salesperson in a department store instead, he may either take the job rather reluctantly or withdraw. Among this group of students in a changing society, there seem to be complicated sociophyschological conflicts of expectations.

In the past, when fewer than 10 percent of youths were in the prestigious situation of being admitted to universities, there was an implicit, and often explicit, promise that they would be given stable managerial jobs in either the public or private sector upon graduation. Therefore, a university diploma was regarded as a "ticket to success." Indeed, until two decades ago, even the student poorest in achivement did not have much difficulty in finding a promising position in a firm if he had a university diploma; employers as well as the society at large expected that any university graduate would be much more talented than "ordinary" young people of his age group, and that expectation was usually warranted. The two expectations—the expectation of university students that they would be hired as junior executives and the employers' expectation that those who had university diplomas would be capable people—did not conflict with each other. Insofar as university graduates were a minority, they turned out to be an "automatic elite," and society confidently approved this automatic association between higher education and employment opportunities.

However, after the mid-1960s, when there was a population explosion of university graduates, a serious dissonance in these expectations began to take place. On the one hand, students still expected to fulfill their future dream of being government officials or business executives, although their specific expectations were more ambiguous than those of 20 years earlier; on the other hand, potential employers for these young people became aware of the fact that university graduates were not what they used to be. Employers today can no longer accommodate all new graduates with good positions, and at the same time they have learned from experience that the quality of university graduates is generally disappointing.

Actual unemployment among all youth aged 20 to 24 years old in Japan, however, does not appear to be a serious problem. In 1975, the unemployment rate for this age group was about 1.5 times the national rate—a considerably lower ratio than that prevailing in a number of other industrial countries. The ratio had risen somewhat in the late 1960s but after that remained relatively stable. Relative unemployment rates for youth 15 to 19 in Japan are also low by international standards and only slightly higher than for the 20 to 24 age group.

According to a survey conducted by the Japan Recruitment Center in late 1976, more than 80 percent of university students were still looking forward to obtaining positions in either government agencies or big business; but obviously, there were far fewer vacancies than students looking for them. Thus the conflict of expectations has become more and more serious; it seems that those most affected by recent economic changes are university graduates 22 to 24 years old.

There are, of course, those graduates who recognize the changes in the labor market and do not hesitate to take jobs which a university graduate of 20 years ago would never have accepted. For instance, a recent survey revealed that 40 percent of the police force in the Tokyo metropolitan area were university graduates, and occasionally one finds a taxi driver or waiter with a B.A. degree. This new movement of university graduates into nonmanagerial areas may be regarded as a threat by the less educated, who previously monopolized these areas.

Indeed, a tragic irony is emerging in the relationship of job opportunities to education. A series of interviews with business executives conducted in the course of researching this study reveals that university diplomas are often barriers to employment. A top executive of a big trading company said that his company would not take any university graduates as secretaries. He stated: "I would rather have a junior college graduate who can type and file than a university graduate who majored in medieval history." In a word, the more education (especially nonpractical education) one attains, the narrower his or her job opportunities may be.

Moreover, business firms evaluate university graduates rather harshly. Among representative business executives in charge of personnel administration, 55.6 percent felt, according to a survey of 1975, that the caliber of university graduates had been declining considerably. In order to recruit the best young people, 34 percent of large firms (those with more than 5,000 employees) send out recruitment announcements to only a handful of prestigious universities. In other words, unless admitted to "name universities," students have no chance to take tests for and be interviewed by the big companies. This practice of the major firms accelerates the already high competition in entrance examinations for those "name universities," creating an additional disturbance in the Japanese education system.

Though the majority of Japanese youths feel that a university education is desirable for their career in terms of prestige, an objective observer recently calculated the gains and losses of higher education from monetary aspects and came to the conclusion that university education as an economic investment does not pay in the long run. The calculation was done by the editors of the Sunday *Mainichi*, a representative weekly magazine. According to the magazine, the gap between the earnings of a university graduate and those of a senior high school graduate has narrowed over the past 10 years. In 1960, the average starting salary of a senior-high graduate was only 62.3 percent of that of a university graduate, but this figure rose to 71.4 percent in 1965, 75.9 percent in 1970, and 84.2 percent in 1975. Moreover, it was revealed that the lowest 10 percent of university graduates' starting salaries in 1976 were below those of the highest 10 percent of senior-high graduates. The difference in monetary earnings between university graduates and senior-high graduates is becoming more and more negligible.

There are, however, more opportunities for promotion for a university graduate, and in a lifetime, on the average, he or she will earn about $440,000, while the total earnings of a senior-high graduate will be around $330,000. But hypothetically, if a person invested the same amount of money as the cost of university education in a trust bond at the age of 18 and started working, then that person's total income (from earnings and interest) would be more than $550,000. In other words, the economic benefit of university education is not so great as people tend to imagine. Indeed, in several business firms, management has already adopted a salary scale without any distinction relative to employees' educational backgrounds. Statistics in the *White Paper on Labor* also indicate that the starting salary of high school graduates increased 21.9 percent over previous years in 1975, while the increase in the rate for university graduates was only 18.3 percent.

One of the problems of those young people who take jobs at the age of 15 or 18, however, is the high percentage of people who leave their jobs. During the calendar year of 1975, some 250,000 workers under 20 years of age (17.6 percent of the age group) were reported to have left their jobs. A more detailed study conducted by the Ministry of Labor showed that of those who obtained a job upon graduation from high school in 1970, some 20 percent quit the job within a year, 30 percent within three years, and another 20 percent within five years. In all, therefore, 70 percent of the new workers of 1970 were not on the same job in 1975. These figures are striking. They include, of course, women who married and quit work, and an additional number of young people might have decided to go back to school. But the majority of the people quit because they felt more or less alienated. They thought that the jobs they took were not what they had expected, complained that their work was too dull or monotonous, or felt that the human relations aspects were too difficult to handle. Fortunately, because of the high demand for the young labor force, these young people who quit do not have much difficulty in finding another job; but it is likely that these young workers will discover other jobs also to be dissatisfying and disappointing.

Except for the ambitious and fortunate few who achieve upward mobility by changing jobs, many young people turn out to be "wandering workers" who hop from one job to another, dreaming of satisfying employment. The police and courts have discovered that significant numbers of juvenile delinquents happen to be "job hoppers." Therefore, it is too optimistic to conclude that full employment provides youth with a satisfactory sociopsychological environment. Quite the contrary, full employment has created hundreds of thousands of "straying sheep," who believe that there must be a better job than the one they have.

Another problem in the current youth labor market of Japan is the status of women. Except for very limited areas of employment, such as civil service (including teaching jobs in public schools), women are treated differently from men. For instance, the banking business will recruit hundreds of women who have graduated either from senior high school or junior college as tellers and secretaries; these positions are exclusively for women. But the university graduates recruited by the same bank are men who are hired exclusively as future executives, and it is quite improbable that a woman would be given such an opportunity. Generally speaking, it is safe to say that women are expected to perform supplementary clerical work for men.

Naturally, many women are indignant about unequal employment opportunities, but employers justify their reluctance to hire women with the fact that young women seldom stay on their jobs. Top executives of business firms repeatedly claim that women usually work only for two or three years and then get married and settle down as full-time housewives. This is especially true among university graduates, who come to work at the age of 22 and get married at the age of 24 or 25. "Two years are just a training period," one executive sighed, and continued, "They leave at the very time when they become competent." Therefore, executives prefer to have 18-year-old senior high school graduates or 20-year-old junior college graduates, because they may be willing to work for five or six years. Indeed, young women, especially in urban middle-class strata, often admit that work is a temporary "experience in the real world." They spend two or three years, partly for fun, as an intermediate period between school and married life. Labor statistics of 1975 show that, on the average, women work only 4.3 years.

4

Employment Policies and Practices

Government agencies have attempted to stabilize youth employment, particularly through career guidance to both junior-high and senior-high graduates, who tend to be careless in their choice of occupations due to the high demand for them from prospective employers. The Employment Security Offices (ESO) urges employers to provide accurate information to enable youth to compare specific working conditions with their own characteristics and expectations before they decide which job to take. ESO also investigates this information and issues warnings to employers who do not give correct information to prospective employees. In extreme cases, ESO has refused to help recruit for irresponsible employers. Since ESO is the only official agency through which employment information is exchanged, a suspension of its information flow is a serious punishment for employers.

ESO, in cooperation with high schools, also provides a lecture series for students who are looking for jobs, and most local ESOs have a counseling section where a student can discuss his or her own work-related problems with professional counselors. The students are encouraged, at the same time, to take vocational aptitude tests, readiness tests, and other tests sponsored by ESO so that they can be more fully aware of their own potential. In 1952, ESO began to hire professional vocational counselors, and by 1976 there were 581 counselors working all over Japan.

High schools are not able to afford a full-time vocational counselor; usually the head of the school is nominally in charge of educational guidance, and teachers spare some class time for counseling. But on the university level, the administration offices usually have a vocational guidance section with a small full-time staff. For example, at Keio University, one of the most famed private universities in Tokyo, 16 staff members work to coordinate student employment. Employers send recruitment announcements to this office, creating a "mini-library" for student use. Members of the staff visit companies to obtain information, transmit this information to students, respond to questions from students, and assist students in finding and applying for available jobs.

Firms seeking qualified and capable young university graduates compete in recruitment. For example, a student with high scholastic achievement in business administration or in computer science will receive job offers from a handful of large firms. These companies once even recruited the top students a year or two before their graduation. In some cases, companies "reserved" brilliant students by giving them financial assistance while they were still on the campus. This method, usually called "early harvesting," became so disturbing from an educational point of view that the Ministry of Labor, the Ministry of Education, and industrial organizations jointly agreed on a "recruitment embargo." In 1975, firms were permitted to start recruitment and examinations only six months before the date of graduation.

In addition to ESO and university administrations, a private organization called Japan Recruitment Center has been a very active information clearinghouse for employers and students, and at the same time gives vocational aptitude tests and personality tests for employers who do not have staff psychologists.

Each local government has schools that give specialized skill training in automobile repair, plastics, textiles, and so forth: there were 437 such training schools in 1975, and some

210,000 young people took their courses as trainees. The instructions are given free of charge, and the trainees may borrow a modest amount in monthly aid, without any interest, which they are to pay back after they get jobs. Among these 437 training schools, there are 11 schools specially designed for the physically handicapped; as of 1975, some 2,000 handicapped youths were enrolled in training programs.

The most interesting trend in vocational training in contemporary Japan, however, is the establishment and maintenance of training facilities by private industries. As of 1975, there were 365 such institutions authorized by prefectural governors. A remarkable example is Toden Gakuen of Tokyo Electric Power Co., which was authorized in 1959. Providing electricity requires highly specialized practical skills as well as solid theoretical knowledge, so the company decided to have its own training school rather than recruit regular senior high school graduates. Each spring, approximately 200 junior-high graduates (one out of four applicants) are taken into this school through a competitive examination, and for three years these young people are full-time students in the equivalent of a regular senior high school. The campus is located in a suburb of Tokyo; students live in clean dormitories, and excellent facilities are provided for various sports and extracurricular activities. Classes meet from 8:30 A.M. to 3:30 P.M., and the curriculum consists of 150 units, including 100 units in history, math, English, political science, arts and so forth—the same courses in a normal high school curriculum—plus 50 units of highly technical classes on generators, transformers, civil engineering, and so on, which are indispensable in the practice of electrical work. The students in this special vocational high school are, in other words, given more knowledge and practical skill than regular senior high school students.

What makes these students even happier than regular students is the fact that their tuition fee, dormitory fee (including meals), uniform, physical education clothes, and other expenses are all taken care of by the company, and moreover, each student gets about $40 monthly as an allowance for incidental expenses. Upon completion of three years of academic work, students get a diploma equivalent to that of a senior high school, and at the same time they are given positions in Tokyo Electric Power Co. as full-time employees. With their concentrated training, they have no difficulty in adjusting to the work situation. From their first day of appointment, they are capable of working on a construction site as junior electrical engineers.

The graduates are obligated to work for the company on a full-time basis. However, if a person is given a high evaluation by his supervisor, he can go on to a higher company-operated training school equivalent to a junior college after a minimum of three years' work. This training course provides young employees with a more sophisticated curriculum in such courses as electrical engineering, economics, applied mathematics, statistical analysis, and so on, and for a period of two years they study as full-time students. During these two years, the students are paid a monthly salary by the company as regular employees. Upon graduation from this course, the employee-students have to go back to work, but again, if they wish to, they may attend a company-operated university course after a minimum of two years' work, with arrangements similar to the junior college course. The students are paid their full salary, and on this level the curriculum is highly technical, incuding thermodynamics, atomic energy, high-voltage engineering, and computer science. After finishing their graduation thesis, these people go back to the company as supervisors, chief engineers, and other managerial personnel.

These junior college and university courses are, in spite of the excellent instruction, not formally approved by the Ministry of Education, so graduates are not given formal degrees, but within the Tokyo Electric Power Company, they are treated equally in terms of salary scale and promotion with those who graduated from other colleges and universities.

Other major electric power companies have adopted systems similar to that of Tokyo Electric Power Company. They recruit young people at the age of 15 and train them in such a way that they can attain both academic achievements and job opportunities.

In Japan, electric power companies are semi-public corporations, but many firms in the private sector have also established their own training facilities. For example, Matsushita Electric Company, the manufacturer of Panasonic products, has very intensive and extensive training programs. This company also has its own high school, but in addition to recruiting "outside" students, the company recruits 80 distinguished workers among its thousands of employees every year on the recommendation of their supervisors. The young workers selected spend a full year as trainees at the Matsushita Engineering School and are trained in mechanics—both theory and practice. Classes meet 750 hours annually, and students spend another 1,000 hours operating various new machines so that they can keep up with rapid technological innovations. Upon completion of training and final tests, they are given "skill grades" and are exempt from skill tests conducted by the government.

There are apparently many advantages in these training schools operated by private industries. On the part of management, these schools are the most reliable source of manpower, especially in view of the fact that the graduates meet so perfectly the specific demands and requirements of each firm. The morale of the young people is, for obvious reasons, much higher than that of ordinary high school students. Of course, the establishment and maintenance of this kind of school are expensive, but in the long run, management believes that the return in terms of high-quality labor will exceed the invested money. Moreover, such schools enable companies to avoid the waste, and sometimes risks, involved in recruiting regular high school graduates.

The young people who are accepted by these schools naturally see many advantages as well. First of all, they can have job security at the age of 15; companies that have their own private schools are, without exception, big organizations, so students at these schools will hardly be disappointed in the work awaiting them. Above all, students can concentrate on their academic and technical work because they are free from tuition fees and other educational expenses and they do not need to worry about the severe entrance examinations which are the major concern of the majority of regular senior high school students. Therefore, the private technical and vocational schools are attracting the attention of competent junior high school graduates who wish to work as skilled workers with a wide range of possibilities for promotion in the future.

Local governments, under the authorization of the Ministry of Labor, conduct Skill Grade Tests for certificates in 82 different occupations involving 153 particular skills. Tests are divided into First Grade and Second Grade. In 1975, approximately 60,000 young workers took the test for the First Grade and 25,000 of them passed. For the Second Grade, 40,000 out of the 100,000 applicants qualified. Possession of a certificate increases the confidence of young people and also leads to promotion and other advantages in working conditions. Both public and private schools trainees are encouraged to take these tests; skilled workers are in high demand not only by private firms but also by the national economy at large.

Working conditions of Japanese youth are not totally protected. Labor laws in Japan prohibit the work of youth under 15 and place restrictions on employers with regard to workers under 18 in such areas as working hours, night work, sanitation, and number of paid holidays. In larger firms, the employers generally abide by these regulations, but in smaller industries working conditions are far less protected. In 1975, the Ministry of Labor discovered that 108,000 employers out of 165,000 (65 percent) violated labor laws and regulations. These employers were given warnings by public administration offices in charge of labor affairs, and some of them were legally prosecuted. The significant gap between the quality of working conditions in big industries and minor industries naturally makes youth wish to work for the former, and as a result smaller firms cannot get competent young workers. This situation creates a vicious circle: smaller businesses do not have enough qualified young workers, so they cannot increase productivity; the less successful they are, the less competent youth are willing to work for them.

Women's labor also suffers from a vicious circle. As discussed earlier, employers usually do not want women, especially university graduates, because young women often work for only three or four years and then quit their jobs when they get married. There seems to be a mutual expectation between employers and young prospective female employees that the employment of women is temporary and auxiliary to men's work. In fact, in certain banking businesses and trading companies, women are employed on the condition that they retire at the age of 30. The implication is that women over 30 have no opportunity for promotion to executive positions, and employers are not willing to pay high salaries to women of that age. Also, there is a traditional sociopsychological tendency to look upon female workers as "the flowers of the office." In the department stores of Japan, for instance, employers assume that customers expect only charming young women to serve them; this assumption may be unwarranted, existing only in the minds of the employers.

All of these assumptions about working women seem to be accepted by the women themselves. Many young women persuade themselves that they are needed only as temporary and auxiliary workers, and this makes them much less motivated than men, which in turn justifies the employers' tendency to hire young women on the assumption that they will not work for long. In a word, women are generally regarded as a temporary, flexible, and cheaper source of labor which employers can draw on as they wish.

Ironically, women's temporary labor has been in high demand in times of economic recession. Figure 3 shows the changes in labor demand during recession compared with previous years. As is apparent from the figure, the labor demand for men in July–December 1974 was 46.5 percent less than that of the same period of 1973, probably the worst in the past decade, and recovery of employment for men has been very slow, although the figure came up to 7.7 percent in January–March 1976. In contrast, the recovery of the demand for female workers and temporary workers was quite remarkable. It attained +0.3 percent and +1.0 percent respectively, early in 1976, while the recovery rate was still minus for men and full-time workers. It is safe to conclude that employers wanted to hire temporary female workers because they were more flexible and less expensive than full-time male workers.

Indeed, temporary hiring of women has become more and

Figure 3. Changes in labor demand, 1974–1976



more popular in recent years, especially since 1960. On the one hand, there are many employers looking for flexible labor because of the fluctuating economy; on the other hand, there are many women, including housewives, who can spare a few hours a day and are willing to earn extra income. Therefore, a small sewing firm, for instance, may circulate an announcement in its neighborhood saying that the firm needs several part-time workers for certain periods of time, a few hours a day, with modest pay. The work in this case may be simple sewing, and it is not difficult for the firm to recruit housewives in the neighborhood.

Part-time female labor of this kind became so popular that recommendations were made by advisory committees to the Ministry of Labor and the Ministry of Social Welfare in 1969 aimed at protecting part-time female workers. It is encouraging, in recent years, to see independent and professional women working in many sectors of society, though their number is still very small. But it remains important to cut the vicious circle not only by raising the status of women but also by training more professionally capable female workers. This is an area where more policy measures must be taken in the future.

5

Impact of Changes in Education

As discussed in Chapter 2, the great majority of junior high school graduates—those who finish compulsory education—choose to attend senior high school. Indeed, senior high school education in Japan today is, at least culturally, semicompulsory. Figure 4 indicates the speed of the growth of advanced education in Japan in comparison with other major industrial countries. It is quite possible that during the coming decade, the youths who enter senior high school upon completion of compulsory education will reach virtually 100 percent. And in spite of the heavy learning load, most of those who enter senior high school will finish. According to the statistics of the Ministry of Education, in 1975, 97.1 percent of the youths who had entered senior high school three years earlier graduated. In other words, the rate of high school dropouts was only 2.9 percent. As will be discussed in Chapter 7 some of these dropouts become involved in juvenile delinquency and crimes, but it should be noted that the drop-out rate in Japan is amazingly low in comparison with other industrial countries.

The drop-out rate is relatively low on the university level as well. Among those who entered colleges and universities in 1969, 79.1 percent graduated in 1973, and an additional 8.8 percent graduated in 1974 after studying an extra year. The rate varies by departments: generally speaking, students in natural sciences found normal graduation after four years of study

Figure 4. Percentage of junior high school students who entered senior high school, selected countries, 1960–1975



Source: Japan, Ministry of Education (1976), p. 32.

much more difficult (in physics, for instance, only 60 percent graduated in 1973) than the students in humanities (the highest being home economics–nearly 90 percent). These figures mean that more than 10 percent of those who entered the university dropped out, although some of them might have graduated in their sixth year. The percentage of university students who graduate after the normal four years of study, however, has been declining. For 1974 graduates, the percentage was 78.4 percent, and for 1975 graduates, it dropped to 75.0 percent. In other words, as their number increases, college and university students find it increasingly difficult to graduate.

Furthermore, as indicated earlier, even those who graduate face increasing difficulty finding jobs appropriate to their educational backgrounds. It is an embarrassing experience for a philosophy major to take a job as an automobile salesman, or for an economics major to work for a primary school. Of course, a fortunate few still obtain "elite" careers as government officials or as junior executives in a big steel or chemical company, but for the majority of university graduates, the job opportunities are not as they (or their parents) expected. The person seeking a secure occupation may find it wiser to take more practical vocational training rather than go to a liberal arts college.

In order to cope with this particular new problem of education vis-à-vis employment, in July 1975, a new law was passed by parliament amending the School Education Law to give official recognition to professional schools as alternatives for postsecondary education, and partially to subsidize these professional schools with government funds.

Under Japanese law, in addition to the official schools there is a category called *Kakushu Gakko*, meaning "miscellaneous schools." This category includes cooking schools, driving schools, flower-arrangement classes, foreign-language schools, sewing schools, accounting schools, and many others. These schools are under local jurisdiction and are simply approved by local authorities. They are easy to establish, and for the general public, including young people, it is easy to get accepted, usually without entrance examination. Upon completion, students acquire a certificate for the particular skills attained, but these certificates are not equivalent to the formal diplomas which accredited high schools, colleges, and universities give to their graduates. In 1975, there were 8,000 major "miscellaneous schools" scattered all over Japan with 1,200,000 students, the majority of whom were young people. The parliamentary amendment of 1975 classified some of these "miscellaneous schools" as "professional schools," placing them under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education.

Professional schools, as defined by law, are educational institutions whose goal is "to promote the abilities necessary for various professions and/or for everyday practice," and there are three minimum requirements: (1) a professional school must give at least one year of continuous education; (2) it must give more than 800 hours instruction; and (3) it must have a minimum of 40 full-time students. A professional school which takes junior high school graduates is called a "professional high school," and one which accepts senior high school graduates is simply called a "professional school." The law also defines the qualifications of teaching staff. For a "professional high school," teachers must have (1) at least four years of teaching experience during school, (2) at least two years of experience after graduation from junior college, or (3) a B. A. degree. For "professional schools," teachers must have (1) at least six years of research or teaching experience, (2) at least two years teaching experience after graduation from universities, or (3) an M. A. degree.

When a school meets these requirements, the Ministry of Education gives its authorization, which is accompanied by various privileges. For example, an authorized professional school is eligible to receive long-term, low-interest loans from a foundation subsidized by the government. Such a school is also exempt from most national and local taxation, and its students are allowed to purchase commuting tickets from Japan National Railways at a discount.

The graduates of authorized professional schools are given diplomas which qualify them as professionally trained people and which are advantageous when the graduates look for jobs. For instance, a professional-school graduate trained in shorthand will without doubt be hired as a professional stenographer; in fact it is very likely that a business executive would prefer such a professional stenographer to a university graduate who majored in Greek philosophy or Chinese literature. In a word, these new schools are designed to meet the demands for a professionally trained labor force.

The establishment of new professional institutions does not imply, of course, that the government has shifted emphasis from the regular institutionalized school system to more practical professional education. Rather, it has shifted from a monolithic educational philosophy to a pluralistic view of education. By establishing and encouraging professional schools, the Ministry of Education seems to be reshaping the model of the educational system in Japan. Figure 5 shows the emerging system—a system which means more alternatives for advanced education in Japan.

As far as employment opportunities are concerned, even before the authorization of the professional schools in 1975, certain "miscellaneous schools" demonstrated that they provided expert training and promoted high achievement in many professional areas. For example, graduates of a baking school in Tokyo were in extremely high demand. Major hotels, restaurants, and pastry shops had been suffering from a shortage of expert manpower, and these establishments competed with each other to recruit the graduates of this particular school.

Business managers, too, are tending to reconsider the "manpower mix." As a matter of fact, business consultants have discovered that firms which had been so eager to recruit the graduates of big-name universities were overloaded with executives. These executives were well educated, of course, but they did not want to work as supervisors of factory work. They were

Figure 5. Patterns of progression of students through educational system


Graduate School
University
Junior College
Professional School
Senior High School
Junior High School
Professional High School
Primary School
Kindergarten

even reluctant to work for the sales department. Being "elite," these people took it for granted that the only positions appropriate for them were managerial posts in the headquarters office. As a result, these firms became "top heavy" and less productive. The consultants suggested that it was a management illusion to think that young men who achieved excellent academic grades were also men of highly motivated talents in business. Therefore, the consultants proposed a better "manpower mix" of university graduates, high school graduates, and professional school graduates as indispensable to improve productivity and morale in a business firm. One successful example is the case of Panasonic. Of the 26 members of its board of directors, only 12 were university graduates; the rest, including the president, had finished only compulsory education. Thus, the newly instituted professional schools are promising both in terms of solid job opportunities for graduates and in terms of morale and self-awareness of students.

Indeed, by definition, the goals of professional school students are more sharply focused than those of liberal arts students. They know what they are and what they can and will be, while the self-images of liberal arts college students are more or less ambiguous. Like the trainee-students of the electric power company discussed in Chapter 4, students in certain professional schools are very confident about their particular skill and talent, and many employers look forward to hiring professionally trained young people along with, if not instead of, graduates of regular colleges and universities.

It is important to note that, compared with "regular" educational institutions, professional schools are extraordinarily flexible in their adaptation to changing societal needs. For example, two decades ago, when the computer emerged, a "miscellaneous school" specializing in computer sciences was established. The school attracted not only future-oriented young people but also mid-career business executives. Those who completed the course became the first Japanese people literate in the new technology. Such an instantaneous, flexible response could hardly be expected of "regular" schools. Indeed, it was at least ten years before major universities set up courses in computer science, partly in response to the computer courses established in the less prestigious "miscellaneous school." Universities, as many critics have said, are so rigid and conservative that they are often unable to cope with innovations, technological as well as sociocultural. In this sense, some professional schools may be seen as innovators in education. As of 1977, there are 152 authorized professional schools in Tokyo and more than 400 all over Japan.

One of the most neglected segments of the young population in Japan today is the small number of young men and women working in the agricultural sector of the economy. Rapid urbanization and industrialization, coupled with mechanized farming, have significantly decreased the agricultural population in general and the number of young farmers in particular over the past two decades. Government agencies, especially the Ministry of Agriculture, have been making efforts to provide training opportunities for youths in rural communities.

One of the first steps was the inauguration in 1968 of the Farmers' University, a subsidiary of the Ministry of Agriculture. Every year, 50 senior high school graduates under 25 (male only) with a minimum of one year's practical experience in farming are admitted to the university, where for three years they are trained in both the theory and practice of modern agriculture. All students live together in dormitories, and the cost is totally subsidized by the government. In addition to the Farmers' University, there are 318 training centers of various types for young farmers. Among these, 56 are devoted to intensive agricultural education at the senior-high or college level, and students are trained for a year or two on a full-time basis. These training centers are all public, and operated mostly under the auspices of local governments. In 1976, some 4,200 young people were being trained at these centers at a cost to the government of approximately $1 million.

Furthermore, the national government offers financial aid to encourage young farmers to succeed their parents on the family farm instead of migrating into industrial urban areas. For instance, young farmers interested in trying some new agricultural technology or crop can borrow $700 to cover the expenses of their education and experiments. The loan must be paid back within three years, but at no interest. When a young farmer decides to start a new agricultural venture, a government loan of $6,000 is available. This loan also is interest free, and repayment must be completed within five years. In 1975, another financial-aid program for young farmers was established. Under this program, a young farmer can get $1,800 while he is trained either in training centers or at qualified farms. Again, the loan is to be repaid in five years, and no interest is charged. In 1976, these special loans totaled almost $35 million.

Similar policies were adopted, in terms of both training facilities and financial aid, for youth in other areas of the primary sector of economy, such as forestry and fishing. The growth of government subsidies in these fields has been significant in recent years.

In another effort to encourage young workers, both in agriculture and industry, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Labor, in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, are conducting international exchange programs. In 1975, 75 selected young farmers between the ages of 18 and 30 with high school educations were sent to the United States (47), Canada (5), and western European countries (23). These farmers spent a year on foreign farms to study modern farming technology and to bring back their experiences to their own farms in Japan. Also, since 1968, bilateral exchange programs for young factory workers have been established with the United States and West Germany. In 1975, 13 skilled young workers between the ages of 21 and 29 were selected and sent to these countries.

On a different level, the Prime Minister's Office charters a passenger boat called "The Youth" every year and conducts a cruising tour in the Pacific, mostly in the Southeast Asia area, for six weeks. In 1975, some 350 young people joined this tour to improve their international understanding. The tour is fully subsidized by the government and the participants must be young workers between 20 and 24. Students are excluded from this program. Though the number of youths who participate in these programs is very small, there is no doubt that the existence of the programs is very encouraging for millions of working youths.

6

Access and Equality of Education

With the growth of the GNP, per capita income in Japan has also increased in the past two decades. The ratio of disposable income to total earning of each household and each individual has also risen. The income-tax policy, with its heavy emphasis on progressive taxation, has succeeded in shaping Japan as a typical middle-income, middle-class society. The distribution of income among the population is represented by an almost perfect normal curve, the median being approximately U.S. $10,000 per year. The consumer market has been showing tremendous expansion, and the distributive sector of the Japanese economy is dynamic and expanding.

However, by definition, a normal curve means that there are many households in which income is below average. For those in the lower to middle income bracket, the relative cost of education for their children is very high, and it may be safe to infer that many young people who take jobs at the age of 15 are the children of these lower-income families. Moreover, with the rise of education costs, even middle-income families often find it difficult to finance their children's education. As a matter of fact, government statistics show that, on the average, parents must pay at least $50 per year for a public primary school child to cover miscellaneous expenses.

The cost of higher education, especially at the university level, has become more and more expensive, and it is not unusual to find tuition fees of over $1,500 per academic year among the more expensive private universities. In addition, parents often must buy school bonds, contribute to the construction of new buildings, and so forth. Therefore, when students are accepted by a university, they or their parents must be prepared to pay up to $2,000 a year altogether. According to a survey conducted by the Ministry of Education in 1974, a student in an average private university paid $900 in tuition fees and $1,200 for housing and living expenses, and considering the incredible inflation that took place after 1974, there is no doubt that a student in a private university today would have to have a minimum of at least $2,000 a year and in many cases far more. This, of course, creates a very heavy burden for the student's parents.

Moreover, there has been an ironic development in the relationship between social class and type of university. As discussed earlier, Japanese national universities were founded in order to recruit competent young people, regardless of their family backgrounds. This tradition has continued until today, and the tuition fee of the national universities remains extremely low—a nominal amount of $200 per year—which most households in contemporary Japan can afford. However, recently it was discovered that the majority of the students at national universities came from middle- or upper-middle-class families with annual incomes exceeding $20,000. The reason is that in upper-middle-class households, each child is given not only his or her own private room but also all necessary study aids, including good private tutors. As a result, these privileged young people tend to have an advantage in the competitive entrance examination to national universities, especially in Tokyo and Kyoto. Those children less privileged in terms of living conditions are likely to fail the examination and therefore go to private universities where tuition and other expenses are much higher than those of national institutions. In a word, the trend indicates that the children of well-to-do families have more opportunities to enter inexpensive and prestigious universities, while youths in the lower social strata are more or less obliged to go to expensive private universities.

This is the reverse of the popular image of national and private universities of a few decades ago. Formerly, the image of a national university student was that of the brilliant young person from lower social strata with high aspiration, while a private university student was the son of a wealthy family. The underprivileged, bright young man was compensated for his social handicap by inexpensive tuition fees at the national university, in contrast to the privileged young man of the upper class, who attended expensive private institutions. An invisible equalizing effect was working in the division between public and private educational institutions. But in recent years, the equalizer does not appear to be working.

In view of the higher cost of education and the financial difficulties of students, not only in college and universities but also in junior high schools, the Japan Scholarship Foundation, a government subsidiary, has been expanding its financial-aid program for underprivileged young people. On the senior high school level, a student is qualified to apply for a scholarship of $150 to $260 a year if his or her family's annual income is below $12,500. On the university level, children of families with income of less than $15,500 are eligible to apply for a scholarship of $500 to $1,000 per year. Special arrangements are made for working students who are taking courses in correspondence universities. In their case, a maximum of $2,000 is awarded as a scholarship. In 1976, the Japan Scholarship Foundation spent $160 million, and the number of student recipients was approximately 330,000.

Even though the scholarship programs help many young students, the absolute amount of money they receive each month is far from sufficient, and students often have to look for other financial sources to supplement scholarships and allowances given by their parents. As mentioned before, some 80 percent of college and university students have part-time jobs, known among students as "arbeit." The most desired but most difficult job to obtain is that of private tutor for primary or junior high school students. Children's admission to a prestigious university is the ultimate goal for many parents, if not for the children themselves, so good private tutors are desired among urban middle- and upper-middle-class families. because private tutorial instructions by qualified university students may mean a great advantage during the entrance examination. A student who can get this kind of job may earn something like $3.00 an hour, 30 to 50 hours a month. Indeed, looking at this private tutorial market, one may feel that a quasi-Keynesian economy is in action: on the one hand are students at the age of 21 or 22 who have passed the entrance examination to the university, and on the other hand are millions of young people between the age of 10 and 17 who hope to succeed in the severe competition. Thus the universities and their students expand the market for tutorial services. But here again, a social irony emerges. For obvious reasons, parents prefer as tutors students of good national universities; therefore, those who are privileged to begin with are also more privileged in this particular job market. Though private tutorial service is not organized as an "industry," simple calculation demonstrates that the aggregate earnings from tutorial service amount to at least $10 million each year.

Of university students working part time, 24 percent are private tutors. The remaining "arbeiters" are either clerical or unskilled laborers, who work mostly during summer vacation. However, it is important to note that approximately 15 percent of university students are working on a full-time basis. For some of them, means often turn out to be ends, and Japanese university administration officers are familiar with students whose names are registered but who scarcely ever show up in person. As seen in Chapter 5, more than 10 percent of those who are admitted do not complete their course, and it is very likely that a considerable portion of these dropouts overlap with students working full time. Indeed, it seems that the boom in higher education has placed an unbearable economic burden on many students' (or their parents') shoulders. High aspiration coupled with the conformity psychology in higher education is fine, but one must also have a solid economic basis on which to materialize this aspiration.

Article 26 of the Japanese Constitution states that "All people shall have the right to receive an equal education correspondent to their ability, as provided by Law," and young people in economic difficulty may claim that they have a constitutional right for their handicaps to be compensated. The scholarship programs discussed earlier are only one of many efforts to provide access to higher education for less privileged young people.

There is an unusual institution through which working youths can earn senior high school as well as university-level credits through correspondence. NHK (the public broadcasting system) started a special educational radio program in 1953 and a television program in 1960. By law, if a person wants to obtain a senior high school diploma, he or she must send an application to an organization called the NHK Gakuen (NHK School) and pay a very modest tuition fee. There is no entrance examination, and a student receives textbooks and other instructional materials from the headquarters of the school. The broadcast curriculum is identical to that given at regular high schools and meets the requirements and regulations of the Ministry of Education. On weekdays, NHK broadcasts the special program from 9:00 to 11:00 P.M. over its educational television channel and from 8:00 to 11:00 P.M. over the radio. For the convenience of students, a certain number of hours are broadcast every Sunday as well.

The students, mostly working youth, watch and listen to these programs after working hours, taking notes and consulting textbooks and other printed materials. They are expected to spend another hour or two on homework. The programs are scheduled in such a way that students can be exposed to eight different subjects. Students may send their questions to the headquarters, where a teaching staff answers them. NHK Gakuen is affiliated with some 70 high schools all over Japan, and correspondence students may come for "schooling" in these schools on specified dates, usually for a few days at a time. The "schooling" allows students and instructors to have some personal exchange of ideas and feedback, which they cannot experience through impersonal broadcasts. After watching or listening to the programs and participating in the "schooling" sessions, the students take tests to earn credits. As already seen, the number of youths who leave school after the junior-high level has considerably decreased; among this minority, it is estimated that more than 50 percent now take senior high school correspondence courses. This is only one of the alternatives for those who cannot go on to the "normal" senior high school.

Interestingly, the average age of students in correspondence schools has gone up, and at present is 25. The reason is that many middle-aged people missed educational opportunities during World War II and still wish to acquire higher education. A housewife at the age of 45 who was unable to attend high school 30 years ago may be interested in widening her knowledge, for her, the correspondence high school provides a precious second chance. In a word, correspondence high schools serve not only 15-year-olds who cannot afford a senior-high education but also the older generation who missed opportunities in the past.

On the university level as well there are social devices through which underprivileged youth can attain a formal B.A. diploma. Japanese education law permits university-level instruction by correspondence. Under this arrangement, a person with a senior high school diploma or equivalent is admitted as a student and must earn 124 units for credit during a five-year course. Sixteen universities and eight junior colleges in Japan today offer correspondence courses. Here again, there is no entrance examination, and students are admitted on a first-come, first-served basis. Once admitted, students receive textbooks and other printed materials for study and are given assignments by a tutor. The assigned written papers must be sent to the tutors, who make comments, give advice, and send the papers back to the students. The students and instructors communicate continuously through correspondence. The tutorial instructors are the regular teaching staff of the universities; the correspondence course is an extra load for the professors, but the university pays an extra honorarium accordingly. The textbooks and other reference materials used by correspondence students are identical to those used by regular students. In that sense, there is practically no difference, in either the status or treatment, between regular students and correspondence students, except that the latter have to spend five years instead of four, while the tuition fee for the correspondence course is much less than that for regular students. Because of the flexible time schedule, a working youth who wishes to achieve university-level education often finds correspondence universities convenient and rewarding. In 1974, there were approximately 150,000 students in correspondence universities, of whom 40 percent were women. Here again, there are many middle-aged students who wanted to recover opportunities missed in the 1940s.

However, one should not be overly optimistic about correspondence universities. In the first place, under the law, correspondence students are obliged to earn at least one-quarter of their credits (30) in residence, which means that they should be on campus for a period of intensive personal instruction. In order to fulfill this requirement, a correspondence student must be a full-time regular student for a period of two or three weeks at least. For many working youths, this requirement is very difficult to achieve, because with few exceptions, employers do not want their employees to leave their jobs for weeks. Civil servants who want to take a degree in law school are encouraged to take leave for "schooling" and are even protected by regulation in doing so. But young workers in the private sector, even if they study very hard on assignments at home, seldom can achieve a degree because of the difficulty of getting the required leave of absence from their jobs.

Moreover, in spite of the fact that the students of correspondence universities are, upon completion of their credit work, awarded a formal B.A. degree, their degree is often regarded as "lower' than that of regular students at four-year colleges and universities, without reason. Graduates of correspondence universities thus still find themselves socially handicapped, and consequently, for those who wish to use a B.A. degree as a "ticket to success," correspondence universities are a somewhat frustrating experience. Financial aid to correspondence universities from the Ministry of Education is also far from sufficient.

In order to solve the problem of university-level education not being able to meet the "popular demand" and to provide equal access and opportunities for the general public who wish to get a university education, the Ministry of Education finally decided to start a Broadcasting University, an independent educational institution utilizing the most sophisticated television technology. Kato and Postgate (1975) studied this new university for UNESCO and made the following observation (pp. 242–243):

> The aim of the Broadcasting University is "to cultivate a capacity for understanding problems, the intelligence to solve them and a creative policy to plan for the future in changing world." If the plan goes ahead, this will be achieved through a degree course lasting for a minimum of four years, composed of three terms of 15 weeks, with broadcast programs on seven days a week for the first two years. . . . Initially the university will operate only in the densely populated Kanto area (in which Tokyo is situated) and in one rural area. An initial entry of 8,000 is contemplated, building up to a student population of 40,000 in four years. Expansion into other areas will depend upon the experience of the first year.

The inauguation of the Broadcasting University was originally scheduled for 1976 but was postponed until 1979. Despite its being a grand public investment which can be only partially redeemed through tuition fees, it is now definite that this new institution will materialize. One of the most important aspects of the Broadcasting University, however, is that its goal is to renovate—if not revolutionalize—the conventional curriculum of the traditional university. The students will have a much wider choice of elective subjects, and the courses will be interdisciplinary and free from conventional departmentalization. The success of the Broadcasting University may contribute not only to a new equalizing effect but also to a breakthrough in the traditional and often stagnant university system in Japan.

7

Values and Deviants

A survey conducted by the prime minister's office in 1975 revealed that the majority of youths today, quite in contrast with their popular image, were more or less satisfied with what they were and with the conditions under which they lived. As Table 2 shows, to the question "Are you satisfied with your present life?" 19.8 percent answered "Yes, very much" and another 53.8 percent said "Yes, mostly." Only 21 percent answered "Not so much," and 4.9 percent that they were "Dissatisfied." The data also show that men are less satisfied than women and that the older group (20–24) are more dissatisfied than the younger group (15–19). These figures indicate, however, that youths today are less frustrated than the public tends (or wants) to perceive. Indeed, it seems that any

Table 2. Degree of satisfaction of young people, 1975

		Very much	*Mostly*	*Not so much*	*Dissatisfied*	*No Response*
Total		19.8	53.8	21.0	4.9	0.4
Men		18.4	50.7	24.9	5.8	0.3
Women		21.0	56.3	17.9	4.3	0.6
Men	15-19	21.5	48.5	23.6	5.8	0.5
	20-24	14.3	53.5	26.5	5.7	—
Women	15-19	23.4	54.4	17.2	4.4	0.6
	20-24	18.6	58.2	18.6	4.1	0.5

SOURCE: Japan, Office of the Prime Minister basis for the stereotypical image of "rebellious youth" has almost disappeared, replaced by "soft" young people. The replacement of rebellious youths by gentle young people can be seen from other data. In 1970, a survey revealed that 24.1 percent of youths answered "Yes" to the question, "Do you have any worries," but in 1975, the percentage significantly declined to 14.1 percent.

The widely publicized "generation gap" also seems to have become less serious in recent years. Again, according to a series of surveys by the prime minister's office to the question "Do you talk with your father often?" 51.8 percent of the youths answered "Yes," in 1975, while the figure was only 45.6 percent in 1970. Youths are found to talk more with their mothers: to the similar question about mothers, in 1975, 81.1 percent of young people said "Yes," while the figure in 1970 was 78.6 percent. If the frequency of conversation with parents is an index of the depth of the generation gap, then it is safe to say that the "gap" is much narrower than people usually expect. Indeed, it is rather surprising that in 1975 only 3.1 percent never talked with their fathers and only 1.1 percent never talked with mothers.

One implication of the changes in these figures is that youths in 1970 were different from their succeeding age group. Indeed, youths 20 to 24 in 1970, who were born sometime between 1946 and 1950 were products of the "baby boom," and their life histories and the sociohistorical context in which they lived were dramatically different from those of younger youth groups, as Table 3 indicates.

Two characteristics are obvious. In the first place, the "baby boom" generation was poorly accommodated by society in comparison with succeeding generations. Though their childhood experience was incomparably better than that of preceding groups, who suffered from severe food shortages and poor housing, the "baby boom" generation still had to carry a slight stigma of the postwar period. Their parents, who are in their 50s to early 60s, were the generation who spent their adolescence during the war and had little opportunity for education. Above all, these parents experienced a drastic change in their

Table 3. Selected data for young people born in 1946–1950, 1951–1957 and 1958–1963, Japan

Item	*Age in 1977 and period of birth*		
	27 to 31 years born 1946–50	*20 to 26 years born 1951–57*	*15 to 19 years born 1958–63*
Number (in millions)	2.7	1.8	1.6
Infant mortality rate	61.7%	44.6%	30.7%
Attendance rate in kindergarten	20.1%	31.1%	47.2%
Primary school class size (number of pupils)	31.7	29.2	25.8
Index of household power consumption	54.6	77.9	100.0
Television ownership	15.9%	91.2%	99.0%
Senior high school attendance rate	70.6%	81.6%	91.0%
Percentage born in urban areas	59.0%	60.0%	67.0%
College and university attendance rate	22.2%	37.5%	–
Per capita daily calorie consumption	2,068	2,106	2,273
Woman as percentage of university students	22.5%	31.6%	–

value system in 1945, and therefore could not be, and still cannot be, confident about themselves as well as about the education of their children.

Furthermore, the "baby boom" generation is exceptional in the sense that they were babies of the radical, "pure" democracy. They were exposed to the extremely idealistic philosophy of democracy brought from the West, especially the United States. The new constitution guaranteed freedom and equality and abolished military power; the constitution, most idealistically interpreted, has been the "Bible" for this generation. Teachers in the classroom taught these ideals with extraordinary zeal, and children readily accepted them. The parents were in ideological confusion and unable to give proper instruction to their children. Some of the children of this generation even condemned their parents in the name of democracy and in this sense appeared to be "angry young men."

In addition, this generation experienced heavy psychological pressures from sheer density: their absolute number was 2.7 million; and they found that their lives were extremely competitive, both in school and in employment. This age group was destined to feel as if they were permanently packed in a commuter subway at rush hour. Indeed, in the late 1960s, observers commented on the physical overflow of students in the major urban universities. Classrooms were overcrowded, libraries were packed, and campus cafeterias had not nearly enough seats. Unable to go anywhere, the students who missed seats even in neighborhood coffee shops had to spend their lunch times on the street.

The sense of overcrowdedness combined with democratic idealism to lead this generation easily to overall frustration and resetment. The violent campus unrest that took place in Japanese universities in 1968–1970 may have its origin in the demographic, sociopsychological, and ideological characteristics of the students of the day. As a matter of fact, it is noteworthy that without exception, the radical activists, including the internationally notorious "Japan Red Army," who engaged in the bloody massacre at Tel Aviv, belong to this particular age group. The occasional terrorism still taking place in Japan is committed by criminals (or suspects) whose ages range from 29 to 33, the former "radical youth" of 1968. At the present time, they find themselves to be "radical early middle-age." An important point here is that this age group failed to recruit any younger followers. Naturally they appealed to the younger age groups to strengthen their power, but these age groups generally were negative. The reason is apparent from the data in Table 3. The potential younger followers, in their teens and twenties, are more satisfied with what they are and what they imagine they will be. Their parents, in their 40s or early 50s, were more adaptable to the postwar situation than the parents of the "baby boom" generation, so that better communication and continuities were established between parents and children. The children who were born after 1951, and especially those borne after 1958, are less frustrated in many respects. The feeling of density is reduced among this group – they find more "elbow room," both in the physical and in the psychological sense. In terms of economic conditions, these younger people feel more secure than preceding age groups. The following figures show the percentage of young people whose families are troubled by low income.

	1970	*1975*
Total	22.0%	15.6%
Men	25.2	19.9
Women	18.7	12.3

The problem of low income declined considerably from 1970 to 1975. However, among younger age groups, the impact of the mass media is much stronger than it was on preceding age groups. Younger people in their teens and early twenties today are the children of electronic media. They have been exposed to television since birth, and their parents half jokingly and half seriously regard television as a free babysitter. According to a survey by Nippon Hoso Kyokai (NHK), the public broadcasting corporation, in 1976 young people between the ages of 16 and 19 spent 2 hours and 13 minutes watching television on weekdays and 3 hours and 58 minutes on Sundays – 20 percent more than the hours spent in television viewing in 1970. There is no doubt, thought it is difficult to prove, that the behavior of youths today is more or less influenced by the messages of the mass media, especially the electronic audiovisual media. And as in many other countries, the values transmitted by mass media often conflict with the values taught at home and in school, so it is quite probable that the conflicts internalized in each individual young person may create yet another psychological problem for the younger generation. (See Kato, 1977, for an extensive study of communication regulations designed to protect the youth from undesirable media content, such as sex and violence.)

The young people of Japan today also seem to look to their peers as a source of reassurance. About 73.8 percent of young men and 81.7 percent of young women in Japan today express a definite desire to have close friends with whom they can talk about anything frankly. It is interesting to note that the need for such close friends is felt more among the 20 to 24 age group than the 15 to 19 age group for men, and the pattern of this need is reversed among women.

The peer group seems to function as the dominant frame of reference for young people. The *White Paper on Youth* revealed that, in case of trouble, young people today tend to consult with their close friends rather than with their parents. Figure 6 shows the distribution of the sources of personal consultation among youth. (The respondents were permitted

Figure 6. Responses to the question "To whom do you talk about your troubles?" (1976)



Source: Japan, Office of the Prime Minister (1976).

to nominate more than one source, so that the total exceeds 100 percent.) The psychological intimacy that youth feel with their friends is often very close: 36.4 percent of women and 30.3 percent of men feel that friends are much closer than parents, whereas 24.8 percent of women and 23.5 percent of men think that the psychological distance from friends is almost the same as that from parents. In other words, among many young people today, the people who belong to the same age group are considered the most reliable source of self-assurance and psychological security. Assuming that the common knowledge that youth share with their friends is gathered from the media, it seems that they are oriented toward their horizontal contemporaries rather than toward vertical transgeneration relationships. In this particular sense, there is an apparent "generation gap."

However, the ideal image of parents held by today's youth shows strikingly different attitudes toward the preferred roles of fathers and mothers, as seen in Table 4. The majority of youths are inclined to see their fathers as active in work, while they want to see their mothers engaged in domestic affairs. But

Table 4. Ideal images of parents held by young people in Japan, 1975

The ideal image of father	
Absolutely devoted to occupational life	12.6%
More concerned with occupation than family life	35.3%
More concerned with family life than occupation	38.7%
Devoted to family life	12.3%
No answer	0.8%
The ideal image of mother	
Absolutely devoted to family life	58.2%
More concerned with family than with social activities	37.3%
More concerned with social activities than family life	2.0%
Devoted to social activities	2.1%
No answer	0.4%

SOURCE: Japan, Office of the Prime Minister (1976), pp. 298–299.

it is important to note that 38.7 percent of the youths hold the ideal image of a father who gives priority to family life over occupational life. Indeed, altogether, the ideal image of the father in Japan is quite domestic. Lacking statistical data for the past, a historical comparison cannot be made here; but until a decade ago, the ideal image of a Japanese father was that of a man devoted to social and occupational service, and it may be safe to say that the ideal image has made a significant recent shift from a job-oriented image to a family-oriented one.

These images are very likely projections of the values held by youth concerning themselves. According to a survey conducted by the Japan Recruitment Center in 1974, to the question "Where is the happiness in your life?" 48.8 percent of young men and 41.6 percent of young women answered "challenging job" while 42.0 percent of men and 54.1 percent of women said "family life"; family-oriented youths are as prevalent as job-oriented youth. Indeed, there seems to have been a shift of values from a hard-working life-style to the new life-style in which a happy family life dominates. Japanese journalists often refer to this tendency as the "new family" or "my home-ism."

The incidence of juvenile crime and delinquency among Japanese youths has varied markedly in recent years. The number of youths who committed crimes declined until 1972 but moved upward from 1972 to 1975. Traffic accidents involving human injury peaked in 1969 and since then has steadily decreased (Figure 7). Among juvenile crimes, according to a 1976 statement by police headquarters, violent crimes such as burglary and rape have decreased significantly in the past two years, but theft, especially the stealing of automobiles and motorcycles, has increased. It is also clear that more female crime and delinquency have been discovered in recent years. The number of young women under 20 who were arrested by the police in 1975 was about 11,000, a 10.2 percent increase over the previous year, the comparable number was only 8,500 in 1969. Also significantly, in 1975 most of the juvenile crimes were committed by young people between the ages of 14 and

Figure 7. Juvenile crimes and traffic accidents involving youths, 1966–1975



Source: Japan, Office of the Prime Minister (1976), p. 117.

16. The absolute number and percentage of juvenile crimes by each age group are as follows:

14	22,087	18.9%
15	26,331	22.5
16	25,700	22.0
17	18,364	15.7
18	13,448	11.5
19	10,852	9.3

Fluctuation in juvenile crime by age group over the period 1966 to 1975 is shown in Figure 8.

The interpretation of these facts and figures is extremely difficult; in fact, no persuasive interpretation has been made yet. However, in comparison with other industrial nations of

Figure 8. Juvenile crimes, by age of offender, 1966–1975



Source: Japan, Office of the Prime Minister (1976), p. 134.

the world, it seems fortunate for Japan that juvenile crime and delinquency are relatively low. Generally speaking, Japanese youths still have high aspirations and morale in spite of the competitive educational system and other difficulties. There are, of course, deviants and deviant behavior, both in reality and potentially, but the overall climate of the youth culture is relatively stable and "gentle." It does appear, however, that youth culture in Japan today is entering a new phase never before experienced.

8

The Future

The youth problem in Japan is an extremely complicated one. Facts and research findings often contradict each other, and under such circumstances, it is almost impossible to make any forecast as to what will happen to Japanese youth in the future. But, several problem areas can be defined here.

Problems of Transition

In the first place, it seems that the process of transition from youth to adulthood has become an extraordinarily complicated one. On the one hand, as pointed out by sociologists and psychologists, "early sophistication" has marked the young people of the past few decades. A child at the age of 14 may know what a child of the same age 50 years ago did not, could not, or was even forbidden to know. Fourteen-year-olds today, exposed to media and living in a permissive environment, have easy access to information. "Accelerated growth," represented by early beginning of the menstrual function, has been significant, too. And in that sense, many youths today may be defined as substantially "adults." But on the other hand, subjectively the youth often feel that they are not adults yet.

According to a recent survey conducted by the Nippon Hoso Kyokai (Japan Broadcasting Corporation) Research Division, it was discovered that 51 percent of 18-year-olds felt that they were not adults, and surprisingly enough, even among 27-year-olds, 15 percent said that they were not adults yet (Figure 9).

Figure 9. Percentages of young people who said they did not feel like adults, by age



Source: Tabulated from Nippon Hoso Kyokai, *Public Opinion Polls* (1976).

In such survey research, of course, a question may be raised regarding the definition of adulthood: each respondent might interpret the term "adult" as he or she pleases. But it is quite probable that for the majority of young people today, "adult" means sociopsychological maturity and preparedness or readiness to act as responsible individual citizens, and the figures shown in the graph imply that many young people are skeptical about their own individual maturity. Therefore, it seems that there are ambiguities in the process of transition from childhood and adulthood.

The source of these ambiguities is obvious. In the first place, because of the diffusion of higher education, many young people experience prolonged dependency upon their families and other socializing agents. Even at the age of 20, when young people become treated as adults legally in terms of constitutional rights and duties, they find themselves still dependent upon their families. Indeed, to celebrate their legal adulthood, the Japanese government in 1948 adopted January 15th as "the day of adulthood," a national holiday. Each year on January 15th, 20-year-olds are congratulated on their legal adulthood both at home and at public places like community centers. As a matter of fact, "the day of adulthood" may be seen as a social institutionalization of the rite of passage in a contemporary context. But as Figure 9 shows, at the age of 20, close to half of the youths psychologically do not regard themselves as adults. This high percentage may represent a self-warning defensive reaction to the public recognition of adulthood, which they are not ready to accept.

Such ambiguities did not exist before. When most young people began working in their late teens, their economic independence made them feel like adults; furthermore, among men, compulsory army drafting at the age of 20 clearly marked their adulthood. But today, young people as well as society at large are puzzled about where the borderline is between childhood and adulthood, in spite of (or because of) the official celebration of "the day of adulthood." How can a graduate student at the age of 25, commuting from his parents' house and depending mostly on his parents, prove that he is an adult? Psychologists could argue that sociopsychological regression on a mass scale has been taking place in Japan in recent years.

As discussed in Chapter 2, 80 percent of university students are engaged in part-time "arbeit" of some kind in order to obtain extra income. It is true that part-time jobs are needed by some students for economic reasons, but there are many young students with upper-middle-class backgrounds who need not worry about extra income but who also take part-time jobs. In their case, the motivation for "arbeit" seems to be more psychological than financial. Even though the money they earn is nominal, it may function as a psychological compensation for their feeling of dependency. Even then, they cannot identify themselves either with "kids" or "adults"; they are somewhere between, in the area which advertisers and marketing experts label as "young adults."

This complicated and ambivalent psychology is typified by a letter from a young male student, 23 to his parents: "Hello, Father, I am short of money as usual. Would you please help me a bit? Incidentally, I am going to get married. Mother, how are you? Don't work too hard." This letter was read by a disc jockey over the radio. The young man, now ready to get married, apparently is an adult, but still depends upon his father financially. The most important point is that, like many of his contemporaries, he does not sense any contradiction in what he has said. Youth – to the extent that they are represented by this letter -- have found a comfortable position in society where they take advantage of the privileges and advantages of both childhood and adulthood, while rejecting the handicaps of childhood and responsibilities of adulthood. Such an image of youth is quite revolutionary in modern Japanese history. Future exploration and research efforts are needed in this area.

Dilemmas in Education

The importance of education to employment in Japanese society has been emphasized throughout this paper. The media, especially the serious newspapers, have been extremely energetic in criticizing the current educational system, and there is a popular image and assumption that unless one has a good education (meaning a diploma from the big-name universities), one will not have good opportunities for employment. Schools specializing in preparation for scholastic entrance examination competitions are extraordinarily prosperous in contemporary Japan, and these competitions start even at the kindergarten level as the result of a strange chain reaction. Many parents believe that good kindergartens promise preparation for a good primary school, and good primary schools give their children qualifications for a good junior high school, and after a series of similar good influences, the good university will be the final result. To exaggerate the situation, a three-year-old child must be in a famous kindergarten if his parents (not the child himself) want him to be accepted by a prestigious university 15 years later.

According to a study completed by the Ministry of Education in early 1977, there are thousands of private "supplementary schools" (known as *Juku* in Japanese) for primary and junior high school children. The *Juku* classes meet early in the evening on weekdays and often all day over the weekends. The children finish their regular school around 3:00 P.M. and then attend *Juku* to get supplementary and more advanced curricula for two or three hours. In the Tokyo metropolitan area, it is estimated that more than 30 percent of primary school pupils are enrolled in *Juku,* which is essentially a preparatory school for junior high schools. Since junior high school is compulsory, every child is accepted by the local public school, but hundreds of thousands of parents look forward to seeing their children accepted by a prestigious private school which can be a starting point for successful higher education, which implies, eventually, a successful career.

The result is that many young children in Japan today do not have enough time to rest. From 8:30 A.M. to 3:00 P.M. they attend school, and from 4:00 P.M. to 7:00 P.M. they study at *Juku.* They have to sacrifice weekends for study. Moreover, as discussed in preceding chapters, many families are willing to pay even more money for private tutors at home. In a word, from primary school age on, Japanese children must live in an extremely competitive world, and the only and absolute good for them is to be admitted by big-name universities. Since *Juku* and other extra-school means of instruction apparently are placing tremendous pressures upon young children, a parliamentary subcommittee has taken up this subject as one of the urgent issues in Japanese education. As pointed out in Chapter 1, "craze" is a much better word than "zeal" to describe Japanese education today.

The social implications of the craze for education are diverse and grave. For example, when a Tokyo business executive is transferred to a branch office located in another part of the country, he seldom takes his family with him. He moves to his new office alone, rents a small apartment, and comes back to Tokyo by plane over the weekends. The reason he does not take his family is simply that such a move is a disadvantage to his children, especially the children who are attending a good school. Such family separations due to children's education are rather common practice among the mobile urban middle class, and it is very likely that such separations cause psychological problems for the entire family. Newspaper reporters often criticize this issue, arguing that separation is undesirable for family mental health; but the reporters themselves, when transferred to a local bureau, usually do not take their families because they also feel that their children's education is more important than family togetherness.

Quite contrary to the craze for education, however, there are several indications that the relationship between education and employment is a myth. The "inflation" of university education has made it impossible for university graduates to be assured of managerial jobs in "big industry" (firms with more than 5,000 employees). In the spring of 1977, approximately a half million young people graduated from colleges and universities, but only 16 percent of them were fortunate enough to find employment in government offices and big industries. Even graduates of such prestigious national universities such as Tokyo or Kyoto had to meet severe competition to be taken by big organizations. All the educational effort – all the sacrifices made since the age of four – did not guarantee anything. It has become simply a matter of statistical probability, and the probability for success is becoming lower and lower. Indeed, one can see a pathological trend in the increase in the number of schools. Of course, there are many bright graduate students who are looking forward to achieving an academic profession in the future, but there are also many young students who decided on graduate school simply because they were unsuccessful in employment. These students have only postponed their critical moment for a few years, and for them, graduate school is just a period of waiting.

Another aspect of Japanese education that deserves keen attention is professional schools as an alternative to university education. More and more ambitious young people who want to become professionals are choosing professional schools, because by definition some of these schools guarantee employment opportunities. During the coming decade, it is probable that more and more parents and young people will become aware of this alternative. The Ministry of Education is encouraging the expansion of professional schools, and industries are becoming interested in recruiting professionally trained young people who have graduated from professional schools rather than ordinary liberal-arts college graduates, whose potentialities are grim. As a matter of fact, according to a survey by the Japan Recruitment Center in 1976, 18.6 percent of the youths thought that a professional-school diploma would be more advantageous than a university diploma for getting a job, even though the majority of youths still felt that universities might give them a better job or a higher salary upon graduation.

Strangely enough, a cross-cultural survey conducted by the prime minister's office in 1972 revealed that, compared with youths from other countries, Japanese youths did not feel that education was a factor in job discrimination (Japan, Office of the Prime Minister, 1976, p. 270). To the question "Do you think that people are unduly discriminated against in work because of their educational background?" as seen in the following figures, very few Japanese youths answered "yes."

Country	*Percent answering yes*
Japan	17.5
United States	34.8
England	32.7
West Germany	46.3
France	51.8
Switzerland	42.4
Sweden	17.5
Yugoslavia	67.6

What Japanese youths feel or think might be quite different from reality, but as far as their attitudes are concerned they seem to be more optimistic about their jobs and careers relative to their education than their peers in many parts of the world.

Attitudes Toward Work

The same cross-cultural study (Japan, Office of the Prime Minister, 1976), also discovered that Japanese youths were more work oriented than the young people of the rest of the world. To the question "What is the ultimate value in your life?" the percentage of the young people who answered "challenging work" was conspicuously higher than that in other industrial societies:

Country	*Percent answering "challenging work"*
Japan	28.0
United States	8.9
England	13.3
France	8.8
Sweden	20.7
Yugoslavia	7.5

(German data were not available)

The general public tends to regard contemporary youth as leisure oriented and as a somewhat easy-going generation; and this general image may be correct. But it is important to note that over one-fourth of Japanese youths at least state that they find the value and meaning of their lives in their work. Moreover, in another survey conducted by the Japan Recruitment Center (Japan, Office of the Prime Minister, 1976, p. 263), to the question "Why is work meaningful to you?" 52.5 percent of 18-year-old high school graduates answered "self-realization through work" while 36.6 percent said "income." In other words, for the younger generation today, work is the means by which they develop themselves rather than the means to obtain economic benefit. It is true that youth today are the children of affluence and that they are great spenders and consumers. But at the same time, Japan is one of the very few countries where the work ethic has not disappeared, and high respect is still given to hard work. These research findings may seem to contradict points discussed in earlier chapters, but it is safe to say that in Japan, in cross-cultural comparison, there seem to be more continuities than discontinuities in values and ethics, in spite of the well-defined "generation gap."

In mobile society, especially a society totally dependent upon overseas trade, it is almost impossible to predict the future. But there is one thing that is very certain: Toward the end of this century, the demographic structure of Japan will be quite different from that of today. Life expectancy is becoming longer and longer, and the birth rate is declining. In the year 2000, the "baby boom" generation will reach their early 50s, and society as a whole will be dominated by an old and middle-aged population. At present, Japanese youth enjoy full employment, but it is doubtful if this situation will prevail 25 years from now. More social welfare measures must be taken to prepare for the forthcoming demographic structure, and this may mean a greater burden for the very young new generation who are under 10 at present. As an eminent futurist aptly remarked, "The future is not what it used to be."

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EDUCATION AND YOUTH EMPLOYMENT IN LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

MEXICO
by Alberto Hernandez Medina
and Carlos Muñoz Izquierdo

SOUTH ASIA
by Manzoor Ahmed

STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE
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Mexico

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IN HIGHER EDUCATION

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by Alberto Hernández Medina and Carlos Muñoz Izquierdo and Manzoor Ahmed

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The Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education, 2150 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California 94704, has sponsored publication of this report as part of a continuing effort to obtain and present significant information for public discussion. The views expressed are those of the author.

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number LC 78-64994

International Standard Book Number ISBN 0-931050-05-7

First Edition

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Foreword

This is one of seven publications presenting studies commissioned by the Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education as a means of providing a global perspective for education and youth employment in contemporary societies. The remaining publications will be concerned with education and youth employment in Belgium, by Henry Janne; Japan, by Hidetoshi Kato; Poland, by Barbara Liberska; Great Britain, by Stuart Maclure; Sweden and Denmark, by Gösta Rehn and K. Helveg Petersen, respectively; and the Federal Republic of Germany, by Klaus von Dohnanyi. Margaret M. Gordon, associate director of the Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education, is the general editor of the series. To the authors of these studies, and to Alberto Hernández Medina and Carlos Muñoz Izquierdo, whose work appears in this volume, we express our deep appreciation.

The German Marshall Fund generously provided support for two international conferences on education and youth employment which were attended by several of the authors of studies for this series and which have contributed significantly to the Council's deliberations on this subject. The International Council for Educational Development, under the direction of James A. Perkins, coordinated the conferences and arranged for the participation of the essayists. Pablo Latapi, Director, Prospectiva Universitaria, A. C. Mexico, served as coordinator and adviser on the essay on youth education and employment in Mexico. We acknowledge all of these contributions with profound thanks.

We also wish to extend our thanks to Mary Pernell Frederick and Diana Lorentz for their editorial contributions, and Sylvia Zuck for coordinating manuscript preparation.

CLARK KERR
Chairman
Carnegie Council on Policy Studies
in Higher Education

Part One

Mexico

by Alberto Hernández Medina and
Carlos Muñoz Izquierdo

1

Mexico in Perspective

Mexico in 1977

Mexico's economic progress between 1940 and 1970 was an admirable example of economic growth, though the achievement of social goals was not so remarkable. The economic problem became acute during the 1970s with accelerated inflation, as can be seen by studying minimum wage levels since 1964 (Table I-1). The crisis arrived in 1976 and reached panic levels during the last four months of that year.

Will Mexico recover? Today there is a confident feeling that "we can do it." President Lopez Portillo has inspired confidence, both by promising much-needed honesty in the bureaucracy and by making a personal commitment to take the country out of chaos. Workers as well as industrialists have declared their support for the new president. President Carter has also indicated a personal interest in Mexico's recovery.

The government, industrialists, and market analysts all agree that Mexico can extricate itself from the "Echeverría pothole" by the end of 1978, but much depends on whether the president is resolute in carrying out massive readjustments in the bureaucracy, thus inspiring public confidence; on whether industrialists and labor unions are firmly determined to climb out of the "pothole"; and on whether United States authorities are willing to help wholeheartedly through tourism.

Table I.1. Minimum wages in the Federal District, in current pesos,[a] 1964 to 1977

Year	*Daily wage*	*Monthly wage*
1964–1965	21.50	645.00
1966–1967	25.00	750.00
1968–1969	28.25	847.50
1970–1971	32.00	960.00
1972–August 1973	38.00	1,140.00
September 1973–December 1973	44.85	1,345.00
January 1974–September 1974	52.00	1,560.00
October 1974–December 1975	63.40	1,902.00
January 1976–September 1976	78.60	2,358.00
October 1976–December 1976	96.70	2,901.00
January 1977	106.40	3,192.00

[a] In September 1976, the peso was devalued.

SOURCE: Mexico, National Commission on Minimum Wages (Comision Nacional de Salarios Mínimos).

capital investments, "Good Neighbor Policies," and so forth. The fact that Mexico has much-needed petroleum also cannot be ignored. In short, the solution will come from two sources: *strong will* by some and *good will* by others. The special responsibility of the president of Mexico will be to make skillful use of these two kinds of will power.

The Mexican Labor Market

The problems of youths in the labor market can best be understood if we first consider the structure of the Mexican labor market.

Industrial distribution of the labor force. According to the population census of 1970 nearly 40 percent of the Mexican labor force was engaged in agriculture and related activities (the primary sector), about 23 percent was engaged in manufacturing and other production (secondary sector), and about 32 percent was in trade and service (tertiary sector) (see Table I-2). Changes since 1969 have not been very significant, except in special cases such as the bureaucracy, which numbered about 407,000 in 1969 and increased to more than 700,000 by the end of 1976.

Table I-2. Occupational distribution of the economically active population in Mexico 1969[a]

Type of activity	*Number (thousands)*	*Percentage*
Primary sector (agriculture and livestock, silviculture, hunting, and fishing)	5,133.5	39.5
Secondary sector (petroleum, mining, manufacturing, electricity, construction)	2,973.5	22.9
Tertiary sector (merchandizing, transportation, services, government)	4,130.5	31.8
Unspecified	747.5	5.8

[a] Total population: 48,225.2. Economically active population: 12,985.1 (26.9% of total population).

SOURCE: Mexico, *Ninth General Census of Population*, 1970, p. 597.

The fact that Mexico still has almost 40 percent of its labor force occupied in the primary sector labels it as a strongly agricultural country. However, the distribution of the labor force is not uniform throughout the country. Table I-3 indicates the variation among four of the nine regions which differ markedly in the distribution of activity among the major economic sectors. At one extreme is the central region, with a preponderance of the work force in industry; at the opposite extreme is the southern region, which is heavily agricultural.

Employment and underemployment in Mexico. Unemployment in Mexico is not a new problem. It can be said that it has always existed and that in recent years it has become more acute. What

Table I-3. Distribution of the economically active population among major economic sectors in Mexico, by selected region 1969

Region	*Primary sector*	*Secondary sector*	*Tertiary sector*	*Unspecified*
Center	10.8%	35.4%	48.8%	5.0%
North	31.7	26.3	36.3	5.7
South Center	53.1	19.3	21.7	5.9
South	69.2	10.1	15.0	5.7

SOURCE: Mexico, *Ninth General Census of Population, 1970.*

are the causes? In recent decades, Mexico has had an annual population growth rate of 3.5 percent, which means that the population doubles every 25 years. It is increasingly difficult, because of shortages of capital for investment, to create new jobs for all of the new entrants into the labor force.

In addition, urban centers have been invaded by people from rural areas, which are characterized by low productivity and declining yields. A typical example is the family with a small tract of land to farm. At first the yield is adequate, but the family grows and the same land must feed more mouths. The children must emigrate because the land will no longer support them all. The cities are crowded with farm people looking for work, as illustrated by Table I-4, which shows how the proportion of the labor force engaged in agriculture has declined since 1940 and, more important, how the contribution of agriculture to the Gross National Product (GNP) has declined.

Luis Unikel (1976, pp. 85–86) has conducted an interesting migration survey. He calls cities in which immigrants account for more than 5 percent of the population "cities of attraction"; "cities in equilibrium" are those in which the proportions of emigrants or immigrants range between +5 percent and –5 percent; and "cities of rejection" are those that lose more than 5 percent of their population through emigration (see Table I-5). The northern cities have exercised the greatest attraction between 1940 and 1970. Obviously the growth of the cities of attraction has not been at the expense of the cities of rejection, but is attributable mainly to the exodus from the countryside.

"Open unemployment," that is, the number of jobless persons who claim to be looking for work, was relatively low in 1969, with a national average rate of 3.8 percent of the labor force. There were, however, substantial variations among regions (Table I-6). We can observe here the impact of rural emigration: the three economically strongest regions (Center, Northeast, and North) are precisely the ones with higher rates of people looking for work—either because they are industrially developed or have highly mechanized agriculture.

Table I-4. Percentage of the economically active population of Mexico engaged in agriculture and share of agriculture in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 1940 to 1970

Year	*Economically active population in agriculture*	*Share of agriculture in GDP*
1940	65.4%	22.6%
1950	58.3	22.5
1960	54.1	18.8
1970	41.1	11.6

SOURCE: Unikel (1976, pp. 187–188).

Table I-5. Cities of attraction, cities in equilibrium, and cities of rejection, 1940 to 1970

Period	*Cities of attraction*	*Cities in equilibrium*	*Cities of rejection*
1940–1950	60	11	12
1950–1960	72	27	22
1960–1970	180	40	46

SOURCE: Unikel (1976, p. 88).

Table I-6. Number and percentage of persons classified as "open unemployed,"[a] by region, 1969

Region	*Number (thousands)*	*Percentage of economically active population*
Total	485.2	3.8
Center	155.1	4.9
Northeast	47.2	4.6
North	72.5	4.0
Pacific	46.2	3.1
Gulf of Mexico	32.4	2.7
South-Center	69.1	3.5
North-Center	24.0	3.7
Yucatan	7.5	2.5
South	31.1	2.4

[a] The "open unemployed" are jobless persons who claim to be looking for work.

SOURCE: Mexico, *Ninth General Census of Population, 1970.*

Underemployment is a very serious problem in the Mexican labor market and includes (1) people partially occupied during some months of the year, (2) underpaid workers, and (3) people engaged in the "informal labor market" (see below).

"Visible underemployment" is the classification for workers who are idle at least three months of the year and encompasses a full 20 percent of the labor force. If we divide this number by four, to approximate a yearly rate, we add another 5 percent to the total unemployment rate. Numbers and percentages of those in the category in the various regions are shown in Table I-7.

Table I-7. Number and percentage of persons "visibly underemployed,"[a] by region, 1969

Region	*Number (thousands)*	*Percentage of economically active population*
Total	2,464.2	19.0
Center	553.1	17.2
Northeast	168.0	25.9
North	387.5	21.5
Pacific	328.2	21.7
Gulf of Mexico	190.1	15.9
South-Center	368.6	18.9
North-Center	136.9	21.7
Yucatan	22.1	7.4
South	209.2	16.0

[a] The "visibly underemployed" are persons who work nine months a year or less.

SOURCE: Mexico, *Ninth General Census of Population, 1970.*

Another employment classification is the "informal market" (or "unformal" labor market, as some prefer to call it). Some authors use income levels as the criterion for identifying this group; others prefer to define it in terms of the social origins of the persons constituting it; still others use the class of work performed or the kind of establishment in which it is observed. Some authors prefer a composite of all these approaches (see Sethuraman, 1976).

For our purposes, and in the view of a number of scholars of Latin America, we may describe those seeking work in the informal market in Mexico as persons with little formal schooling and no social status who tend to exclude themselves from better paying work on account of their poor, sickly, and defeated attitude. They can find work only in small factory workshops, at low wages, without legal protection of their rights, and are exposed to harsh and unsanitary working conditions. Alternatively, they engage in such uncomplicated activities as shoeshining, gardening, car washing, and street vending. Frequently shifting from one such activity to another, they will work at anything but have no real marketable skills. Their income is generally below the minimum wage level and is very irregular.

The percentage of this informal work sector is similar and consistent in all Latin American cities. Souza and Tokman (1976) have found that it encompasses an average of around 50 percent of the total work force in various Latin American cities (Table I-8) and that 70 to 80 percent of the immigrants to these cities join the ranks of the informal sector. The reason is that this secondary labor market acts as a reservoir of unskilled labor which can regulate the rise and fall of levels in the primary market. This secondary market supplies additional workers in times of expansion and retains surplus workers in times of retrenchment. The primary market, in turn, accepts the most qualified workers and rejects the poorest—very convenient from management's point of view.

Table I-8. Percentage of the economically active population classified as in the "informal sector," five Latin American cities, 1974 to 1975

City	*Percentage of the economically active population in the "informal sector"*
Asuncion, Paraguay	57
Guayaquil, Ecuador	48
Quito, Ecuador	48
San Salvador, El Salvador	46
Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic	50
Average	50

SOURCE: Souza and Tokman (1976, p. 69).

One yardstick for measuring underemployment used by other Latin American countries has been the practice of considering as underemployed all those who report earnings less than the minimum wage. As is well known, in Mexico the minimum wage is a subsistence wage. To earn less is to belong to the most underpaid sector—generally the result of low productivity of an activity.

The 1970 census provides information on the percentage of the labor force with some reported income who received less than the minimum wage. On the basis of a sample of 20 percent of the Mexican states, the portions receiving less than the minimum wage varied from 85 percent in agriculture and livestock to 23 percent in transportation (see Table I-9). It must be borne in mind that almost 40 percent of the labor force is engaged in agriculture and livestock raising; thus the 85 percent figure is highly significant. The fact that 60 or 70 percent of the population earns so little has kept industry from developing more, simply because the "customer market" is restricted to the remaining 30 percent of the population.

These figures on open unemployment, visible unemployment, the informal sector, and people earning less than the minimum wage give an idea of the extent of underemployment. Naturally, there is some overlapping of percentages, so it is not possible to calculate exact figures for the overall underemployment rate.

Table I-9. Percentage of labor force[a] with reported income below minimum wage, from a selected sample of 20 percent of Mexican States, by industry group, 1969

Industry group	*Percentage below minimum wage*
Agriculture and livestock	85.5
Extractive industries	38.2
Manufacturing	43.3
Construction	41.3
Transportation	22.8
Services	43.7

[a] From a selected sample of 20 percent of Mexican states.

SOURCE: Mexico, *Ninth General Census of Population, 1970.*

The industrial structure of Mexico. At one end of Mexico's industrial spectrum are a great number of small workshops operating with little capital, paying very low wages, and having low productivity. At the other extreme is "big industry," highly technical and well-organized, with heavy capital investment and large-scale production, paying much higher wages. This disparity is shown in Table I-10. Capital investment per person in small-scale industry is only 9.1 percent of that for "big business" (first and last lines of Table I-10, respectively). Similarly, the value added (by manufacturing) of small businesses is only 13.9 percent of that for "big business."

Table I-10. Wages, value added, and capital investment per person in industrial enterprises, by gross value[a] of their total production, 1970

Value of annual production (thousands of pesos)	*Average annual earnings of wage earners*	*Average annual salary of salaried employees*	*Value added per person*	*Capital investment per person*
1,500 or less	8,885	16,046	15,279	13,562
1,501–5,000	11,720	27,990	31,611	31,900
5,001–20,000	13,445	35,746	43,698	44,365
20,001–50,000	14,726	38,974	55,012	67,293
50,001–100,000	17,186	43,002	67,652	92,275
100,001 or more	22,288	49,094	109,692	149,306

[a] In 1970, the exchange rate of the peso was 12.50 pesos per U.S. dollar. All amounts are in pesos except for column 1, which gives amounts in thousands of pesos.

SOURCE: Mexico, *Ninth Industrial Census, 1971*, Vol. I, p. 5.

Turning to the number of workers employed by industrial enterprises, we find that there were barely 200 companies in 1970 that employed more than 750 workers each (Table I-11). (Note the large number of nonremunerated personnel—about 92,000). Establishments with fewer than five workers accounted for almost 63 percent of those paying wages (those that do not pay wages averaging 1.6 workers). At the other end of the scale, the five largest groups of establishments accounted for only 2.6 percent of all establishments, although they employed 50.5 percent of the wage earners.

Table I-11. Number of industrial establishments and their total personnel, by number of employees per establishment, 1970

Number of employees per establishment	*Number of establishments*	*Total personnel (thousands)*	*Percentage of establishments*	*Percentage of personnel*
All establishments	62,395	1,489.3	100.0	100.0
Fewer than 6	39,222	107.0	62.9	7.2
6–15	10,959	98.7	17.6	6.6
16–25	3,329	66.5	5.3	4.5
26–50	3,532	126.6	5.7	8.5
51–75	1,582	97.6	2.6	6.6
76–100	910	79.3	1.5	5.3
101–175	1,217	161.8	2.0	10.9
176–250	579	121.4	0.9	8.2
251–350	366	108.4	0.6	7.3
351–500	287	119.2	0.5	8.0
501–750	200	120.7	0.3	8.1
751 and more	212	282.1	0.3	18.9

SOURCE: Mexico, *Ninth Industrial Census, 1971*, Vol. 1, p. 149.

Despite these statistics, Mexican industry is rapidly becoming modernized. Trejo Reves (1973) estimated that establishments with 50 or more workers accounted for 42 percent of the wage earners in 1960 and 51 percent in 1965. Table I-11 indicates that by 1970 these establishments accounted for 73 percent of industrial wage earners. The speed with which modern industry is displacing the traditional pattern of employing fewer than 50 workers has caused problems: industry has not been able to absorb all the workers available. In particular, we know that the industrial expansion of 1960–1970 averaged around 10 percent a year, while the absorption of labor during the 1960s occurred at an annual average rate of only 5.5 percent (Banco Nacional de Comercio Exterior, 1973). The reason is simple: modern industry saves manual labor, and that is precisely what is most undesirable in a country with an almost unlimited supply of labor (Lewis, 1960).

Another feature of the Mexican labor force is that young people begin work at the age of 12, in contrast with many other countries where they begin at 14, 16, or 18 years of age. This fact, along with an annual population growth rate of 3.5 percent, aggravates all other problems of employment. If young people would stay in school longer, the pressure on jobs would be lessened, and they would be better prepared for entering the labor market. However, necessity forces children of poor families to go to work while quite young. Because of their large numbers, the younger age groups (12- and 13-year-olds) are very important. The rapid growth rate of youth cohorts from 1960 to 1970 is indicated in Table I-12.

Table I-12. Age distribution of youths and annual rate of increase in Mexico, 1960 and 1970

Age	*1960 (thousands)*	*1970 (thousands)*	*Average annual rate of increase, 1960-70*
12	949.0	1,365.1	3.7%
13	814.8	1,198.8	3.9
14	808.0	1,194.8	4.0
15	753.7	1,101.1	3.9
16	703.1	1,018.6	3.8
17	703.2	1,032.6	3.9
18	798.6	1,056.3	2.9

SOURCE: Mexico, *Seventh General Census of Population, 1960*, pp. 74 and 76; and *Ninth General Census of Population, 1970*, p. 37.

Military service. Service in the armed forces has practically no effect on the education or employment of Mexican youths, who are obliged to enter the service at the age of 18 but can do so without interrupting their studies or work by drilling on Saturday afternoons or Sunday mornings.

We now turn our attention more directly to the matter of education and employment of youths, dealing especially with the deficient educational level of most young people, the economic problems of working youths, the maladjustment between school dropouts and the labor market, and the inescapable problem of education and social status. We will touch, though not deeply, the social problems of today's youths. And finally we will mention the remedies that have been applied to improve the employment situation of young people in Mexico. Though precise and abundant statistics such as those obtainable in developed countries are, unfortunately, not available, there is nevertheless considerable information to illustrate the essentials of the problem.

2

Youth in Mexico

Education of Mexican Youth

According to Article 16 of the Federal Law of Education of 1973, which is still in effect, "primary education (grades 1 to 6) is obligatory for all the inhabitants of the Republic." However, no specific age is established for compulsory education. Although Article 31 of the Mexican Constitution requires all citizens to "ensure that their children or wards younger than 15 years shall attend private or public schools in order to receive elementary and military education," the government has not been able to meet the demand for primary education. According to the 1970 census, 33.5 percent of children aged 6 to 14 were not attending primary school. (According to the Ministry of Education, however, it was only 21 percent; Medellín and Izquierdo, 1973, p. 48).

A more serious problem is the high percentage of dropouts. In developed countries, the numbers of young people 20 to 24 years old participating in higher education are substantial—nearly 24 percent, on the average, for developed countries and 48 percent in the United States in 1970 (UNESCO, 1972)[1] In contrast, in Mexico the respective enrollment was 3.5 percent for the period 1959 to 1970. Table I-13 shows how the percentages enrolled decline drastically as the cohorts advance through the age scale. The rate of dropouts at the primary level is frightening: in the years 1955–1966, 82.8 percent failed to complete the sixth grade. Only 6.9 percent of those entering the first grade of the primary level completed secondary school. In 1966, the percentage was up to 8.5 percent, but this means that only 6.9 percent were more or less ready to enter the industrial labor force.

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[1] These enrollment rates are derived by dividing the total number of students enrolled in higher education by the population aged 20 to 24. The results can be misleading where, as in the United States, a substantial proportion of students are aged 18 to 19. The actual percentage of persons aged 20 to 24 enrolled in the United States is considerably smaller than the UNESCO data indicate, and this is also true for certain other countries.

Table I-13. Enrollment in school and college in Mexico, selected levels, 1955–66 and 1959–70

	1955–66		*1959–70*	
Level	*Number (thousands)*	*Percentage of age group*	*Number (thousands)*	*Percentage of age group*
1st primary	1,465.6	100.0%	1,990.2	100.0%
Graduates from 6th grade	252.1	17.2	449.8	22.6
1st secondary	131.3	8.9	231.5	11.6
3rd secondary	102.2	7.0	170.0	8.5
1st preparatory	59.7	4.1	85.5	4.3
2nd preparatory	48.5	3.3	77.9	3.9
1st college	43.3	2.9	69.8	3.5
5th college				0.8[a]

[a] 1976.

SOURCE: Mexico, Ministry of Industry and Commerce, continuous statistics.

Muñoz Izquierdo (1973) has estimated the flow of those who leave school either by dropping out or by graduation (Table I-14). If we wish to obtain a more comprehensive view of all the current educational deficiencies in Mexico, we must also consider those who are completely illiterate plus those who finished primary school and did not finish secondary school. Graduation from secondary school is considered a desirable cutoff point for Mexicans. Hence those who left school at a lower level have a deficient education and are considered the "potential audience" for adult education. The startling facts of the situation are revealed in the following figures (Ministry of Public Education, 1973):

Total Mexican population	59,763,800	
Illiterates	6,193,800	
Did not finish primary school	11,958,300	
Did not finish secondary school	9,154,300	
Total with deficient education	27,306,200	(45.7% of total)

These figures do not take into account children four years old or younger (8,949,000 children).

Table I-14. Withdrawals from school in Mexico, 1960 to 1970

Grade	*Number (thousands)*	*Withdrawal percentages*		
		Total	*Males*	*Females*
Total	9,747.0	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
1–3	3,952.0	40.6	38.5	43.0
4–5	1,819.0	18.7	18.9	19.6
6	815.9	8.4	8.1	8.7
7–8	1,680.5	17.2	17.5	17.0
9	679.7	7.0	7.2	6.7
10–12	452.2	4.6	5.6	3.4
13 or more	347.7	3.6	5.2	1.6

SOURCE: Muñoz Izquierdo and Lobo (1974, p. 154).

The amount of education received by young Mexicans can also be examined by the various age groups. As can be seen in Table I-15, the younger generations have had more schooling. The most remarkable increase is in primary school, with a rise from 59.5 percent for those currently aged 20 to 24 to 76.1 percent for those in the 10 to 14 age group. However, there is still a total of almost 20 percent of young people with no schooling at all. This is serious, since each group numbers in the millions. The total number of young people between 10 and 20 without any schooling is about 3.1 million, and they constitute a completely unskilled work force.

There are no satisfactory short-range solutions for the problems of education in all their harsh reality. The share of the

Table I-15. Educational attainment of youths in Mexico by age group, 1970

		Educational Attainment		
Age group	*Total (thousands)*	*None*	*Some primary*	*Some post-primary*[a]
10–14	6,396.2	19.0%	76.2%	4.8%
15–19	5,054.4	18.4	60.7	20.9
20–24	4,032.3	22.5	59.6	17.9

[a] Secondary schooling ends at 15–16 years.

SOURCE: Mexico, *Ninth General Census of Population, 1970,* p. 299.

federal budget earmarked for education is already very large, but demographic pressures continue to exacerbate the problem. The Lopez Portillo administration has announced a "National Plan of Education" that hopes to remedy the deficiencies, and people are beginning slowly to respond to the government's appeals. But the prospects are not very promising.

Youth in the Labor Force[2]

Despite the fact that many young people enter the labor force at the age of 12, the actual percentages of boys and girls 12 to 14 in the labor force (or economically active population) are quite small—15.5 percent of boys and 7.6 percent of girls (Table I-16). Among those 15 to 19, as would be expected, the percentages are considerably larger—52.2 percent of young men and 23.9 percent of young women. The lower percentages for women in this age group are largely explained by early marriage or unpaid family work. Among those in the labor force in the entire 12 to 19 age group, 94 percent are employed, indicating that they are fully incorporated in the labor force. However, the percentage of men who are employed is appreciably higher than women, since in Mexico women find it much harder than men to obtain work.

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[2] The term *youth* refers to young people between the ages of 12 and 19. Many children enter the labor force at 12, and 19 has been chosen as the upper age limit because few people go on to college (3.5 percent of the total) and only 0.8 percent of these graduate. (A large portion of college students work as well.) Thus the great majority of young people are ready for adult work by the age of 20.

The "open unemployment" rates shown in Table I-16 are greater for young people than for the population in general (6.0 percent for ages 12 to 19 compared with 3.8 percent for the entire labor force). Under equal circumstances, young people tend to feel more keenly the impact of a rise in unemployment. The unemployment rate for the younger group, ages 12 to 14, is lower than for those in the 15 to 19 age group, because the simple tasks performed by the younger people give them more mobility in seeking work.

Table I-16. Labor force and employment status of youths in Mexico by age and sex, 1970

	Age		
Sex	*12–14*	*15–19*	*Total*
Total			
Population	3,758,700	5,054,400	8,813,800
Percentage in labor force (economically active)	11.6%	37.4%	26.4%
Percentage of labor force employed	94.8	93.9	94.0
Percentage of labor force unemployed	5.2	6.1	6.0
Men			
Population	1,917,300	2,491,000	4,408,300
Percentage in labor force	15.5%	52.2%	36.2%
Percentage of labor force employed	95.8	94.7	94.9
Percentage of labor force unemployed	4.2	5.3	5.1
Women			
Population	1,841,400	2,563,400	4,404,800
Percentage in labor force	7.6%	23.9%	16.6%
Percentage of labor force employed	92.7	92.0	92.2
Percentage of labor force unemployed	7.3	8.0	7.8

SOURCE: Mexico, *Ninth General Census of Population, 1970.*

The Economically Inactive Population

Among young people, those who are economically inactive consist of domestic workers, students, and others (Table I-17). (The inclusion of domestic workers distinguishes the Mexican concept of "economically inactive" persons from that of the United States and most developed countries, who consider domestic workers to be employed.) About 50 percent are students, 34 percent are domestic workers, and 16 percent are in other categories. As might be expected, a large percentage of those engaged in domestic work are young girls, chiefly in the 15 to 19 age group. The fact that 2.2 million young persons of both sexes work at domestic labor is a clear sign of underemployment and unemployment. Also notable is that among students in the 15 to 19 age group, 54 percent of the males and only about 23 percent of the females are students.

Simultaneous Work and Study (12 to 19 years)

Until recently it has been impossible to know how many students were also working. This has finally been achieved with the cooperation of the economically active population and through

Table I-17. Status of economically inactive youths in Mexico by sex and age group, 1970

		Percentage of economically inactive population		
Activity and age group	*Number (thousands)*	*Total*	*Males*	*Females*
Total economically inactive population[a]	6,484.9	100.0	100.0	100.0
Domestic workers	2,205.7	34.0	5.3	56.0
12–14	713.2	21.5	3.7	38.4
15–19	1,492.5	47.2	7.4	71.2
Students	3,245.5	50.0	65.2	38.5
12–14	2,162.4	65.1	73.6	56.9
15–19	1,083.1	34.2	53.7	22.5
Others	1,033.7	15.9	29.5	5.5
12–14	446.9	13.5	22.6	4.7
15–19	586.8	18.5	38.9	6.3

[a] Subtotals may not add to totals because of rounding.

SOURCE: Mexico, *Ninth General Census of Population, 1970.*

the examination of school registrations. The resulting data (Table I-18) are extremely interesting: 835,000 students work, and 9.5 percent of the students in the 12 to 14 age group and 36.0 percent of students 15 to 19 hold jobs. Even more significant is that those who both study and work constitute about 52 percent of the economically active population 12 to 14 years old and 32 percent of those 15 to 19. These students work either in the mornings or in the afternoons. At the college level, the "sandwich pattern" in which they attend classes three to four hours in the early morning and another two to three hours in the late afternoon, with their work schedule falling in the middle of the day is preferred.

In his survey of the labor market for economists, Jose

Table I-18. Working and nonworking students in the youth population of Mexico by sex and age group, 1970

Activity and age group	*Total*	*Males*	*Females*
	Number of students (thousands)		
Economically active population	2,328.2	1,596.6	731.5
12–14	436.1	296.6	139.4
15–19	1,892.1	1,300.0	592.1
Students (registered in the educational system)	4,080.5	2,256.0	1,824.5
12–14	2,388.1	1,289.2	1,098.9
15–19	1,692.4	966.8	725.6
School only	3,245.5	1,833.1	1,412.4
12–14	2,162.4	1,193.6	968.8
15–19	1,083.1	639.5	443.6
School and work	835.0	422.9	412.1
12–14	225.7	95.6	130.1
15–19	609.3	327.3	282.0
	Percentages		
Of students who work	20.5	18.8	22.6
12–14	9.5	7.4	11.8
15–19	36.0	33.9	38.9
Of the economically active population who are students	35.8	26.5	56.1
12–14	51.8	32.2	93.3
15–19	32.2	25.2	47.6

SOURCE: Mexico, *Ninth General Census of Population, 1970.*

Angel Pescador (1976, p. 17) has calculated the precise stages at which university students begin to work. About one-half begin work in the first year at the university, and smaller percentages begin work in each of the following years. By the time of graduation, 94 percent of the students work. The great majority of the working students (about 72 percent) are from lower-class families, and the others are from middle-class families. Students from upper-class families evidently do not work.

Many teachers and institutions complain that university students are not productive in their studies owing to worry about their jobs. However, few countries have managed as well as Mexico to combine theory with practice, for students try to obtain jobs that are related to what they are studying. In addition, university students tend to work so that they can later get jobs more easily. Pescador (1976) reports that 43 percent declared that their first professional job was in the same establishment where they had worked part time as students.

When we consider the levels of education in which young people are enrolled, we find, surprisingly, that 50 percent of the 15 to 19 age group are enrolled at the primary level (Table I-19). However, a good sign for this age group is that 9.3 percent are receiving vocational training and 4.7 percent are studying at the subprofessional level. This indicates that young people today want to study even beyond the normal age and that they are trying more than ever before to obtain direct training in work skills.

Table I-19. Distribution of the student population ages 12 to 19 among educational levels, 1970

Educational level	*Ages 12 to 19*	*Ages 15 to 19*
Total students	100.0%	100.0%
Primary	60.4	50.0
Vocational	4.4	9.3
Secondary	25.2	29.3
Preparatory	6.3	5.4
Subprofessional	2.3	4.7
College	1.4	1.3

SOURCE: Mexico, *Ninth General Census of Population, 1970.*

Maladjustment Between the School Population and the Labor Market

When we examine what happens to students after leaving school, we find that the labor market cannot properly accommodate all those young persons who sooner or later terminate their studies and want to work.

The federal government has made strong efforts to expand middle (secondary) education both at the basic level (seventh, eighth, and ninth grades) and at the upper (superior) level (tenth, eleventh, and twelfth grades) by providing some optional alternative study courses as well as vocational education. The real purpose of this effort has been to provide a better educated labor force. In the past, the government devoted its best efforts to expanding primary education, but today there is strong social pressure to provide more educational opportunities for the middle grades as well.

The high growth rates at all levels of middle schooling are shown in Table I-20. Particularly noteworthy is the jump of 23.5 percent between 1970 and 1974 at the secondary level (superior cycle—systematic education). Unfortunately, the figures for vocational training continue to be low and show relatively slow growth. However, educational expansion as a whole has produced a great increase in the educational attainments of young people, as Table I-21 shows. The increase also shows up clearly in the rise in the educational attainment of the total economically active population (Table I-22). Especially remarkable have been the increases in those who have completed six years and ten or more years of school, respectively.

The problem of absorption of labor is not a question of more or less education among the population but of the inability of both public and private investment sources to create new jobs for all cohorts terminating their lives as students. Demographic pressures are stronger than the capacity for new investments, and the disparity is cumulative over time. In addition, technical progress and the modernization of Mexican industry tend toward labor-saving processes. All of these factors make the absorption rate seriously insufficient (see Table I-23). Of

Table I-20. Numbers and increases in enrollments in middle-grade education in Mexico, by level and type, 1959 to 1974
Numbers (thousands) and increases

Level and type	*1959*	*1964*	*Annual average rate of growth*	*1970*	*Annual average rate of growth*	*1974*	*Annual average rate of growth*
Basic cycle (grades 7, 8, and 9)	277.6	583.2	16.0%	1,208.3	12.9%	1,798.0	10.5%
Systematic education (including curricula with terminal options)	174.5	431.1	19.8	1,027.3	15.6	1,613.2	11.9
Nonsystematic education (vocational only)	103.1	152.1	8.1	181.0	2.9	184.8	0.5
Superior cycle (grades 10, 11, and 12)	93.2	165.6	12.2	325.5	11.9	680.0	20.2
Systematic education (including curricula with terminal options)	50.5	97.1	14.0	232.8	15.6	542.1	23.5
Nonsystematic education (vocational only)	42.7	68.5	9.9	92.7	5.2	137.9	10.4
Grand total	370.8	748.8	15.1	1,533.8	12.2	2,478.0	12.7

SOURCE: Mexico, Ministry of Industry and Commerce and Ministry of Public Education, continuous statistics.

Table I-21. Enrollment rates of youths, ages 12 to 19 in Mexico, 1959 to 1975

				Annual average rate of growth	
Year	*Population ages 12 to 19 (1) (thousands)*	*School registrations (2) (thousands)*	*(2) ÷ (1)*	*Population, ages 12 to 19*	*School registrations*
1959	5,859.4	1,369.4	23.4%		
1964	7,125.6	2,350.5	33.0	4.0%	11.4%
1970	8,813.1	4,080.5	46.3	3.6	9.6
1975	11,124.7	6,329.0	56.9	4.8	9.2

SOURCE: Population data from Mexico, *Ninth General Census of Population, 1970*, and from projections of the Banco de Mexico; school registration data from Ministry of Industry and Commerce and Ministry of Public Education, continuous statistics.

Table I-22. Distribution of economically active population in Mexico by years of school completed, 1960 and 1970

Years of school completed	*Percentage of economically active population*	
	1960	*1970*
0	36.0	27.1
1–3	31.9	30.6
4–5	11.4	11.5
6	12.7	17.8
7–8	1.6	2.1
10–12	2.2	4.1
13 and more	1.9	3.2

SOURCE: Muñoz Izquierdo, unpublished data based on population censuses.

Table I-23. Absorption of youths leaving school into the labor market in Mexico, 1960 to 1970 (numbers in thousands)

Years of school completed	*Number leaving school (thousands)*	*Increase in suitable employment (thousands)*	*Coefficient of absorption*[a]
Total	9,747	5,345	55%
13 and more	348	253	73
10–12	452	324	72
6–9	3,176	1,378	43
1–5	5,771	2,105	36
0	–	1,284	–

[a] These absorption estimates may be underestimated by undercounting of the economically active population in the 1970 census, which would mainly affect the figures for any work which requires less schooling.

SOURCE: Muñoz Izquierdo and Lobo, 1974.

significance above all is the low absorption rate for those with little schooling (one to five years and six to nine years), which confirms the theory of the gradual devaluation of primary schooling. If we add to this the numbers leaving school in these groups (5.8 and 3.2 million, respectively), we must admit that the problem of unemployment is acute. The overall absorption coefficient of 55 percent does not reveal the full problem. On closer examination, we find that the employment prospects of youths have deteriorated: their rates of participation in the economically active population have declined between 1960 and 1970 (see Table I-24). However, this reflected a decline only for males; the rates for females increased, possibly owing to an increasing tendency of Mexican women to seek jobs. Moreover, the decline for males was associated with an increase in school enrollment rates.

To gain entry into a labor market where there is already a practically unlimited supply of workers becomes a real problem for young people. Whenever there is an opening, management always demands experience, which is precisely what youths lack. The level of vocational skill, suggested by the data in Table I-20, is also still far from satisfactory, although it has improved. The young man who is neither a college student nor a highly skilled technician has no choice but to begin with a modest job or to join the informal work market as a shoeshine boy, street vendor, or unskilled helper. All this is called "discrimination against youth" by Sanchez (1976), in his excellent study of youth unemployment in Argentina. In Mexico the principal problem has been and continues to be the lack of job opportunities.

Table I-24. Percentages of youths in the economically active population of Mexico, by sex and age group, 1960 and 1970

	1960			*1970*		
Age group	*Total*	*Male*	*Female*	*Total*	*Male*	*Female*
Total, ages 12–19	28.4%	44.9%	11.8%	26.4%	36.2%	16.6%
12–14	10.7	16.3	4.8	11.6	15.5	7.5
15–19	41.5	67.0	16.7	37.4	52.2	23.1

SOURCE: Mexico, *8th General Census of Population, 1960; 9th General Census of Population, 1970.*

3

Unemployment and Underemployment of Mexican Youths

A detailed analysis shows how and to what extent the rates of unemployment and underemployment affect young people more than the rest of the labor force.

The Statistics

Youth unemployment. In an attempt to gain more adequate insights into the employment problems of youths, we shall consider first data for the three largest urban areas in Mexico—the Federal District, Guadalajara, and Monterrey—and then proceed to estimate unemployment in rural areas. The labor force participation rate jumps sharply between the 12 to 19 age group and the 20 to 24 age group, confirming the fact that at age 20 most Mexicans are fully incorporated in the labor force (Table I-25). Further, after ages 25 to 34, a slow decline in participation rates begins, although the rate for the 45 to 54 age group is higher in Guadalajara and Monterrey than in the Federal District. Also, the rate for the 12 to 19 age group is above average in Guadalajara, whereas it is lower than average in Mexico City and even more so in Monterrey.

The unemployment rates for juveniles in the Federal District differ somewhat from those previously discussed (Table

Table I-25. Percentage of the population in the labor force in Mexico, by age, 1973–74[a]

Age	*Federal District*	*Guadalajara*	*Monterrey*	*Average of three areas*
Total, 12 and older	53.4%	49.8%	46.7%	50.0%
12–19	32.8	36.3	29.9	33.0
20–24	66.6	60.6	62.2	63.1
25–34	67.5	62.0	60.1	63.2
35–44	66.8	61.7	57.6	62.0
45–54	62.2	54.1	52.6	56.4
55 and over	38.0	35.6	32.4	35.6

[a] Data are averages for the four quarters of 1973 and the first two quarters of 1974.

SOURCE: Mexico, Ministry of Industry and Commerce, Bureau of Statistics, *National Home Survey, 1974,* Charts V, VII, and IX.

I-26) for two reasons: the earlier figures were for 1969, while we are now considering data for 1973 and 1974; and these data are for a large urban area. The Federal District includes Mexico City, which is one of the most heavily populated urban areas in the world and a strong center for immigration from all over the country. The data for the Federal District also show the great differences in unemployment rates between young people and adults—in fact, high unemployment rates are concentrated among those 12 to 24. Other groups have enjoyed low unemployment rates, especially in recent years. The general rate for the population age 12 and older is high because the juvenile rates are so high. Also worthy of note is the sharp drop from an average of 18.8 percent unemployment for males and females 12 to 19 to 9.7 percent for those 20 to 24. Among the more mature groups, there are no such sharp changes.

The second largest urban area in Mexico is Guadalajara—an important commercial center with much light industry—which has grown considerably in recent years. It is the most important trading center in western Mexico, and, although metropolitan, has considerable agricultural and livestock-raising activities. The unemployment rate for ages 12 to 19 averaged only 13.4 percent in 1973–1974—much lower than that for the Federal District (Table I-27). The average for the 20 to 24 age

Table I-26. Open unemployment percentages by sex and age, Federal District, 1973–74[a]

Period and sex	*Population 12 years or older*	*12–19*	*20–24*	*25–34*	*35–44*	*45–54*	*55 and older*
Total 1973							
Jan.–March	6.3%	16.0%	8.9%	4.0%	2.2%	2.3%	2.4%
April–June	7.8	16.0	8.9	4.0	2.2	2.3	2.4
July–Sept.	8.6	22.1	11.2	4.4	2.4	3.6	4.5
Oct.–Dec.	6.9	18.3	9.0	3.0	3.0	3.6	2.4
Total 1974							
Jan.–March	6.6	17.0	9.5	3.5	2.4	3.2	2.7
April–June	7.6	19.6	9.3	5.1	3.0	3.0	3.6
Males 1973							
Jan.–March	5.6	16.3	9.3	3.2	1.8	2.5	2.3
April–June	6.8	20.6	9.8	3.2	2.6	3.0	4.2
July–Sept.	7.1	22.0	11.2	2.8	1.3	2.9	4.7
Oct.–Dec.	5.6	16.3	7.7	2.3	2.3	3.2	2.7
Males 1974							
Jan.–March	5.8	17.6	9.3	2.7	1.6	2.2	3.2
April–June	6.1	17.5	9.1	3.6	1.8	2.4	4.0
Females 1973							
Jan.–March	7.6	15.6	8.2	5.7	3.1	2.0	2.6
April–June	9.7	19.1	11.5	6.0	5.7	3.0	3.2
July–Sept.	11.2	22.2	11.1	8.3	4.7	5.4	3.9
Oct.–Dec.	9.7	20.8	11.0	4.7	4.7	4.5	1.7
Females 1974							
Jan.–March	8.3	16.2	10.0	5.3	4.2	5.6	1.4
April–June	10.5	22.2	9.7	8.4	5.2	4.6	2.4

[a] "Open unemployment" includes persons out of work who claim to be seeking work.

SOURCE: Mexico, Ministry of Industry and Commerce, Bureau of Statistics, *National Home Survey, 1974,* Chart VIII.

group was only 6.3 percent, also lower than for the Federal District. The fact that unemployment rates drop sharply in the April–June period indicates the extent to which business in the area relies on activity in the primary sector.

Monterrey is Mexico's most industrialized city. Its citizens are hardworking and thrifty. Unemployment rates are higher than in the other two cities we have been considering, but this may be attributable to the greater flow of immigration to Mon-

Table I-27. Open unemployment percentages by sex and age, Guadalajara Metropolitan Area, 1973–74[a]

Period and sex	*Population 12 years or older*	*12–19*	*20–24*	*25–34*	*35–44*	*45–54*	*55 and older*
Total 1973							
Jan.–March	6.9%	16.0%	9.8%	3.7%	2.5%	3.3%	2.5%
April–June	6.0	13.0	5.4	3.2	1.4	6.4	6.1
July–Sept.	5.8	14.1	6.0	2.7	2.7	3.0	2.6
Oct.–Dec.	5.6	10.8	5.7	4.1	1.9	4.1	4.2
Total 1974							
Jan.–March	6.7	15.5	5.9	3.0	3.7	5.1	3.4
April–June	4.7	10.3	4.9	3.3	1.4	2.4	3.0
Males 1973							
Jan.–March	6.7	15.6	10.6	3.0	2.9	4.3	3.5
April–June	4.3	8.4	2.9	2.9	0.9	4.6	8.3
July–Sept.	4.8	12.3	6.3	1.8	1.3	3.3	3.7
Oct.–Dec.	5.0	10.0	6.6	3.7	0.8	3.8	4.9
Males 1974							
Jan.–March	6.3	15.6	5.4	2.7	3.6	5.6	3.1
April–June	4.2	9.1	5.9	3.3	1.0	2.4	2.5
Females 1973							
Jan.–March	7.5	16.7	8.5	5.6	1.4	–	–
April–June	9.7	19.4	9.1	4.0	2.9	11.3	–
July–Sept.	8.1	16.6	5.6	5.9	6.8	2.1	–
Oct.–Dec.	6.8	12.0	4.3	5.1	5.3	5.2	2.2
Females 1974							
Jan.–March	7.7	15.0	6.6	4.0	3.8	3.8	4.0
April–June	5.8	12.3	3.3	3.2	2.7	2.5	4.3

[a] "Open unemployment" includes persons out of work who claim to be seeking work.

SOURCE: Mexico, Ministry of Industry and Commerce, Bureau of Statistics, *National Home Survey, 1974,* Chart VIII.

terrey. The unemployment rate for youths 12 to 19 averaged 19.6 percent in 1973–1974, and for those 20 to 24 was 8.3 percent (Table I-28).

Youth underemployment. In all three geographic areas we have been considering, about 50 percent of the informal work force earning less than legal minimum wages are under 25 years of age. The figures of the Bureau of Public Employment Services (1976) are really discouraging:

Table I-28. Open unemployment percentages by sex and age, Monterrey Metropolitan Area, 1973–74[a]

Period and sex	*Population 12 years or older*	*12–19*	*20–24*	*25–34*	*35–44*	*45–54*	*55 and older*
Total 1973							
Jan.–March	8.2%	21.2%	9.2%	2.7%	4.0%	3.9%	3.3%
April–June	7.0	18.7	8.9	4.4	2.0	3.7	2.8
July–Sept.	8.8	24.7	9.3	4.1	3.0	2.8	0.9
Oct.–Dec.	5.7	16.1	7.0	2.2	1.4	2.9	1.7
Total 1974							
Jan.–March	7.0	18.8	7.0	3.6	2.0	3.3	5.5
April–June	6.9	17.9	8.3	4.1	1.4	2.0	1.1
Males 1973							
Jan.–March	6.8	20.4	9.9	2.5	3.4	3.0	3.1
April–June	6.7	21.8	9.6	3.6	2.6	3.5	3.4
July–Sept.	6.7	18.6	10.1	4.6	2.6	2.5	1.1
Oct.–Dec.	4.9	14.2	8.4	2.2	0.6	3.3	2.0
Males 1974							
Jan.–March	6.1	18.8	5.7	3.5	1.5	3.8	6.4
April–June	5.5	16.1	7.7	4.5	1.1	2.3	1.3
Females 1973							
Jan.–March	11.8	22.3	7.7	3.8	6.7	9.5	4.3
April–June	7.8	14.4	7.7	7.5	—	4.3	—
July–Sept.	14.3	32.3	8.0	2.6	4.9	4.3	—
Oct.–Sept.	7.8	18.8	4.2	2.4	5.1	—	—
Females 1974							
Jan.–March	9.7	18.8	9.4	3.9	4.8	—	—
April–June	10.5	20.0	9.3	2.9	3.3	—	—

[a] "Open unemployment" includes persons out of work who claim to be seeking work.

SOURCE: Mexico, Ministry of Industry and Commerce, Bureau of Statistics, *National Home Survey, 1974,* Chart X.

	Total informal labor force	*Percent of informal labor force under 25*
Mexico City	472,900	51.0%
Guadalajara	155,800	48.2
Monterrey	68,400	56.0
Total	697,100	50.9

The industry groups in which the informal work sector is found include services, retail food stores, and small-scale production of shoes, clothing, and nonmetallic furniture (Table I-29). They do not include the important electrical and automotive industries or the great food-processing plants. Variations in the percentages of youths in the various economic sectors that are characterized by an informal work force are somewhat similar among the three metropolitan areas, and the percentages in any given sector do not differ greatly from one metropolitan area to another. On the whole, the figures fall within a range of 40 to 60 percent, with 50 percent as the median. This is apparently the labor market in which young people under 25 find the easiest acceptance.

Youth in rural areas. For many months of the year, unemployment is chronic in the Mexican countryside, but annual man-days worked per person have increased with the passage of time (Table I-30). Although the most recent figures available are for 1960, things are not likely to have changed greatly since then. The data have not been broken down according to age, but it is believed that they are about the same for adults and youths. As can be seen, more work has always been done on larger privately owned farms, but the small number of days worked even on these private farms is still shocking. The situation for a young man in the country who belongs to a family that operates a small farm or a communal landholding is unendurable.

The preceding figures indicate the extent of underemployment and unemployment among Mexican youths. In the strong-

Table I-29. Percentages of the informal labor force under 25 years of age, three large metropolitan areas of Mexico, 1970

Selected industry groups	*Mexico City*	*Guadalajara*	*Monterrey*
Food products	48.8%	45.0%	60.7%
Intermediate products	55.5	54.2	53.0
Repair services	66.3	65.5	61.9
Clothing and shoes	47.6	52.8	52.8
Retail food stores	38.2	38.9	44.7
Domestic work	58.5	53.0	65.2

SOURCE: Mexico, Bureau of Public Employment Services, Special Tables, Chart 21.

Table I-30. Estimated annual average man-days of work in rural areas, by farm size and type of land tenure, Mexico, 1940 to 1960

	Man-days of work		
Size and type of ownership	*1940*	*1950*	*1960*
Private ownership (5 hectares or more)	127.6	130.1	202.0
Private ownership (less than 5 hectares)	59.0	46.2	34.9
Communal lands (*ejidos*)	80.6	105.7	99.5

SOURCE: Center of Educational Studies, Mexico, based on data from the Agrarian Investigation Center.

est industrial areas, the rate of open unemployment for youths is nearly 20 percent; about 50 percent of the workers in the informal labor market are young people under 25; and annual man-days worked on farms ranged from 35 to 202 in 1960. These statistics indicate that the situation is serious, even though it is one that has prevailed over the years. Recession and inflation affect young people even more without changing the overall situation; yet a boom in the economy will not improve matters for most young people. The main point is that the problem of unemployment and underemployment of youth in Mexico is not accidental—it is structural.

Social Status and Education

Although some improvements have been made, the general rule in Mexico has been "poor education for poor people and poor education for poor regions."

Income distribution by sector. Great social and economic differences among individuals and regions, reflected in the distribution of income, are becoming even wider than before in Mexico. Manuel Gollas and Adalberto Garcia (in Unikel, 1976, p. 252) have compared inequalities in distribution of income for 1950, 1958, 1963, and 1969, and found that the situation has worsened consistently over time. The variations in inequality of income among the three major economic sectors are indicated in Table I-31. Persons working in the primary sector earning less than 1000 pesos per month comprise 52.8 percent of all the poor people in Mexico. The secondary sector accounts for another 19.5 percent of this poorest group, while the tertiary sector accounts for 27.7 percent. The secondary sector shows a more uniform distribution of income, while the tertiary sector includes a somewhat larger proportion of those in the middle and upper classes.

Table I-31. Distribution of income groups by major economic sector, Mexico, 1970

Monthly income (1969 pesos)	*Total*	*Primary sector*	*Secondary sector*	*Tertiary sector*
Average monthly income	100.0%	38.5%	25.9%	35.6%
Less than 199	100.0%	72.7	9.1	18.2
200–499	100.0%	61.5	12.9	25.6
500–999	100.0%	24.3	36.5	39.2
1,000–2,499	100.0%	7.5	39.7	52.8
2,500–9,999	100.0%	9.1	36.5	54.4
10,000 and more	100.0%	20.0	36.4	43.6

SOURCE: Unikel (1976), based on the *Ninth General Census of Population, 1970.*

The distribution of income within each of the three sectors is illustrated in Table I-32. People earning less than 1000 pesos per month comprise a full 93.9 percent of the primary sector, 57.4 percent of the secondary sector, and 57.8 percent of the tertiary sector. The rural primary sector—and to a lesser extent the two urban sectors—receives the full impact of lack of education, as well as all the other attributes of proverty.

Implications for education. In Mexico it is quite obvious that a very poor family cannot give its children continuous and complete schooling; this is a privilege limited to the upper and middle classes. About 42 percent of the population lives in the countryside, as we have seen, and there the rate of school attendance in the sixth grade is only 9 percent, compared with 63 percent in urban areas—an incredible disparity. Furthermore, it is clear that economic factors are decisive in access to educa-

Table I-32. Income distribution of economically active population, by major economic sector, Mexico, 1970 (percent in each income group by sector)

Monthly income (1969 pesos)	*Primary sector*	*Secondary sector*	*Tertiary sector*
Less than 199	34.6%	6.5%	9.3%
200–499	42.4	13.2	19.0
500–999	16.9	37.7	29.5
1,000–2,499	4.1	32.1	31.1
2,500–9,999	1.5	9.2	10.0
10,000 and more	0.5	1.3	1.1
Total economically active population	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

SOURCE: Unikel (1976), based on *Ninth General Census of Population, 1970.*

tion, because 18 percent of school-age children who do not attend school are absent because of insufficient funds. This frustrating inequity is seen in 40 percent of the families with incomes under 200 pesos; in 30 percent of those with earnings from 201 to 400 pesos; in 13 percent of those with incomes of 401 to 600; and in 9 percent of the families with incomes from 601 to 1,000. Ninety-three percent of the families whose children do not attend school for economic reasons have monthly incomes under 1,000, and at the other extreme, 91 percent of the student body of the University of Mexico comes from the 15.4 percent of families who are wealthy. There appears to be an automatic selection process along the educational ladder.

Rodrigo Medellín (1974) has shown a decided similarity in the impoverished regions in their levels of schooling. He has also shown, as an illustration of the sharp contrasts between the poorer and more affluent regions, the pronounced differences in educational attainment of the population in Mexico City and in southern Mexico. In Mexico City, about 22 percent of the population has had no schooling, while 18 percent has completed six or more years of education. In southern Mexico, in contrast, 66 percent has had no schooling, and only 1.3 percent has completed six or more years of school. Medellín's theory is that there is not only a wide disparity in wealth and educational attainment among the seven regions of Mexico, but that this gap is constantly widening.

This disparity also can be examined in terms of the relationship between poverty and school attendance as far as the sixth grade. The data are not recent, but we believe that they are still valid. They show that there is an inverse relationship between income and nonattendance at school as well as between income and dropping out before the sixth grade (Table I-33). Mexico actually spends a larger percentage of GNP on education of the wealthier classes than on that of the needier ones (Table I-34)–inconceivable in a country proclaiming social justice and equal opportunity for all. The explanation for this is that the government spends much more per student in higher grades than on those in the lower grades, but because the upper classes are almost the only ones to benefit from the opportunity for higher education, the result is that the government spends relatively more money on them.

Intergenerational educational mobility. Has there been any progress among children due to improved education of their parents? Probably so, particularly at the higher levels, where the father may have graduated from the university while his son

Table I-33. Percentage of children in Mexico attending school, by family income, 1959

Monthly family income (in 1959 pesos)	*Percentage of school-age children attending school*	*Percentage of relevant age group attending the sixth grade*
Less than 200	38.2	0.7
201–400	60.5	2.5
401–600	72.1	4.1
601–800	71.6	7.1
801–1,000	79.6	5.9
1,001–1,500	87.4	9.4
1,501 and more	84.1	8.0

SOURCE: Mexico, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, *Statistical Bases of the Eleven Year Plan for Primary Education.*

Table I-34. Percentage of the GNP of Mexico spent on education of children, by socioeconomic class of parents, 1959

Socioeconomic class	*Percentage of GNP*
Paupers	0.66
Poor	0.72
Poor in transition	0.76
Insolvent middle class	1.06
Solvent middle class	1.24
Highly privileged	1.53

SOURCE: Mexico, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, *Statistical Bases of the Eleven-Year Plan for Primary Education.*

now aspires to a master's or doctor's degree, perhaps even from a foreign university. This seldom occurred 30 years ago. Furthermore, parents realize that standards have changed: where once it was enough to be a general medical practitioner, now a two- or three-year hospital internship is required as a step toward medical specialization. Likewise, many jobs in the past did not require even a grade-school certificate, whereas today a secondary diploma is demanded. The conclusion is that to succeed as well or better than in the past, more schooling is necessary.

The Center for Educational Studies in Mexico City is preparing a detailed survey of the requirements that are necessary for an industrial job in the Mexico City metropolitan area. Among other things, the center expects to find intergenerational, educational, economic, and social mobility in the area. The data are still being processed. Meanwhile, we can provide some data on intergenerational educational mobility in the city of Monterrey (Table I-35). Although the data show a strong relationship between the educational levels of children and of their parents, they also show that a substantial proportion of children are achieving higher levels of educational attainment than did their parents, greatly exceeding the proportion with lower attainment than their parents.

The current Federal Law of Education has as one of its objectives the goal of "promoting social mobility and distributive

Table I-35. Intergenerational educational mobility, based on survey data for Monterrey, 1967

	No schooling	*Incomplete primary*	*Complete primary*	*Basic or upper medium*	*Superior (college)*
Educational level of the parents	*Educational level of the children*				
No schooling	73%	39%	18%	9%	1%
Incomplete primary	24	47	47	40	22
Complete primary	3	13	29	36	30
Basic or upper medium	–	1	5	12	27
Superior (college)	–	–	1	3	20
Educational level of the children	*Educational level of parents*				
No schooling	27	6	1	–	–
Incomplete primary	51	42	21	9	–
Complete primary	16	29	33	17	7
Basic or upper medium	6	18	33	37	25
Superior (college)	–	5	12	37	68

SOURCE: Balán (1967, Tables VII-9A and VII-10).

justice" (Art. 5, Par. VIII). For this to become a reality it will be necessary to provide equal opportunities not only to enter school but to remain there. This double goal has not yet been achieved. Rural areas have minimal access, if any, to a second-rate primary education compared with urban areas, and the opportunity to remain within the educational system still depends greatly on the family income of the pupil. Worse still, the student's probability of benefiting from education is also linked to the family's socioeconomic level. Hence most pupils who drop out belong to poor families.

What can these dropouts expect in the labor market? Their only choice is to begin at the bottom in the informal work force and slowly climb upward as they gain experience over the years, until they reach at best a mediocre position. It is urgently necessary, therefore, that Mexico delay entry into the work force until at least age 15, even providing subsidies to accomplish this. It would be expensive, but worth it. The size of the labor force as well as the amount of unemployment would be reduced, and job applicants could hold their heads up when seeking work, confident in their improved technical or academic abilities.

After three decades of effort in education, the distribution of income, and hence of education, was more equitable in 1950 than in 1970. Where is the social progress proclaimed by the Mexican Revolution?

4

Current Trends and Future Prospects

The Employment Situation

The nub of the employment problem consists in the fact that year after year the total population wanting to work cannot be accommodated–at least not properly–by the labor market. This gives rise to open unemployment, visible unemployment, and underemployment. At the same time, educational standards have declined while employers insist on increasingly better education from job applicants. Between 1960 and 1968 the various sectors of employment were able to raise their educational requirements by two full grades (Keesing, 1971). Investments to provide more jobs cannot keep pace with growth of job applicants. The problem is constantly becoming more acute, and it is urgent that it be solved in order to reduce the surplus of supply in the labor market.

Formal education. It has been demonstrated that young people 12 to 19 years of age are today more educated than 5, 10, or 15 years ago. The growth rate of school enrollment is now about twice as high as the growth rate of population, which in itself is one of the highest in the world (Table I-21). School registrations increased from 23.4 percent of the age group in 1959 to 56.9 percent in 1975.

Education for work. The establishment of schools to provide job training for young people is a recent development, the goal of which is to provide training for work on a subprofessional level after graduation from basic secondary school. This automatically relieves the pressure on the demand for college education. The types of vocational schools that had been built or were under construction in 1972–1973 are indicated in Table I-36.

Table I-36. Number of vocational schools built or under construction, by type of training, 1972–73

Type of training	*Built*	*Under construction*
Technical schools for industry and commerce	115	19
Training centers for industry	27	–
Centers for technological studies	12	–
Centers for scientific and technological studies	50	17
Agricultural and livestock technological schools	242	84
Agricultural and livestock technological centers	12	7
Centers for forestry	8	–
Training centers for agriculture and livestock	1	–
National centers for marine science and technology	1	–
Regional technological institutes	27	1
Technological schools for fishing	30	3
Training schools for teachers of agriculture and animal husbandry	1	–

SOURCE: Mexico, Ministry of Public Education, National System for Technical Education, 1972–73 (10) 4, 9, 10.

In addition to the larger institutions, there are other means of providing technical education, including (1) the system of open education; (2) schools for adults; (3) teaching "brigades" (traveling teams); (4) basic educational centers; (5) mobile rural classrooms; (6) development "brigades" for the improvement of the Indians; (7) bilingual cultural units; (8) cultural missions; (9) reading rooms; (10) "houses of culture"; and (11) "houses of art." Many large companies have set up procedures to provide technical and academic training to their employees, only some of whom are eager to take advantage of these opportunities.

If all these opportunities were taken advantage of, recurrent education would become a reality. Unfortunately, those who need education the most have the least urge to learn.

Industrial training of employees. Industrialists are the first who should be obliged to provide continuous training to their workers, because they are the first to benefit from the added skills. But they should also be willing to help train youths who are not in their employ as an important social gesture. For example, the specialized sectors of the metalworking or clothing industries could establish centers for training. If workers are not helped to improve by their employers they can hardly be expected to do it on their own; thus the company should help employees, even allowing time off from the job, job incentives, and the like.

The educational system, particularly its technical branch, ought to maintain closer contacts with industry in order to direct young workers toward potential specialties so that they do not become "jacks of all trades and masters of none." We are aware of the argument that has arisen between exponents of specific technical training and those for general education; for our own part we favor specific technical training in Mexico at this point in its development.

Short- and Long-Range Prospects

The heavy tax load required to support the educational program makes it likely that gaps in the present system will continue on both the secondary and working levels for the next 10 or 15 years. Another reason for pessimism is that jobs today require an average of two more years of schooling than formerly. This is a source of frustration to those who 20 years ago believed that graduation from primary school would gain them easy entry into the work force; they now find that many jobs require secondary education as well. The only solution is to study more, either through recurrent education or by staying in school a few years more. The latter calls for missed opportunities to earn money: few today are willing or able to make the sacrifice.

It also has been suggested to the government that industry in Mexico be shifted to a more labor-intensive rather than technical structure, because the latter requires a high rate of investment per capita. Such a change in structure, however, would be very difficult today because present industrial systems are more profitable and are all firmly established.

The most feasible short-range solution would be to invest capital to create the many jobs that are needed to end open and concealed unemployment—and underemployment as well—and to close the gap between supply and demand for jobs. At present, Mexico is going through a very difficult period, but there is hope for the future. Before long, Mexico will become a petroleum-producing country. This gives rise to the hope that oil, like a *deux ex machina*, will help solve Mexico's internal problems and help her assume a more prestigious international position.

Political policies since the 1930s have caused the unequal distribution of wealth in Mexico; 70 percent of the people are impoverished, while there is a small middle class and a tiny wealthy elite.

The policy of "substitution of imports" has kept the rate of absorption of labor into the job market lower than the population growth rate. Production methods appropriate for an underdeveloped country were imposed. As a consequence, today we have unemployment, underemployment, and a great many people languishing in the informal work market. The main problem of unemployment in Mexico is that new jobs are not being created fast enough. It is to be hoped that the new attitudes of President Lopez Portillo, together with the benefit of the recently discovered vast petroleum deposits, will relieve this situation in the near future.

Although youths today are better educated than they were a few years ago, their unemployment rate is still higher than that of other age groups and their participation in the informal sector is greater than before. This unhealthy situation continues to worsen, for youths suffer from the effects of recession more than the other groups. There should be a legal minimum age for working, not lower than 15 years. This would reduce the size of the labor force, would bring supply more into line with demand, and young people would encourage young people to be better educated and prepared to begin their working life.

Because of the complexity of the youth unemployment problem no substantial improvement is expected for at least ten years. Structural changes are required which cannot be established overnight. Youth employment problems are grave and will continue to be serious, according to even the most optimistic observers, for quite a while into the future.

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Part Two

South Asia

by Manzoor Ahmed

5

South Asia in Perspective

In no part of the world is the youth population identified only by an age span (15 to 24 years for the purpose of our discussion) a homogeneous group, and the problems of such a population have many dimensions. An attempt to understand the youth phenomenon, however, brings to the surface a number of general issues and concerns for thinkers and scholars as well as "doers"—those with responsibility to make policies and guide action. One way of looking at these general issues is that they concern transition—the transition of young people into adult roles and responsibilities as workers, citizens, members of the local community, members of the family, and individual human beings—and how effective educational and other social institutions are in facilitating this transition.

Each phase of transition produces inevitable conflicts, frictions and maladjustments. The frictions of transition, however, are shaped and accentuated in the poor countries by overall development problems: resource scarcity, inadequacy of institutions to manage the existing resources, population growth outpacing development, and the pressure of rising expectations. When we consider that the youth population is close to one-third of the working-age population in fast-growing developing countries and that national development programs are future-oriented endeavors to improve the destiny of today's young people, the development process and the youth transition situation become even more closely intertwined. This general formulation of the youth problem provides a framework to examine the dimensions of the problems faced by youth in South Asia, the efforts to solve these problems, and the elements of a more effective strategy.

Quantitative Dimensions

South Asia—Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan), India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon)—with three of the world's most populous countries, accounts for over one-third of the total population of the nonsocialist Third World. The combined population of the four countries was estimated to be 771 million in 1975. India accounts for the largest share of this population, with about 610 million; Bangladesh has 79 million; Pakistan, 69 million; and Sri Lanka, slightly less than 14 million (*World Bank Atlas, 1976*, Annex). These countries also contain the world's largest concentration of mass poverty, with per capita income in 1975 (in U.S. dollars) of $110 for Bangladesh, $140 for Pakistan, and $150 for India and Sri Lanka (and a highly unequal distribution of this average income).

The population in the 15 to 24 age group in the four countries in 1975 numbered slightly over 151 million, assuming a 20 percent share of the age group in the total population. Because countries with high population growth rates have a higher proportion of their total population in young age groups than countries with low population growth rates, the developing countries have relatively higher proportions of youths. According to the *UNESCO Statistical Yearbook, 1974*, 21 percent of the population of developing countries were between 15 and 24 years of age, while only 17 percent were in this age group in developed countries. The proportion of the youth population is even higher in developing countries when compared with the total adult working population over 15 years of age, with consequent implications for the employment situation and educational services (see Table II-1).

Table II-1. Youth population, total population, and population over 15 years of age, selected countries and years (numbers in thousands)

Country	*Population 15 to 24 (1)*	*Total population (2)*	*Population over age 15 (3)*	*(1) as a percentage of (2)*	*(1) as a percentage of (3)*
Developed countries					
United States (1974)	39,557	211,909	157,293	18.7%	25.1%
Japan (1973)	18,463	108,710	82,264	17.0	22.4
United Kingdom (1973)	6,872	49,175	37,513	14.0	18.3
France (1972)	8,534	51,702	39,437	16.5	21.6
Developing countries					
India (1974)	114,047	586,056	351,033	19.5	32.5
Pakistan (1968)	7,180	44,080	24,865	16.3	28.9
Sri Lanka (1969)	2,610	12,298	7,460	21.2	35.0
Mexico (1974)	11,214	58,118	31,140	19.3	36.0

SOURCE: United Nations Demographic Yearbook, 1974.

The Educational Profile

With respect to the educational profile of the youth population in South Asia, the general pattern that prevails in the three larger countries is broken by Sri Lanka. The overall literacy rates and the gross rate of participation of the respective age groups in the first, second, and third levels of education provide a proxy measure for the educational level of the youth population in the four countries (see Table II-2). It should be noted that the gross ratios in Table II-2 overestimate the participation of the population in the educational process in two major ways—by counting the enrolled students in a particular level who are above or below the specified age group for that level, and by hiding the high dropout rate prevalent in all four countries. In India and Pakistan only a quarter of those who enter the first grade complete the fifth grade. In Bangladesh the survivors are estimated to be 20 percent of the first-grade enrollees. In Sri Lanka the survival ratio is close to one half. These statistics also ignore the unequal opportunities for education between urban and rural areas, between males and females, and between the rich and the poor.

Table II-2. Literacy rate and percentage of relevant age-groups participating in education by level, 1965 and 1970

Country	*Literacy rate population over 10 years of age (1970)*	*Gross enrollment first level[a] (1970)*	*Gross enrollment second level[a] (1970)*	*Gross enrollment third level[a] (1965)*
Bangladesh	23%	56%	13%	–
India	29	79	28	2.6%
Pakistan	39	48	8	3
Sri Lanka	85	103	50	1

[a] The first level is primary education; the second level is secondary; and the third level is tertiary or higher education. The duration of the third level in the four countries is not the same; therefore, the ratios are not strictly comparable.

SOURCE: World Bank, *Education Sector Paper*, 1974, Table 3; *UNESCO Statistical Yearbook, 1974*, Table 3.2; Marga Institute, 1974, pp. 26, 241.

In all four countries, secondary education is divided into two cycles, the first cycle ending at the end of tenth grade. The progression rate from the first cycle to the second cycle of secondary education (usually lasting two years) is low. In Sri Lanka, where secondary education is more widespread, the proportion of students proceeding from grade 10 to grade 11 (after passing a public examination–General Certificate of Education–Ordinary Level) is only 12 percent (Marga Institute, 1974). Similar barriers of public examination between two cycles at the secondary level exist in all the other countries. The end of the first cycle of secondary education corresponds with age 15 or 16; thus an overwhelmingly large proportion of the youths we are concerned with are no longer participants in the formal educational system.

The overall picture that can be drawn from Table II-2 is that in the three large countries of the region, over 90 percent of the population in the 15 to 24 age group is not enrolled in educational institutions; over 50 percent of the youths are illiterate; 10 to 15 percent have a certain amount of secondary education; and the remainder have complete or incomplete primary education.

In Sri Lanka, the literacy level of the youth population, in line with the overall rate, is around 90 percent. Specific information about the educational attainments of Sri Lanka youth is available from a socioeconomic sample survey conducted in 1969–1970 (see Table II-3).

Table II-3. Educational attainments of youths 15 to 24, Sri Lanka, 1969–1970

Educational attainment	*Number*	*Percentage*
Population 15 to 24	2,609.700	100.0
No schooling	194,700	7.5
Grades 1–5	767,000	29.4
Grades 6–10	1,287,000	49.3
General Certificate of Education (11th grade and above)	360,000	13.8

SOURCE: Gunatileke, 1972, p. 67.

The influence of socioeconomic factors on access to educational opportunities in South Asia is often underrated. Available evidence indicates that nonattendance and dropping out at the primary level are due mainly to economic reasons. In the subsequent stages of education, the ruthless screening process that eliminates a large proportion of students is also strongly influenced by the socioeconomic circumstances of the students. J.P. Naik (1968, pp. 22, 108), writes of India: "At the elementary stages, the weaker sections of the community still get very little benefit, their enrollment is comparatively less and wastage greater. . . . But from the very few studies available, it appears that the equality of educational opportunity provided at the secondary stage is far less than that at the elementary stage. . . . Secondary education is still very largely urban and boys still form the vast majority of secondary students."

Indian economist Jagdish Bhagwati advances the general hypothesis that in capitalist less developed countries (LDCs) like India, the benefits of state subsidies to various stages of education accrue disproportionately less to the poorer groups at each level of education; at successively higher levels of education, the average income of the groups to which the students belong tends to increase and the rate of government subsidization to higher education is greater than to primary education.

He presents corroborative evidence from India to show that for the lowest income groups the opportunity cost for participating in education is higher and the benefit derived from education is lower than for the higher income groups. Bhagwati also suggests (1973, p. 24) that discriminatory benefits and advantages "can be handed to elite groups by the state without obvious disaffection if they are handled via the educational system which in principle, at least, is open to all classes and castes and therefore conceals effectively its inegalitarian impact."

In Bangladesh, two studies in rural areas show that 55 and 68 percent of families who did not send their children to primary school cited economic reasons. Another 29 and 16 percent of the families expressed lack of interest in education, probably a defensive reaction to hide their economic incapacity (Islam, 1973, p. 54).

G. V. Aratchy (1972) argues that in Sri Lanka "free" education at all levels did not open up the higher educational system or provide the benefits of such education equally to members of all ethnic groups and economic strata.

The conclusions of the International Labor Organization expert team on equality of access to education and benefits from education in Sri Lanka merit quoting (ILO, 1971, pp. 160–161):

> First, in spite of high rates of unemployment for a number of years, most individuals with education end up with considerably higher incomes (and no doubt better future prospects) than those without. The differentials have been declining, but they are still large.
>
> Second, and more significant, the distribution of those benefits by social class is far from even. The 1963 Consumer Finance Survey revealed a considerable disparity in earnings even between persons of similar educational levels.
>
> * * *
>
> Third, on the cost side, differences in the ability of different individuals to supplement public provi-

> sion of education can have very significant effects on results.
>
> * * *
>
> Finally, even if the system were free from bias between individuals in terms of family income or social background, it would still embody enormous social inequalities between the few who make the grade educationally and the majority who do not. The higher life-time earnings of the educated are paid for by public education, which is financed from general taxation.
>
> * * *
>
> This last point is probably the most serious aspect of unequal distribution of education in Ceylon [Sri Lanka]. Although inequality internal to the educational system is far from negligible, it is probably less severe than in many other countries, particularly those where the crucial levels of education are not free. But the external aspects of educational distribution in Ceylon may be no less unequal than elsewhere.

Youth Employment

Conventional estimates of labor force participation and measures of employment and unemployment—used in modern economies where the wage sector comprises a major share of the economically active population—can be misleading when applied to South Asian economies dominated by peasant agriculture (characterized by small holdings of land) and "informal" economic activities in the urban areas. For both subsistence-level farming and unorganized urban labor, the distribution of time between work and leisure is not clearly structured, the activities of the household merge with the farm or other unit of production, and the return on labor is not definitely ascertainable. Conventional methods of measuring employment based on certain hours of gainful work during a reference period do not readily apply in this situation. Conventional calculations also systematically underestimate the active labor force and consequently the rate of unemployment and underemployment, particularly among youths, because these calculations leave out young people seeking work for the first time, those discouraged from doing so by the employment prospects, and boys and girls engaged in nonwage family subsistence activities. The contribution of housewives and women to household activities—which comprise a large share of agricultural processing in the South Asian countries—is systematically excluded from employment measurement, explaining the apparently low participation rate of women in the labor force. With these limitations in mind, the conventional estimates of labor force participation for the total population and the youth population as a percentage of the total working-age population (14 to 64 years) are shown in Table II-4.

Table II-4. Percentage of the population in the labor force, for persons 14 to 64 and for youthful age groups, by sex, South Asia, selected years

	Percentage of age group in labor force					
	14–64		*15–19*		*20–24*	
Country and year	*Male*	*Female*	*Male*	*Female*	*Male*	*Female*
Bangladesh (1974)	35.2%	18.7%	–	–	–	–
India (1971)	32.9	11.9	36.6%	15.5%	49.6%	17.8%
Pakistan (1972)	30.0	5.4	–	–	–	–
Sri Lanka (1971)	34.8	18.8	37.6	26.4	65.4	42.2

SOURCE: International Labor Office, *Yearbook of Labor Statistics, 1975.*

In the absence of detailed information, we assume somewhat liberally that 10 percent of the youths in the 15 to 24 age group in South Asia are enrolled in educational institutions. Of the 90 percent who are out of school, more than half are girls, a large portion of whom are already or shortly to be in the traditional housewife's role (most girls marry between ages 15 and 20) and are not likely to be economically active outside the household. Leaving aside the in-school population and the housewives, roughly one-half of the youth population in South

Asia, about 75 million youths, were in the active labor force in the mid-1970s.

A clear picture of the employment status of youths in the labor force is not available. Where data are available, they show a higher incidence of unemployment among youths compared with the overall unemployment rate. One estimate in India indicates that unemployment among youths in the 18 to 24 age group is 25 percent, both in the literate and illiterate segments of the population group (Indian Institute of Public Opinion, 1976). In Sri Lanka 37 percent of the youth population was estimated to be unemployed according to a 1969–1970 survey. However, unemployment was primarily a youth problem, since over 82 percent of all unemployed were concentrated among the youth (Gunatileke, 1972).

Because of problems with the concept of employment and its measurement, these percentages do not signify the real dimensions of the employment situation of youths, nor are they useful in establishing appropriate policy measures. A useful analytical step would be to disaggregate the youth labor force by education and urban-rural background and to consider the employment situation of the disaggregated groups separately. This will cause a large overlap between educational status and domiciliary status, because most of the educated youths reside in the cities and most of the illiterates reside in rural areas (with the exception of Sri Lanka, as we shall see).

An overwhelming majority of all youths in the region live in rural areas, in line with the low urbanization of these countries. According to a somewhat dated source, around 80 percent of the youths live in the rural areas (Table II-5).

Adequate information about the educational attainments of the youth labor force were not available for all four countries. In India according to the 1971 census, 45.8 percent of labor force youths ages 18 to 24 were literate. Of the literate youths, 38 percent were students and, not surprisingly, 38 percent were urban dwellers. Four percent of the literate youths had higher education (above the secondary level) and 21.5 percent had ten years of formal education (Indian Institute of Public Opinion, 1976).

Table II-5. Urban and rural distribution of youths 15 to 24, South Asia, selected years

Country	*Year of data*	*Total youth population (millions)*	*Urban youth population (millions)*	*Rural youth population (millions)*
India	(1961)[a]	78.2 (100.0%)	14.9 (20.3)	58.3 (79.7)
Pakistan including Bangladesh	(1961)[a]	14.3 (100.0%)	2.4 (16.4)	12.0 (83.6)
Sri Lanka	(1963)[b]	1.9 (100.0%)	0.4 (21.0)	1.5 (79.0)

[a] Based on census of population, 1961.
[b] Based on tabulation of a 10 percent sample.

SOURCE: United Nations, 1968.

The pattern of a high concentration of literate youth in the urban areas and among the student population is likely to be similar in Pakistan and Bangladesh. In Sri Lanka, however, with its high overall levels of educational attainment, the distribution of educated youth between urban and rural areas is reported to be roughly proportional to the overall distribution of the population between urban and rural areas (Poleman, 1972, p. 41), and the level of education and literacy in the youth work force is much higher than in the other three countries.

The broad picture that emerges for the three large countries is that a large majority of the youths in the labor force are illiterate or semiliterate, living in rural areas, and are willy-nilly doing their best to eke out a living from agriculture and other rural occupations. Then there is a relatively small minority with a considerable spread in educational attainments, ranging from illiteracy to the highest university degrees, employed in urban economic activities and with occupational goals and life aspirations tied to nonrural, "modern" economic activities. (This picture also fits Sri Lanka except for one important detail – almost all of the rural youth in Sri Lanka are literate and a substantial portion have completed primary and even secondary school.) The neatness of the picture is, of course, marred by a number of phenomena. Some illiterate and semiliterate young people from the rural areas move to the towns, lured by the potential rewards of the modern sector. A segment of the urban work force is in the so-called informal sector, half way between the peasant economy and the wage economy. And various public and private rural development programs and services attempt to place and retain at least a small segment of the educated and professionally trained people back in the rural areas.

The division of youths between urban and rural residents—accentuated by the educational gap (always excepting Sri Lanka), the duality of modern and traditional economic activities, differences in occupational opportunities and their rewards, and different goals in life—is wide enough to warrant separate consideration of the employment problems of rural, educationally deprived youths and urban educated youths. Sri Lanka has to be treated as a special case, though the following discussion has some application to the island nation.

Rural youths. In the agriculture-based economies of South Asia, possession of land is a major determinant of the economic situation, including opportunities for gainful employment, of rural families. With limited employment prospects in the nonagricultural economic activities in rural areas and a high ratio of the expanding working-age population being absorbed into agricultural activities, unemployment and underemployment in rural areas, reflected in low productivity and low earnings, are increasing (Raj, 1974, 1976). In this situation only families with access to adequate cultivable land can be assured of gainful employment for their working-age members. Others have to compete for the limited nonfarm jobs and farm laborer's work that provide sufficient employment only during short seasonal peaks. A large portion of rural families in South Asia fall into the latter category.

In India, according to one estimate, rural households that derive their livelihood primarily from agricultural labor but have no land constitute 27 percent of all rural households. They own only 5 percent of the cattle, 3 percent of the buffaloes, and

2 percent of wooden and iron plows; this implies that most own neither assets nor implements and have no option but to sell physical labor. To this group may be added the very small landholders owning less than 2.5 acres. Their holdings are not economically viable, and the large majority of them are actually farm laborers rather than producer-farmers. This group comprises 33 percent of all the rural households (Swany, 1976).

A recent sample survey of households in ten districts in Bangladesh revealed that 70 percent of the rural households relied for their livelihood entirely or partially on agricultural labor, but 38 percent of the rural households had no land available for farming either by ownership or by rent (Integrated Rural Development Program, 1976).

In Sri Lanka, where a large share of the nation's land is owned by estates, nearly 60 percent of the holdings are smaller than two acres. It is reported that a "cycle of impoverishment" affecting the small farmers has resulted in increased landlessness and a rise in acreage under sharecropping by 158 percent between 1946 and 1970 (Marga Institute, 1974, p. 19).

In Pakistan the portion of landless farmworker households and households with landholdings insufficient for family subsistence is over half of the rural households. This group conservatively estimated at 40 percent of the rural households, constitutes the hard core of rural poverty and deprivation. The hard core of unemployed and impoverished youths belong to this 40 percent of the rural households; their families possess little or no cultivable land, and they themselves are illiterate and without special skills. They are, of course, the victims of extreme poverty and deprivation and the correlates of poverty—malnourishment, ill health, lethargy, absence of initiative, and lack of a political voice and social connections that could be of help in escaping their condition.

The employment problem of these young people is not just the lack of work. On the contrary, when rural youths are not working as field hands, they are taking care of family and household chores, engaged as domestic servants at the landowner's home, hawking trinkets or more essential commodities to village wives, carrying loads in the local market, or begging and stealing. These youths probably put in more hours of back-breaking labor than full-time employees in regular wage-earning jobs. The youth's hard work, however, does not earn them enough to ensure the basic amenities or even to enable their escape from dire poverty. It is now recognized in literature on employment and rural development that the main problem is to create work opportunities that ensure a minimum standard of living for the worker—to raise the productivity and earnings of activities which the rural economy can provide and sustain. As the ILO employment mission to Colombia concluded (ILO, 1970, p. 15): "In the last resort the real tragedy of those without jobs is the poverty into which they slip and which they share with all those with very low incomes. After all, the ultimate objective of policy is not just to provide more jobs, but to provide work which is socially productive and yields enough income for a reasonable standard of living." (See also Jolly, Seers, and Singer, 1973).

In the case of Sri Lanka, the high educational level of rural youths probably means that their occupational and life aspirations are somewhat similar to those of urban youths—to the extent that formal education shapes these aspirations. According to a survey, among persons aged 15 to 24 who have been seeking jobs but have never been employed, 35 percent of those without secondary education aspired to white-collar employment, but among those with the secondary level diploma, 76 percent wanted white-collar employment (ILO, 1971, p. 87). Unfortunately, these data were not separated for urban and rural youths.

While educated rural youths in Sri Lanka may have expectations unlikely to be nurtured by the educationally deprived rural youths in the other countries, the nature of the problem in Sri Lanka is not fundamentally different: a rural country, with a large proportion of households below the "poverty line," and a high level of overall and youth unemployment and underemployment.

Educated unemployed youths. The discussion about the employment situation among young people is dominated by the theme of unemployment among educated youths—particularly the mismatch between the educational achievement and the expectations of graduates on the one hand and the available employment opportunities in the modern sector of the economy on the other.

Though the total numbers of unemployed educated persons are relatively small compared with total youth employment (again with the exception of Sri Lanka), educated unemployment is cause for special concern for several reasons. It appears that in all developing countries, including South Asia, unemployment is higher among the educated than among illiterates and higher at the middle level of education than at the bottom end. It is also concentrated among the younger age groups, particularly in the 15 to 24 age group. (Turnham and Jaeger, 1971). It is, of course, a waste of national resources when the skills and knowledge acquired through education are not put to productive use. Another important reason national authorities and policy makers are especially concerned about the educated unemployed is that they are more vocal, articulate, and capable of being organized than the educationally and socially underprivileged rural youths. The frustration and anger of educated youths can and have caused trouble for the national governments. (Educated youths also happen to be the sons and daughters of those national authorities and policy makers).

Conventional measures of employment and unemployment are more applicable to educated youths than to rural youths because most of the former are employed and aspire to jobs in the "organized" sector of the economy. Even here, of course, caution must be exercised with definitions because very different results may be obtained by altering definitions. For instance, some measures in India show a very low rate of unemployment because they leave out all those who have been gainfully employed for any amount of time during a reference week and those not currently seeking full-time work for whatever reasons (Blaug, 1976). A more liberal (albeit vague) definition of unemployment results in substantially larger unemployment figures for the educated.

Whatever definitions of unemployment and methods of calculation are used, no one will deny that there is a serious problem of unemployment and underutilization of the educated work force in the South Asian countries. A report prepared by the Manpower Section of the Planning Commission in Bangladesh (1974) shows the stock of persons in the labor market with various secondary and postsecondary educations and the estimate of the number of jobs demanding these qualifications (Table II-6). The balance of "unemployment and inappropriate placement" is staggering for secondary graduates and those with higher degrees in humanities and social sciences. These statistics should be interpreted with caution, however, because "inappropriate placement" is not the same as unemployment and because many questions can be raised about the assumptions and methods used in the calculations. Despite the limitations of the data, they at least reveal a serious problem of unemployment, underemployment, mismatch of qualifications and jobs, unfulfilled expectations, and frustrations among educated youths. They also raise questions about the scale and nature of the higher educational effort, especially when a large number of the youths do not enjoy the benefits of primary education.

Detailed tabulation of the unemployment situation among educated youths in Sri Lanka is available from the 1969–1970 Socio-Economic Survey (ILO, 1971, p. 28; see Table II-7). This tables clearly demonstrates that the higher the level of education of a young man, the higher his chances are of being unemployed, up to "A" level (12 years of formal education) when the rate of unemployment falls. The overall rate does not differ much between urban and rural areas in Sri Lanka, except for women, who fare particularly badly in the rural areas and for whom the unemployment rate does not drop even at "A" level as it does for men.

Recent data about unemployment among those who completed secondary education in India are not readily available. A mid-1960s estimate is that the total of educated unemployed in India at that time was about one million, the bulk of whom—probably 90 percent—were secondary-level graduates (India, Report of the Education Commission, 1976).

Indian census data of 1971 provide basic information

Table II-6. Stock of degree-holders in job market and number of jobs requiring degrees, Bangladesh, mid-1973

(1) Educational qualifications	*(2) Number available for employment*	*(3) Number of jobs demanding this qualification*	*(4) Balance of unemployed and inappropriately placed*	*(5) Percent (4) ÷ (2)*
Secondary level				
Secondary school certificate	630,576	246,792	383,784	60.9
Higher secondary school certificate (science group)	45,252	1,733	43,519	96.2
Higher secondary school certificate (other groups)	112,743	5,208	107,535	95.4
TOTAL	788,571	253,733	534,838	67.8
Bachelor's level				
(First university degree)				
Arts	88,631	33,913	54,718	61.7
Commerce	51,434	13,388	38,046	74.0
Science	31,694	3,574	28,120	88.7
TOTAL	171,759	50,875	120,884	70.4
Master's level				
(Second university degree)				
Humanities	6,441	3,919	2,522	39.2
Social sciences	7,703	3,145	4,558	59.2
Economics, statistics, business	6,360	4,459	1,901	30.0
Natural sciences	6,492	6,096	396	6.1
Law	5,658	2,198	3,460	61.2
Journalism (diploma & degree)	212	886	-674	–
Library science (diploma & degree)	33,271	21,420	11,851	35.6
Post secondary technical diplomas				
Engineering technicians	11,182	11,416	-234	–
Medical technicians	5,655	10,617	-4,962	–
Jute and textile technicians	871	4,134	-3,263	–
TOTAL	17,708	26,167	-8,459	–
Professional degrees				
(Other than teaching)				
Engineering	4,456	4,887	-431	–
Medicine	4,903	5,185	-282	–
Agriculture	3,569	4,897	-1,328	–
TOTAL	12,928	14,969	-2,041	–

Table II-6. Stock of degree-holders in job market and number of jobs requiring degrees, Bangladesh, mid-1973 (continued)

(1) *Educational qualifications*	*(2)* *Number available for employment*	*(3)* *Number of jobs demanding this qualification*	*(4)* *Balance of unemployed and inappropriately placed*	*(5)* *Percent (4) ÷ (2)*
Professional education degree				
Master's level	1,248	408	840	67.3
Bachelor of Ed/Teaching	11,128	52,229	-41,101	–
Certificate and Higher Certificate in Education	49,381	189,036	-139,655	–
Diploma and Degree in Physical Education	2,140	1,541	599	28.0
TOTAL	63,897	243,214	-179,317	–

SOURCE: Government of Bangladesh, Manpower Section Planning Commission, *Employment Market for the Educated in Bangladesh: A Benchmark Analysis by Level and Type of Education in Terms of Economic Sector* (June 1974).

about the employment situation of the postsecondary degree and diploma holders (India, 1976). The total number in this category described as "involuntarily unemployed" was reported to be 288,487–13.5 percent of all postsecondary graduates in the country (Table II-8). The highest proportion of unemployed compared with the total graduates in the field was in the technical/vocational field, followed in descending order by science, commerce, engineering, and agriculture. The percentage of unemployed among graduates in arts and humanities was slightly lower than the average for all fields. This suggests that a policy of restricting admission to arts and humanities and increasing enrollment in technical and professional subjects–a course of action often advocated for alleviating the problem of unemployment among the educated and enhancing the contribution of education to national development–is unlikely to work. The higher rate of female unemployment in all fields is striking, especially because of the overall low ratio of female graduates among the total number of graduates (less than 400,000 in a total of 2.1 million graduates in 1971).

Table II-7. Youth seeking work, percentage of the active labor force by age group, Sri Lanka, 1969–70

	Age 15–19				*Age 20–24*			
	Urban	*Rural*	*Estates*	*Total*	*Urban*	*Rural*	*Estates*	*Total*
Both Sexes								
No schooling	13%	11%	31%	23%	29%	8%	5%	8%
Primary	44	34	27	34	16	17	12	15
Middle	57	41	71	46	44	38	25	39
"O" Level	87	93	–	92	45	69	–	63
"A" Level or above	–	–	–	–	22	17	–	27
TOTAL	51	41	32	41	37	39	11	34
Males								
No schooling	14	11	46	26	17	–	18	11
Primary	48	39	35	40	11	13	12	12
Middle	52	36	79	41	34	33	39	33
"O" Level	86	80	–	81	41	61	–	55
"A" Level or above	–	–	–	–	20	50	–	40
TOTAL	50	37	44	40	29	30	17	28
Females								
No schooling	11	–	22	20	38	14	–	6
Primary	28	19	16	19	56	36	12	24
Middle	73	54	33	56	77	54	–	55
"O" Level	88	100	–	98	54	78	–	74
"A" Level or above	–	–	–	–	25	100	–	88
TOTAL	52	51	19	42	61	59	5	44

SOURCE: Socioeconomic Survey, 1969–70, First Round, Special Tabulation, cited in ILO, 1971, Table 8, p. 28.

The high concentration of enrollment and graduates in arts, humanities, and natural sciences is reflected in the fact that together they constitute 76 percent of all unemployed graduates. The large number of graduates from the general arts and sciences colleges draws attention to their unemployment, but these graduates would be unemployed even if they had studied engineering, agriculture, commerce, or some other vocational subjects, for which the unemployment rate is even higher. Thus, if enrollment in higher education cannot be restricted or reduced and if the employment structure remains unaltered, it is a "lesser evil" to have the majority of students in low-cost arts,

Table II-8. Unemployed postsecondary degree holders, by educational fields, India, 1970

Educational fields	*Male*	*Female*	*Total*
A. Unemployed as percent of total degree holders in field			
Arts and humanities	10.7	19.7	13.1
Science	15.3	21.8	16.5
Commerce	13.8	23.0	13.9
Agriculture	11.3	20.2	11.4
Veterinary	5.4	13.1	5.5
Medicine (allopathy)	3.8	6.1	4.2
Medicine (others)	5.2	11.4	5.9
Nursing	3.5	3.5	3.9
Engineering	12.7	23.5	12.8
Technical-Vocational	18.3	38.4	21.8
Others	7.3	17.5	9.2
All fields	12.0	19.6	13.5
B. Unemployed in field as percent of total unemployed degree holders			
Arts and humanities	42.0	72.9	50.5
Science	26.4	22.3	25.2
Commerce	11.0	1.0	8.3
Agriculture	2.1	0.1	1.5
Veterinary	0.3	0.0	0.2
Medicine (allopathy)	1.0	1.0	1.0
Medicine (others)	0.5	0.4	0.5
Nursing	0.0	0.2	0.1
Engineering	14.6	1.0	10.9
Technical-Vocational	1.7	0.6	1.4
Others	0.4	0.5	0.4
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0

SOURCE: Sharma and Apte, 1976, Tables 1, 3, 10, and 11.

humanities, and general science courses rather than in high-cost professional and technical courses.

While the high level of unemployment among the educated is a common feature of all the countries in South Asia, there are different interpretations of this phenomenon, reflecting divergent normative and ideological viewpoints. Some view the problem essentially as a "waiting period" or time lag between completion of education and placement in jobs. Blaug, a proponent of this view, explains that "the rate of open unemployment among the educated is high because so many of them take

6–12–24 months to find their first job; the rate of unemployment among those who have finally acquired a first job is in fact trivial" (Blaug, 1976, p. 6). According to this view, eventually the unemployed graduate either finds a job he aspires for or lowers his sights to accept what is available. The transitory nature of the phenomenon does not, however, minimize its seriousness, because at any particular time a large segment of the educated work force of the country is unutilized and the waiting period appears to be increasing, causing an ever larger percentage of the educated work force to be out of work. For advocates of this view, the remedy lies in measures that would reduce the waiting period and hasten the adjustment between the number and expectations of job seekers and the number of jobs. The basic tools to be used are to be drawn from the operation of the market mechanism—restricting the expansion of higher education by cutting public subsidy or using other financial moves and improving the flexibility of the labor market so that wages respond to the supply of labor.

Opponents of this view stress the differential between private and social returns on education, wage rigidities, artificial links between jobs and educational qualifications, slow growth of the economy, and the educational explosion (see Edwards and Todaro, 1974).

Another more sociological view of unemployment among the educated emphasizes the educational process itself and what it does to the students. It is argued that the attitudes and expectations created by the educational system and the knowledge and competence imparted by it fail to prepare students adequately for available work opportunities. Educational reform efforts in South Asia are based largely on this premise. Myrdal discusses this theme in *Asian Drama* (1968, p. 1646): "Throughout South Asia there is a traditional contempt for manual work, and the educated tend to regard their education as the badge that relieves them of any obligation to soil their hands. . . . This attitude constitutes a large part of the problem of the 'educated unemployed.' "

The remedial measures proposed by the proponents of the sociological view vary, including curricular reform emphasizing a more "practical bias" in the school, more sweeping reforms such as radical changes in the institutional structure of education, and giving a prominent role to nonformal education and widening access to education for the underprivileged masses.

The points of view mentioned above are not exclusive of each other, and most scholars as well as policy makers tend to combine elements of the market and sociological views in explaining and seeking remedies for the problems of the educated unemployed. Their differences are usually in the degree of emphasis on specific elements.

There is a view that sees both market and sociological manifestations of the unemployment problem as symptoms of a more fundamental problem concerning the overall socioeconomic structure. According to this structuralist view, unemployment among the educated–a specific form of a more general problem of underutilization of human resources–arises from the development design and goals chosen; the consumption pattern permitted and promoted; the technology of production that perpetuates waste of human resources and dependence on the industrial countries; dualism between the urban and rural areas and the modern and traditional economic activities that persists; and the political power structure which, for instance, grants subsidies to unemployable university students but denies basic education to the masses (Bowles and Gintis, 1976). The more pragmatic structuralists, while recognizing the centrality of overall structural change in solving the problem of the educated unemployed in developing countries, also recognize the resistance and obstacles to far-reaching changes in the political power structure and the development design in most Third World countries. They will settle, at least temporarily, for measures that bring about certain changes in the structure of the educational system and of the labor market that may cumulatively over time contribute to overall structural change (Jolly, 1974). In this sense the structuralist approach encompasses at least some of the market and the sociological solutions.

Economic Factors

To recapitulate, the main problems that South Asian youths face, burdening their passage from childhood and adolescence to full adulthood and permanently thwarting the fulfillment of their life ambitions, are as follows:

First, nearly one half of the youth population in the three largest countries of South Asia are deprived almost totally of even a basic level of education, and most suffer from unequal access to all levels of education. The main problem in this connection is how to widen educational opportunities without exacerbating the "educated unemployment problem" which even the restrictive educational system has already created.

Second, a large segment of the youth population, concentrated mostly but not totally in the rural areas and among the educationally deprived, is victim to a vicious cycle of low productivity, low earnings, and extreme poverty. The problem of this group is not unemployment in the conventional sense but the incapacity of the rural economy to generate sufficient productive work to ensure a minimum standard of living for the worker.

Finally, there is an ever-widening gap between employment opportunities and the occupational expectations of the youths coming out of the educational system, creating a serious problem of unemployment and underutilization of educated young people. Unemployed educated youths, therefore, are a burden on society instead of being an asset to a developing country. Nevertheless, public subsidies to higher education continue while basic education remains unavailable to many. Issues that arise in this connection include: Can or should higher education be curtailed? Can it be transformed to fit more closely to job opportunities? Can access to it be made more equitable and, if so, what would be the consequences for employment?

To these should be added the problems arising from frustration, despondence, anger, loss of self-esteem, cynicism, and the sense of alienation that are created by poverty, unemployment, unfulfilled expectations, and shattered dreams. The phenomenon euphemistically described as "unrest" is usually mentioned only in connection with students. Although rural youths do not capture the headlines as the students do, they are also susceptible to unrest and agitation. It is reasonable to surmise that they played a part in the April 1971 upheaval in Sri Lanka, in the Naxalite violence in India in the late 1960s, and in the scattered lawlessness and violence in recent years in the Bangladesh countryside. It is also a reasonable presumption that disruption and upheaval in rural areas in South Asia will increase in the future, with the active participation of youths, unless the present situation begins to improve at a perceptible pace.

The youth problem worldwide has many dimensions and manifestations, but in South Asia the economic issue is clearly dominant. Preparing for and finding gainful work that will permit youths to escape poverty and fulfill their aspirations is the main concern of all youths–rural and urban, illiterate and highly educated. Although education is not merely preparation for an occupation, the high level of unemployment and unfulfilled occupational expectations among the educated make employment prospects the fulcrum of thought and action about education for both individual students and national authorities.

The contrast in the nature and magnitude of the problem in South Asia and in the advanced industrial countries is striking. Kerr (1976, pp. 138–140), presenting an analytical framework of the youth problem in the United States on the basis of a schematic categorization of youths by sociologist Martin Trow, estimates that about 80 percent of American youths "have both the resources and the preparation for life to fit into the meritocracy, and for them one could say there is no problem." Another 10 percent either have adequate preparation or the financial resources (but not both) to assume their adult roles and responsibilities. The real problem category comprises 10 percent–ghetto youths with no resources and no preparation. The proportions in South Asia appear to be just the reverse: 80 percent have serious deficiencies in resources or preparation for entering adult life; 50 percent of the youths lack both; and only 20 percent have a relative advantage in the form of either resources or preparation, a small fraction of whom are fortunate enough to enjoy both.

6

Responses to Youth Employment Problems

As we have seen, the problems young people face as they pass from adolescence to adulthood are intertwined with the problems of economic growth, social change, technological choices, distributive justice, and educational progress–in short, with problems of overall national development. The policies and actions of nations, that affect the problems of youths often are not specific responses to youth problems per se but are taken within the context of national goals and strategies for development and are intended to serve objectives and needs besides those of youths. Keeping this qualification in mind, we can discern six categories of developmental activities in South Asia that may be viewed as responses to problems faced by youths. These are: (1) expansion of primary education and literacy programs, (2) reform of secondary education, (3) attempts at restricted development of higher education, (4) programs for youth employment promotion, (5) programs to recruit youths for national service, and (6) general rural employment programs also benefiting youths.

Efforts to Expand General Education

In South Asia, only Sri Lanka has the distinction of making primary education available–almost universally to both boys and girls and in urban and rural areas. In India, the national constitution guarantees every child the right to education up to age 14, but thus far it has been possible to bring only about two thirds of the primary-school-age children into school. In Bangladesh and Pakistan the portion enrolled in primary schools is around half of the age group.

All three countries attach high importance to achieving universal primary education, as reflected in targets for expansion which are invariably overambitious. The draft of India's Fifth Plan mentions the goal of 97 percent enrollment of the age group by 1979. The New Educational Policy of Pakistan announced in 1972 anticipated universal enrollment in primary schools for boys by 1979 and for girls by 1984. An Education Commission appointed by the government of Bangladesh recommends that compulsory primary education be introduced throughout the country by the end of 1978. These ambitious targets and the emphasis placed on quantitative expansion and enrollment ratios have led to a strategy of linear expansion of the existing pattern without any basic change in the content, structure, and objectives of primary education. Primary education is regarded as a full-time, age-specific, sequentially graded activity based on a standard national syllabus. This rigid adherence to the conventional approach has meant that the expansion effort, despite good intentions, has failed to face up to some basic problems of the present system, and this in turn has hampered the expansion effort itself.

As we have noted, the enrollment ratio hides the fact that only a small percentage of those enrolled actually complete primary education. The reasons for dropping out are complex, and the combination of factors vary for different groups and regions. The available data suggest the preponderance of economic factors among the causes for dropping out. Even when primary education is free, the opportunity cost for a poor family is high when all of its working hands are needed for survival. The basic economic factors cannot be altered by any educational measure, but the opportunity cost of attending primary schools for the children of poor families could be reduced by introducing a part-time, variable-duration, flexible timetable for primary education, thereby reducing the number of dropouts and encouraging more new entrants from poor families.

Attendance in primary school does not necessarily ensure that educational objectives are achieved. Many students who leave primary school early may be described as "pushouts" rather than "dropouts" because of the poor quality of teaching, the lack of enthusiasm of the teachers, and the absence of essential supplies such as books and teaching aids. The Indian *Report of the Education Commission* (1964–1966) has commented: "The system of primary education continues to be largely ineffective and wasteful and many children who pass through it either do not attain functional literacy or lapse into illiteracy soon afterwards. If we are to continue our dependence on this programme alone for the liquidation of illiteracy, we may not reach our goal even by 2000 A.D.!"

The issue of quality is partly a matter of resources and partly a question of right policies and strategies, and all these aspects cannot be discussed here. But it should be noted that though quantitative expansion and qualitative improvement are not necessarily in conflict, in the efforts to expand primary education in South Asia, little progress has been recorded on the side of quality. The purpose of the expansion itself will be defeated if the level of achievement of the system cannot be raised.

A related dual question is: How can primary education opportunities be expanded without further aggravating the already serious employment problem among the educated, and what can be done to enhance the contribution of primary education to a process of rural development that would help improve the employment prospects, earnings, and living standards of rural youths? The answers to these questions lie partly in policies and actions external to the educational system, but the relevance of primary education to rural development efforts and realistic employment prospects of students is certainly an educational question. Suffice it to note that the conventional primary education program, viewed essentially as an academic step toward the next level of formal education, does not effectively address the problem of relevance.

The situation in Sri Lanka is instructive for the other countries in the region, illustrating the scenario resulting from the strategy of linear expansion. Although near universal enrollment was achieved at the primary level almost two decades ago (through a combination of the Buddhist tradition of respect and support for education at the community level, early missionary efforts, and a high level of government commitment to public services) the drop-out rate is still high, though not as high as in the other countries, and unemployment is a more serious problem among the completers of primary education than among dropouts and illiterates.

The countries of the region recognize the need for literacy programs and adult education for the many people who have passed childhood and adolescence without ever stepping into a school or deriving much benefit from their brief encounter with schools. In India, under the auspices of the Directorate of Adult Education and through nongovernment voluntary organizations, functional literacy programs are conducted throughout the country. The government-sponsored efforts in functional literacy were in operation in over 100 districts with a total participation of about 200,000 in 1974 (India, Ministry of Education and Social Welfare, 1974).

Pakistan's *The Educational Policy* (1972) anticipated a program to provide literacy training to 11 million illiterates (roughly a quarter of the total illiterates) by 1980. Progress in implementing this plan, however, has been extremely slow, and the target is expected to be missed by a wide margin. Bangladesh has no national effort comparable to that in India and Pakistan, though the need for it has been frequently proclaimed. A number of small-scale nongovernment programs constitute the main literacy and adult-education efforts in Bangladesh.

The literacy and adult functional education programs in the three countries with high illiteracy so far cover only a small fraction of the potential clientele. It has proved difficult to expand the programs and make them effective by integrating them with other components of rural and agricultural development, even when substantial effort has been made, as in India. A general problem with adult literacy efforts in poor countries is that it is extremely difficult to maintain learner motivation and make the programs relevant to learner needs when there is little direct use of literacy in the daily life of the learner in a nonliterate rural environment. Literacy, it appears, becomes functional only in a dynamic socioeconomic environment after a degree of rural transformation has been achieved (UNESCO-UNDP, 1976).

A more pertinent issue as far as the youth population is concerned is that the adult programs are not oriented toward giving a second chance for basic general education to the adolescents and young adults who missed primary school or dropped out early. Recognizing this need, the Indian Ministry of Education has proposed general education programs for out-of-school children in the 6 to 14 age group and youths in the 15 to 25 age group. The programs, still to be fully developed, are to be part time with multiple entry levels, shorter in total duration than the primary program, and conducted under diverse organizational sponsorship at the local level.

Reform at the Secondary Level

Rising unemployment among those who complete secondary education and increasing pressure on higher education led the South Asian countries in the 1960s to many variants of the attempt to reorient second-level general education to give it a work-oriented practical bias and to include vocational subjects in it. The premise is that a vocationally oriented education at the secondary level would lead the student to employment after secondary education, thus reducing educated unemployment and steering young people away from higher education. This notion can be found in plans to "diversify" secondary education in Pakistan and Bangladesh, to introduce practical subjects in the secondary program in India, to turn the lower secondary level in Ceylon into a prevocational course, and to open agricultural secondary schools.

There is obviously a case for introducing work-orientation elements into both primary and secondary schools—far too often characterized by rote memorization of textbooks and rigid syllabuses largely unrelated to the life of the learner (Staley, 1973). However, when the enrichment of the school experience with work orientation is confused with occupational training and supplying labor market needs, neither purpose is served well. The record of reform attempts in secondary education in South Asia bears testimony to this. The Indian *Report of the Education Commission, 1964–1966*, summarizing the experience of multipurpose secondary schools that include technical and vocational subjects in the curriculum, said: "Most of the students who join these schools have only one purpose in view—to pursue their studies further at a university. Consequently, streams like fine arts and agriculture and even the technical stream, which do not lead to popular courses at the university stage, are taken up by few students. . . . One of the main objects for which the scheme of diversification was introduced . . . has not been realized."

The prevocational program in Sri Lanka at the lower secondary level (grades 6 to 9) is intended to enable students to "execute selected manual skills related to vocations with an appropriate degree of proficiency" as well as to achieve other general education goals. A few years of experience with the program (introduced on a limited scale in 1969) already suggest that the main goal of the program is not likely to be achieved. Among the reasons cited by the International Labor Organization (ILO, 1971, pp. 181–182) were:

> (a) In the face of uncertain employment demand and little information about such demand, schools with their standard syllabuses cannot match supply and demand;
>
> (b) The school course cannot always provide the necessary basic technical training for some occupations and the specialized training needed for others;
>
> (c) The needed workshop, equipment and facilities in the school setting make the school program

> highly expensive; specially because the training needs to be responsive to technical change and change in skill demand.

The majority of the graduates of agricultural courses in secondary schools are employed by the government, and it is the ambition of most graduates to land a white-collar job (ILO, 1971).

The following general comment about secondary-level formal vocational education in developing countries fully applies to South Asia:

> Their costs are too high to allow for more than a small fraction of young people to be served; they have had severe difficulties recruiting and holding good technical teachers in the face of competition from the private sector and other government agencies; the training they provide is often poorly adapted to market employers; their unchanging curriculums, methods, and equipment become increasingly ill adapted to the dynamically changing requirements and working conditions of their environment; and frequently a high proportion of their graduates do not end up in jobs that effectively utilize their training. On the whole the record of formal vocational training at the secondary level bespeaks strong caution against an undiscriminating pursuit of this approach in the future; above all in rural areas. [Coombs and Ahmed, 1974, p. 144.]

There are examples of secondary-level technical and vocational training programs in the region—relatively few with a small number of trainees compared with the total secondary system—which are more effective in producing readily employable skilled workers. These programs are usually managed by ministries other than education or by private organizations. The programs may or may not include a significant general-education component, but typically one third or more of their instructional time is spent on acquiring practical work experience. Their effectiveness is positively related to the degree to which they shed the trappings of formal institutional training: full-time instruction programs and instructors, lengthy courses, rigid syllabuses, expensive fixed installations, inadequate provisions for practice and so on. One of these relatively successful programs is the vocational training program of the Ministry of Labour in Sri Lanka, which, besides two fixed centers in Colombo, has over 100 mobile units traveling throughout the country. Over two dozen crafts and skills are taught by this program in courses ranging from six to nine months to persons who are unemployed or who require upgrading certain skills (Margo Institute, 1973).

Development of Higher Education

Recall the following facts about higher education in South Asia:

1. A substantial percentage of graduates of higher education is unemployed continuously, wasting national human resources and causing frustration and unrest among graduates and students.

2. Like the rest of the educational system, higher education is characterized by unequal access—more so because of the screening process in the preceding stages.

3. Nevertheless, higher education is subsidized heavily by the governament and consumes a large portion of the government budget,[1] although the majority of youths (if dropouts from the primary level are included) are deprived of basic general education.

Is restricting the expansion of higher education the best solution of the problems created by the above factors? Restricted entry into higher education would limit the number of job-seeking graduates, would reduce the size of public subsidy to the relatively privileged at the cost of the poor, and would free resources for the expansion of primary and basic education or employment-generating economic activities.

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[1] In Sri Lanka, higher education is offered free of charge. In Bangladesh 61 percent of the finances of the general universities and 81 percent of the technical universities are provided by the government. (Islam, 1973). Universities are also government financed in India and Pakistan.

The solution, however, is not so straightforward. Restriction imposed by financial measures (such as cutting public subsidy and making students pay the full cost) will increase the present inequity by making higher education and the attendant benefits a monopoly of the rich. Provisions to offset this consequence by quotas and financial assistance to the poor are not likely to be effective in unequal societies known for corruption and influence peddling. Veteran Indian educator and champion of equal opportunities, J. P. Naik (personal communication), claims that the present open system actually serves as the main channel for social mobility, allowing a trickle of people from lower socioeconomic strata to filter up the educational stream. On this ground, among others, Naik hesitates to support severe restrictions on higher education.

Furthermore, the policy of restriction implies acceptance of the present employment pattern of the educated, the incentive structure, the national development design, and the values that have created the present situation in the first place. Why should the unemployed graduate not work as a rural primary school teacher, a community development worker, or an extension agent instead of becoming a clerk in a city office? Is it not possible to create the conditions and the motivation necessary for the university graduate to find a useful role in the massive endeavor of national development? After all, the number of people with higher education in South Asia, as a proportion of the population, constitutes only a fraction of that in the developed countries.

Whatever the pros and cons of restricting higher education, politically it has proved impossible even to slow down the growth of higher education in this region, though a strong body of support for restriction exists. India's authoritative *Report of the Education Commission, 1964–1966* (p. 97) declared it necessary "to restrict the unplanned and uncontrolled expansion of general secondary and higher education, if massive educated unemployment is to be avoided."

Similar comments were made in the Fifth Plan document of India: "The Indian economy at its present level of development has neither the resources to expand higher education at the present rate nor the capacity to absorb all the resulting increase in output into employment at wages corresponding to the expectations of those who receive higher education" (India, *Draft Fifth Five Year Plan 1974–79*, vol. 2, p. 198). The plan, nonetheless, fixed a target of increasing university enrollment during the plan period from 3 million to 4.65 million, with a corresponding increase in the participation ratio of the 17 to 23 age group from 4.4 percent to 6.0 percent. Pakistan similarly plans to add 100,000 new students to higher education by 1980, raising the enrollment ratio of the relevant age group from 2 to 3 percent (Pakistan, 1972, p. 3). The First Five Year Plan of Bangladesh projected a 63 percent increase in university enrollment in five years (Bangladesh, 1973). The Ministry of Education of Sri Lanka projects over 100 percent increase of enrollment in higher education between 1968 and 1980.

Development plans for higher education include proposals for qualitative improvement such as improved facilities, laboratories and libraries, and lower teacher-student ratios. None of the plans anticipate any major structural change in higher education in the form of part-time and recurrent courses, flexible entry requirements and prerequisites, credit for practical experience, variable duration and timetable of courses, breaking the interdisciplinary boundaries, and so on. The dominant pattern will be full-time study beginning immediately after secondary school and lasting two to four years, ending in a university qualifying examination for a degree in one of the conventional subjects.

With respect to technical education, the Indian Five Year Plan did propose the use of formal technical institutions for purposes other than full-time formal courses: "part-time and informal education programmes will be expanded—not always or necessarily in relation to the highly structured academic courses leading to a degree or a diploma—and specific training programmes will be organized to meet established manpower needs of industry" (p. 203).

Another exception to the general pattern is Pakistan's People's Open University, established to provide part-time education "through correspondence course, tutorials, seminars, workshops, laboratories, television, radio broadcasts, and other mass communication media." The activities of the university so far have been confined mainly to upgrading elementary teachers and training instructors for literacy programs (Pakistan, Educational Policy 1972–1980, p. 22).

Employment Promotion and Training Programs

Large-scale public programs for skill training and employment promotion specifically for out-of-school youths do not exist in South Asia, though many small programs run by private groups and voluntary agencies can be found. The total number of youths served by these programs is insignificant compared with the potential clientele. Sri Lanka appears to have received more government support for this type of program than the other countries and is also rich in nongovernment programs.

Two programs of the Sri Lanka Department of Agriculture teach rural youths modern farming techniques to orient them toward farming and make them more productive farmers. One of these is the Young Farmers' Clubs, with about 100,000 members. The clubs are organized and guided by the extension officers and agricultural instructors of the Department of Agriculture. A smaller program is the Practical Farm Schools, designed to give practical agricultural training to young men and women on their own land or on land leased from the government. Sri Lanka also has a Youth Settlement Scheme, through which young people are provided training and financial support to open and reclaim new agricultural land.

An example of a nonagricultural skill-development program in Sri Lanka is on-the-job training in weaving, a program of the Department of Small Industries in cooperation with the handloom weaving industry of the country. About 10,000 out-of-school youths, 90 percent of whom are female, are trained through this program every year.

Skill-training programs for out-of-school youths are advocated on the ground that the young people should be equipped with occupational skills as they move toward adulthood. Nonformal (as opposed to full-time institutional) training is favored for this purpose because of its potential advantages, such as flexibility in adapting to local needs and conditions and the ability to harness local resources and talents for the training programs. In practice, these potentials have often remained unrealized: "For the most part these programs are small and raise serious questions of replicability on a large scale; many are restricted to young people who have completed primary school, thus leaving the great majority at a further disadvantage; sometimes the training they give (especially in rural areas) is not sufficiently linked to realistic job opportunities in the area and, like formal schools, they do not provide follow-up support to their trainees to help them apply their training and enlarge upon it" (Coombs and Ahmed, 1974, p. 144).

Some important questions about skill-training programs, particularly in the rural context, are: Do these programs make an incremental difference? Would a certain number of people be absorbed into the economy anyway and the training program just keep them occupied for a while during the period of waiting for jobs? Would the jobs not be filled somehow, even if there were no training programs, and the genuine training needs met through on-the-job apprenticeship or other improvised means, though the beneficiaries might not be the same people? What difference do the training programs make in productivity, earnings, and income distribution? These questions have to be answered for each particular situation before training programs can be justified or managed effectively.

The evidence indicates that training programs may be effective in spurring employment and higher earnings when they are accompanied by various related support services (such as credit, management advice, marketing, design, supply of raw materials, and so on) and when they are made an integral part of a broader development strategy of an area.

The handloom weaving program in Sri Lanka illustrates the typical problems the skill-training programs face. The program appears to be a vigorous effort, but the number of rural people employed in this industry and the annual intake of trainees in the program have remained stagnant for many years, though the government has plans to increase handloom production substantially. It appears that various government policy measures concerned with industrial development, import, and taxation have created disincentives for the expansion of the rural handloom industry. Moreover, the wages of most handloom weavers are below poverty level due to low productivity and a limited market for their products. This occupation, therefore attracts mostly women who are content to make only a supplementary contribution to family income. Similarly, the farmers' training programs are handicapped by the fact that the return to smallholding agriculture in Sri Lanka is so low that it is an occupational choice for young people only as a last resort.

Youth Service Programs

Programs of youth service may be organized within the context of formal education usually by educational institutions themselves, with enrichment of students' educational experience as a major goal. Another goal of these programs is to involve students in "practical activities that help meet the basic needs of other people (e.g., through agricultural extension, health care and education, social-welfare work)" (Fussel and Quarmby, 1974 p. 8). There is also the expectation that channeling the student's energy and interest into useful extracurricular activities may help alleviate the problems of poor discipline and unrest among students.

Programs organized for out-of-school youths may have a range of objectives, including providing temporary employment, instilling discipline and patriotic values, teaching and improving skills, and mobilizing youth manpower for national development schemes (see Ahmed and Coombs, 1975). The youth service schemes for out-of-school youths do not appear to have taken hold in South Asia except to a degree in Sri Lanka. For the student population, India and Pakistan have attempted to introduce national service schemes, but the efforts have been less than vigorous and the number of institutions and students covered by the schemes has remained small.[2]

[2] It is stated in the Indian Fifth Plan document that "The introduction of the National Service Scheme, on a universal basis at the college stage, had been under consideration ever since the formulation of the First Plan. The general approach was to take students from their institutions to places of

The general conclusion about service schemes for students is that if well organized and properly executed they can to a certain extent meet their objectives of enriching the students' education, helping the needy, and channeling student energies constructively. But as the Indian experience suggests, logistic and management problems are often insurmountable, especially if the program is initiated and directed by the national government rather than being organized locally. In any event, these schemes cannot be viewed as a solution to the unemployment of graduates or even as a very effective remedy for the despair and frustration caused by an uncertain future.

The only large government-sponsored service program for out-of-school youths in South Asia is that of the National Youth Service Council in Sri Lanka, established in 1969 with the mandate to organize and coordinate activities beneficial to youths and the nation for both in-school and out-of-school youths in the 14 to 25 age group. The council, however, was most active in organizing work camps and participating in national development projects for out-of-school youths. As an incentive for participation, the youths were given credit points which entitled them to preferential treatment in gaining employment or admission to an institution of higher education. The program, however, became embroiled in political disputes when the political party in opposition won the national election in 1970, and program activities came to a halt. After more than two years, the government reactivated the program.

Examples of nongovernment service programs for out-of-school youths are the youth activities of the Sarvodaya movement in Sri Lanka and of the Bangladesh Rural Advancement

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work where their boarding and lodging would be a charge on the state. The programme never got off the ground mainly due to organisational and financial difficulties involved in moving, feeding and finding work for a large number of students over long periods and the inadequate motivation of students who had to be away from their studies. The Fifth Plan intends to orient the whole scheme and make national service an essential part of the curriculum; effort will be made to link every subject with practical problems and socially useful work, generally in the vicinity of each institution" (*Draft Fifth Five Year Plan 1974-79*, Vol. II, p. 201). However, progress in fulfilling the intentions of the Fifth Plan also has been slow as before.

Committee (BRAC) in Bangladesh. Interestingly, in both programs mobilization is undertaken as a part of broader multifaceted rural-development programs, which the two organizations have initiated in selected rural areas of the respective countries. In Sarvodaya, youths constitute one of seven functional community groups in a village that accepts the Buddhist principle of moral reawakening and collective self-help activities. The members of the youth group engage in either teaching or learning skills for rural industries and other economic activities and in services for children, adult education, and cultural activities.

The goal of the BRAC program is to engage rural youths, especially those who have some education, in becoming organizers and guides of development projects in education, health, agriculture, and the like in their own villages. It is BRAC's premise that this goal can be achieved if rural youths can be organized and given support both in the form of some leadership training and with seed money for projects developed by the youth groups. BRAC has developed a training program for the youth workers and has initiated what is called the "youth self-starter" program in a number of rural localities (Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee, n.d.).

These two voluntary programs are relatively small scale and have not been in operation long enough to provide conclusions regarding their effectiveness in achieving the main goal of engaging youths in national development efforts. Even if they are effective, it is unlikely that they can be replicated widely enough to involve a substantial portion of the youth population. Moreover, the contributions these programs might make to solving the problem of career choice of the participating youths is not clear. The extent to which these activities can contribute to the solution of the economic problems of poor rural youths depends on the effectiveness of the overall development program of the parent organizations, of which youth mobilization is only one facet. It should be noted that these two voluntary programs are not typical of youth service programs in other parts of the world, which are usually unrelated to a larger multifaceted development program and are more rigidly structured with respect to training, activities undertaken, duration of service, and the administration of the program.

Rural Employment Programs

Programs aimed at alleviating the effects of severe rural poverty by creating rural employment through public-works programs have been in operation in South Asia. Similarly, encouragement of small and cottage industries has been an important part of the effort to improve the rural economic situation. While these programs are not aimed specifically at the youth population and the age breakdown of participants of these programs is not available, it is a reasonable assumption that young people from poor rural households, the group hardest hit by low earnings and underemployment, are employed in these programs in substantial numbers.

Rural works programs. The experimental rural-works programs that began in the Comilla area of former East Pakistan in the early 1960s provided the inspiration for continuation and expansion of this program in both Bangladesh and Pakistan. Pakistan's rural-works program, besides serving employment and income objectives, is also expected "to mobilise local resources and to motivate the people for a mass productive effort so that the process of development gets institutionalised and is associated with a large segment of the population" (Pakistan *Annual Plan, 1972–73*, p. 112). The various components of the works program in Bangladesh, planned and designed at the subdistrict level, constitute part of the effort to attain self-sufficiency in food grains by constructing and maintaining irrigation, drainage structures, and market roads (Bangladesh Planning Commission, 1974).

In India a crash scheme for rural employment was initiated in 1971–1972, under which 210 million man-days of employment was provided during the two subsequent years, mostly in rural road-construction work. In addition, a number of special programs included in the Fifth Plan such as the Small Farmer Development Agencies (SFDA), Drought Prone Area Program (DRDA), and Marginal Farmer and Agricultural Laborers Program (MFAL) were intended to relieve rural poverty and underemployment. The crash scheme was abandoned in the Fifth Plan, but a variant of the rural works projects was retained in what is known as the Minimum Needs Program, under which rural road building, drinking-water supply, and construction of primary schools and other public facilities would be undertaken (India, *Draft of Fifth Five-Year Plan, 1974–79*).

Somewhat comparable to the rural-works program in the other countries of the region are the activities of the Rural Development Societies in Sri Lanka. Formed under the auspices of the Ministry of Local Government and Home Affairs, there are over 8,000 Rural Development Societies throughout the island, of which 1,500 have exclusively women members. The societies are voluntary organizations, functioning in specific rural localities, meeting from time to time and responding to current local needs—basically on the principle of self-help, but drawing upon technical and financial assistance from the government when such assistance is available. Primary concerns of the societies have been construction and building projects, irrigation works, afforestation, and the organization of rural industries on a cooperative basis.

The significance of programs creating employment and channeling income directly to the rural underemployed and unemployed is undeniable. When it is so intended, most of the funds for these programs can go into wages rather than materials and equipment. When these are implemented on a large enough scale, they can make an appreciable difference in the precarious living condition of the poor rural workers.[3]

Dandekar and Rath (1971) suggest that it is possible to organize a massive rural-works program in India with block- and district-based planning and management of the projects that would provide regular and continuous employment to the 30 percent poor rural residents (excluding the poorest 10 percent who may be unable to work and need welfare assistance) and raise their consumer expenditure to a desired minimum per cap-

[3] In Bangladesh the share of the wages in some of the projects ranged from 85 to 94 percent of total project costs (Costa, 1973, p. 382; see also Thomas, 1971).

ita per year. They argue that the necessary transfer of income could be achieved by cutting consumption by 15 percent for the richest 5 percent of the population and by 7.5 percent for the next richest 5 percent.

While it is possible to conceive in theory the efficacy of rural-works programs in alleviating rural poverty and underemployment among youths and others, implementation of these programs is another matter. The Bangladesh program, which was relatively large in the mid-1960s, lost its momentum in subsequent years. The National Planning Commission pointed out in 1974 that the program was hampered by scarcity and price escalation of construction materials, lack of technical personnel, and lack of sufficient institutional support by the local government bodies.

Dandekar and Rath (1971) concede that their ambitious scheme can be implemented only if the implementing organizations and institutions function effectively to mobilize the labor force and other resources; if measures can be taken to match monetary resources with real resources by redirecting real resources to rural areas; if the pattern of production is reoriented to supply simple consumer goods to meet the demands of the newly created consumption capacity; and finally, if the political powers take the necessary fiscal measures to reduce consumption among the rich and to harness the resources thus released for rual development projects. This is a long list of conditions!

Small and village industries. All of the South Asian countries have followed an active policy of encouraging small-scale and village industries as the means for creating employment opportunities at low capital cost and bringing the fruits of economic development to the rural areas. India, however, has had the largest and most diverse experience among the developing countries in promoting small-scale and village industries. Since the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956, a plethora of agencies and programs have come into existence with the aim of expanding small-scale and village industries. Prominent among these are the Small Scale Industrial Development Organization (SSIDO), with its own network of Small Industry Service Institutes, Extension

Centres, and training/production centers; the Rural Industries Projects Program (RIP), with 49 pilot rural-industries project areas; the *Khadi* and Village Industries Commission, with jurisdiction over handspinning, weaving, and 14 other traditional village industries; the *high-level* Small Industries Extension and Training Institute (SIET); various entrepreneur training programs; and programs run by the state governments (deWilde, 1975).

While the numbers provided employment by the above programs are large, they pale to insignificance when compared with India's total labor force of over 200 million. In both *Khadi* and other village industries, low productivity and low cash income still offer less than a living wage to most workers.

The Fifth Plan envisioned substantial expansion of the RIP program. DeWilde (1975, pp. 482–483), while supporting the RIP approach, points out some of the pitfalls.

> The problem of selecting types of industries that can operate profitably and competitively on a small scale has not yet been fully resolved. Nor have adequate efforts been made to devise technologies appropriate to small-scale industries in which the availability of capital and labor skills is varied. In rural areas profitable opportunities for the expansion of traditional industries or the introduction of new and more modern industries are likely to be severely limited unless there has been a significant prior development of basic agricultural and livestock production that can provide the raw materials for processing or the markets for service and consumer goods industries.

Another dilemma that has never been satisfactorily solved is the conflict between the legitimate concern for dispersing small industries to the most backward and economically depressed areas and the need for discrimination in selecting locations and enterprises which make for viable projects.

7

Strategy for the Future

The picture painted in the preceding chapters is somber, with only a few faint rays of light. The problem is not to create opportunities for individual self-realization and growth into full adulthood for a small number of deprived and underprivileged youths or to facilitate the adjustment of a small fraction of the youth population with the existing social and economic institutions. The problem is one of massive deprivation and unequal opportunities for the large majority of youths with respect to basic education, productive work, earnings to maintain a minimum standard of living, and participation in the mainstream of socioeconomic development. The size of the deprived and disadvantaged youth population and the source of their problems make these problems the core of important program and policy issues of national development. Marginal adjustments in existing educational programs or in other institutions and special projects to help specific groups of youths will only help a few youths without making much of a dent in the total situation. In South Asia, as in other parts of the Third World, therefore, there is no alternative to a structuralist solution of the problems faced by youths—an approach that embraces relevant overall national development priorities, goals, and actions that create the appropriate environment and reinforce specific measures and policies having a direct bearing on youths. A strategy in tune with the structuralist approach has three main components: (1) educational actions, (2) a positive manpower approach and (3) a development strategy focused on basic needs.

Educational Development

Expansion of basic general education. The opportunities for basic general education at the primary level can be widened and a larger population ensured a minimum level of educational achievement if the exclusive reliance on the conventional age-specific full-time primary school is relaxed. A combined formal-nonformal strategy can be adopted that would (1) reduce the "opportunity cost" of participating in primary education for poor families, (2) involve local communities in enlarging primary education opportunities for their children, and (3) make primary education relevant to rural life and environment.

The economic roots of unequal access and participation in primary education cannot be removed by educational measures alone. However, some measures can be taken to reduce direct and indirect costs of participating in education for poor families. Flexibility of school hours, course duration, and timetable to conform with both the local agricultural cycle and the pattern of children's labor in family subsistence activities; less rigid age requirements for admission and different age groupings for the same grade levels; and part-time and abbreviated "second chance" programs for older children and youths are a few of these measures.

Community involvement has become an educational cliche, but in almost every situation, with the use of some imagination and sincerity, more could be done to increase the school's accountability to the local community, relate the school experience to the individual community's circumstances, and tap community resources to enrich the educational program. For instance, the International Council for Educational Development had a number of specific recommendations "to encourage communities to take a greater interest in the education of their children" in the context of an integrated rural development project in Bangladesh: forming representative community education committees to maintain and improve primary schools and other educational facilities in the village; forming postschool youth groups to maintain and improve the knowledge acquired in school; using local artisans, farmers, and development agency personnel as instructional resource people in the school; developing learning activities that use the institutions, productive enterprises, cultural heritage, and rituals of the local community as learning resources; undertaking joint student-teacher economic and agricultural activities both as learning enrichment and a means for generating supplementary resources for school and student.

A minimum level of general education, commensurate with the resources and overall socioeconomic development of a country, is generally accepted as a basic human need important in its own right, and decisions about expanding primary education generally do not take the effects of primary education on youth employment into consideration. To the extent that primary education exacerbates the alienation of youths from the rural environment or raises expectation for an "educated man's job," it is a problem of the pattern of reward for productive work and the urban-rural disparity in the national development design. Measures suggested above for broader participation and community involvement will be of help in minimizing the separation of young learners from their social and economic milieu. There is certainly room for more effort directed to the improvement of primary-level curriculum, educational materials, and quality of teaching that use the physical and social environment of the learner as the main learning resource. This is different from saying that rural primary schools can or should be used to make little farmers out of the students. Any design of primary education that makes young people adjust to their present life of poverty and deprivation cannot succeed, because the people invariably see through the subterfuge. It is imperative, therefore, that the effort to expand basic general education be on the basis of "a parity of esteem" between second-chance and nonformal programs and the conventional primary schools and there should be a perceivable evolution toward a unified (not uniform) system for all (Ahmed and Coombs, 1975, pp. 335–364).

Functional education within economic projects. Complementing the efforts to expand primary-level basic education focused on children and adolescents, functional literacy and education programs are needed for older youths and adults. These programs, however, need to be planned and implemented as inherent aspects of *economic* improvement projects for the learner groups. For illiterate and semiliterate young adults, improvement of the economic status is the central concern, overshadowing other problems they may face. Any activitiy that calls for their time, energy, and commitment must be directly linked to economic improvement. Creating a critical awareness of the learners' own situation and preparing for collective or individual economic and self-help projects would be at least as important as literacy skills in the functional education programs for older youths. Experience in South Asia and in other parts of the Third World indicates that the help of both established voluntary organizations active in rural development and local voluntary groups is vital in the implementation of these programs. Because of the crucial relationship between economic improvement and educational programs for young adults, a strong national coordinating agency, such as the Ministry of Agriculture, should work hand in hand with local cooperatives and government structures as leaders of these programs.

Reform in secondary education. Secondary education in South Asia, beyond five years of primary education or its equivalent, is characterized by two conflicting features: (1) the primary function of selection and preparation for higher education—a function performed inequitably and at the cost of the majority of students who do not go on to higher education, and (2) unsuccessful efforts to give secondary formal education a vocational orientation. Combating these twin deficiencies of secondary education calls for affirmation of formal general education, as opposed to vocational training or grooming for university. This requires a realistic appraisal of what secondary education can and cannot achieve under the present circumstances in South Asia—an admission that of those who survive high school, some go to the world of work and others to various higher education programs, but the large majority drop out before the end. The only way the system can be fair to all these groups is to offer all of them a foundation of general cognitive knowledge and intellectual skills and let them take their chances in the wider world. This stress on the "foundation-building" role of secondary education would require it to be viewed as an extension of primary-level general education, making it more flexible organizationally in order to make it more widely accessible, and taking the occupational training functions out of it. The implications in terms of curriculum and teaching approach of "foundation education" are self-evident: The aim will be to create educated men and women who are intellectually curious, analytical, and rational in their approach to problems of life and society, socially responsible, and cognizant of important social institutions and the historical and socioeconomic roots of underdevelopment in South Asia. They should also acquire basic language and mathematics skills and understanding of basic concepts of natural sciences. In brief, the products of secondary education, instead of being stuffed with bits of information useful in university courses or adept in manual skills that may or may not be salable, should develop the ability to take advantage of specific on-the-job or institutional occupational training, to benefit from higher educational opportunities when and if available, and to enter adult social and individual roles and responsibilities.

The organizational and structural flexibility suggested above for primary education must also be introduced at the secondary level on the same grounds of reducing opportunity costs for participants, granting wider access, and mobilizing available resources for education. This structural flexibility is necessary to accommodate in fair proportions students coming from formal, nonformal, and hybrid programs at the primary level with consequent diversity in age and socioeconomic background. Eventually and gradually, as national resources permit, secondary education up to tenth grade or its equivalent, offered through a variety of channels—full-time, part-time, and recurrent courses with appropriate use of communication media—would be recognized as basic education and would be universally available.

The strategy for middle-level technical/vocational training should be to shift the main burden of skill development to employers and to strengthen the indigenous system of skill development in the traditional sector of the economy. Educational planners need not assume that there is a skill shortage if a formal training program does not exist for a particular skill; in fact, empirical evidence suggests otherwise. The economies of the South Asian nations are kept functioning, by and large, by people who have learned their productive skills through on-the-job experience and indigenous traditional skill-transfer methods rather than by those trained in vocational training programs. The first step in this technical/vocational training strategy would be to put a moratorium on the expansion of all formal full-time vocational/technical institutions—such as the vocational training institute, industrial training institute, technical training centers, technical institutes, and polytechnics—and then to turn them into multipurpose, flexible, technical service centers for providing specific training and assistance to industrial and business enterprises. The second step would be to prepare flexible, often part-time, specifically designed ad hoc courses in cooperation with employers. These courses would contain a large component of practical apprenticeship, would be offered only when a distinct market for the skills exists, and would often be attended by students also enrolled in the general secondary education program. Another step would be to identify the ways in which traditional artisan and crafts skills are transmitted and the possible need for assistance to improve or expand this sytem of transmittal.

A doctrinaire position need not be taken regarding the separation of vocational training and general secondary education. There are examples, such as the Diyagala Boys' Town, a residential Jesuit institution in Sri Lanka, that combine general education and vocational skill development for youths. The key to an effective program appears to be an intensive and fairly prolonged supervised work experience, provided at a low cost in a communal setting, which contributes substantially to the operating expenses of the institution. Even with successful programs, it is not known whether a large number of them are needed or if their graduates would be readily absorbed in the employment market (Van Rensburg, 1974).

In some economically backward regions, it may be necessary to make a special publicly funded effort for skill development, in which case a self-supporting skill-development program through production cooperatives might be tried. Van Rensburg, from his experience with a self-supporting skill-development program in Botswana, found that the key to a replicable skill-training approach with significant impact on rural employment and development was training through cooperative production enterprises. The cooperatives (1) bring unemployed adolescents, youths, and adults into productive employment; (2) accumulate capital through the participants' own efforts; (3) pool the resources of the people and establish diversified production enterprises, and (4) develop the necessary productive skills. It would be extraordinarily difficult for a government bureaucracy to design and manage such a program involving popular participation, improvisation, and local decision making. This type of program has a better chance of success if voluntary organizations with competent leadership are given government support and granted sufficient latitude to guide the programs with relative autonomy.

Recurrent higher education. With regard to youth employment problems, the policies and programs of higher education must fulfill three conditions: (1) deal effectively with the problem of mismatch between expectations and employment opportunities, (2) ensure more equal access to higher education, and (3) prevent a disproportionately large share of public resources going to higher education at the expense of primary and secondary education. We are not considering here the quality of higher education or the appropriate role of higher education in national development, but policies that meet these three criteria should have positive consequences with respect to both educational quality and national development efforts. We will consider in this section the feasible options only within the educational system, recognizing that concomitant measures are needed outside education as well.

Reducing enrollment in higher education would in principle meet criteria (1) and (3) above but is unlikely to make access and participation in higher education more equal. Moreover, the scale of the reduction in higher education needed to meet these conditions is not politically feasible in South Asia. There are other objections to the solution of cutting enrollment in higher education to match the number of "acceptable" white-collar job openings. This is placing far too much faith on manpower projections (see Ahmad and Blaug, 1973). More serious, as noted earlier, is the assumption that the existing utilization and reward structure among people with higher education is optimal.

The most practical and feasible approach toward higher education development requires a two-pronged attack: first, restricting the growth of full-time, specialized, professional higher education through financial measures, and second, introducing structural and organizational changes that contribute to more equal access to both professional and general higher education, wider opportunities for general higher education, improved professional preparation and career choices, and reduced demand for full-time and high-cost specialized higher education.

A distinction must be made between specialized professional education, imparting required skills and competence for specific occupations and jobs, and general higher education, not specifically linked to competence and skills required to perform occupational tasks. While structural changes and the recurrent-education approach should be applied to both categories, the case for limiting the growth of general higher education is arguable mainly on the basis of limitations of national resources, whereas professional and specialized education must be planned with an eye to employment demands sustainable by the national economy. Social demand for general higher education can be better satisfied if ways are found to reduce the costs of such education—for instance, through a radio- and television-based "open university" approach, more intensive use of existing facilities and personnel during "off hours," self-study by students with the help of programmed materials and other low-cost learning aids–in short, through possibilities opened up by the recurrent-education approach.

Extreme financial measures such as making every student pay the full cost of higher education (modified by grants and loans to the qualified poor) may not be practical as the major weapon for shaping the development of higher education, but it is possible to raise tuition substantially for full-time and professional higher education in South Asia and to apply a sliding scale, granting full and partial tuition exemption, based on income. Along with increased fees, there is room for increased scholarship assistance and guaranteed loans for students from families underprivileged because of income, tribal or caste affiliation, and domicile.

There is a fairly wide range of measures which come under the category of structural and organizational flexibility in higher education programs. A broad definition of recurrent education includes postponement of admission into higher education after the secondary level, part-time courses, recurrent programs with short cycles of variable duration, programs combining practical work and academic training, granting credit for practical experience, and so on (Faure, 1972). It is necessary, however, to discriminate in selecting recurrent-education ideas that would be effective in the South Asian context in meeting the criteria of higher education development mentioned above.

Postponed entry into higher education is suggested by the ILO employment mission to Sri Lanka and Kenya as the means for cutting college enrollments, acquainting students with the world of work, and improving their career choices (ILO, 1971). It is argued that if all students are required to spend two or three years in productive work found by themselves in public or private employment or in a voluntary youth-service program and university selection is based on work experience as well as on previous academic achievement and aptitude tests, many students will find that a university degree is not required for a satisfying occupational career and others will have clearer ideas about the type and level of higher education needed for their own future. The mad rush into higher education would be further reduced and would be more closely linked to career choices if the scheme for a national-service and work-experience interval is accompanied by part-time courses that young people can take while employed and short-cycle courses which they can join later in their career.

Contrary to the usual practice and belief in South Asia, in specialized professional training in such fields as agriculture, engineering, and medicine, it is possible to replace a substantial part of full-time academic training by internships and supervised practicums with public and private employers. It is also possible to draw students for advanced professional training from the ranks of middle-level technicians and paraprofessionals with relevant work experience. All these measures are likely to produce professionals better adapted to the development needs of South Asia.

Providing large public subsidies to higher education when a large proportion of children and youths do not have the benefit of basic primary education is incompatible with the welfare ethics and the social values professed by the South Asian nations. There is no strict formula for allocating public resources to different levels of education, but in all South Asian nations except Sri Lanka there is a case for shifting substantial amounts of resources from higher education to primary education, whether rate-of-return analysis supports such shift or not. (It so happens that such a shift is also supportable on economic grounds in many developing countries.)

A Positive Manpower Policy

The usual manpower estimates and the policies derived from them accept the existing patterns of employment, manpower utilization, and distribution of rewards for work, stressing ways and means of adjusting manpower supply to demand within the existing structure. A positive manpower policy, instead of passively accepting the present pattern and attempting to adjust to it, would emphasize specific programs and actions designed to ensure proper utilization of the human resources while removing gross socioeconomic inequity and establishing fair distribution of the rewards of work. Three specific actions are suggested as major ingredients of a positive manpower policy in South Asia.

Reduction of wage differentials. The differentials between wages, particularly between those for white-collar jobs and skilled workers' jobs and for professional positions and middle-level technician positions, need to be reduced. The average wage of top-ranking public-service jobs in South Asia is 15 to 20 times higher than that of the lowest ones. (In contrast, the differential is around 5:1 in industrialized countries. Reduction of wage differentials would be a disincentive for the demand for higher education generated by expectations of white-collar and professional jobs, would help establish the dignity of labor and attract young people to middle-level skills, and make at least a symbolic contribution toward building a more egalitarian society—symbolic because only a small portion of all workers are in the wage sector and the major source of income inequality in South Asia is not wage differentials but other income such as rent, dividends, interest, and profit.

The flood of applications that any white-collar vacancy draws in South Asia indicates that there should not be any insurmountable obstacle to this plan on purely economic grounds. The ILO employment mission in Sri Lanka, for example, found that arts graduates were willing to consider a job at half the current salary for university graduates in public service fixed on the basis of educational qualifications (ILO, 1971).

The ILO employment missions to Sri Lanka and Kenya recommend reduction in wage differentials. In the case of Sri Lanka it is proposed that wage reforms be introduced by offering a reduced youth-service pay scale for a period of five years graded by the age of the employee rather than by educational qualifications. For Kenya, the recommendation is to reduce salaries by 25 percent at entry points for five years, after which period salaries and entry criteria should no longer be determined by higher education qualifications.

Separating degrees from jobs. A systematic effort should be made to deemphasize formal educational qualifications as the criteria for recruitment in jobs. The public sector bears the major responsibility for placing a high premium on university degrees for recruitment, often specifying educational requirements wholly unrelated to the skills and competence needed to perform the designated tasks. The public sector also generally sets salary scales graded by educational qualifications and induces the private sector to do the same.

It is obviously difficult to implement a policy of disregarding educational attainment in job placement when there is an oversupply of highly qualified people. However, the escalation of demand for degrees is fueled by the overvaluation of degrees in employment. Therefore, changes must be made on both fronts, and the large public sectors employing a large portion of the educated workers in South Asia must take the lead in implementing this proposal.

The ILO mission to Sri Lanka suggests that one approach to separating higher education from jobs would be to recruit public servants at the level of clerks, with a general secondary education as the basic requirement, and to promote some on the basis of performance and ability to administrative and professional levels. Those promoted would have the opportunity to attend special job-related training courses. A similar approach can be followed in specialized fields such as teaching, engineering, and medicine, where initial recruitment may be as primary teachers, technicians, and medical assistants.

Whether lateral entry into high-level positions in public and private enterprises should be totally eliminated and what the loss of "new blood" would be are debatable and need careful consideration. However, internal promotion and staff development can be pursed more systematically and vigorously than they presently are in South Asia.

Partnership with employers. An important element of the positive manpower approach is close and systematic involvement of employers in both public and private sectors in establishing manpower development and utilization policies and programs. Trade associations, public corporations, major government departments, and the rural sector (represented by various cooperatives) must participate in determining the skill-development activities that various users of manpower can and do undertake and the specific ways in which government educational and training intervention can be best applied. This measure complements and reinforces the earlier proposal to shift the burden of vocational training from schools to employers.

Incentives and disincentives through taxes and tax credits, licensing, and other regulatory measures can be used to encourage private-sector employers to support skill-development programs. Specific manpower development and utilization provisions can be incorporated in agreements permitting external investment and economic ventures.

Similarly, an explicit manpower training and utilization plan that conforms to overall national manpower policies can be made a part of all development projects undertaken by the government.

Overall Developmental Strategy

In a general situation of low productivity, low earning and the lack of the basic amenities of life, it is unrealistic to think of alleviating these conditions only for youths. In South Asia, any real effort to improve the present prospects of youths must first attack rural poverty, improving the living condition of the poorest one third or more of the population for whom landlessness, absence of other opportunities for gainful employment, poverty, and lack of education coincide, and among whom are included the most underprivileged of the rural youths.

A development design aimed at providing basic needs will also create an environment conducive to effective educational and manpower measures and other programs already under way in South Asia. (Basic needs are defined in terms of availability and the notion of "minimum standard of living" for a particular society, and consist of consumption items such as food, housing, and clothing, and services such as water, health, sanitation and education. See Hopkins et al., 1976, pp. 9–37.) Important elements of a development strategy focused on basic needs in the South Asian context are noted below.

Economic redistribution. It is impossible to meet the basic needs of the people of South Asia by the end of this century without following a highly egalitarian economic distribution policy and an economic development pattern that concentrates on meeting the basic needs of the poor and accepts the need for changes in the pattern of production and investment. Mahbub ul Hag (1974, p. 79) says: "We have a number of case studies by now that show how illusory it was to hope that the fruits of growth could be redistributed without reorganizing the pattern of production and investment first. . . . In my own country, Pakistan, the very institutions we created for promoting faster growth and capital accumulation later frustrated all our attempts for better distribution and greater social justice." The design and implementation of a policy of redistribution with growth is the central theme of national and international economic development debate and is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is certainly not beyond human capacity to design and implement such a policy (Tinbergen and others, 1976; Chenery and others, 1974). What is needed first of all is national commitment to such a policy and the determination to pursue the path this policy dictates.

Labor-intensive agriculture. Agriculture is the dominant factor in the gross domestic product and employment in South Asia; thus all policies relating to agriculture are likely to have implications for poverty and employment generation. Policies regarding mechanization, pricing of agricultural commodities and inputs, new farming techniques with varying labor intensity, land reforms, and agricultural credit favoring small farmers and increasing labor use obviously are conducive to improving the economic situation of rural people, including youths (Shaw, 1970).

It is surprising how little systematic effort has been directed in South Asia to increasing labor intensity in agriculture. The myth that rural labor surplus siphoned off to urban industries is the mainspring of economic development still exists in these countries. The number of farm workers employed per unit of land in Japan and Taiwan is more than twice that of India and only slightly less than twice as great in Egypt. In addition, the average size of farms in Japan and Taiwan is smaller than in India, but grain produced per hectare is four to five times higher than in India (Mehta, 1976). Obviously, there are formidable institutional barriers to be overcome in implementing a program of bringing all the available human resources and the land resources to an optimally productive combination. The optimal use of rural manpower through agricultural activities should, therefore, become the basic criterion for the functioning and development of rural institutions such as the land-tenure system, extension service, system of credit and input supply, marketing and price structure, and dissemination of farm technology.

Labor-intensive industry. Industry is the leading growth sector in the economies of South Asia, and its importance increases as the structure of the economy shifts and the ratio of industrial production in the Gross Domestic Product (GDS) grows. However the modern, capital-intensive, high-technology industries create a relatively small amount of employment, using up large amounts of scarce capital, and often produce goods that are unrelated to satisfying the essential consumption needs of the people. The basic policy guidelines for industrial development, therefore, would be the maximum use of the most abundant production factor—that is, labor—and economizing on the capital resources. A policy package designed to achieve this goal may include various elements: an emphasis on small and medium-scale industries;[1] pricing capital at its scarcity value instead of artificially lowering its price through external assistance and government regulation; changing the composition of the industrial output basket to give greater weight to goods produced by labor-intensive technologies and goods needed to satisfy minimum consumption needs; establishing a complementary relationship between large, medium, and small industries; and devoting a greater effort to devising labor-intensive technologies.

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[1] It is reported that in India in 1968, the fixed capital per employee, on an average, in small-scale industrial units was 3,170 replies compared with 22,000 replies in a large-scale unit. The small-scale sector accounted for 7.5 percent of the total fixed capital investment in the factory sector, but its share in the total output was 28 percent (*Draft of the Fifth Five Year Plan, 1974–79*, p. 160).

Commitment to rural development. A development strategy oriented to basic needs in South Asia inevitably requires a genuine commitment to rural development and a high priority on improvement of living conditions of rural people. Rural development may be defined as a process of rural transformation that not only results in higher agricultural production but brings to rural people basic amenities of life such as adequate housing, essential health and educational facilities, clean water, roads, and electricity; gives them a voice in their own affairs; and offers work opportunities that pay a living wage to all. An all-out commitment to such a process implies a reorientation of national development goals and the transfer of real resources to rural areas on a much larger scale than at present.

Decentralization of development activities. National commitment to rural development cannot be translated into a uniform operational plan for a whole country because rural areas differ widely in their natural resource endowments and basic development potential, in their present stage of development and economic infrastructures, and in their readiness to advance further. A commitment to rapid rural transformation, therefore, calls for decentralized development planning and administration that allow each rural area to devise, within the national framework, its own development plan, adapted to its particular potentialities and constraints.

Programs for solving hardcore rural employment problems require the integration of various specific employment measures with comprehensive development programs for each area. A portfolio of rural works projects, small-scale and cottage industries, production/training programs in artisan and crafts skills, young farmers' or laborers' cooperatives, and so on are likely to be more effective if they are constituent parts of the comprehensive, locally managed development plan for a specific rural district. It would be then possible to give the works projects more than an ad hoc character, because successive local development plans can continue to devise projects with high social return and maintain a thread of continuity among them. Various production/training schemes would be adapted to local needs and would serve longer-range goals because follow-up and related future development activities would be in the hands of the local organizations.

Special programs for the disadvantaged. Given the framework of decentralized planning and management of development activities and a redirection of development investments toward the rural areas, a number of specific activities might create additional employment openings and contribute to the improvement of rural living conditions by mobilizing the most underutilized and economically disadvantaged segments of the working population: out-of-school youths, landless farmworkers, and women.

For example, the International Council for Educational Development (1976) recommends that young people from landless rural families in the 15 to 25 age group could be organized into young farmers' brigades for the purpose of collective farming and related production activities and to pursue education, health, and other self-help efforts. As a group they could secure land by lease or on a sharecropping basis. A total production plan for year-round optimal utilization of the total land area secured by the group could be made. The local extension agent and a youth-program officer recruited by the community development agency or the local government body could work closely with the brigades in preparing the production plan, seeking appropriate technical assistance from the extension service and other available sources. Special provisions for credit could be made through banks or from special credit funds to cover as much of the input costs (except labor) as needed to implement the production plan.

Once the brigades make some gains in their economic enterprises and win the confidence of their members and the communities, they could begin to arrange basic educational programs for interested and motivated members, and specially trained brigade members could serve as auxiliaries for their respective villages in the areas of health and family planning, disease prevention for livestock and poultry, fishery extension, and so forth. Special training for such activities could be provided by the regional and local personnel of different government departments or by arrangement with voluntary agencies with appropriate expertise. The educational and other service activities would be for the benefit of the whole village, though the collective production activities would be carried out by the brigade members.

Formation of youth production brigades will by no means be the total solution for the problem of disadvantaged rural youths but could improve the life prospects of at least a portion of the youths in areas where such organizations are formed and might even be the precursor of similar self-help organizations of youths and other disadvantaged groups.

Along the same lines as the young farmers' brigades, organizations could be formed for women and girls from low-income families. In the initial groups, emphasis could be given to specific ways of improving the economic condition of families—for example, by raising poultry, eggs, and vegetables; by sewing clothes for children; and by making handicrafts for sale. Again small amounts of credit could be made available for group and individual economic projects. Once the new organizations are fully active, they could be encouraged to take on other functions with respect to health, nutrition, family planning, child and maternal care, and children's and women's education. The use of community-based auxiliaries of government departments, under the supervision of local-level technical personnel, could be an important feature of such schemes.

The extent to which the approaches and activities suggested here are acceptable and feasible in the South Asian countries has not been considered. Resistance to change and maintenance of the status quo are, of course, components of underdevelopment, though knowing what changes to seek and how is no small puzzle.

No doubt all of the suggestions made here have been or will be vigorously resisted by some people. Every measure indicated will stir up controversy and will tread on vested interests of one kind or another. It is the coalition of vested interests in support of the status quo (or at least of minimal change) that appears to have the upper hand in South Asia.

The suggestions made above may be regarded as reformist rather than radical because they contain implicit consideration of the power of the forces of resistance and the need for minimizing social and private costs of change. Without these considerations, more drastic and revolutionary solutions could be conceived. The problems faced in South Asia have apparently been solved (or are at least being dealt with vigorously) nearby in the People's Republic of China. The task ahead with respect to overall development and the problems of youths within that context are of such magnitude that no less comprehensive a strategy can be contemplated if meaningful change without unacceptable high social costs is to be attained.

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R3805-2.3

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Klaus von Dohnanyi

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The Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education, 2150 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California 94704, has sponsored publication of this report as part of a continuing effort to obtain and present significant information for public discussion. The views expressed are those of the author.

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number LC 78-73638

International Standard Book Number ISBN 0-931050-06-5

First Edition

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Foreword

This is one of seven publications presenting studies commissioned by the Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education as a means of providing a global perspective for education and youth employment in contemporary societies. The remaining publications will be concerned with education and youth employment in Belgium, by Henri Janne; Mexico and South Asia, by Alberto Hernández Medina and Carlos Muñoz Izquierdo and Manzoor Ahmed, respectively; Poland, by Barbara Liberska; Great Britain, by Stuart Maclure; Sweden and Denmark, by Gösta Rehn and K. Helveg Petersen, respectively; and Japan, by Hidetoshi Kato. Margaret S. Gordon, associate director of the Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education, is the general editor of the series. To the authors of these studies, and to Klaus von Dohnanyi, whose work appears in this volume, we express our deep appreciation.

The German Marshall Fund generously provided support for two international conferences on education and youth employment which were attended by several of the authors of studies for this series and which have contributed significantly to the Council's deliberations on this subject. The International Council for Educational Development, under the direction of James A. Perkins, coordinated the conferences and arranged for the participation of the essayists in this project. We acknowledge these contributions with profound thanks.

We also wish to extend our thanks to Mary Purnell Frederick and Diana Lorentz for their editorial contributions, and Sylvia Zuck for coordinating manuscript preparation.

CLARK KERR
Chairman,
Carnegie Council on Policy Studies
in Higher Education

1

Social and Economic Background

In recent years the situation of youth in industrialized democracies has become a central political concern, especially in the light of increasing youth unemployment. The fact that young people are forced to experience rejection and superfluousness at the beginning of their careers has led to an increasingly intensive consideration of the problems of youth in all the countries concerned.

To provide a constructive answer to these problems, and especially to the question of youth unemployment, relationships with general social developments cannot be overlooked. The years since World War II have been marked, especially in democratic industrial societies, by extraordinary stability of economic growth and social development until the beginning of the present decade. Since the mid-1970s, this stability seems to have been lost. Once more we experience considerable social tensions. Indeed, if we compare the present situation with the rapid changes precipitated by technical progress and economic expansion in the nineteenth century or in the first half of the twentieth century, the thesis of accelerated social structural changes may no longer be maintained without reservation. Yet there is no doubt—especially in comparison with the stability of the 1950s and 1960s—that we experience the new developments in a particularly sensitive way politically and socially. At the same time, we recognize more distinctly the limits imposed on further industrial development and we seem to feel—perplexed or perhaps just more modest and more experienced than former generations—the limits of our own possibilities of political structuring in a complexly interwoven world society.

Structural change concerns and poses significant problems for all groups in society. One need only think of the drastic changes that old people in particular have to face: largely excluded from the mobile small family, they experience, as a result of a biologically extended life, a feeling of superfluousness and loneliness. This fate already casts its shadow over middle age, with the monotony of working life associated with increasing specialization and with rigid social rules that force termination of occupational activity in the fullness of productivity. "Middle-age crisis" is a fashionable term but not a fashionable problem.

Although the troubles of youth have been discussed a great deal in recent years in the industrial democracies and the problems of youth have been thrust into the foreground, this does not mean that the young suffer objectively more from social change than older generations. Certainly there is juvenile delinquency, drug abuse, juvenile alcoholism, and the problem of dropouts. But the dimensions of these problems can really be recognized only when one considers, for example, the alcoholism of the middle-aged and of the old. The changes we live through, the new difficulties that accumulate, and the resulting prospects are not limited to separate parts of society and therefore cannot be solved for parts of society.

We also must refrain from nostalgic recollections of the "good old days." Whether the gains and losses of industrial progress have really changed the basic balance of human happiness or whether in recent years the assets of progress have been confronted with more and more debits—this is not the object of our study. We are concerned with definable and comprehensible descriptions of the situation of youth in our society and especially with opportunities for employment and education.

If we consider the development of industrial democracies from this broader perspective, it seems that youth is not the great loser but rather the clear winner in developments to date. Never before have youth had such a degree of measurable freedom from repression on the one hand and objective opportunities for personal responsibility and self-realization on the other. The problem of youth unemployment is grave in industrialized societies; yet one should not forget that the problem of child labor was certainly graver. Juvenile delinquency is a provoking problem, and yet one should not forget how earlier generations were affected by drill and coercion. We do not want to underemphasize the problems, but we must measure realities against actual experiences and not merely against hopes and goals.

In this study, we shall attempt to clarify the specific problems of youth in a broader context. Because youth unemployment can be understood only in connection with general labor-market problems, we shall try to illuminate these general problems as a background for the youth unemployment problem and its remedy.

Socioeconomic Changes

Today the Federal Republic of Germany is considered one of the most successful, wealthy, and stable of the democratic industrial nations. In the 1950s the economic miracle of the Federal Republic was marveled at. In the 1960s this development was consolidated, and in the 1970s it was expanded in spite of the world economic crisis. Not only is the Federal Republic the most populous country in Western Europe, but today it also has the highest per capita income after the Scandinavian countries. In 1976, with a Gross National Product (GNP) of nearly $7,300 per capita, it has almost reached the level of the United States ($7,910) (Table 1). The Federal Republic also takes a primary position in the resources of private households and of public institutions, and its social security system is very extensive.

The Federal Republic, however, is very dependent on exports. More than one-fourth of its GNP is created in external economic areas, an extraordinarily high percentage for a relatively large industrial nation, especially when compared with the United States (6.8 percent) and Japan (10.1 percent). This is the more striking when we consider that the share of exports in the Federal Republic is continuing to increase. The country

Table 1. Economic data for countries of the European Free Trade Association, the European Economic Community, United States, and Japan, 1976

Country	*Population (millions)*	*Gross national product per capita (U.S. dollars)*	*Foreign trade as percentage of gross national product*	
			Exports	*Imports*
European Free Trade Association	40.5	$6,072	23.7	27.9
Austria	7.5	5,336	21.2	28.7
Finland	4.7	6,006	22.5	26.2
Iceland	0.2	6,422	28.6	33.4
Norway	4.0	7,612	26.0	36.4
Portugal	9.4	1,545	12.4	29.4
Sweden	8.2	8,972	25.1	26.1
Switzerland	6.4	8,977	25.8	25.7
European Economic Community	258.4	5,351	23.5	24.8
Belgium-Luxemburg	10.2	6,821	47.4	51.0
Denmark	5.1	7,530	23.9	32.6
France	52.7	6,603	16.0	18.5
Germany (Fed. Rep.)	61.8	7,298	22.6	19.5
Ireland	3.1	2,526	41.9	53.1
Italy	55.8	2,944	22.5	26.4
Netherlands	13.7	6,386	44.4	45.8
United Kingdom	56.0	3,863	21.4	25.9
For purposes of comparison				
United States	213.5	7,909	6.8	7.2
Japan	111.6	4,957	10.1	10.5

Source: EFTA Bulletin (reproduced in *Aussenhandelsblatter der Commerzbank*, August 1977).

is also poor in natural resources and imports 63 percent of its energy needs, 95 percent of its crude oil, and 60 percent of its natural gas. It does not own any substantial uranium reserves, and its only significant domestic sources of energy are relatively expensive coal and fairly accessible peat.

In relation to the per capita income of the Federal Republic, the share of its GNP in the industrial (secondary) sector is unusually high (about 57 percent). *Expenditures for education* reached 6.7 percent of GNP, including net expenses of business for vocational training, in 1975. Nearly 19 percent of young people continued education at the upper-secondary level in 1975, while the percentage of the age group enrolling in universities and colleges was nearly 20 percent in 1976.

The average age of the population of the Federal Republic is relatively high. More than 14 percent are 65 years of age and older, while more than 19 percent are 60 and older. The number of births declined from 1.1 million in 1963 to 0.6 million in 1975. In 1976, the birth rate showed a slight increase for the first time in many years. The native German population has declined slightly since 1971, and it is expected that the German population will have decreased to 60.4 million by 1990, compared with 61.5 million today.

About 3.8 million registered foreigners, comprising about 6.2 percent of the population, live in the Federal Republic. Almost all of them have come as *Gastarbeiter* (guest workers) or family members of such workers. Since 1974, the number of foreign residents has decreased by 250,000 as a result of employment policies and increasing unemployment.

The employment rate of the total population is decreasing. In 1976 it was 41.8 percent, compared with 46.9 percent in 1962–55.1 percent for men and 29.7 percent for women. Among young men 15 to 19, it was 57.2 percent in 1975, and among those 20 to 24, it was 79.9 percent. For women, the corresponding figures were 50.6 and 68.4 percent. The proportion of foreigners among all workers was 7.5 percent in 1976, compared with 8.7 percent in 1973. In 1975, about 7.5 percent of the labor force was employed in agriculture (the primary sector), while the industrial (secondary) sector employed about 47.5 percent and the services (tertiary) sector about 45.0 percent, including public employment.

During the world economic recession in 1974–75, real GNP decreased by 2.5 percent; in 1976 there was an increase of 5.7 percent, and a relatively low rise of 3.5 percent was expected in 1977. Since 1973, about 1.2 million jobs—or 5.4 percent of the total—have disappeared. Of these, 400,000 were held by foreign workers. Total employment declined from 26.7 million in 1973 to 25.7 million in 1976, on an annual average basis. The average annual unemployment rate in 1973 was 1.2 percent, while in September 1977 it was 4.0 percent. The average for 1977 was expected to be 4.5 percent. Among young people 15 to 19, the unemployment rate in 1976 was 4.6 percent, while among those 20 to 24 it was 6.0 percent—higher than for any other age group except those aged 55 and older.[1] Although the labor situation improved in 1976, the year 1977 showed again a slight increase in unemployment rates for all age groups.

In the 28 years of its existence, the Federal Republic has had five government heads, an indication of comparatively high political stability. Although the country is considered to be remarkably stable economically and socially in comparison with most other democratic industrial nations, certain distinguishing features of other highly industrial nations are becoming more pronounced here as well. Rising alcohol consumption, a rising divorce rate, an increasing crime rate, and a relatively high suicide rate should be mentioned. Also in recent months a politically motivated terrorism has developed in the Federal Republic. The Japanese social scientist, Nagasada Miawaki (1976), proposed the construction of a "negative index of affluence" (*anomie* index) and placed the Federal Republic second only to the United States among five comparable countries (Table 2).

Signs of Structural Change

Increasing unemployment during the world economic recession of 1974–75 in the democratic industrial nations was linked with problems of business cycles and of world economic development. Yet it is questionable whether the oil crisis of 1973 and the subsequent world economic recession can be chosen as the point of departure for an analysis of the unemployment problems of these countries. Already in the 1960s there were signs

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[1] The data are based on special investigations conducted in May. They are official German (unadjusted) rates and differ from rates that have been adjusted to U.S. or international concepts.

Table 2. Ranks in indexes of anomie in five countries

Type of index	*Japan*	*United States*	*United Kingdom*	*Germany (Fed. Rep.)*	*France*
Crime rate	4	1	3	2	
Strikes (lost days of work)	4	2	1	5	3
Accidents					
Death rate per 100,000 population	4	1	5	2	3
Death rate per 1,000 autos	1	5	4	2	3
Unemployment rate	3	1	2	4	
Divorce rate	5	1	2	3	4
Diabetes rate (per 100,000 population)	5	2	4	1	3
Venereal diseases					
Syphilis rate (per 100,000 population)	4	1	2		3
Gonorrhea rate (per 100,000 population)	4	2	3		1
Suicide	2	4	5	1	3

Source: Nagasada Miawaki

of less favorable economic developments: growth rates declined, inflation accelerated, unemployment rose, and political radicalism made itself loudly heard. In the early 1970s, these tendencies were concealed by a strong economic upswing, but then the oil crisis exposed what today must be considered a development that started much earlier and largely independent of the rise in the cost of oil.

To point out these long-term tendencies is not to underrate the importance of the oil crisis but rather to call for extending the diagnosis to the deeper causes, improving the probability of a successful therapy. A successful struggle against youth unemployment—and against unemployment in general—depends on correct assessment of the structural causes of unemployment and of future developments. The same applies to reform of the relationships between the educational system and the labor market. For this reason, it is important that unemployment not be misunderstood to be primarily the result of payment crises caused by the rise in the cost of energy or even by a normal cyclical fluctuation in the world economy. The most essential causes must rather be sought in deep internal contradictions of industrial societies and of world-wide conflicts between poor and rich countries. This is certainly not the place for a comprehensive analysis of these causes, but the unfavorable pre-1973 economic developments that we have mentioned were the result of an uncontrolled worldwide interdependence and especially of the system of fixed exchange rates. In connection with these unfavorable developments, the Federal Republic of Germany tended to be in an extraordinarily favorable position in most years. Yet it must be recognized that these developments have not left the situation in the Federal Republic untouched. Moreover, the citizens of the Federal Republic react to even small economic fluctuations much more critically than do those of other industrial countries.

The structural economic changes in the democratic industrial countries will be described more specifically as they relate to the Federal Republic. Table 3 shows that, in spite of a rela-

Table 3. Average annual rates of change in the gross national product and its components, 1951–55 to 1971–75

Periods	*Private consumption*	*Public expenditure*	*Gross capital investment*	*Gross national product*
		In current prices		
1951–55	11.1%	11.4%	18.0%	13.2%
1956–60	8.7	9.7	10.2	9.4
1961–65	8.5	11.3	11.0	8.8
1966–70	7.4	9.3	8.8	8.4
1971–75	9.5	15.2	4.2	8.8
		In 1962 prices		
1951–55	8.9	5.4	12.9	9.4
1956–60	6.8	5.7	6.9	6.6
1961–65	5.4	4.4	6.8	5.0
1966–70	4.6	3.0	4.8	4.8
1971–75	3.0	4.8	-0.9	1.8

tively high nominal rate of growth of GNP prior to 1971–75, the real rate of growth fell continuously after the first five years of the Bonn Republic. From a real rate of 9.4 percent in 1951–55, the rate gradually fell to 1.8 percent in 1971–75.

Those who look for the cause of the slowing rate of growth primarily in a decreasing investment rate, as so often happens in discussions in the Federal Republic, will be surprised by the statistically demonstrable stability of investment rates. Table 4 shows clearly that in 1971–75 the share of investment in the GNP actually remained unchanged, although in the early 1970s the rate was higher and in 1975 and 1976 somewhat lower. The table also shows the structural changes that were associated with the termination of postwar reconstruction: the rate of investment in construction dropped, while that of investment in equipment rose. The continual increase in the share of foreign trade—both exports and imports—in GNP is also indicated. With respect to employment, this dependency on foreign trade is of central significance.

Table 4. Average changes in the shares of selected components of the gross national product, in 1962 prices, 1951–55 to 1971–75

Component	*1951–55*	*1956–60*	*1961–65*	*1966–70*	*1971–75*
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Private consumption	55.3	55.9	56.7	56.6	57.9
Public expenditures	15.8	13.6	14.5	13.6	14.0
Gross capital investment	22.0	24.2	26.3	25.3	25.1
Investment in equipment	8.9	9.9	11.6	11.6	12.6
Investment in construction	13.1	14.3	14.7	13.6	12.5
Exports	15.5	21.4	19.9	25.6	33.2
Imports	10.6	16.8	18.9	23.0	30.7

Source: Federal Statistical Office.

The Federal Republic differs from other highly developed industrial nations in one aspect of its development: While as a rule the service sector tends to increase its share of GNP at the expense of the industrial sector, so far this development has hardly occurred in the Federal Republic. As shown in Table 5, the share of the industrial sector (over 56 percent in recent years) actually rose slightly from 1966–1970 to 1971–1975. This state of affairs is extremely important in explaining unemployment in the country today.

Table 5. Shares of the major economic sectors in the gross domestic product, averages for 1951–55 to 1971–75

Years	*Total*	*Primary sector*[a]	*Secondary sector*[b]	*Tertiary sector*[c]	*Government*
1951–55	100.0%	8.1%	48.8%	34.2%	8.9%
1956–60	100.0	6.1	52.2	34.0	7.7
1961–65	100.0	4.9	54.9	32.8	7.4
1966–70	100.0	4.3	56.3	32.1	7.3
1971–75	100.0	3.9	56.6	32.1	7.4

[a] Agriculture and forestry
[b] Manufacturing, construction, energy economy, and mining
[c] Service industries without government

Source: Federal Statistical Office.

In fact, with the exception of agriculture, the industrial sector, which increased its share of GNP in the 1971–75 period, also experienced the greatest increase in productivity. Table 6 shows that the rise in productivity in the secondary sector from 1950 on was especially significant in comparison with the government sector. Whereas in 1950 the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per man-hour in 1962 picas was 3.25 DM in the secondary sector and was clearly lower than in government, by 1975 this situation had changed radically. In the latter year, productivity in the secondary sector was 15.19 DM, compared with only 6.74 DM in government.

The result is that the share of the secondary sector in GDP has increased much more than its share of employment. Since 1950, the percentage of workers in agriculture has decreased rapidly, while the percentage in the secondary sector has risen only minimally (Table 7). The percentage in the tertiary sector has risen, and the increase has been especially pronounced in government. However, the tertiary sector has not been able to

Table 6. Changes in labor productivity by economic sector, 1950 to 1975

A. Level of productivity (gross domestic product in Deutschmarks per manhour of labor–1962 prices)

Sectors	*1950*	*1955*	*1960*	*1965*	*1970*	*1975*
All sectors	3.02	4.25	5.84	7.65	9.92	11.94
Primary sector[a]	1.15	1.73	2.57	3.32	4.94	7.14
Secondary sector[b]	3.25	4.68	6.68	9.06	12.04	15.19
Tertiary sector[c]	4.03	4.85	6.03	7.60	9.48	10.96
Government	4.07	4.74	5.31	5.43	5.90	6.74

B. Annual average rates of change in productivity

Sectors	*1951–55*	*1956–60*	*1961–65*	*1966–70*	*1971–75*
All sectors	7.0%	6.6%	5.5%	5.3%	3.8%
Primary sector[a]	8.5	8.1	5.3	8.3	7.6
Secondary sector[b]	7.6	7.6	6.3	5.9	4.7
Tertiary sector[c]	3.8	3.1	4.7	4.5	2.9
Government	3.1	2.4	0.4	1.7	2.7

[a] Agriculture and forestry

[b] Manufacturing, construction, energy economy, and mining

[c] Service industries without government

Source: Federal Statistical Office.

Table 7. Average changes in the percentages of employment in major economic sectors, 1951–55 to 1971–75

Periods	*Total*	*Primary sector*[a]	*Secondary sector*[b]	*Tertiary sector*[c]	*Government*
1951–55	100.0%	20.4%	44.8%	27.1%	7.7%
1956–60	100.0	16.0	47.3	29.2	7.5
1961–65	100.0	11.9	48.5	30.4	9.2
1966–70	100.0	9.7	48.1	31.4	10.8
1971–75	100.0	7.5	47.5	32.4	12.6

[a] Agriculture and forestry

[b] Manufacturing, construction, energy economy, and mining

[c] Service industries without government

Source: Federal Statistical Office.

compensate for the loss of jobs in the industrial sector. Thus, it is not surprising, in view of the high share of the secondary sector in GDP and the decreasing share of this sector in employment, that the total number of employed has been declining for some time. Table 8 shows that the annual average rate of increase of 2.7 percent in total employment in 1951–55 must be contrasted with an average rate of decrease of 0.1 percent in the second half of the 1960s and with an average rate of decrease of 1.0 percent in the first half of the 1970s.

Table 8. Annual average rates of change in the gross domestic product and its components, 1951–55 to 1971–75

Periods	*Number of workers*	*Hours per worker*	*Total amount of labor*	*Labor productivity*	*Gross domestic product*
1951–55	2.7%	-0.4%	2.3%	7.1%	9.5%
1956–60	1.5	-1.6	-0.1	6.5	6.5
1961–65	0.5	-0.9	-0.4	5.5	5.1
1966–70	-0.1	-0.4	-0.6	5.4	4.7
1971–75	-1.0	-1.0	-2.1	3.8	1.7

Source: Federal Statistical Office.

Youth in the Context of Social Developments

In discussions of the situation of youth, the emphasis rests without doubt on their gains and losses. The pressure to achieve in school, vocational training, and the universities; the lack of training positions in business, government, and the universities; and youth unemployment and its consequences dominate discussions on the situation of youth in the Federal Republic as well as in other democratic industrial nations.

Various studies indicate that, at a time when the drive to achieve among adults is somewhat on the decline, competition among young people has increased alarmingly. The race for better opportunities for education and employment has shifted progressively back from the time of entry into working life to the years of early youth and even of childhood. The social stress associated with admission to certain educational fields has already begun to influence the life of children negatively. Drugs, alcoholism, and juvenile delinquency have high priority in this discussion. There is no doubt that these problems exist, and we shall return to them shortly. It seems essential, nevertheless, to mention the favorable developments for youths in Germany in recent decades.

During the 1960s and early 1970s, in particular, youth in the Federal Republic, as in most industrial societies, developed a measure of independence, self-assurance, and joy of living that was unknown before. A changing system of values placed love, friendship, and comradeship in the foreground. Work and making a living became secondary. Authority and achievement were questioned by critical self-awareness and the drive for quality of life. Friend, girlfriend or boyfriend, or marriage partner became more important in relationships than teachers or parents. Personal fulfillment became more significant than the fulfillment of duty or work. A 1975 study by the youth division of the German Shell Company on the situtation of youth since 1964 attempted to quantify these developments. Whereas in 1964 an opinion poll showed that only 6 percent of youths 13 to 24 considered "work and other duties" a heavy burden or a necessary evil, in 1975, 16 percent felt that way. While in 1964 work was considered a satisfying activity by 64 percent, only 44 percent considered it so in 1975.

Sand and Benz (1976) reported that 89 percent of young people between 16 and 24 years of age, questioned at random, were convinced that youth of today thought differently from those of the 1950s. When asked what the differences were, the young people emphasized especially characteristics like "free, open, critical, self-reliant, self-assured, mobile." At the center of their interests were questions relating to education and social problems. Equality and sexual freedom played a significant role.

These tendencies were associated with financial and legal policies favorable to youth. Complete equality for illegitimate children, essential improvements in youth labor laws, financial aid for children, and the introduction of broad financial aid in education are examples of this development. At the same time, a number of essential decisions were made toward changing the legal status of youth. The attainment of majority of 18-year-olds was one. It is certainly possible to criticize the effects of the material and legal independence of 18-year-old youths in the democratic industrial societies. Nevertheless, the right of 18-year-olds to majority status; the increasing authority of pupils, apprentices, and students to participate in decisions concerning their institutions; or the rights created in recent years to education financed by public funds have all without doubt improved the status of youth in the Federal Republic. And, in spite of general compulsory military service, the rights of convinced pacifists are also respected today (Table 9).

Table 9. Refusals of military service: annual applications and decisions, 1967 to 1976

Year	*Total applications*	*Decisions*	*Approvals*
1967	5,963	5,433	4,739
1970	19,363	11,864	9,521
1971	27,657	14,444	11,033
1972	33,792	18,431	13,132
1973	35,192	25,087	16,649
1974	34,150	27,330	18,621
1975	32,565	26,508	18,496
1976	40,618	22,366	16,505

Source: Federal Ministry of Defense.

This summary is not intended to portray a paradise for youth in the Federal Republic. We also do not dispute the fact that there have been and still are tendencies in German society that have caused significant disadvantages to youth, in spite of quantitative progress. The increasing trend, for example, toward the small nuclear family and the rising percentage of working mothers must certainly be counted among such tendencies. In metropolitan areas, the lack of sports facilities and playgrounds, as well as the rise in traffic accidents, have been inimical to children. The urbanization of life doubtless holds disadvantages for the sheltered development of youth and is reflected in negative psychological reactions. However, we are dealing here with losses of quality in industrial societies that concern not only youth. For this reason, it is inappropriate to report on the development of crime, alcoholism, and drug abuse among youth without reference to such tendencies in society at large.

In relation to all criminal offenses, relative delinquency specific to youths 14 to 17 increased only slightly between 1960 to 1975, and the same was true for those 18 to 20. Among those 21 to 24, as well as among adults (25 and over), the tendency applied to only a slightly lesser degree. The differences are striking, particularly for robbery and blackmail. For those 14 to 17, there was an increase from 11.8 to 33.9 per 100,000 inhabitants, but there has been no increase since the beginning of the 1970s. Among adults the robbery and blackmail rate rose from 1.5 to 3.0. In the case of offenses against persons—such as assault, manslaughter, and murder—the rate for those 14 to 17 rose from 88.7 to 115.7, but has remained stagnant since 1970. Among those 18 to 20, the rate rose from 290 to 337; among those 21 to 24, it fell from 325 to 237; and among adults, it fell from 112 to 84.

Youth alcoholism must be seen in relation to the rising per capita consumption of alcohol in the Federal Republic: in 1960, annual per capita consumption of pure alcohol was about 7.8 litres, while in 1975 it was about 12.4 litres. While there are close to 150,000 juvenile alcoholics in the Federal Republic, one must add that there are an estimated 1.5 million alcoholics among all age groups. According to a recently published study at the University of Kiel, 18 percent of 10- to 18-year-olds who were questioned drank no alcohol, while 17 percent considered themselves to be particularly heavy and steady drinkers. Here it must be pointed out that the ability to hold liquor is a prestige value not only among youth.

According to estimates of the Federal Ministry of Youth, Family, and Health (February 1976), the hard core of drug consumers among youths 14 to 24 is considered to be about 40,000. Other estimates are around 50,000, which would amount to about 0.5 percent of the population in this age group. Although youths under 30 play an increasingly important role in the drug consumption, precise numbers are not known. The percentage of addictions to hard drugs is apparently rising, while "mild drugs" and alcohol are used interchangeably, but again there are no exact statistics.

The total picture of youths 15 to 24 in the Federal Republic in no way conveys an impression of crisis developments. Whether it will be possible to let the new freedoms become productive in an affluent society, and, furthermore, whether it will be possible to maintain this affluence are uncertainties for the future. The restoration of full general employment and the elimination of youth unemployment will certainly play a decisive role.

2

Education in the Federal Republic of Germany

In the Federal Republic, the 10 states (*Länder*) and West Berlin are largely autonomous and independent in the education sector. Yet the basic structure of the educational system has remained homogeneous to a great degree. This is primarily the result of intensive coordination by the conference of the ministers for culture of the states and of the federal-state commission on educational planning. Compulsory education in the states lasts 9 years, between the ages of 6 and 15; in West Berlin there are 10 years of compulsory education ending at age 16. After this, young people are obliged to attend vocational school on a part-time basis between 6 and 12 hours a week unless they go on to a school at the secondary level.

In the course of the 1960s and 1970s, educational opportunities for youth have improved. Step by step (varying among the states) compulsory education has been increased to 9 years. The trend is toward 10 years of full-time compulsory education between age 6 and age 16.

Concomitantly, the employment rate of young people 15 to 19 fell by one-third, from about 80 to about 54 percent, between 1961 and 1975, while that of 20- to 24-year-olds declined from about 82 to 74 percent (Table 11).

Data on attendance rates in schools for specific ages up to 18 are significant only for attendance at full-time schools on the upper-secondary level, because part-time education is required for those who do not continue in full-time school. There has been a rise in enrollment rates of youths 15 to 19 in general full-time schools (excluding vocational schools), that is, in high schools (*Gymnasien* and *Realschulen*). The proportion enrolled in these schools rose from 11.4 percent in 1960 to over 14.5 percent in 1970 and to nearly 19 percent in 1975. The number of German first-time enrollments in universities rose from 74,200 in 1960 to 120,000 in 1970, or from nearly 7 percent to about 15 percent of those 20 to 21 (the average age of first-year students). The percentage reached 18 percent in 1974 and was expected to be more than 20 percent in 1976 (Table 10).

This trend will continue. In 1973 a planning committee appointed by the federal government and by the states (the

Table 10. Percentages of the population enrolled in school and college, by age and level of school, actual 1970 and projected 1975, 1980, and 1985

Level of school and age group	*1970*	*1975*	*1980*	*1985*
Nursery schools (elementary level; 3- to 5-year-olds)	27%	52%	70%	70%
Preschool education (5-year-olds)	53	60	85	100
Elementary schools (6- to 10-year-olds, including special schooling)	100	100	100	100
Medium level (lower secondary level; 11- to 15-year-olds, including special schooling)	100	100	100	100
Upper secondary level (15- to 19-year-olds)	19			
Full-time proportion	36.9	41	45–57	50–52
Part-time proportion	63.1	59	53–55	48–50
Universities (tertiary level)	14.2	20	20–22	22–24

Source: Federal Statistical Office.

Federal-State Commission for Educational Planning–*Bund-Länder-Kommission für Bildungsplanung)* proposed the so-called joint plan for education, which was approved by the federal and state governments as a binding guideline for future development. According to this plan, the development of educational structures is as shown in Table 11. The expected expansion up to 1976 essentially occurred, and some goals were even surpassed. Moreover, there was not only a significant increase in educational expenditures (from 47 billion DM in 1970 to 87 billion DM in 1975), but also a distinct increase in the share of educational expenditures in total public expenditures and in the GNP (from 5.1 percent in 1970 to 6.7 percent in 1975).

Table 11. Percentages of young people employed (not in secondary school) 1961 to 1975[a]

		Ages 15 to 19			*Ages 20 to 24*	
Year	*Total*	*Men*	*Women*	*Total*	*Men*	*Women*
1961	79.8%	81.3%	78.2%	81.7%	91.1%	71.9%
1970	65.7	66.9	64.4	77.2	86.8	67.1
1975	54.0	57.2	50.6	74.0	79.9	68.4

[a] Number of employed per 100 population, by age and sex, including soldiers.

Source: Federal Statistical Office.

Despite the increase in educational opportunities, enormous shortages of openings have appeared, especially of private training positions and of university student places. The reasons for this are varied. Training positions in the private sector have been subject to a long-term decline, which was accelerated, among other things, by the tightening of legally set requirements for the quality of training after 1969. The universities have been unable to keep abreast of the increasing applicants (in spite of a doubling of academic and other personnel in one decade and a corresponding expansion of buildings), partially because of the continuous lengthening of the duration of university education. Average duration in 1970 was 5.7 years, and in 1975 it was about 6.5 years.

Thus, in spite of public efforts, opportunities for education and training had become a central problem for young people and their families long before the 1974–75 recession. It is no wonder that the German Shell Company study showed a distinct shift in the grievances mentioned by youth in the period from 1954 to 1975: irritations as well as failures on the job and in school played an increasing role in the troubles of youth. To be sure, the difficulties thus far mentioned cannot entirely explain this tendency. The educational system of the Federal Republic has structural characteristics that are highly significant for the psychological problems of youth and for youth unemployment.

Basically, the educational system of the Federal Republic is structured not horizontally but vertically; the structure depicted in Table 11 includes in the lower- and upper-secondary levels several types of schools that are not organizationally connected with one another and that relate to each other rarely or in a very limited manner. Educational decisions must therefore be made very early in life; and they are relatively irreversible.

Figure 1 shows the differentiated structure of the educational system. This structure is the cause of a substantial part of the problems of young people. The crucial point is that, as a rule, the most important decision determining future life has to be made after four years of elementary school (except in Bremen and in West Berlin, where there are six years of elementary school). Parents and children are largely bound by this choice in their further educational and vocational paths. If parents choose the basic school (*Hauptschule*) after the fourth school year (one of several possible choices), the only subsequent opportunities for youth are, as a rule, the "practical vocations." In this case schooling ends in most instances with the basic school.

In 1976, about 18 percent of those leaving basic schools had no regular leaving certificates; they had to find a job without a certificate. After graduation from a basic school, the path leads either directly to work, when 15-year-olds begin as unskilled laborers, or it leads via apprenticeship to a "skilled trade." However, the percentage of people who practice another

Figure 1. Model of a horizontally structured educational system in the Federal Republic of Germany


FURTHER EDUCATION
Structure and Terminal Studies
Long Study Courses
Short Study Courses
UNIVERSITIES
Technical Schools
b
(13)
Core Programs, Elective and Achievement Courses
12
UPPER SECONDARY LEVEL (2 to 3 years)
Including Vocational Programs
Practical Vocational Education
11
a
Core Programs, Vocational Achievement Courses, Elective Courses
10
9
LOWER SECONDARY LEVEL (6 years)
8
School Years
7
Orientation Stages
6
Inner Differentiation, Advancement Courses
5
4
3
2
PRIMARY LEVEL (4 years)
1
ELEMENTARY LEVEL (Nursery, pre-school)
(1 to 5 years—voluntary)

Completion a = Abitur I (Secondary Certificate I),
b = Abitur II (Secondary Certificate II)

trade than the one they have learned after completing apprenticeship is substantial, as we shall see. Graduates of basic schools rarely have access to continuing schools (*Realschulen* or *Gymnasien*); every tenth graduate attends a full-time vocational school.

However, if parents decide to send their 10-year-old children, after four years of elementary school, to a continuing school, the choice is (1) a modern secondary or intermediate school (*Realschule*) resulting in an intermediate degree (*mittlere Reife*), and then an upper technical school (*Fachoberschule*) or technical high school (*Fachhochschule*) with prospects for a more elevated career (but seldom for academic education); or (2) the *Gymnasium*, which leads as a rule to the matriculation examination (*Abitur*) and then to the university and to an academic or professional career.

Regular statistics about transfers to different types of schools or training are not available, but estimates are shown in Table 12.

Table 12. Estimated transfers to different schools or training programs

Graduate of:	*Academic or professional career*	*Vocational full-time schools*	*Training in firms*	*Other—federal defense*	*Other—miscellaneous*	*Total*
Basic schools or special schools	0.0%	10.8%	64.3%	1.6%	23.3%	100.0%
Modern secondary schools—intermediate degree	0.0	23.5	66.7	1.9	8.0	100.0
Gymnasium or other institutions–matriculation examination	89.2	2.5	5.8	2.5	0.0	100.0

Source: Kühlewind, Mertens, and Tessaring, 1975.

The three-level school system in secondary education (*Hauptschule, Realschule,* and *Gymnasium*) has negative consequences for the structure of society and for equality of opportunities. Because of the necessity of making a decision at an early age, children of high-income families are at an advantage. This is not surprising: after all, the vertical structure of the school system was designed as a social class system, and it still functions to determine social classes today. However, gifted children from socially disadvantaged backgrounds have always been admitted to the *Gymnasium*. Thus, the stronger are separated from the weaker at age 10, based on an almost complete system of merits. Males will meet as equals at most one more time in their lives, when they join the federal defense forces. When all the gifted children, joined by the great majority of those from the middle and upper classes, get together in the *Realschule* and the *Gymnasium,* the weakening of the basic schools becomes obvious, and the social discrimination against the already individually disadvantaged becomes particularly noticeable.

Since the choice of school actually determines the future, school days have degenerated to a kind of premature competition for careers. Those who do not choose the *Gymnasium* find the course of their lives more or less inevitably determined. Passive resignation is often the result. If the choice is the *Gymnasium,* they soon meet with cut-throat competition that expresses itself not only at the end of the *Gymnasium*—that is, the point of transition to the university—but reaches back as far as the last years of elementary school. The pressure to make decisions very early and the pressure of competition for the best grades in the transition to the universities leads to the dissolution of solidarity among classmates. And the uncertainty of career opportunities, which today are even associated with the choice of higher education, instills in young people either an unscrupulous sense of competition or resignation.

Finally, the three-level school system causes misdirections and resulting frustrations. The inevitable result of the need to decide at a young age is that the continuing schools have had to be considerably expanded in recent years. Especially in urban areas, the basic schools have become repositories for less gifted and socially disadvantaged children. In areas with a high concentration of children of foreign workers, the basic schools even face the question of whether the majority of a school class is German speaking. This again increases the drive for entry into continuing schools.

The preparation for a career at the different types of schools tends to convey the impression to graduates of the *Gymnasium* that successful graduation will guarantee access to the university and to the corresponding academic and professional careers. Consequently, there has been a continuous increase in the number of graduates (*Abituren*) who have taken the continuation of their education at the university and resulting career opportunities for granted. The trend toward the *Gymnasium* led to a political neglect of vocational training in the 1960s when the demand for *Gymnasium* and university places grew vigorously. The consequence was education oriented toward the higher professions, without any relation to social needs, as well as a corresponding horizon of professional expectations of the students. Thus, the Federal Republic today is facing the problem of unemployed teachers, lawyers, chemists, and engineers, while there are qualified jobs in trade and crafts that cannot find trained new recruits.

After 1945, many education traditions in addition to the *Gymnasium* were continued, including the system of apprenticeship. The structure of this training program is based on the concept of a connection between training in a firm and in school. The young graduate (now usually after nine years of school) enters into a contract with a firm which, as a rule, guarantees three years of continuous apprenticeship and education. In addition, the youth is obliged at the same time to attend a vocational school for 6 to 12 hours a week (the exact time varying among the states). This vocational school offers general education, such as social studies and sports, as well as the technical and theoretical aspects of vocational education until the end of this part-time obligatory schooling at 18 years. In addition, there are full-time vocational schools which terminate with a qualification for a job. These schools are likely to become more and more important.

During the 1950s and 1960s, vocational training was left essentially in the hands of firms and chambers of commerce. First of all, educational policy had to deal with the explosion of the *Gymnasium* and its resulting avalanche of students in the early 1970s. Then, much too late, when the qualitative and quantitative defects of vocational education had become incalculable, and when shortages of training capacity were developing, vocational education for young people 15 to 19 became a central policy issue. Until 1973, educational policy in the various states, which are essentially responsible for their own vocational education, was under the jurisdiction of the departments of commerce or labor. This was also true at the federal level. Only after a prolonged struggle over jurisdiction was the responsibility for the planning of vocational education finally transfered to the ministry responsible for other educational planning activities, the Department of Education and Science.

In view of the negative selection patterns between basic school and the *Gymnasium*, the problem of vocational training is hardly soluble without reference to educational reform in general. The prerequisite for a solution to the problems of vocational training would be the upgrading of the basic school. A solution will not be possible as long as 10-year-old children are involved in a process of negative selection, to the disadvantage of the practical trades, by being forced to choose the broader opportunities offered by the *Gymnasium* or the *Realschule*. An upgrading of the basic school, however, would only be possible through creation of comparable standards at the lower-secondary level for the content and quality of education at the *Gymnasium* and at the basic school. This would also make possible the merging of the school types—the central goal of the reform of educational policy—the replacement of the three-level school system by the comprehensive school.

In recent decades the debate over educational reforms in the Federal Republic has dealt primarily with this goal. The point of departure was, first of all, the sociopolitical question of how a decision as far reaching as the choice of type of school can be socially and pedagogically justified for 10-year-old children. While the experts were overwhelmingly of the opinion that such a decision cannot be made in a responsible way, those interested in preserving the existing structures of education—especially the well-to-do parents of *Gymnasium* students—have seen to it that a rather hostile climate was created in opposition to prolonged joint schooling. It must be added, however, that most proponents of school reform were unable to support their arguments with well-prepared and promising reform models.

Today the questionable nature of the existing three-level school system becomes apparent not only in the social consequences but also in the quantitative misdirection that it causes. These misdirections play an important role in explaining youth unemployment and contribute the most important negative element to the situation of youth in the Federal Republic. A realistic assessment shows that, at least until now, the problems of youth unemployment were clearly secondary to those that resulted from a nonreformed educational system. The most depressing problem that young people have to deal with today is not the threat of unemployment but problems of education in general. The antiquated and inexpedient three-level school system, with its apparently clear options and yet obvious occupational insecurities, has beome a source of insecurity and depression for today's youth, which will make a future-oriented and self-assured development in democratic equality of opportunity much more difficult, if not impossible.

3

Employment in the Federal Republic

Employment Potential

Population growth and the rate of employment are of decisive importance for the labor market. Table 13 shows that in spite of a population increase from 56.8 million in 1962 to 61.4 million in 1976, the employment potential has not increased, owing to a continuous drop in the employment rate from 60.5 percent in 1962 to 54.8 percent in 1976. During this period the native German population increased from 55.9 to 57.6 million, while the population of foreigners rose from 0.9 to 3.8 million. For Germans, the employment rate fell from 60.1 to 53.6 percent, and for foreigners from 81.3 to 75.6 percent.

Changes in the future employment potential of the German population will first of all reflect the high birth rates of the years until 1963. The large cohorts born in those years will make particular demands on training capacities and on the labor market for newcomers in the coming years. In addition, the declining employment rate among the German population was caused by a reduction in the length of working life as a result of earlier retirement on the one hand, and by the prolongation of education and the declining employment rate among young people on the other hand (Table 11). Thus, the employment rate of the German male population of working age declined

Table 13. Population and employment data,[a] 1950 to 1976 (numbers in thousands)

Population and labor-force components	*1950*	*1955*	*1960*	*1962*	*1970*	*1973*[b]	*1975*	*1976*
Population	49,989	52,382	55,433	56,938	60,651	61,976	61,829	n.a.
Population 15 and over	n.a.	n.a.	43,609	44,445	46,593	48,105	48,543	n.a.
Employed	21,960	24,165	26,591	26,382	26,668	26,712	25,350	25,752
Self-employed	3,245	3,215	3,327	3,203	2,690	2,594	2,510	2,331
Unpaid family workers	3,168	2,855	2,663	2,527	1,732	1,554	1,420	1,188
Dependent employees	13,963	17,160	20,257	20,652	22,246	22,564	21,420	21,700
Foreign workers			279		1,807	2,595[c]	2,071	1,937
Unemployed	1,584	935	271	154	149	273	1,074	1,060
Unemployment rate–unadusted	7.2	3.9	1.3	0.6	0.7	1.2	4.7	4.6
Unemployment rate–adjusted to U.S. concepts	6.8	3.4	0.8	0.4	0.5	1.0	3.4	3.6

[a] Data do not include the Saarland until 1958.

[b] Based on numbers of social security card holders from 1973 on; data before and after 1973 are not comparable.

[c] Based on BMWI performance in numbers, 1976; BMWI = Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft (Federal Economics Ministry).

Sources: BMWI; Federal Statistical Office and Federal Labor Institute; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, *Labor Force Statistics, 1958–1969,* and *Labor Force Statistics, 1964–1975* (Paris, 1971 and 1977); Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, *Methodological and Conceptual Problems of Measuring Unemployment in O.E.C.D. Countries* (Paris, 1976), Part I; and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, unpublished tables.

from 82.9 percent in 1962 to 72.1 percent in 1976, while that of women fell only from 41.0 to 37.8 percent in the same period. Since 1972, the employment rate of women has increased slightly, reflecting increasing employment of middle-aged married women.

In the coming years, the number of school leavers is expected to rise, followed by a decline in the 1980s:

Actual		*Projected*	
1971	705,000	1980	926,000
1975	780,000	1981	952,000
		1985	851,000
		1990	650,000

Projections show that by 1990 the German employment potential will increase by one million persons, whereas it decreased by approximately two million from 1960 to 1975.

Unemployment

An unemployed person by statistical definition is a person who is looking for work, living in the Federal Republic (including West Berlin), and is registered with the Labor Office as seeking full-time work amounting to more than seven calendar days, either inside the country or in a foreign country. Disabled persons are not included, nor are those already working more than casually as employees, domestic workers, members of a family enterprise, or self-employed people. The basis for the calculation of the unemployment rate is the employment rate, based on the population and employment census of 1970, as well as on the extrapolated population. The total number of unemployed is divided by the number of dependent employees, including those who work only up to 20 hours a week.[1] The specific problems of youth unemployment statistics will be considered later.

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[1] Dependent employees who work more than 37 hours per week are used as the basis for calculating the full-time unemployment rate, while the part-time unemployment rate is based on the number of dependent employees who work from 20 to 36 hours a week.

Unemployment benefits may be claimed by those who are registered with the Labor Office as unemployed, are listed as available for work by the employment agency, have completed the required time for qualification, and have filed for unemployment benefits. A person who looks for work is unemployed in this sense, even when he holds one or more casual jobs if they amount to less than 20 hours a week. Unemployed people are considered to be looking for work if they are available for work through the employment agency and if they are willing to accept a "reasonable job" under the customary conditions of the general labor market and are actually able to perform such a job. Those who are able to hold only minor jobs, or can work only at certain hours because of diminished productivity or family obligations (excluding children in need of supervision and persons in need of care) or those who do not qualify for a job because of certain behavior (for example, alcoholism) are not considered to be available for work and therefore have no corresponding claim.

A central problem in the question of claims for unemployment benefits has to do with the explanation of "reasonability," which corresponds to the regulation in the United States that an unemployed person can be denied benefits if he refuses "suitable work." The Labor Promotion Code provides that the assessment of reasonability must take into account the situation and development of the labor market and the interests of both those who pay unemployment contributory taxes and the unemployed. It is explicitly added that employment is not unreasonable just because it does not correspond to the former occupation of the unemployed person, because the place of employment is farther away from the home of the unemployed than his former place of employment, or because the conditions of labor are less favorable than in the previous job. The assessment of reasonability decides in the last instance the definition of "unemployed." The harsher the standard, the smaller the number of unemployed, whereas the more generous the standard, the greater the number of unemployed.

Finally, the right to unemployment benefits applies only to those who have held a job for 26 weeks or 6 months within a specified time period during the past three years in an occupation subject to unemployment insurance contributions. In addition, the unemployed person must register personally with the local employment office on the first day of unemployment. Unemployment benefits are payable for 13 to 52 weeks, according to the duration of insured employment. There are also special provisions relating to certain activities, such as serving time in the military or participation in a program of vocational training or retraining.

The unemployment benefit amounts to 68 percent of the former wages. The legal taxes which an employee normally has to pay are subtracted in computing the most recent wages. Overtime work is taken into consideration. The process of calculation is regulated in detail and is relatively complex.

In the 1950s, the Federal Republic had effectively eliminated unemployment. The number of unemployed decreased from about 1.6 million in 1950 to about 271,000 in 1960, while the unemployment rate declined from 7.2 to only 1.3 percent in the same period (Table 13). The drop in unemployment was continuous, except in 1957 and 1958, when unemployment remained temporarily around 3.7 percent. During the 1960s, unemployment remained at the extraordinarily low level, by international standards, of about 1 percent, except in 1967–68, when, in the wake of a local recession, it rose to 2 percent.

The high level of employment until the recession of the 1970s was, at first glance, particularly remarkable, since about 15 million refugees from the Eastern provinces (the present-day German Democratic Republic (GDR)—were accommodated. In addition, the number of foreign workers grew continuously during the 1960s, peaking at 2.6 million in 1973 (Table 13). However, the foreign workers essentially merely offset the declining employment potential of Germans. The expansion of jobs and the attractive possibilities of work and wages in the Federal Republic brought about an influx of foreign workers not only from member states of the European Common Market but also from Yugoslavia, Spain, Turkey, and Portugal. (The influx of foreign labor will be discussed later, especially in connection with the role played by an inordinately low exchange value of the German mark during the 1950s and 1960s.)

Until 1973, the entire labor force could be employed, except for a minimal number of especially mobile or hard-to-adjust employees; but the number of employed workers decreased by about 1.4 million between the middle of 1973 and the middle of 1977. The unemployment rate increased accordingly, as we noted earlier. However, whereas in 1976, there was an appreciable decrease in unemployment, this tendency was reversed in 1977. In September 1977, the number of unemployed was 911,000, compared with 898,700 in September 1976. But this rise reflected an increase in the number of part-time unemployed, especially women and the number of "short-time" workers (that is, those who work less than the normal number of hours per week in their regular job). The number of full-time unemployed did not increase.

The severity of unemployment has varied among the various sectors of the economy. The sectors that would have had to dismiss workers in any event for structural reasons, quite apart from the impact of the recession, were hit the hardest. This was particularly true for the construction industry, which had been geared to heavy postwar reconstruction needs and necessarily had to shrink. But the consumer-goods industries, which were affected by increased imports, decreased as well. The construction and consumer goods industries were responsible for one-half of the total loss in employment, while the capital-goods industries accounted for another three-tenths. The decline in total employment was held down even during the most severe period of the recession by a continued increase in employment in the service sector.

The willingness to expand personnel in the public services, however, has sharply decreased since the beginning of 1976; only half as many new workers were employed as in 1974 and 1975 (Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, 1977).

Meanwhile, discussions concerning the expansion of public services in connection with fiscal policy have taken a slightly different turn, as we shall see.

The employment potential of German workers is expected to increase in the coming 10 years. Therefore, the problem of unemployment is likely to intensify if the cyclical and structural causes of unemployment cannot be successfully removed. Moreover, the struggle against youth unemployment depends primarily on the elimination in general.

Youth Unemployment

The specific problem of youth unemployment in the Federal Republic occurred for the first time, as we have seen, in connection with the general rise in unemployment in the mid-1970s. Table 14 shows the increase in the unemployment rate for persons of all ages and for youthful age groups from September 1967 to September 1976. In the recession year of 1967, the unemployment rate of those under 20 was only 0.8 percent, while that of persons 20 to 24 was 1.0 percent, at a time when the overall rate was 1.6 percent. As the economy

Table 14. Total unemployment and unemployment of youths, September 1967 to September 1976 (numbers in thousands)

	Total unemployed		*Unemployed ages under 20*		*Unemployed ages 20 to 24*	
Year[a]	*Number*	*Unemployment rate*	*Number*	*Unemployment rate*	*Number*	*Unemployment rate*
1967	341.1	1.6	19.2	0.8	24.3	1.0
1968	174.5	0.8	8.3	0.4	12.3	0.5
1969	100.5	0.5	5.8	0.3	8.7	0.3
1970	97.3	0.4	7.5	0.4	10.7	0.4
1971	146.7	0.7	11.7	0.6	17.3	0.6
1972	194.7	0.8	15.5	0.7	23.1	0.8
1973	219.1	0.9	21.0	1.0	30.0	1.0
1974	556.9	2.4	69.8	3.4	88.3	3.0
1975	1,006.5	4.4	115.8	5.8	171.6	5.8
1976	898.3	3.9	102.6	4.6	154.5	6.0

[a] The data are for September of each year.

Source: Federal Labor Institute.

recovered from the recession, youth unemployment declined drastically. From the beginning of the 1970s until the onset of the world economic crisis in 1973–74, the rise in unemployment was slow, but from 1974 on it accelerated. The data in Table 14 also show that the relative rates of youth unemployment tended to rise, and this tendency continued between 1976 and 1977. In May 1977, the rate for youths under 20 was 4.1 percent, while that for 20- to 24-year-olds was 6.3 percent, compared with an overall rate of 4.1 percent.

This development came as a surprise to the federal government. While an analysis of long-term economic trends indicated that unemployment would probably increase in Western industrial countries and that there would be a large influx into the German labor market between 1975 and 1985, the government did not believe that there was a threat of youth unemployment. In a news release in January 1975, it stated that the Federal Administration does not anticipate that in the middle- or longer-term there will be structural youth unemployment in the Federal Republic of Germany. However, among all age groups, the highest rate in May 1977 was for those 20 to 24, according to the Federal Labor Institute. Although there had been relative improvement for this age group from 1975 to 1976, the tendency was reversed in 1977. Also in May 1977, by comparison with a year earlier, age-specific unemployment rates had increased for those under 20, 30 to 34, and 55 to 59. In September 1976, the Federal Labor Institute had pointed out that unemployment rates in the upper age groups were no longer as much above average as they were during and after the recession, but the lower age groups were much more afflicted. The explanation for this, the institute reported, was to be found, among other things, in regulations protecting the work place for older and/or long-term employees with one firm. These, in the meantime, had been expanded significantly in legal, wage, and industrial agreements, and had contributed to a certain redistribution of the unemployment risk. Nevertheless, compared with the situation in the larger industrial nations, youth unemployment in the Federal Republic is relatively low, as is unemployment in general.

Not everyone without a job is listed as unemployed in the statistics, and this is probably especially true of youthful unemployed persons. As we have seen, the unemployment statistics of the Federal Republic are based on the number of registered unemployed. It may rightfully be assumed that unemployed youths, who can neither hope to get a job by registering nor to receive unemployment benefits (since they have not worked before) are less interested in registering with the Labor Office than are adults who have already been employed. Moreover, the statistics include only those persons as unemployed who are looking for a job; they do not include those who are looking for a training position. Moreover, young people who have terminated their education and, in the absence of a job, are going through additional training, are also not listed in the statistics as unemployed, even though they would much rather work than continue their training. Also disregarded in the statistics are those who are continuing to study (for example, in a second field of study or for a higher degree) merely to kill time in the absence of a job, as well as the young housewife whose registration at the Labor Office would not get her a part-time job, or the 17-year-old daughter who remains with her parents without registering as unemployed, since she has no prospects of finding an adequate job.[2]

Estimates indicate that this "silent reserve" is a significant group in terms of the difference between the employment potential on the one hand and the sum of employed and unemployed persons on the other (Table 15). The implications of this problem for unemployed youth has been the subject of a study by Schober-Gottwald (1977), who assumes that the official figures undercount the number of unemployed youths. Her estimates for September 1975 indicate that the unemployment rate for those under 20 should be 7.5 percent instead of the official 5.8 percent if one includes applicants for training

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[2] The adjusted unemployment data in Figure 2.2 in Gordon (1979) show that unemployment rates of German youths 15 to 19 are higher than those for the 20 to 24 age group, thereby tending to confirm the underestimate of teenage unemployment, which appears to be less pronounced than for those 20 to 24 in the official German figures.

Table 15. The "silent reserve" in the labor market, 1960 to 1976 (numbers in thousands)

Year	*Employment* 1	*Unemployment* 2	*Sum of 1 and 2* 3	*Employment potential* 4	*Silent reserve (4-3)* 5
1960	26,247	271	26,518	–	–
1965	26,887	147	27,034	27,034	–
1970	26,668	149	26,817	26,817	–
1971	26,725	185	26,910	27,000	90
1972	26,655	246	26,901	27,045	56
1973	26,712	273	26,985	27,136	151
1974	26,215	582	16,797	27,003	200
1975	25,350	1,074	26,424	26,877	465
1976	25,752	1,060	26,812	26,761[a]	

[a] Estimate

Source: Mitterlunger aus den Arbeito-und Berupforschung (Mit AB), January 1977; Official Newsletter of the Federal Labor Institute, Annual Statistics, 1976.

positions who are not placed and youth who participate in courses sponsored by the labor administration instead of working. For September 1976, she estimates a rate of 6.2 percent for this age group compared with the official 4.6 percent.

However, we do not believe that the number of unemployed youths should be corrected by adding unplaced applicants for training positions as well as a number of participants in vocational training courses; the real undercount must be attributed to youth who are unregistered and are not in these categories.

The motives for registering with the Labor Office are, as we have seen, twofold–to get a job and to receive unemployment benefits. The possibility of getting a job usually motivates young jobseekers to register. However, the obvious futility of the prospect of placement in certain occupations, as well as social aversion to being registered as unemployed, prevents many young people from registering. This is likley to be all the more true if financial benefits cannot be expected from registering. Since unemployment benefits are paid only if the applicant was previously employed, and unemployment relief is provided only if the level of family income is relatively low, there are doubtless unemployed youth who have no motive for registering.

Here again, Schober-Gottwald has tried to make realistic estimates to determine more correctly the number of unemployed youths. She classifies as unemployed those 15 to 17 who are legally obliged to attend part-time vocational school but do not have a job or apprenticeship at the same time. In the fall of 1975, there were 72,000 students who had neither a job nor a training position, but only 45,000 youths under 18 were registered as unemployed with the Labor Office. This suggests that about 27,000 youths should be considered as unregistered unemployed youths. This would mean that the unemployment rate for those under 18 would have been 60 percent higher than the official figures indicated. This, of course, would be a significant difference statistically.

Schober-Gottwald also assumes that there was no further increase in the number of unemployed students in 1976–77 because some of the states created full-time educational programs for this group (a year of vocational preparation, a vocational basic school year, and so forth). This assumption, however, can only be partially accepted, since it has been reported that unemployed youth have taken advantage of these educational opportunities only to a relatively small extent.

As for those 18 to 24, the undercount in the official statistics is apparently much lower, since the percentage who have previously been employed is much greater, and therefore unemployment benefits are much more likely to be available. [In addition, children's allowances (that is, support to parents for expenses of twin children) have recently been extended to include children to the age of 23 (rather than 18), creating a financial incentive for the registration of youth in the 18 to 23 age group.] Yet even in this case, a certain undercount must be expected, especially among girls.

Schober-Gottwald's findings are corroborated by other studies. For example, a survey in the Dortmund area showed that girls between the ages of 15 and 18 who could not find jobs would often simply stay with their families, helping their mothers, without registering as unemployed. The survey indicated that if appropriate adjustments were made for unregistered unemployed youth, the actual number of unemployed youth in January–February 1975 would have been 6,200 compared with the official count of 1,847. If the results of this survey were extended to the entire Federal Republic, actual youth unemployment would be more than three times as high as the official figures indicate. And this does not include foreign youth, many of whom have been leaving the Federal Republic with their parents for economic reasons; nor does it include those who are continuing their education but would rather work.

Thus, doubts about the reliability of youth unemployment statistics are not unfounded, and most calculations tend to estimate that the actual figures are higher, rather than lower, than the official count. However, relatively high unemployment benefits (68 percent of recent wages, as we have seen) could lead young people who have already worked to abuse the unemployment insurance system; there are documented cases in which youth have preferred unemployment to an unwanted but reasonable job. The potential for this is certainly there, and discussions about such cases have increased recently in the Federal Republic. These discussions concern especially the 20 to 24 age group, who are enabled to use the system to their advantage because they are highly mobile (especially if unmarried). Numerous employers complain that young applicants sent to them by the labor offices have no intention of taking a job, and a jobseeker sent by a labor office could deter an employer from hiring him by his attitude, statements about himself, and the general impression he makes. Youth who refuse to accept jobs that are offered, for whatever reason, may be counted as registered unemployed, but it is doubtful that this constitutes a large group.

On the whole, in weighing the tendencies toward an undercount or overcount of youth unemployment, it is advisable to estimate the youth unemployment rate as somewhat higher than the official statistics indicate.

This conclusion is of considerable political significance. The number of legitimately unemployed youth is likely to increase in the coming years, primarily because numbers of young people entering the labor market for the first time will be particularly large. Although a detailed discussion of youth unemployment in the Federal Replublic must be based on the official statistics, we must keep in mind the fact that these statistics tend to minimize the problem of youth unemployment.

The structure of youth unemployment is quite different from that of adult unemployment. Detailed structural data are available primarily only for youth 15 to 19. For those 20 to 24, adequate data are unfortunately not available.

The age groups. During the years preceding the world economic recession, youth under 20 experienced a disproportionate increase in their unemployment rate, whereas this tendency did not appear until after 1973 for those 20 to 24. The reason for this is obviously that unemployment among those 20 to 24 is much more sensitive to cyclical movements. Yet it has become clear in recent years that the unemployment rate of 20- to 24-year-olds is one of the highest age-specific rates. For this reason, it will be necessary in the future to provide more data on unemployment in this age group.

Within the 15 to 19 age group, a distinct break appears at age 18. For those 15 to 18, unemployment rates are higher than for 19-year-olds. Among other factors, this is probably explained in part by the fact that those who terminate their vocational training before age 19 are not necessarily accepted as employees in the firm in which they were trained. As a result, they must seek a job when their training is over. During the period of jobseeking, they are considered unemployed, even though the unemployment may be short–lived.

For male youth, there is the additional factor of military service, which usually begins at age 18 and lasts 15 months. This deters employers from hiring youth who have not yet gone into military service. Furthermore, youth under age 18 are obliged to attend vocational school (6 to 12 hours a week) and are protected specifically by the labor laws. Without doubt this, too, prevents employers at times from hiring young people. These factors are considered more fully below.

Socioeconomic structure of youth unemployment. Table 16 provides structural data for unemployed youth 15 to 19 in the Federal Republic in the years 1974 to 1976. The data show that the disproportionate percentage of women among unemployed youth has tended to increase. The percentage of unemployed males in this age group declined from 46.1 to 40.3 percent, whereas the percentage of unemployed women rose from 53.9 to 59.7 percent. As to age, the percentage of those 15 and 16 declined from 26 percent in 1974 to 18 percent in 1976, whereas the share of those 17 to 19 rose correspondingly. It must be kept in mind, however, that the younger members of this population belong to a relatively numerous age class. Moreover, the proportion of youths who were unemployed in spite of having completed vocational training with a firm increased from about 26 percent in 1974 to 34 percent in 1976. There was also a rise in the percentage who had completed their vocational training in school—from 1.3 percent to 3.2 percent. Also particularly noticeable is the rising share of unemployed youth who had graduated from upper-secondary schools.

A detailed unemployment analysis was conducted in September-October 1975, and was based on a random sample of 2 percent of Germans who were registered as unemployed with the labor offices at the end of September 1974, including 1,300 who were under 20 years of age. Schober-Gottwald has reported on this study (1977). The results indicate that the percentage of wage-earners among unemployed youth was disproportionately high (data not shown). As might be expected, workers who had not completed vocational training were especially affected. These factors were related to social stratification. Among the unemployed youth, 65 percent came from working-class families, compared with 44 percent of employed youths. In contrast, there were only a few unemployed youths whose fathers were, for example, civil servants. Within the group from working-class families, children of unskilled workers

Table 16. The structure of youth unemployment (under 20 years of age), by selected characteristics of a random sample and selected cases subsequently investigated, 1974 to 1976

	Total youth unemployment end of September[a]			*Sample*[b] *September 1974*	*Subsequent investigation*[c] *selected cases*
	1974	*1975*	*1976*		
Number of cases (000)	69.8	115.8	102.6	349	965
Percentage of total unemployed (all ages)	12.5	11.5	11.4		
Percentage who were foreigners	10.8	9.1	6.8		
Sex					
Men	46.1	48.5	40.3	44.3	42.9
Women	53.9	51.5	59.7	55.7	57.1
Age					
15	10.1	5.7	4.5		11.7
16	15.9	13.6	13.7		11.9
17	22.2	19.9	21.7		21.3
18	24.8	27.3	28.2		22.0
19	27.1	33.5	32.0		33.2
Vocational training without completion					
Vocational training	69.8	67.4	63.6	66.3	61.7
Without basic school completion	32.2	30.8	26.3	34.8	30.3
With basic school completion	28.4	29.0	27.1	27.8	27.6
With upper-secondary school completion	3.2	4.0	7.4	3.6	3.7
With instruction	3.2			2.8	3.3
With vocational training in a firm	25.8	30.5	34.2	29.3	33.3
With vocational training in a school	1.3	2.1	3.2	1.6	1.7
Desire for vocational training among unemployed youths without vocational training					
yes	14.8	8.5	12.0		16.7
no	85.2	91.5	88.0		83.3
Employment					
No employment so far	23.6	18.9	22.4		25.1
Previously employed	76.4	81.1	77.6		74.9

[a] Only Germans.

[b] Including the category "instruction."

[c] Base of reference: unemployed youths without completed vocational training. For September 1974, the calculation of the "yes" percentages is based on those youths without jobs, which were taken care of by vocational counseling and were transferred to Labor Office for placement, because of a lack of qualification or a lack of training positions.

Source: Federal Labor Institute.

were disproportionately represented, accounting for 35 percent, whereas the proportion from such families among employed youths was only 12 percent. The occupation of the father was more important than his education. Unemployed youth also frequently came from families with many children, a factor which also correlates in part with social stratification. There are no statistical data on youth unemployment among children of foreign workers because, among other things, the number of these young people who are old enough to work is still relatively small.

Education and qualifications. As youth unemployment in the Federal Republic increased, it became clear that formal qualifications in the case of school graduates (the best grades on examinations or the best certificates) were an essential prerequisite for getting a job—at least for getting a job corresponding to the individual's ambitions and formal qualifications. For those who had completed vocational training, formal qualifications were less important than experience gained and the type and place of training (such as size of firm, occupation of training, and so on). Of course, young people who had completed training in an occupation that was negatively affected by cyclical developments were often unemployed in spite of good qualifications in their field. Youth who had completed intensive training programs that were particularly relevant for their trades were also rejected by firms more frequently than before. If the firm had no demand for junior staff, even the best qualifications were useless. Both of these groups—those who were formally qualified school graduates and those who had completed vocational training—entered into intense competition to oust those youth who had neither of these qualifications. Finally, it became apparent that those who were only 15 to 17 years of age were at a disadvantage, especially in areas with high unemployment, because they were less mobile than older workers.

The structural profile of unemployed youth was characterized most decisively by their previous education. Those who had not completed vocational training had an unemployment rate of 7.3 percent, compared with only 3.4 percent for those who had completed such training. Two-thirds of the unemployed youths under 20 either had no vocational training or had interrupted it, whereas only 25 percent of employed youths in this age group had not completed vocational education (Table 17). About one-third of the unemployed youths had not even graduated from basic school. Among those who were 15 years of age, 70 percent had not graduated from school, whereas among the 19-year-olds 16 percent had not graduated. The reason for this enormous statistical difference is not that the percentage of younger age groups leaving basic school without graduating has increased significantly; rather, 15-year-olds rely exclusively on their school certificates for evidence of qualifications when they apply for a job, whereas 19-year-olds have usually worked before and depend more on evidence of former work experience.

As we have seen, the proportion of unemployed youths who had interrupted their training was relatively high. Schober-Gottwald (1977) observes that girls break off their training more rarely than boys and that for both sexes cyclical developments play a significant role. "In conclusion," she states,

Table 17. Unemployed Germans under 20 who had been employed before their unemployment and employed Germans under 20 by vocational training status, September 1974

Employment and status and age	*Total*	*Without vocational training*	*With interrupted vocational training*	*With completed vocational training*
Unemployed youths under 20	100.0%	46.3	24.2	29.5
Employed youths 14 to 20	100.0%	7	17	76
Total unemployed (all ages)	100.0%	49		51

Source: Federal Labor Institute.

> those youths who broke off their training immediately before unemployment were already affected by the beginning of the recession—although only a few of them gave reasons relating to the industrial and economic situation for the termination of their training. This becomes apparent, because these youths were trained in vocations and fields that are particularly susceptible to cyclical developments, and mostly in smaller firms, and because most of them were not in those vocations that traditionally have a high rate of interruption of training. This group of unemployed youths who have interrupted their training in turn represents a selection according to qualification criteria—compared with unemployed graduates—because a large percentage of them have not graduated from basic school. However, for this group . . . the training program was discontinued a long time after the trial period, in other words, the aptitude for vocational training was absolutely evident.

Thus, it is not so much personal qualifications and motivation as the general economic situation that is to be held responsible for the interruption of training. This argument is also supported by the fact that many of those who broke off their training were in regions with high unemployment.

About half of the unemployed youths who had completed their training had received it in small firms, that is, in firms that could not keep them on because the employment of even one youth might be too costly. About 45 percent of these youths had received their training in commerce and 20 percent in service sectors. Clearly training contracts with small firms provide fewer opportunities for employment later on.

Compared with the total number of training positions, there have been a few especially hard-hit occupations represented among unemployed youth with completed vocational training: salesmen, office clerks, commercial clerks, medical and dental assistants, construction-related trades, and printing trades (Figure 2). This concentration in certain occupations, however, is less evident than is often suggested in public dis-

Figure 2. Percentage of unemployed completers of vocational training, 1974,[a] and of outstanding certificates of completion in the dual system, 1974, by occupation group of training[b]



[a] Does not include foreigners.

[b] Includes 67 percent of all unemployed completers of vocational training and 39 percent of outstanding certificates of completion in the dual system.

cussions; in particular, a surplus of what are often called "fashionable vocations," for example, truck mechanics, electrical engineers, and certain office jobs could not be recognized distinctly, at least not in 1974.

Former employment and length of unemployment. About 80 percent of unemployed youths under 20 had been employed before, but quite naturally this tendency varied directly with age. Whereas about 40 percent of those under 18 had not held a job before, only about 5 percent of the 18- and 19-year-olds had not been employed. Large proportions of unemployed youths had been employed in manufacturing, as well as in commerce and in construction. They were likely to have been employed in labor-intensive activities, as they often function as apprentices in such work. In addition, 42 percent of the unemployed youths had been employed less than six months in their former job, compared with only 18 percent of all unemployed. And about 40 percent of unemployed youths had previously worked in small firms, in contrast with only 27 percent of all unemployed. Thus, not only with respect to training but also with respect to previous employment, small firms represent a relative risk for youth.

Unemployed youth who have not completed vocational training but have been employed show a relatively high concentration in certain occupations, such as auxiliary workers, warehouse workers, and unskilled metal workers. As to length of unemployment, about 66 percent of the unemployed youths had been out of work less than three months in September 1975, compared with only 42 percent of all unemployed. For those under age 18, the average duration of unemployment was even less than for the 18- and 19-year-olds. As already suggested, this must have to do with the fact that school graduates usually go through a period of unemployment that is relatively short while looking for their first job. Another reason may be found in the training programs provided for youthful unemployed persons, which attract more and more youth back into training, rather than permitting them to be registered as unemployed any longer. Moreover, the duration of unemployment tends to vary inversely with educational attainment: in 1974, 31 percent of those who had graduated from upper-secondary schools were unemployed less than one month.

In conclusion, the structure of youth unemployment clearly shows the process of selection at work. However, it is doubtful that this can be called an "achievement selection" in each individual case. Naturally, one could make a general statement that the more able and diligent youth tend to be put on the right "school track" when they are 10 years old. It is probably also true that the more intelligent and diligent youth will as a rule finish their training and secure for themselves a better vantage point in the struggle for jobs. Finally, it is also true that particularly competent youth are more likely than less qualified ones to be kept on after training, even if there is a lack of need for junior staff.

However, youth unemployment shows certain structural characteristics that can hardly be influenced by the individual. In view of the shortage of training positions, the choice of regional location or of a small firm for training can no longer really be controlled by youth. Finally, training in trades that were particularly hard hit by the cyclical depression is accepted by youth only when other training opportunities are not available. In addition, youth with little experience are usually working in labor-intensive fields, which in turn are under particular efficiency pressures. Moreover, youth are protected by special provisions of the labor law, and their obligation to attend vocational school part time reflects both educational and social policy. Finally, there is greater job protection for older employees, which often leads employers and shop committees to dismiss younger workers or to solve economic problems by temporary stoppages of work rather than dismissals. Certainly none of these factors can be attributed to individual youth, nor are youth responsible for inadequate vocational training if there is a shortage of training positions or if there are inadequate connections between education and vocational training. Data compiled by the Federal Labor Institute also show that occupational counseling, to which every youth is entitled, as we shall see later, had benefited only about one-tenth of employed youths who lacked vocational training. These facts must be taken into consideration before accepting global judgments questioning the personal qualifications and motivation of unemployed youth.

Causes of Youth Unemployment

The fact that youth unemployment in the Federal Republic was scarcely a problem until 1974 indicates the influence of general economic developments on job opportunities for youth. Young people, of course, have advantages and disadvantages in the labor market. Their lack of experience lessens their employment opportunities in a period of low economic growth; however, they are often considered physically more productive, more mobile (because they are often not married), and more adaptable than older workers. In a period of high unemployment, it is especially important to recognize these specific advantages and disadvantages of youth, because a successful struggle against youth unemployment is possible only if these characteristics are taken into consideration. The correct and most efficient method of fighting youth unemployment, however, is a policy which aims at the restoration of full employment. Before getting into policy issues, though, it is necessary to consider certain factors which play a special role in youth unemployment.

Official unemployment statistics, as we have seen, do not include young people who are in school or in vocational training or are looking for a training position. Moreover, in recent years the enrollment rates of young people in schools and universities have significantly increased. This has been a factor relieving the labor market in general and the job market for youth in particular.

In view of the direct relations between the training system and the labor market, the number of unemployed youths must necessarily increase if the number of training positions is insufficient. In this sense, the growing scarcity of training positions and student places—especially in vocational training but also as a result of restrictive quotas on university enrollment—have intensified the youth unemployment problem.

Training positions for vocational education. The so-called *dual system,* in which the youth (or their parents) enter into a contract with the training firm, has been traditional in Germany and was continued after World War II. For a large proportion of young people (about 45 percent of those 15 to 18), this training comprises the "upper-secondary level." The youth receive compensation from the firm, and the apprenticeship usually lasts for three years. They are obliged at the same time to attend public vocational school for 6 to 12 hours a week (depending on the state).

When training positions in industry become scarce, the danger of youth unemployment is increased. Table 18 shows that the supply of training positions has fluctuated to a certain extent with cyclical developments. This fact, however, does not explain the downward trend in the number of training positions from 1967 to 1975. Other causes have been more significant in this respect. To understand these causes, the threefold function

Table 18. Training places and economic fluctuations, 1950 to 1976 (numbers in thousands)

Year	*Training places*	*Percentage change since previous listed year*	*Percentage change in Gross National Product since previous listed year (1970 prices)*
1950	977		
1955	1,432	46.6	
1960	1,198	-16.4	
1965	1,220	1.8	5.5
1966	1,246	2.1	2.5
1967	1,263	1.3	-0.1
1968	1,249	-1.1	6.5
1969	1,149	-8.0	7.9
1970	1,145	-0.4	5.9
1971	1,134	-1.0	3.3
1972	1,154	1.7	3.6
1973	1,159	0.4	4.9
1974	1,150	1.0	0.4
1975	1,138	-0.7	-2.5
1976	1,121	-1.5	5.7

Note: The total number of training places for most training occupations includes three to three-and-one-half training years, so that a smoothing of annual fluctuations results. Only those training relationships that are supervised by the Federal Labor Office are included.

Source: Bundesministerium fur Bildung and Wissenschaft (Federal Ministry for Education and Science); and *Statistisches Bundesamt* (Federal Statistical Office).

of the dual system must be recognized: the activity of the apprentice is at the same time (1) training (in the interest of the apprentice), (2) development of junior staff (in the interest of the firm), and (3) provision of additional income for the young person (in the interest of the apprentice and the parents). In addition, the apprentice represents cheap labor, even within regular training, insofar as his training involves activities that yield products or services sold by the firm at normal prices.

The dual system is training geared to educating youth for a practical vocation while providing the necessary theoretical foundations, either in the firm or in vocational school. A certificate of qualification is issued based on a final examination, which represents the foundation for the later occupational career. Usually the firm profits from the productive labor of the apprentice. In fact, if the firm has taken on more apprentices than it needs for its own junior staff, the compensation and training costs cannot be justified economically unless the firm at the same time profits from the labor of the apprentice.

Since 1950, the supply of apprenticeships has usually been larger than the demand. Table 19 shows how these relationships changed from 1973 to 1976. Even when the supply has been larger than the demand, however, this has not meant that all

Table 19. Changes in supply and demand for training positions in firms, 1973 to 1977 (numbers in thousands)

Supply and demand	*1973*	*1974*	*1975*	*1976*	*1977*
Supply	552	480	481	514	
Percentage change from previous year		-13.0	0.1	6.9	
Demand	466	471	486	523	557[a]
Percentage change from previous year		1.2	3.1	7.6	6.5[a]
Excess (+) or deficiency (-) of supply compared with demand	+18.4	+1.7	-1.1	-1.8	

[a] Estimate

Source: 1973–76 Vocational Training Report (*Berufsbildungsbericht*, 1977).

youths who did not attend a full-time school at the upper-secondary level would undergo apprenticeship training. On the contrary, there have always been a number of "young workers," that is, youth without training who have entered the labor market as unskilled workers at 15 to 16 years of age. The number of these young workers significantly declined from 1960 on, but the increasing shortage of apprenticeships in recent years has been accompanied by an increase in the percentage of young workers without training.

In the past, the enormous surplus of apprenticeships enabled youth to reject training offers that did not correspond to their interests, that they did not consider promising for their careers, or when they disliked the employer or the economic conditions seemed unsatisfying. But even when there was a general surplus of training positions, the supply was not balanced regionally or between city and country. Thus, the surplus of apprenticeships did not mean a sufficient supply for all youth; in rural areas and in small towns, youth were often compelled to choose from a very narrow supply if they wanted to be apprenticed and to continue living with their parents. Thus, their vocational careers were prematurely restricted by regional economic conditions.

The reasons for the decline in training positions are manifold. President Stingl of the Federal Labor Institute has recently pointed out the possibility that today the economy in general can manage with a lower level of training for an increasing number of employees due to automation, but this thesis cannot be proven. The employment market is still looking for skilled workers with qualified training, while unemployment of less qualified workers is on the increase. But the training requirements do not always coincide with the former vocational training. In this respect, the balance between supply and demand is extremely unsatisfactory. More important in explaining the decrease in training positions is the fact that the economy, and especially manufacturing, is expecting only minimal growth, which can essentially be handled by more economical use of labor and technical progress. Thus an expansion of personnel in enterprises is not anticipated, as a rule (Table 20).

Table 20. A survey of enterprises relating to the expected development of their employment structure in the medium-term future

Type of worker	*Expecting an increase*	*Expecting number to hold constant*	*Expecting a decrease*
Total	11.6%	76.8%	11.6%
Women	8.6	82.8	8.5
Part-time workers	5.3	77.1	17.5
Foreigners	5.5	73.0	21.5
Older workers (over 50 years of age)	8.3	73.6	18.0
Young workers (under 20 years of age)	14.0	80.8	5.1
Apprentices	17.5	76.6	5.8
Managerial employees	7.1	88.1	4.8
Skilled workers	24.8	64.3	5.6
Administrative positions	8.0	72.0	20.0
Research positions	16.8	80.0	3.1

Source: IFO–*Institut Schnelldienst*. November 8, 1977, June 28, 1977.

The thesis that educational policy decisions have contributed to the scarcity of training positions is definitely provable. However, it would be a mistake to stamp these decisions, on the whole, as erroneous. Assuming that training under the dual system does include the motivation of cheap labor on the part of the employer, it is obvious that every stiffening of training regulations and every improvement in the protection of youth against possible exploitation by the employer must lead to increased training costs and to the elimination of inadequate training positions.

Discussion of the quality of vocational training in the 1960s induced a number of state governments to look into the matter. The results of these investigations were at times horrifying; they revealed an enormous number of training positions that corresponded in no way to the demands for a sound foundation of vocational training. The resulting Vocational Training Law of 1969, passed by the Great Coalition of political parties, raised the legal standards for the quality of vocational training, systematically strengthened the rights of apprentices in the firms and undoubtedly made training more difficult, more expensive, and occasionally more troublesome and irritating for the firms.

While the economic costs per training position were certainly increased in this way (making it less profitable for firms to offer training positions), there were at the same time two additional developments that negatively affected the supply of training positions. Scientific developments made it necessary for an increasing part of education to be transferred to the theoretical level, and this also reduced the usefulness of apprentices for profitable business activities. It was also necessary to increase the percentage of general curriculum hours—for sports, social studies, and so on—in order to provide for youth opportunities that were comparable with those of young people continuing in secondary schools. Finally, the compensation for apprentices increased disproportionately. This also contributed significantly to the rise in the cost of vocational training for the firms (Table 21).

The inevitable consequence of all of these tendencies was a decline in the number of training positions, a result that insightful experts, by the way, not only predicted but considered

Table 21. The increase in the compensation of apprentices in comparison with earnings of skilled workers and costs for apprentices' subsistence, 1971 to 1977 (1971 = 100)

Expenditure item	*1971*	*1972*	*1973*	*1974*	*1975*	*1976*	*1977*
Compensation for first-year apprentices	100	117	140	170	185	200	213
Compensation for apprentices, average, first to fourth year	100	115	130	160	170	180	197
Compensation for fourth-year apprentices	100	112	125	150	160	170	181
Earnings of skilled workers—certificate holders	100	108	116	130	140	150	160
Costs for apprentices' subsistence	100	106	110	120	135	140	151

Source: Handelsbich, July 8/9, 1977.

necessary and unavoidable as early as 1969, during the debates over vocational education reforms. It was the goal of all parties concerned with those reforms to eliminate training positions that were qualitatively unsatisfactory, if necessary through compulsory standards and related controls. Their rationale was that it is not necessarily in the interest of vocational education to create new training positions of doubtful quality under the impetus of youth unemployment. However, in the absence of labor market alternatives, a poor training position may be better than none. In times of need, "the devil eats flies," as the saying goes.

The discussion about the decline of training positions has become one concerning the "guilt" of the state, of educational reforms, and of trade unions and employers. This is nonsensical, for the requirements of qualified training have increased with the progress of science and technology. Traditionally, however, a significant number of training positions have been supplied by smaller trade and craft firms, which often admit being unable to provide the theoretical and technical breadth of future-oriented training. Higher training costs for expanded training are a necessary consequence. Undoubtedly there have been excessive demands for more rigid standards as well as decisions that went beyond practical and necessary changes. These demands and decisions may have eliminated a training position here and there that might still exist otherwise. But this would not affect the general tendency, and the overall supply of training positions was certainly not influenced by such misjudgments.

The decline in training positions was not primarily caused, as representatives of business often mistakenly maintain, by irritation of employers over public discussions of "exploitation of apprentices" by "capitalist" firms. The critical debate, especially in the 1960s, was not primarily concerned with the training system in general or with abuses in firms but with the quality of training and with the necessity of finding new organizational forms (for example, training institutes outside of the firm) to ensure this quality. These new organizational forms necessarily meant increasing costs and greater hardship for the individual firm.

Thus, the rational background for the decline in training positions lay in the raising of standards on the one hand, and in the controls associated with legally intensified requirements, the increasing costs resulting from these higher standards, and the rapidly rising compensation for apprentices on the other hand. Moreover, especially after 1973, there was a gradual decrease in the need for trained junior staff because the need for workers in the industrial sector was generally declining. This was also true in certain service sectors (trade, banks, and so forth), which in the past had provided an important share of the training positions. In these areas, technological progress and its resulting structural changes (such as supermarkets and computerized accounting) have caused an enormous decrease in the number of jobs and, as a result, in the need for trained junior staff.

Table 18 shows that the decline in training positions began about 1967 and accelerated after 1968. Because of full employment and the great surplus of training positions that had existed, this development went essentially unnoticed by the authorities. In this connection, the fact that responsibility for vocational training generally did not rest with departments of education and culture but with departments of commerce or labor—at the federal and state levels—was significant. Only after the combining of jurisdictional responsibility in 1972–73 was it possible to gain an overview of developments; by then, however, it was rather late to take the appropriate measures.

As the scarcity of training positions became more and more clear, the debate turned from the quality of training positions to the new question of how an adequate supply of positions could be secured. In view of rising costs, the question of who was carrying the financial burden of training in the economy had to be asked. A commission appointed by the federal government (the Edding Commission) concluded that a relatively small number of firms (about one-sixth) finance all of the industrial training. A significant number of trainees, particularly in crafts, train in small firms and then go to work for larger industrial firms. The result is that important sectors of the economy share inadequately in the training costs. This occurs in spite of the fact that training costs play an increasing role in the provision of training positions. For this reason, the commission concluded that there should be a general levy on all firms to provide funds to finance training positions in those firms that were prepared to conduct training. These proposals were highly controversial economically and politically. The demand for apportioned financing was rejected on the ground that it would mean a further increase in training costs for all firms and thus a further decrease rather than an increase in the supply of training positions. The federal government tried to settle the question in 1975 by proposing legislation providing that if, in the previous year, the supply of apprenticeships exceeded the demand by less than 12.5 percent, a levy would be imposed on all firms that were not training and were of a certain minimum size. The bill did not pass. The details of the actual measures taken will be discussed later in connection with the struggle against youth unemployment.

Another critical factor was the insufficient number of training positions outside of firms. Those trades that require increasingly theoretical and technical knowledge that cannot be supplied by individual firms must be provided with training institutions outside of firms for various industries and regions. Such training positions are expensive, however, and cannot be financed by smaller firms. Therefore it became necessary to close this critical gap, which indirectly had contributed to the decline in training positions, through public subsidies.

Today, there is no doubt that there is a shortage of training positions. The significance of this for youth unemployment, however, is doubtful. The statistical data for September 1976 record only 5,834 applicants for training positions in firms, a number that corresponds to 6 percent of unemployed youths under 20. If the figure is compared with all unemployed youths 15 to 24, it amounts to less than 3 percent. Thus, from a statistical point of view, the scarcity of training positions seems to be of minor importance for youth unemployment. Moreover, there was no change in the situation between 1975 and 1976. The theory that the shortage of training positions does not play a very great role in explaining youth unemployment is corroborated by the fact that there are many training positions in business that are not filled. It was reported, for example, that in the fall of 1977 every fifth training position in the construction industry was not filled. This alone would amount to about 5,000 training positions. Further, a significant number of training positions for hairdressers, restaurant workers, retail clerks, and butchers and bakers were left open. Precise statistics on the overall situation are not available, because only a portion of the training positions are obtained through the labor office.

For the individual youth it may be better to obtain any training position, even if it is qualitatively inadequate and in an occupation that is unpromising in relation to future employment, then none at all. At the level of the national economy, however, the provision of such training—and the costly consequences of a possible need for later retraining—is problematical. Furthermore, young people do not always feel that any training position is better than none; in the construction sector, in which many people lost their jobs in the economic crisis of 1974–75, youth are found to reject training positions because of the insecurity of future employment. However, the willingness to accept a training position is influenced not only by future opportunities and conditions of training, but also by such factors as regular working hours, free weekends, and cleanliness and prestige of the activity. This is why, for example, youth dislike training positions in the restaurant business, where they have to work evenings and weekends.

In weighing the significance of the shortage of training positions for youth unemployment, we must counter the statistical situation and the existence of unfilled training positions with the existence of concealed youth unemployment. There is certainly a significant number of youths who could not obtain a training position but did not register as unemployed because they could expect neither a training position nor unemployment benefits. On the whole, therefore, the scarcity of training positions is an important factor in youth unemployment. Moreover, a narrow balance between supply and demand for training positions cannot be considered sufficient because of regional variations and differing vocational interests of young people. A significant surplus of training positions is needed if all those who are seeking training positions are actually to find them.

Openings in full-time secondary schools. The three-level school system which forces 10-year-old children to decide on future schooling after the fourth grade has, as we have seen, had the effect of expanding enrollment in the *Gymnasium*. In 1967, there were about 63,000 graduates from the *Gymnasien* (*Abiturienten*). By 1976, this number had doubled, with 127,000 graduates reported. If this number is compared with the graduates of basic schools, the shift becomes obvious. In 1967 there were 462,000 graduates of basic schools and in 1976 only 425,000. A forecast for 1985 estimates 190,000 graduates of *Gymnasien* and only 366,000 from basic schools. In spite of the growth of enrollment in *Gymnasien*, there was practically no change in the student-teacher ratio because of a significant expansion of the teaching staff—the student-teacher ratio remained about 19 to 1. There was however, a slight increase in the number of students per class (from about 29 in 1967 to 30.5 in 1976), because the compulsory hours of teachers were reduced. Moreover, in the years from 1967 to 1975, public expenditures per student at the *Gymnasien* doubled, increasing from 2,000 to 4,070 DM. This means that for educational facilities in the *Gymnasien*, there is considerable pressure but no critical problem that would lead to rejection of youth. The increasing cohorts, however, in the coming years, could mean difficulties, as we shall see later.

Vocational schools, in contrast, which must be attended by youths 15 to 18 who do not go to full-time schools, are seriously deficient in both teachers and facilities. This, however, does not entail shortages of training places in these schools. The deficiencies are qualitative rather than quantitative. The deficiencies do not cause unemployment except indirectly, when the youth later enter the labor market and lack the necessary qualifications.

In contrast, the lack of vocational/technical schools at the upper-secondary level is definitely a cause of youth unemployment. The expansion of this type of school was provided for in the joint educational plan, and today about 300,000 youths are enrolled in these schools. There is an unsatisfied demand in this field, however, which cannot be quantified. Without doubt, the expansion of technical schools can contribute to the elimination of youth unemployment.

Enrollment quotas at universities. Youth unemployment is also intensified because universities are unable to admit all secondary school graduates who want to enter. In recent years, more and more fields have introduced the *numerus clausus*—that is, an absolute limit on the number of new students admitted per academic year or per semester. Considering the expansion of enrollment in the *Gymnasien,* the demands with which universities have had to cope in recent years become obvious. Expansion of the universities was the only way in which the growing percentage of youths who wanted to enter could be accommodated. The number of German first-year students rose from 91,000 in 1967 to 160,000 in 1976. The total number of German students enrolled increased from 392,000 to 840,000, on an annual average basis, in the same period, more than doubling. Added to this are about 8 percent who are foreign students. The increase in enrollment from 1960 to 1976 is indicated in Table 22.

While the enrollment increases in the *Gymnasien* could be more or less absorbed through construction and additions to

Table 22. Number of enrolled students and of academic personnel in universities, 1960 to 1976 (numbers in thousands)

Year	*Total students*	*First-time students*	*Academic personnel*
1960	291.0	79.4	19.3
1970	510.5	125.7	53.8
1971	587.4	143.5	64.4
1972	625.5	155.5	70.5
1973	714.2	164.7	74.5
1974	772.5	168.3	77.9
1975	815.4	166.6	78.3
1976	877.3	168.1	77.5

Source: Bundesministerium für Bildung und Wissenschaft (Federal Ministry for Education and Science), *Basic and Structural Data* (provided by the Academic Council).

teaching personnel, this was not possible in the case of the universities. Although total expenditures for the university sector increased from 4 billion DM in 1967 to about 14 billion DM in 1976 and academic personnel doubled, the *numerus clausus* was introduced in many fields, and the waiting periods for entry into universities became much longer (Table 23).

The rush to the universities is often considered to be the result of the educational reforms, which stressed equality of opportunity, a better general education for all, and longer compulsory education. This interpretation stresses the point that, because admittance to universities was not to be essentially limited to those whose parents were graduates of the *Gymnasium* and because graduation from the *Gymnasium* was not to remain the only means of access to the universities, public attitudes tended to overestimate the value of academic and professional careers, and this caused the rush to the universities. We have earlier shown, however, that an educational system which compels the parents of 10-year-olds to make crucial long-run educational decisions will necessarily result in overvaluation of academic studies. This is simply because parents and children

Table 23. Data indicating increasing problems in access to universities, 1973–74 to 1975–76

A. Rise in average grades of *Abitur* holders for admission according to performance, by field of study

Year	*Total*	*Medicine*	*Dentistry*	*Biology*	*Pharmacy*	*Psychology*	*Nutrition*
1973–74	13.8	1.9	2.1	2.7	1.7	2.3	3.1
1974–75	12.4	1.7	1.8	2.4	2.0	2.1	2.4
1975–76	11.3	1.6	1.6	2.3	1.9	2.0	1.9

B. Rise in waiting period (in years) for admission according to waiting period, by field of study

Year	*Total*	*Medicine*	*Dentistry*	*Biology*	*Pharmacy*	*Psychology*	*Nutrition*
1973–74	19	4	4	1	5	4	1
1974–75	22	4	5	2	5	4	2
1975–76	25	5	5	2	6	4	3

Source:

will try to choose the best opportunities as long as the real chances of the individual child cannot be predicted. If the best opportunities are chosen for 10-year-olds, there will always be an opportunity to shift to less favorable options later; but if less favorable options are chosen in the first place, the best opportunity can be regained only with extreme difficulty and in exceptional cases.

The current explosion of enrollments in the *Gymnasien* and the universities was statistically foreshadowed in school transitions nine years ago—that is, before the beginning of the educational reforms of 1969–70. The explosion was caused by the three-level school system itself, the reform of which is often opposed by adherents of the traditional system, who at the same time complain about the crowding of the universities.

The waiting period before entering the universities, caused by the maladjustment between the capacity of the universities and the demand for enrollment, is an additional contribution to youth unemployment. This is likely to intensify, since new university regulations will remove the possibility of the so-called parking studies. Today, for example, applicants for medical school enroll in different departments, such as biology, for a considerable period of time without any intention of completing study in that field. This in turn caused these departments to introduce a *numerus clausus,* which in terms of students' actual choice of profession would be unnecessary. These "parking studies" are to be made more difficult by limiting second fields of study.

It is hard to quantify the impact of the *numerus clausus* on youth unemployment. Graduates of secondary schools who are waiting to be admitted to a university or have given up hope of admittance usually have superior opportunities to gain a training position or a job in a private firm. In this way, they displace less qualified youths from basic schools and do not appear themselves as a signficant factor in youth unemployment statistics. Indirectly, they are probably an important factor.

Clearly, questions of capacity in the educational realm represent essential elements in the youth unemployment problem. Even though there are unused capacities—both in vocational training positions in firms and in some fields within universities—questions must be raised about the goals of the training or education and the future need for qualifications so acquired. Moreover, the problem of educational capacities has an impact not only on youth unemployment but also on the goal of a more equitable distribution of educational opportunities. The three-level school system, which corresponded traditionally to the social class structure of the nineteenth century, is as such opposed to equality of opportunity. Parents of socially disadvantaged classes are not equally able as parents of more advantaged classes to bring their children up to a level of education at age 10 which will guarantee the transition to the *Gymnasium*. More important, however, is the fact that the growing selection pressures in the schools demand sacrifices and support from parents which often cannot be given, especially when both parents do not have an educational background themselves and also when both may be working.

In recent years, the opening up of the *Gymnasium* has been successful, in spite of the inadequacies of the three-level school system, in raising the percentage of children from working-class families among students in secondary schools and at the universities (Tables 24 and 25). In view of the capacity problems at the universities, however, the process of selection at the point of transition from primary school to the *Gymnasium* (fourth or fifth school year) has again developed adversely for the children from less well-off socioeconomic groups. The same is true for the intensified selection in the secondary schools themselves, which makes it unlikely that the percentage of working-class children with improved educational opportunities will rise in the coming years.

In addition, youth with better certificates are beginning to compete in the classical areas of vocational training. Those who are refused admission to the university, or are waiting for it and want to undergo vocational training in the meantime, can obtain a training position much more easily with the *Abitur* than can a graduate from basic school. This process of social displace-

Table 24. Social origins of *Gymnasium* students, 1965[a]

Social origin (occupation of father)	*Students* *10th school year*	*Students* *13th school year*	*Male employed workers over 40 years of age*[b]
Number	100,488	52,826	7,893,000
Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0
Officials	25.1	27.6	8.7
Salaried employees	33.6	32.0	21.9
Workers	10.0	6.4	45.2
Self-employed	20.5	18.3	22.5
Free of occupation	9.0	12.4	1.7[c]
Without an occupation or occupation not reported	1.8	3.3	
Percent having graduated from universities	22.4	30.1	

[a] These data result from individual questionnaires administered to over 150,000 pupils in public and private *Gymnasien*, May 15, 1965.

[b] *Mikrocensus* of April 1966 (not including members of the armed forces). The German *Mikrocensus* is a periodic household sample survey.

[c] Unpaid familiy workers.

Source: Federal Statistical Office.

ment reinforces the social structure of unemployment already described.

A sufficient supply of educational and training capacities, geared to the changing occupational structure of demand, and the readiness of youth to take up these training places are decisive prerequisites for the reduction of youth unemployment.

Qualifications. The Federal Republic is characterized by shortages of qualified workers on the one hand, and a renewed rise in the total number of unemployed in 1977 on the other. These conflicting tendencies often suggest that raising the general level of educational attainment would reduce unemployment. Undoubtedly, this is appropriate for the individual case. Possibly improved all-round qualifications would also increase the total number of jobs available in some fields. However, raising qualifications generally as a means of achieving a comprehensive solution to the unemployment problem in general,

Table 25. Social origins of university students, 1954 to 1971–72

Social origin (occupation of father)	*Total students*		*First-time students*		*Male employed workers over 40 years of age*
	1954	*1966*	*1967–68*	*1971–72*	
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Officials	34.7	30.9	26.6	24.5	8.7
Salaried employees	23.7	31.7	32.5	34.5	21.9
Self employed	33.6	29.5	31.4	26.7	22.5
Agricultural	4.6	2.8	3.0	3.6	
Workers	4.9	5.7	7.6	11.7	45.2
Occupation not reported	0.4	2.2	1.0	2.1	1.7

Source: Federal Statistical Office.

and youth unemployment in particular, seems doubtful. The fact that the less qualified workers have a higher share in unemployment reflects not only the need for more qualified workers but also the competition for jobs, which will inevitably be present as long as the total demand for labor does not increase substantially.

Because youth with a lower level of education tend to experience a higher share of unemployment, discussions revolve again and again on the need for a general improvement in vocational education as a means of eliminating youth unemployment. This, too, must be discussed with great caution. The question of qualifications is not identical with the problem of the supply of training positions. A sufficient supply of training positions, which would also be taken up by youth, would necessarily absorb a number of unemployed youths and thus reduce the youth unemployment rate. But the question of the role of the insufficient qualifications in explaining youth unemployment raises the issue of how far improved education for youth would result in higher demand for youth in the labor market. The structural description of youth unemployment has shown that the unemployment rate for dropouts is higher than for graduates who have not completed vocational training; that those who have completed vocational training have better chances of employment; and that university graduates have significantly better opportunities for employment than youth in general.

However, as a result of competition, in each case the less educated and less qualified is replaced by those with superior qualifications in periods of an insufficient total demand for labor. Graduation from basic school used to mean an advantage in job seeking over dropouts; now the intermediate certificate or even the *Abitur* has become an important aid in the struggle for the limited supply of vocational training positions. True, the balance between demand and supply in the labor market can only be achieved if certain qualifications can be supplied in larger amounts. There is a demand for technical labor that cannot be satisfied today. However, it is not only technical qualifications but also personality and the readiness and willingness to work that will play an essential role in satisfying this demand. These characteristics are not necessarily related to formal qualifications.

Improved qualifications will help the individual, but the improvement of the level of qualifications as a whole will not necessarily reduce unemployment. Good general education and realistic training are essential for international competitiveness of the economy as well as for competitiveness of the individual. They are, however, no guarantee against increasing unemployment in world economic crises, in periods of rapid national structural changes, and in periods of a general and structural recession in the demand for labor.

A few words must be added about the problem of relations between supply and demand in vocational training. Hofbauer and Kraft (1974) found enormous changes in occupations for vocational trainees or persons who had completed training. About half of the trainees had changed the place of training after the first year of training; and about 40 percent of workers who were asked in 1974 about their past vocational careers had changed their field of work. The percentages of changes in industry were especially high and were lower in trade.

It may be concluded that improving educational and training attainments all along the line would be no guarantee against youth unemployment if the qualifications attained were not in harmony with the changing occupational structure or if the overall demand for labor did not correspond to the supply. Certainly, those who have already undergone one type of training are usually more apt in retraining, but caution is needed in accepting the idea that youth unemployment can be solved by raising qualifications alone.

Juvenile law and labor cost. We have already noted that special protections for youth in labor law are partially responsible for the reluctance of employers to hire youth, and thus these protections contribute to youth unemployment. The current Youth Protection Labor Law, which had remained practically unchanged since 1960, was revised May 1, 1976. This law must be viewed in relation to other laws which also have special provisions for youth, such as the Works Constitution Law (1972) and the Labor Security Law.

The Youth Protection Labor Law applies to employees under 18 years of age and now covers young civil servants for the first time. It provides that the minimum age for employment must be 15 instead of the former 14 years. It lengthens the annual vacation minimum, limits hours of work to 40 hours per week (formerly 44 hours generally for youths over 16 and 48 hours in family work and agriculture). Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays are free as a matter of principle. Work may not begin before 7 o'clock in the morning (previously 6), and exceptions are allowed only for purposes of vocational training. A shift may not exceed 10 hours, or 11 hours in the restaurant business. The former prohibition against piecework will be expanded. In addition, annual health examinations are mandatory. Penalties against employers who violate the law were made more severe.

During the debates over this law, controversies arose over the impact of stricter protective measures in certain economic sectors and especially on the supply of training positions. For example, in the restaurant business, the originally proposed provision, which absolutely prohibited work on weekends and holidays, appeared likely to reduce the number of training positions in this field even more. The law was, therefore, at first rejected by the Federal Council and was passed only after mediation proceedings which classified the restaurant industry under exceptional rules which provide that youth who are compelled to work on weekends and holidays (even when in training) get a weekday off in exchange.

The debates over this law made it clear once more that youth protection and employment opportunities are directly related. The discrimination against certain groups in the labor market, which is refelected in relatively high unemployment rates for those groups, is the direct result of the interest of private and public employers in achieving continuous labor performance at the lowest possible cost. Therefore it must be recognized that the particular protections granted to youth, women, and the disabled can lead to discrimination in the search for a job. For the protection of disabled war veterans and of the handicapped, there is a law that obliges private and public employers of a certain minimum size either to employ a certain percentage of disabled within their total employment or to be relieved of this obligation by paying a fee. There are no corresponding requirements for youth or women.

There is no doubt that youths under 18 and women were formerly often employed as particularly cheap labor. The improvement of protective laws, as well as approximation of wages and salaries of youth and women to the wages received by adult men, were socially warranted and inevitable. But economically the higher wages have raised the relative costs of employing youth and the employer can therefore no longer offset the higher costs of protective laws by lower wages. This is especially important for the compensation paid to apprentices. We have seen how this compensation has risen relative to training costs and salaries and wages in general (Table 21).

The extra costs associated with protective laws for youth are not precisely measurable. They include the right and duty of youth to attend vocational school 6 to 12 hours a week, as well as such factors as the prohibition of overtime work and the right to longer vacations. Though not precisely quantifiable, there is no question that these differential costs are higher today than 5 or 10 years ago. Nor can there be doubt that these additional expenses are necessary—not only to guarantee adequate education but also to protect young employees who do not have a chance for a full-time education from premature wear and tear at their jobs. But the consequences must be recognized, in terms of higher costs and youth unemployment. It should not surprise anyone that an analysis of the employment offers in May 1977 indicated that out of 243,000 offered positions, 87,000 required a minimum age. In 36,000 offers, the applicant had to be older than 18, and in 33,000 could not be less than 24 years old.

Job security of adult employees. Just as youth protective laws help to explain youth unemployment, so job security laws have a negative influence on the younger generation in a period of a stagnating labor market. While youth are relatively adaptable and efficient in competition with older employees, they will often not find employment because the older employees enjoy special protections which make it impossible for the employer—either legally or financially—to dismiss older employees in favor of younger competitors. When cutbacks in employment are required, youth are often less protected than older employees who have been with the firm longer. Younger employees are, therefore, the first to be dismissed.

The goals of job security laws, of course, have to be affirmed. Employees who have to support families—especially those over 50, who would hardly be able to find new jobs because of their age—are in need of job security in economically difficult times. Job security is an essential part of social security and an important prerequisite of social stability. And yet it presents an obstacle to youth who are seeking their first jobs. Youth also incur particular risks of dismissal in cutbacks. This is especially true when large cohorts are entering the labor market, as in the 1975–85 period.

Competition between young German employees and foreign workers is a different matter. The discontinuation of labor contracts with foreign workers has resulted in a significant exodus of such workers. The extent to which a further reduction in foreign labor contracts in favor of a sharply increasing indigenous youthful generation is justifiable in social terms, as well as from the point of view of foreign trade and foreign relations, will be discussed more fully later.

4

The Social Consequences of Youth Unemployment

In considering the consequences of youth unemployment, we must distinguish between individual and social aspects. Thus far, only marginal impressions are available with respect to the individual and psychological results. Long-term consequences in particular can be predicted only with difficulty, in view of the fact that the problem was practically nonexistent from the mid-1950s until the beginning of the 1970s.

In public discussions, social consequences are in the foreground. The thesis that youth unemployment causes crime, drug consumption, and alcoholism among youth is widely accepted. Studies show, however, that unemployment in general—and this certainly includes youth unemployment—has serious psychological consequences for the individual and that social consequences are often overestimated. However, these findings must be interpreted cautiously. Intensive investigations of the social consequences of youth unemployment in the Federal Republic have been completed only in recent months; and long-term studies are practically nonexistent because of the long period of full employment.

To begin with, crime rates of youth showed no increase, but rather a general decrease, in the 1970s (Table 26). This was also true for adults. These statistical findings are similar to those resulting from studies in other countries. A summary by

Table 26. Delinquency and crime rates for major groups of offenses and age groups, 1955 to 1975

Major offense group (felonies & misdemeanors)	*Year*	*Criminally liable*	*Juveniles*	*Adolescents*	*Young adults*	*Adults*
Offenses against the state and public order	1955	54.1	17.8	91.7	141.3	47.6
	1960	49.9	28.3	98.1	119.3	40.1
	1965	40.8	20.0	84.8	104.7	33.8
	1970	33.6	24.6	81.6	95.3	26.6
	1975	31.0	23.2	69.7	81.2	24.9
Sex offenses	1955	34.2	44.9	48.2	43.5	31.1
	1960	34.0	75.3	63.6	51.6	26.1
	1965	24.8	50.3	49.9	51.1	18.7
	1970	16.4	28.5	30.2	37.0	13.0
	1975	13.9	15.1	29.7	35.6	10.8
Other crimes against persons	1955	135.9	64.8	241.0	321.2	119.5
	1960	140.3	88.7	290.2	324.7	111.9
	1965	113.4	78.3	236.2	265.8	94.7
	1970	103.6	108.1	244.1	250.5	83.3
	1975	105.2	115.7	237.7	236.5	84.4
Theft and embezzlement	1955	224.5	444.8	633.6	604.6	133.4
	1960	223.1	685.6	684.0	551.1	109.4
	1965	203.2	645.5	651.5	509.0	112.3
	1970	290.0	1037.5	850.9	666.2	165.2
	1975	301.7	802.8	771.2	594.5	199.5
Robbery and extortion	1955	3.5	5.0	15.4	13.3	1.5
	1960	4.5	11.8	21.1	13.3	1.5
	1965	4.5	13.1	35.4	14.9	1.6
	1970	6.5	25.9	33.1	19.6	2.2
	1975	9.3	33.9	43.5	30.0	3.0
Traffic violations	1955	555.0	221.6	1130.0	1281.8	484.2
	1960	558.1	270.0	1331.7	1289.6	436.8
	1965	604.3	382.3	1441.7	1594.0	479.8
	1970	644.5	294.9	1548.1	1748.5	532.8
	1975	600.8	331.7	1478.7	1426.3	498.4
Other crimes	1955	323.8	140.9	475.0	636.9	306.3
	1960	316.0	212.0	556.0	645.4	268.7
	1965	243.3	171.4	474.9	575.9	204.0
	1970	251.2	221.2	515.0	653.3	206.6
	1975	281.3	260.0	662.1	736.8	219.5

[a] Data for 1955 and 1960 are for the Federal territory without the Saarland and Berlin; after that they are for the Federal territory. They refer to persons convicted.

Opaschowski (1976) makes it clear that various social groups in the Federal Republic (for example, the Association of German Criminal Investigators and also journalists and judges) write and talk about the consequences of youth unemployment in connection with criminality and drug consumption as though these were matters of fact, whereas the sociological data available hardly support such assertions. In Opaschowski's view, corroborated by earlier studies of Beerman (in Schelsky, 1952), there is a connection between the impulse to form gangs and engage in crime, as well as a higher rate of repeated offenses, and youth unemployment. But he believes that crime leads to youth unemployment rather than the other way around. The majority of members of gangs are economically, socially, and educationally on the lowest rung of the social structure. The result is that juvenile delinquents are particularly susceptible to unemployment. However, this does not lead to the conclusion that the unemployed are susceptible to crime.

> The slipping into a criminal subculture and the danger of brutalization do not exist, because most unemployed youths are not looking for the lifestyle of cliques and subcultures, but are in loneliness and isolation. They feel stigmatized, excluded from work, and without the possibility of securing their existence by working productively. Deviant behavior, such as committing a criminal offense, for example, would push them farther into the role of an outsider and would not strengthen their already damaged self-esteem. For this reason, unemployed youths avoid any kind of conspicuousness; they mix with already existing cliques and groups and conceal their unemployed status. They do not build a counterworld, but on the contrary, try to demonstrate their similarity and equality by overadapting. [Opaschowski, 1976, p.44]

Opaschowski points out that social workers and teachers, in particular, who are directly involved in various field experiences, do not observe tendencies toward criminalization, but rather the opposite development. In a study conducted by the city of Munich (*Münchner Stadtanzeiger*, May 23, 1975) it was found that the juvenile crime rate in the city fell steadily from 1973 on. There was an especially steep decline in 1974 and 1975. Without doubt, there was an increase in youth unemployment in Munich in these years. Even offenses that are associated with youth groups, such as "rock criminality," have decreased by 40 percent in Munich since 1974.

The same results were found in a study conducted in Duisburg-Hamborn over many years, indicating that since 1971 juvenile delinquency cases have continuously decreased while youth unemployment has increased. The statistics show a relationship with economic developments, but the opposite from that expected by journalists, with a low point of juvenile delinquency following the 1967–68 recession and a high point in the boom period of 1971–72. There are a number of explanations for this development: on the one hand there is the "overadaptability" of unemployed youth, and on the other hand the fact that self-control of social groups, families, and relatives increases in times of unemployment.

There are no studies that statistically analyze the proneness of unemployed youth to drug consumption and alcohol. On the basis of information from a few social welfare experiments, however, abuse of drugs and alcohol by unemployed youth cannot be confirmed even after intensive observation. Opaschowski (1976, p. 44) observes: "Unemployed youths show typical, everyday behavior of working youths, which includes two to three glasses of beer. The lower availability of pocket money prevents any kind of escape into alcohol. The youths have a hard time to pay for their daily smoking needs and for a glass of beer at the bar. It is considered absolutely luxurious if a young man is able to buy his 'pearl' a coke."

Evidently the individual psychological consequences of youth unemployment are far reaching. The tendency to withdraw has already been mentioned. Opaschowski reports on studies that show a tendency for unemployed youth to adopt a single-minded orientation toward employment. "This total fixation on money can go so far that the possibility of accepting a temporary job as solicitor for a book club on the next day is preferred to the prospect of a permanent job two or three weeks later" (1976, p. 44).

In Duisburg-Hamborn, an attempt was made by five "street workers" to establish contacts with about 130 unemployed youths between the fall of 1975 and the spring of 1976, with the aim of intensively discussing their situation and at the same time giving them technical help toward reintegration into the labor market. The results showed that the majority of these unemployed youths, probably influenced by the length of their unemployment, assumed a relatively calm and sober attitude. Unemployment was considered a structural problem of society—not a problem of which they themselves were guilty and which they would have to overcome eventually. Their reaction is a certain abstinence from consumption and a retreat to the family, while retaining at the same time a relatively unlimited readiness for work. In contrast, there were smaller groups of especially active, confident unemployed youth at one extreme, and apathetic and resigned youth at the other extreme. These studies, however, cannot yet be generalized.

Results of studies conducted by the German Youth Institute (*Jugendinstitut*) in 1974–75 are similar. Furthermore, they suggest that the self-confidence of unemployed male youth is more gravely affected than that of young women by the lack of training position or a job. Apparently the self-image of women as potential housewives and mothers, who do not work anyway, plays an appeasing role. Thus, while in a period of unemployment, young men strive to adjust by improving work and qualification requirements, and women tend to adapt by reverting to the traditional role of wife and mother. In this way, unemployment among young women reinforces their social dependency, temporarily if not permanently.

Here we must add a word about political radicalism. On the basis of hindsight, we can see that the economic changes that have beome apparent since the oil crisis of 1973 have led, with respect to the political position of youth, toward a consensus with adults. Since 1971–72 there has been evidence of decrease in radicalism at the universities, and there can be no doubt that the pressure to achieve and to qualify for a job resulting from unfavorable labor-market developments has narrowed rather than widened the scope of political activity. This does not mean that youth who submitted to this pressure accept the society that exerts the pressure more than they accepted it in the past. It only means that they see the necessity of giving in to the pressure in order to protect their own opportunities. The state of affairs cannot be judged by the present terrorism of a tiny group of extremely radical and determined persons who are in most cases not youths any more. This terrorism developed in a period when a youth unemployment problem was practically unknown, and apart from its international connections is a product of industrial society which perhaps finds special expression in the Federal Republic. In general, however, an increasing trend toward conformism rather than toward more violent conflicts with existing society can be seen among youth.

Finally, we need to mention briefly the problem of young foreign workers. As we have seen, there are no statistics on unemployment among them. However, the dangers of radicalization under conditions of long-term unemployment, especially for those with language difficulties and social isolation, are obvious. This is particularly relevant where foreign workers live under unfavorable conditions and a geographical concentration of underprivileged persons results. This problem must be observed with great care in the coming years.

In conclusion, there are general social consequences of youth unemployment, but they do not express themselves primarily in increasing crime, drug consumption, or alcoholism; on the contrary, they seem to be characterized by a tendency toward isolation and an attempt to adjust. For a single young individual who undergoes the experience of unemployment at the beginning of his or her career, the consequences can be incalculable. The results of the shattering of self-confidence at an early age, of resignation, and a lack of trust in the entire social system cannot be determined today. The dangers, however, are evident.

The Struggle Against Unemployment

The problem of youth unemployment, as we have seen, is primarily a problem of inadequate demand for labor. Certainly the most successful way to fight it is to restore full employment; this goal, however, has not been achieved in the Federal Republic since 1974. An unemployment rate of over 3 percent would not be considered full employment even on the basis of recently altered criteria and in the face of the obvious problems of regaining full employment. (The measures that are adopted internationally on the basis of different experiences and assumptions are not in agreement on this percentage.)

In the struggle against youth unemployment, measures that would favor youth in the general labor market at the expense of adults are disqualified, even though the youth unemployment problem is considered a particularly difficult social and political burden. Governments, not only of the Federal Republic but also of the Common Market countries and of the most important democratic industrial nations, have emphasized at various conferences (most recently at the London Summit) the youth unemployment problem as a special challenge. And yet it is recognized that there is no social group whose unemployment does not present particular problems. Thus, the unemployment of people over 50, who have to support a family and have only slim chances of regaining an adequate job, is also considered a significant problem. Likewise, the unemployment of a young father 25 to 35 years old is no more bearable in social terms than that of a youth. Again the question of youth unemployment must be seen in the total context and not in isolation. This is not an argument in favor of making light of youth unemployment; naturally, special efforts must be made to combat it. However, since a struggle against youth unemployment waged at the expense of other groups of unemployed can neither be accepted by these groups of workers nor by the unions (a loosening of job security provisions for older workers, for example, is out of the question), specific measures against youth unemployment will have to concentrate primarily on the educational sector in its broadest sense.

Before concentrating on policies against youth unemployment, let us consider briefly the general measures taken in the Federal Republic to restore full employment.

General economic policy. General measures of economic policy have been central in the attempt to restore full employment in the Federal Republic since 1974; labor-market policy measures, in contrast, initially considered quite frequently, have remained politically and financially in the background. The economic measures have been aimed primarily at stimulating private and public investment. In addition, there have been tax measures designed to lower operating costs, as well as general economic measures to increase private and public demand.

In this connection, it must be remembered that an effective stabilization policy was not possible until the decontrol of exchange rates. Up to that time, stability in the Federal Republic had caused speculation in favor of the German mark, which in turn had negative consequences for stability because of the increase in German mark liquidity. In the spring of 1973, after decontrol of exchange rates, the federal government fought increasing inflation with general stabilization measures. The oil crisis changed the underlying data and the entire economic climate radically, in spite of the fact that the export boom of 1974 made full employment possible at first.

In the spring of 1974, when declining demand was noticeable in the Federal Republic (while as yet no dangerous tendency toward unemployment was apparent on an international scale), the federal government changed its policies because of the international consequences of the increase in the price of oil. (At the time, in May 1974, the unemployment rate was only 2 percent and there were two million foreign workers employed.) Restrictive measures that had been in effect up to that time to protect monetary stability (for example, special taxes on investments) were abolished. An economic program for areas with structural problems was adopted with the participation of the state governments, with total expenditures amounting to 900 million DM. This program concentrated primarily on infrastructure investments of communities and on building plans for those areas. In September 1974, another regional program followed, amounting to 950 million DM; and, finally, in March 1977, a public-investment program was developed that would concentrate on water supplies, the energy economy, and transportation investments, and would cost 16 billion DM over a four-year period. One-fourth of the total expenditure was to be made in the first year.

Apart from strengthening public investments, an attempt was also made to control unemployment by strengthening private investment. In December 1974, assistance for equipment investments in trade and industry was provided, and in August 1975, stimulation of building plans was emphasized. Finally, income taxes were lowered in the summer of 1977. Investment capacity, especially of smaller and middle-sized firms, was to be strengthened by this reduction.

Along with this policy of stimulating investment, significant budgetary deficits were risked, and a program of sufficient monetary supply and low interest rates was pursued by the Federal Bank (*Bundesbank*). The deficit of the federal government, the federal states, and the local government amounted to about 4.5 percent of GNP in 1976, or considerably less than the debt rate of other comparable industrial nations at the time. The discount rate, which had been 7 percent in 1973, decreased to 3.5 percent in September 1977. Cooperation between the Federal Bank and the government was excellent in these matters.

In spite of the new net indebtedness in 1976 and 1977, however, public expenditures were not able to stimulate expansion sufficiently. For this reason, rates of increase of federal expenditures were raised—from 3.5 percent in 1976 to 6 percent in 1977, and to 10.5 percent in 1978. The federal government supports this policy of fiscal expansion with a bill for tax reductions, but thus far it has not passed because of a veto by the Federal Council.

These expansionary policies, however, have not been successful in improving the employment level, although they may have prevented an even more serious unemployment situation. The employment results of various labor-market measures will be discussed later. However, the lack of success of fiscal policy—which incidentally has been supported again and again in Parliament by the opposition party—has led to more and more vigorous debate about the structural problems of the labor market, the low increase of demand both inside and outside the country despite the increase in productivity, and problems of saturation of the domestic market and insufficient purchasing power, as well as increasing international competition.

In discussions of the causes of unemployment, employers usually point to the large increases in costs during the early 1970s, stressing wage increases and social benefits as deterrents to investment, whereas the unions insist on world economic developments, unaltered high productivity in the face of slowly growing needs, accelerated rationalization of production (efficiency measures) owing to technical innovations, lagging domestic demand as a result of market saturation in important industries, and related overcapacity. Finally, the unions accuse employers of uncooperative operating practices, such as overtime and special shifts instead of new jobs.

The political parties have taken their positions essentially along similar lines, if not with the same rigor. The conservative Christian Democrats blame inflation on wage and welfare policies, exceeding social possibilities, which the social-liberal coalition has pursued since 1969. The Social Democrats, in contrast, explain unemployment primarily as a result of world economic developments since the oil crisis, with occasional accusations of conscious obstruction by employer policies.

In reality, the problem is probably much more complex than presented by either of the two sides. Certain special conditions in the Federal Republic have to be kept in mind. The international monetary system resulting from the Bretton Woods Conference, the shortcomings of which were recognized at least by the end of the 1960s, led to continuous exchange speculations toward revaluation, in view of the obvious undervaluation of the German mark. These could only be fought, under fixed exchange rates, by a significant increase in German mark liquidity, that is, by the purchase of depreciating dollars in exchange for marks. This resulted in an uncontrolled boom, with enormous investment and capacity expansions between 1968 and 1973, especially in the Federal Republic.

The revaluation speculations only reflected the culmination of drawn-out distortions of the exchange value of the mark. As early as 1961, a controversy over this issue existed between Ludwig Erhard, then minister of economic affairs, and

Konrad Adenauer, then chancellor. The reconstruction of the almost totally destroyed country after the war resulted in high capacities that could not be maintained on a long-term basis for domestic requirements alone. For two decades, the low exchange value of the mark also stimulated the expansion of export capacity, which no longer corresponded to the real level of costs. The export aspect of expansion was thus based on products which, because of high wages, could not, at the existing level of industrialization and the stage of development of the Federal Republic, have been produced competitively except for the undervaluation of the mark. As a result, in contrast with the general trend in Western countries, the share of the industrial sector in the German economy did not decline in favor of the service sector, but, as we have seen, increased continuously.

Today the main problem of unemployment in the Federal Republic is as follows: A general wage level exists, which to be sure is still competitive internationally, in view of the fact that the country will once more achieve a trade surplus (about 34 million DM, in 1977) in spite of a revaluation of about 70 percent in relation to the dollar since 1969. The problem, however, is that an industrial and employment structure developed during the period of fixed exchange rates based on a level of costs kept artificially low in international competition, which had to undergo significant change after exchange rates were decontrolled. When decontrol occurred in the spring of 1973, it became clear that certain sectors of production would now lose out in the international as well as the domestic market under increased pressures to import. Economic sectors such as textiles, shoes, and leather goods–generally labor-intensive sectors–as well as some other manufacturing sectors were increasingly affected by this development. In addition, the period of reconstruction came to a close. Demand was exceptionally high in the 1950s and 1960s, because the needs of reconstruction as well as of normal growth had to be met. We have noted earlier the development of overcapacity in the construction industry. Thus, a decline in employment, especially in construction, was a natural result.

Another cause of the decline in employment is the continued increase in productivity, which in most sectors today is rising more rapidly than demand, whereas formerly gains in productivity were more than compensated by the growth of demand. Moreover, certain technological changes have facilitated significant efficiency measures. This applies especially to increasing control of work processes by computers. In the printing industry, for example, a revolution is occurring that parallels developments of the fifteenth century.

Along with these economic developments has come increasing political insecurity, which in turn has led to a more cautious attitude on the part of businessmen. Whatever political party is in office is held responsible for this attitude on the part of business. (This is as true of France and its liberal-conservative government as of the Federal Republic, with its Social Democratic government.) Arguments over these phenomena, however politically opportune they may be, tend to result in dangerous disorientation of the voters through the implication that political change alone would bring about an essential improvement in the situation. Yet the political insecurity of the business community does not depend on which government is in power but on the uncertainty of future political and economic development in a closely knit world economy that is undergoing rapid structural changes and is burdened by strong political tensions.

One must consider, also, the complex internal political developments in some European countries, the shift in power relations of the superpowers since the end of World War II, and the rise of formerly third- or fourth-rate countries to economic world power. In this context, one cannot be surprised if responsible business managers favor more cautious decisions. In such times of change, businesses will try to keep fixed costs as low as possible. In view of the difficulties of dismissing personnel, therefore, firms will tend to retain the smallest possible permanent staff, using overtime and special shifts when necessary. Larger firms (for example, Volkswagen) have openly admitted that they will reject especially large orders and let them go to a competitor, rather than adjust their personnel capacity to carry out such orders.

All of this must be seen against the background of inflation, which leads to an inordinate increase in the cost of services, although the service sector would ordinarily offer the most promising possibilities for employment expansion. A special aspect of this situation for the Federal Republic—in view of the decline in the relative value of other currencies—is that Germans are now tourists in other European countries, where expanding tourism employment is occurring, rather than at home.

Labor-market policies. While general economic policies to combat unemployment have been emphasized in the Federal Republic since 1974, there have also been measures aimed directly at the labor market. In the fall of 1973, the so-called "recruitment stop" cut off the influx of foreign labor at a time of full employment because of the prospects of increasing social problems. In several German metropolitan areas, foreign workers had exceeded 25 percent of the employed population. Ghetto and class problems were developing, which in time would have to be met. The recruitment stop limited the total number of foreign workers permitted in the Federal Republic. Subsequently, policies relating to foreign workers became an important instrument of labor-market policy. With the increase of unemployment from 1974 on, many expiring foreign labor contracts were not renewed, leading to a decline in the number of foreign workers in Germany.

Even today, however, about four million people of different nationalities live in the Federal Republic. Most of them are foreign workers or members of the families of foreign workers. Among them are almost one million youths under 18. These youth—some in school and some already seeking employment—will present a particular problem for training and the labor market in the coming years.

In the area of labor-market policy, the direct creation of additional jobs stands in the foreground. As early as December 1974, in addition to investment stimulation, labor-market policies involved employment assistance in the amount of 600 million DM (about $228 million), of which the largest part (500 million DM) was to be used for wage subsidies for the hard-to-place unemployed, while the other 100 million DM was to be used for mobility allowances, that is, to promote geographical mobility of the unemployed. These measures were used especially in areas with above-average rates of unemployment. In addition, the former period for short-term work benefits was extended from 12 months to 24 months. Employees who were unable to work the full weekly hours because of the diminished work load of their firms received public assistance beyond the usual term. This allowed employers to bridge the stagnation of orders without dismissals.

Another program adopted in November 1976 had the same objectives, involving total expenditures of 430 million DM, of which 100 million DM went toward the placement of 10,000 severely disabled unemployed. Federal Labor Institute data on the reduction of unemployment resulting from these measures of job creation or of facilitating short-time work are shown in Table 27.

Table 27. Reduction of unemployment (numbers in thousands)

	1974	*1975*	*1976*	*1977*
Reduction of work time in firms though short time	70	175	60	42
General measures of job creation	6	30	58	63

Specific Measures Against Youth Unemployment

As we have seen, specific measures against youth unemployment took the form primarily of educational policies. In view of the jurisdiction of the states over all essential decisions of educational policy, the variety of measures in the different states must first be considered. On November 15, 1976, the federal-state commission adopted a "program for the realization of urgent measures for the reduction of unemployment risks of youth." This program was accepted by all the states and represents the framework within which they will carry out a coordinated policy for the control of youth unemployment. It deals with expansion of educational capacities but does not touch on the problem of technical/vocational schools that provide full vocational qualifications, which will be very significant in the successful control of youth unemployment. The program concentrates on the following measures:

1. Expansion of the basic vocational education year and of educational courses that train for an occupation
2. Expansion of training positions in the dual system
3. Expansion of vocational schools
4. Vocational counseling
5. Opening up of the universities

These educational measures are aimed at controlling youth unemployment in two ways: (1) relieving the labor market by prolonging periods of schooling and (2) improving qualifications and thus permitting youth to fill jobs for which qualified applicants are lacking today.

Increase of school and training positions. In the context of youth unemployment, the question of the length of compulsory schooling has gained a new dimension. The unions and the Social Democratic Party, in particular, demand the introduction of the tenth compulsory school year, primarily to relieve the labor market. The issue of the tenth year, which was already discussed in the 1950s and 1960s, today deals primarily with the question of whether it should be vocational or general. The advocates of vocational education stress the point that youths 15 and 16, who would be subject to the tenth compulsory year, generally show a high degree of "school-weariness," and could be kept in a general education program only reluctantly and without educational success. A year of vocational education, in contrast, would have the advantage of providing all youths who are not going on to a continuing school (*Realschule* or *Gymnasium*) an opportunity for instruction geared to a vocation. This would offer a broader foundation for those youths who wish later on to take up a practical vocation.

A second question concerns whether a vocationally oriented tenth year should be arranged in connection with the firms or rather as a theoretically oriented "vocational fundamental school year." In recent years models for both alternatives have been developed, but it turned out that a fundamental vocational school year would present difficulties at the point of transition to training in a firm. Because of a federal requirement equating this year with the first year of training in the dual system, firms would be forced to advance a graduate of a fundamental vocational school year to a second year of training in the firm. The firms have pointed out that graduates of the vocational school year often lack the knowledge required for the second year of apprenticeship. The so-called "credit ordinance," that is, this obligation for firms to accept graduates of the vocational school year into a second year of apprenticeship, has boomeranged in its effect on the training of youth: firms have increasingly refused to accept graduates from the vocational school year into training.

Those who do their first year of vocational training in a firm do not encounter similar difficulties. Here, as well, basic insights are taught and primarily theoretical and technical knowledge is covered, but the fact that practical training is included makes it undoubtedly easier for the firms to accept those completing the first year of training into the second year.

Since 1971, the number of youths who are either in the vocational school year or in a vocational basic training year has steadily increased. From 4,000 in the school year 1971–72, it rose to 27,000 in 1976–77. (The expectations, however, had been for 37,000 as early as 1975.) According to the program for the realization of urgent measures of November 1976, the number of youths in the vocational training year and in the vocationally instructive courses is expected to be 76,800 on an annual basis in 1977 and 120,000 in 1982.

Although there has been no binding decision concerning the introduction of a tenth compulsory school year as yet, there has been a tendency for the number of students completing a tenth school year in the basic schools to rise. This does not involve direct vocational preparation, but it does mean improved qualification of youth in the transition to vocational training, as well as general relief for the labor market.

If the decision is made to make the tenth year of basic school obligatory, it will be an important step, for as long as there is a choice of whether to continue at school for a tenth year or to enter the labor market immediately, the less qualified will tend to enter the labor market and become unskilled workers. The risk of unemployment of these youths is, of course, especially high.

Full-time schools at the secondary level. In the debate over a tenth school year, the federal government has taken the position that it prefers the introduction of a vocational training year or a vocational school year at the upper-secondary level as the first occupationally oriented training year. Thus, the official plans of the federal government are currently aimed at expansion of full-time schooling at the upper-secondary level for all youths in the tenth year of education. Beyond this, the focus is on the expansion of technical schools. The overall educational plan envisions a substantial increase, while the "urgent measures" anticipate an increase from 354,000 in 1977 to 372,000 in 1980. The expansion of the *Gymnasium*, however, does not present any capacity problems.

Increase in training positions with firms. In connection with the future of the dual system, it must be kept in mind that the number of graduates from secondary education is constantly rising. As a proportion of the population of the relevant age, the percentage of graduates from the *Realschule* has increased from 10.9 percent in 1965 to 22.2 percent in 1974, more than doubling. The high and rising percentage of graduates from the *Realschule* and the number of youths who seek a training position but cannot be placed in one by the labor offices indicate that this group is meeting with increasing difficulties in the realization of its original training goals owing to the scarcity of training positions. In addition, the dual system will be burdened in the coming years not only with quantitative problems associated with increasing numbers in the relevant youthful age group but also with qualitative problems that did not exist in the same measure earlier.

To bring about an increase in training positions, appeals to the private economic sector have been made by the federal government and the states in recent years. There have also been public awards for firms that increased the number of training places, and both federal and state public agencies have increased their numbers of training positions beyond those actually required for the training of junior staff. Finally, appeals have been directed at the youth themselves to accept training positions, if necessary, that do not quite come up to their expectations.

We have earlier noted that educational policy decisions have accelerated the decrease of training positions in the private sector. Insofar as such developments can be avoided, within the parameters of qualitatively improved education, the federal government has made attempts to correct the educational policies. This has been true of requirements for training facilities as well as other training requirements that were particularly difficult for small firms.

Financial issues have been central to the federal government's policies for increasing training positions. We referred earlier to the recommendations of the Edding Commission and to the rejection of the federal government's bill aimed at partial implementation of those recommendations. An even more modified bill was then introduced which would have affected only firms with a payroll of more than 400,000 DM per year. Even this legislation, though enacted, was heavily attacked by the private sector, in spite of the fact that about 90 percent of all firms would not have been subject to the levy involved. All but 6 percent of crafts firms and 9 percent of trade firms would have been excluded.

In 1977, the question of application of the law arose, but the federal government dispensed with the levy, because firms engaged in training had agreed voluntarily to assume the responsibility for adding 100,000 training positions. In fact, the training positions have increased in 1977, but it is not yet clear whether the total of 100,000 additional positions will be reached.

The expansion of training institutes outside for firms has also been encouraged by the federal government. We noted earlier that, in view of the rising qualitative level of training requirements, a number of middle-sized and smaller firms could not meet these requirements and maintain their training positions unless aspects of vocational training were taken by adequately equipped institutions outside of the firm. As early as 1973, 180 million DM were allocated for this purpose by the federal government, and the states were pursuing the same policies. The program of "urgent measures" of November 1976 included an expansion of training positions in training institutes outside of firms from 43,000 in 1977 to 77,000 in 1982.

Student places at the universities. The role of expansion of university education in relation to the struggle against youth unemployment is controversial. The opinion is frequently expressed that the rising number of students threatens to increase unemployment of university graduates. For this reason, it is argued, in view of the slim chances for employment of graduates in certain fields (for example, teachers, sociologists, and political scientists), a further increase in the number of students would not contribute to the struggle against youth unemployment. Not only would the additional years of study be expensive for the nation, but they would be followed by unemployment of graduates, with all of its social and political dangers.

This danger would indeed exist if, as in the past, the university student expected employment in his field of study after graduation. There is no doubt that this has been the expectation so far. Indeed, most parents and students hold the government responsible for an adequate supply of jobs after the completion of studies. In spite of repeated statements on the part of the federal government and people in other responsible positions, a change in this attitude can hardly be noticed. Unemployment of graduates is considered misplanning and a political as well as an individual problem, whereas the unemployment of skilled workers (as in printing, for example) is accepted as a necessary consequence of technological changes.

Although relationships between academic education and jobs cannot actually be solved, the federal government advocates increased admissions to universities in view of the prospect of increasing youth unemployment among larger cohorts of young people. The government's demand for opening up of the universities and for avoidance of the *numerus clausus* is not only a policy for the universities but part of a total educational strategy: those *Gymnasium* graduates who are presently waiting to be admitted to universities represent dangerous competitors for other youth who have not completed a *Gymnasium* education. From the point of view of educational policies, open access to the universities is also more appropriate than the present practice of enforcing a *numerus clausus* based on grades that cannot be compared and entailing considerable pedagogical disadvantage in the upper levels of the *Gymnasium*.

The federal government sees no alternative to opening up the universities, since there are at present no adequate alternative choices for rejected students, in spite of the programs to expand training capacities. In the coming three to four years, the impact of the years of high birth rates will be particularly critical in the area of vocational training, because the age of entrance to vocational training programs is earlier than that of entrance to universities. The Federal-State Commission for Educational Planning therefore considers it necessary to create about 200,000 additional training positions as well as 70,000 full-time vocational school positions. This tense situation should not be made worse by pushing a substantial percentage of university applicants into training positions outside of the universities where they would be competing with graduates of basic schools and *Realschule*, who are dependent on these positions. Certain training areas, such as banking, which are offered as alternatives to university studies, or at least are seen as such, already present a greater maladjustment between applicants and available positions than in the university fields most severely affected by the *numerus clausus*. The opening up of the universities could act as a signal for special efforts in other training areas (Federal Ministry for Education and Science, Press Release, May 2, 1977).

For this reason federal and state heads of government are debating the elimination of the *numerus clausus* in all but seven basic subjects. An agreement was pending in October 1977 but was not reached owing to last-minute disagreement between the states with Social Democratic governments and those with governments controlled by the other parties. The goal of these joint attempts at eliminating the *numerus clausus* is to maintain an expansion target of about 850,000 student places and to provide an even greater educational capacity through an "overload quota" until about 1990 to accommodate those born in the years of high birth rates. The disadvantages for the quality of education that could result from this are understood. Even so, the "overload quota" is considered appropriate to help the large cohorts of the coming years. In addition, a specific program for the improvement of the situation of the junior academic staff was adopted. (This concerns a relatively small number of highly qualified scientists who are to receive additional research opportunities at the universities.)

Improvement of existing qualifications. One of the characteristics of the labor-market situation in the Federal Republic is the fact that there are numerous vacancies in private industry and public administration that cannot be filled because of inadequate qualifications of applicants. There is no agreement as to the causes of this discrepancy. A general decline in the qualifications of young trainees cannot be conclusively determined. However, there is no doubt that types of training are acquired that are not in demand in the labor market, necessitating later retraining, and further that young people want qualifications that cannot be provided in sufficient volume—that is, easy, clean white-collar work. In order to improve qualifications and adjust them to changing demands, a number of measures have been taken.

Almost all the states have adopted programs to make it possible for those who have dropped out of basic school (to go to work) to return to school for graduation. The courses last from four to six months and are available for youths both under and over age 18. Frequently they are conducted by the so-called people's universities (*Volkshochschulen*). The programs have in part scored considerable successes. Critics remark, however, that the completion of basic school graduation is simply "youth care," since graduation is only of limited help to youth later on. This charge is even more valid today, since graduation from *Realschule* and *Gymnasium* has become considerably more significant in the competition for training positions in firms.

Youth without a training contract are usually employed on the labor market as temporary workers. These "young workers" or "young employees" had been declining continuously in past years. Since the beginning of the current unemployment problem, however, the number of young workers has been increasing again. There is a danger that this tendency will persist in the coming years because of the shortage of apprenticeships. Opportunities for young workers on the labor market are reduced because of their obligation to attend vocational school part of the time. For this reason, several ministries of culture in the states have considered converting the vocational school requirement into one year of full-time vocational school for youth without a training contract. One of the reasons for this is the inadequacy of the part-time vocational school education for young workers without training contracts. In the absence of vocational training in a firm, there is no direct contact with the vocation in a vocational school. Thus vocational school attendance, with its "compensatory" educational relationship, becomes only an obstacle in the labor market.

Against this proposal it is argued that unskilled young workers "are simply easier to place, since the inconvenient weekly vocational school day—which has to be paid for by the employer—is dispensed with and since with the alternative learning plan the firms are provided with disposable temporary workers at the expense of the state" (Braun and Weidacher, 1976, p. 38).

In contrast, the plans for a "vocational preparation year," with an adequate arrangement of educational content, as provided by the state of North Rhine-Westphalia, must be judged more favorably. This accommodates youth who have not as yet decided on a vocation or cannot make enough progress in one year of vocational basic school. There must be a goal of leading them to a choice of vocation. In one full-time school year of classes that cover several vocational fields, youth should acquire the knowledge, ability, and modes of behavior that will enable them to make subsequent vocational choices.

In view of the fact that the shortage of training positions is one of the important reasons for the renewed increase in the number of "young workers" and in view of the probability that this tendency will persist in the coming years, a plan for a vocational school year for youth without training contracts seems reasonable only if they are not simply taken off the labor market but are given an opportunity to make reasonable vocational decisions.

Measures for vocational preparation. The Federal Labor Institute offers measures for vocational preparation. In 1975–76, more than 1,000 courses, with a total of 31,000 participants, were reported. The program includes further education as well as courses for improved integration into the labor market (for example, of the disabled). The aim of the measures for vocational preparation is to qualify the participant for a simple activity at the end of the course. The basic training courses financed by the Federal Labor Institute–in competition, as it were, with the basic vocational education year–are more practically oriented. Sometimes they are criticized for their emphasis on short-term applications of knowledge and their neglect of real basic training. They usually do not give long-term help, and their importance in the elimination of youth unemployment should not be overestimated.

Counseling services. In discussing counseling services, we shall make extensive use of a report prepared by the federal government for the European Common Market. The expansion of the counseling system has been strongly emphasized in recent years. In a decision of 1973, the conference of cultural ministers of the various states formulated comprehensive guidelines for the development of an efficient counseling system. Within the schools, the counseling system focuses on psychological services and on counseling teachers employed at the school.

The main task of the psychological services consists of recognizing and diagnosing difficulties and problems of students and treating them properly in collaboration with the parents and the school. In addition, the services aid students and parents in making decisions about school and educational careers through analyses, diagnoses, and counseling.

In 1975, a total of 390 psychologists were engaged in school counseling, suggesting that the effects of psychological counseling services in the schools must be very limited. The overall ratio of students to full-time school psychologists was 25,000 to 1. The plan adopted in 1973 provided for a ratio of 5,000 to 1 by 1980; the service must be multiplied at least by five to achieve the goals of the plan.

Academic counselors are trained for their tasks in accordance with special measures in the various states. Their main task is the counseling of students and parents about the various possibilities of school programs, including requirements and graduation qualifications. Further, individual counseling, especially in cases of student difficulties in learning, is provided. In 1975, there were trained active academic counselors in only five of the states. The ratio of 3,000 students to 1 counselor provided in the total educational plan has not as yet been achieved, while a ratio of 1,000 to 1 is sought by 1980.

The most important link between the labor market and the educational system is vocational counseling, which is conducted by agencies of the Federal Labor Institute and is aimed at advising youth and adults before and during employment on all questions of occupational choice and development. The institute also has responsibilities with respect to counseling on education. Vocational counseling is conducted in three settings: in school conferences, in parents' meetings, and in individual counseling sections. Again it is apparent that the system is quantitatively inadequate. In 1974–75, a total of 31,000 conferences on school careers were conducted, and, in 1975, 5,000 parent meetings were reported. The total number of persons who were counseled one or more times in 1974–75 was 946,000.

In addition to these counseling activities of the Federal Labor Institute, vocational counseling is also provided by local chambers of industry and commerce (*Industrie- und Handelskammern)*, for example, the crafts chambers (*Handwerkskammern*). Again the necessary number of counselers is lacking. In 1972 there was one training counselor for every 300 training firms and for about 1,300 trainees, indicating that intensive vocational counseling is not possible.

Looking at the struggle against unemployment in general and youth unemployment in particular, we find that the Federal Republic has been successful in recent years in stabilizing the number of unemployed but not in reducing it appreciably. On the contrary, a slight increase in unemployment was reported in the fall of 1977. In the battle against youth unemployment, a worsening of the situation is anticipated, in view of the increasing size of the age group, unless measures specifically directed against youth unemployment are successful The measures for the improvement of the economic situation provide necessary support for maintaining employment, but they will not increase employment to such a degree that elimination of youth unemployment will be possible, in view of rising productivity and the increasing size of the youthful population.

Among the specific measures for the control of youth unemployment, the most obviously effective is the introduction of the tenth educational year. In addition, the opening up of the universities, the increase in the number of training positions, and the expansion of technical schools are promising beginning.

In carrying out these conceptually correct measures, it will be important to organize the relations between the federal government and the states in such a way that planned and coordinated synchronization of these measures with overall economic policy is achieved. It will also be important to synchronize the educational and vocational systems more effectively. In this connection, studies must be taken into consideration that provide insight into the future changes in employment (see Table 20). Follow-up studies, such as those published by the Federal Labor Institute (*Vorausschau auf den Arbeitsmarkt der Bundesrepublik Deutschland bis 1990*—Forecasts of the Labor Market of the Federal Republic of Germany to 1990), must be taken into account in this connection.

It will also be important to keep in mind that, in addition to the normal rate of growth of age groups, the education and labor-market systems must handle not only an additional 80,000 young Germans each year (as a result of the high birth rate years), but also an annual average of 45,000 foreign children reaching the age of employment. In the next five years combined, Germans and foreigners together will need an additional 600,000 work and training positions.

The labor market in the Federal Republic will also be burdened by people of German origin immigrating from Eastern Europe (Poland in particular). Moreover, about 40,000 foreign youths have entered the Federal Republic as family members since the recruitment stoppage. The special problem that exists for the second generation of foreigners cannot be overlooked. Youth who grow up in the Federal Republic expect equality of rights to a larger extent than their parents did. A failure of social and vocational integration will be considered discrimination by the young foreigners and will lead to significant social tensions. In the overcrowded urban areas, in which the share of births among foreigners amounts to 40 or 50 percent of all births, this will be associated with significant social problems. The measures that will have to be taken here go far beyond the problem of youth unemployment.

The future supply of German workers (the German employment potential) will result from the interaction of population growth and annual productivity changes. According to estimates of the Federal Statistics Bureau, the German population will continue to decline in size. About five million fewer Germans are expected to live in the Federal Republic in the year 2000 than in 1975. However, the population reaching employment age will increase relatively markedly in the next

15 years, because those born in the high-birth-rate postwar years will become employable in those years. Only after 1990 will there be a decline in the German employment potential.

We have already noted that the annual number of births was particularly large in the mid-1960s, at around one million a year, whereas at the beginning of the 1950s it was only about 800,000 and today is only about 600,000. (There was a slight upturn in 1977.) Therefore, in the next three or four decades, unless there is a sharp, unexpected increase in the birth rate, the ratio of employed age groups to nonworking groups (children and retired older people) will be more in favor of the employed age groups than it has been in the past 10 years.

In view of the increasing size of the youthful population and the increased labor-force participation of women, the *Institut für Arbeitsmarkt= und Berufsforschung* (Institute for Labor Market and Occupational Research) forecasts (1976) that "in spite of longer and increased educational participation and in spite of earlier retirement possibilities, about one million more Germans will enter employment than will leave in the coming ten to fifteen years. On the supply side of the labor market there is occurring at present a basic change in tendencies compared with the last 15 years, in which the supply of German workers declined by about two million and foreigners were brought into the country to make up for the decrease."

A shortage of German workers will occur again about 1990, according to the same forecasts. In the event of unchanged labor-force participation rates among individual age and sex groups, the supply of German workers will decrease by one million between 1990 and 2000 and thus will reach the level of 1975 again. In the following two decades, up to the year 2020, there will be an additional decline of two million.

This development, which is particularly contingent on demographic developments, has special consequences for individual age groups. At the end of the 1960s, older employees were the center of worries, because relatively small cohorts of young people were entering the labor market. Today it is the young people who crowd the labor market, and this tendency will increase. At the beginning of the 1970s, about 700,000 young people left the educational system each year, and this number will rise to about 950,000 in 1981. A model calculation of "possibilities for covering the educational gap in the coming years," developed by Mertens and others (1977), is presented in Table 28. Column 6 shows how the "gap" will change over the years.

Dangers for the Future of Youth

At the beginning of this study we pointed out that young people do not statistically appear to face a crisis today in the

Table 28. School leavers and education and training places for new entrants to more advanced education and training or work, actual 1971 to 1976 and projected 1977 to 1990

		Training and education places for new entrants				
Year	*Total school leavers* (1)*	*University fields (2)*	*Full-time vocational schools (3)*	*Training places in firms (4)*	*Voluntary dropouts (10 percent of leavers)* (5)*	*Remainder (6)*
1971	705	105	70	460	70	–
1972	725	117	60	460	73	15
1973	743	122	55	460	74	32
1974	770	130	58	450	77	55
1975	780	133	60	445	78	64[a]
1976	784	136	62	440	78	68[a]
1977	852	140	64	440	85	123
1978	907	145	66	440	91	165
1979	895	151	68	440	90	146
1980	926	155	70	440	93	168
1981	952	157	70	440	95	190
1982	947	160	70	440	95	182
1983	926	163	70	440	93	160
1984	894	166	70	440	89	129
1985	851	170	70	440	85	86
1986	808	170	70	440	81	47
1987	766	170	70	440	77	9
1988	721	170	70	440	72	-31
1989	680	170	70	440	68	-68
1990	650	170	70	440	65	-95

*In thousands

[a] Effect of short school year

Source: Mertens and others, 1977.

Federal Republic of Germany. Youth unemployment is much lower than in other industrial countries, and tendencies toward demoralization, which have become noticeable in other countries, have up to now appeared only in very small dimensions in the Federal Republic. This is probably attributable in part to the relative decentralization in the population settlement patterns of the Federal Republic.

What is not tangible statistically, however, is not necessarily absent. The general developments of industrial societies display increasingly negative results for the personal development of the individual, and these results obviously do not bypass young people in the Federal Republic. On the contrary, since today's 18-year-olds grew up under conditions of advanced industrial societies, they are perhaps in special ways susceptible to the dangers lying before us.

The social-psychological situation of young people in the Federal Republic lies at the point of intersection between two tendencies. On the one hand, the limits and increasingly negative results of growth and well-being of industrial societies are recognized by youth; on the other hand, the world economic crisis of the 1970s has been viewed as only the acute phase of a long-term dialectical tendency of social and economic developments, with especially difficult repercussions on youth. Both developments—the long-term process of negative trends of high industrialization and the actual impact of the world economic crisis—have a cumulative effect, objectively as well as subjectively. Objectively, this negative effect results from the fact that high industrialization arouses expectations which the actual impact of the economic crisis has revealed as illusory. The expectations of youth, which resulted from the changes in the occupational structure and the educational structure, for example, were destroyed; the hope that each person could get the job of his or her choice has revealed itself as an illusion. Subjectively, one must recognize again that the 15- to 25-year-olds of today grow up in a period that accepted without question the benefits of unlimited growth and constant improvement of the standard of living. It was a time in which the economic well-being and broadening of individual private freedoms were understood as reciprocally conditioned developments rather than as contradictions.

The older generation tended to face the new developments of the 1970s on the basis of earlier experiences, which made them more skeptical. Young people, however, were unprepared and were abruptly confronted with new conditions, negative expectations, and a life perspective which adults could view optimistically.

All of these factors affect the situation of youth in the late 1970s, a realistic understanding of the causes of the problem, and workable stimuli for possible improvements.

There is no doubt that, after a long period of growth, new limits of economic development, which had unmistakable effects on other social developments, became apparent. After a period in which general expectations of life in industrial countries rose year after year, the rights of minorities improved, class barriers were lessened, and democratic rights deepened, a general disenchantment with progress appeared, which especially affected youth. Young people, who formerly were the greatest gainers in the improvement of well-being, became for the same reasons the clearest losers. The dialectic of economic outcomes that confronts us today has permitted the development of a feeling of crisis in Western society that can only be the result of long-term slackened economic growth and negative labor-market tendencies. No doubt, the reversal of scientific and economic progress becomes ever clearer on many fronts.

The sources of economic progress–division of labor and competition–are without doubt also the source of the mobile small family and the resulting isolation of its members. Similarly, division of labor and the associated achievement of a hierarchically ordered society lead simultaneously to increased competition as well as to homogeneity of people, and thus permit new and hitherto unknown fears to develop in many ways from school to the end of life. The clearly higher standard of living indeed improves the opportunities of individuals, but it also permits expectations which, if not fulfilled, can bring deep= seated frustrations. And the associated prolonging of life expectancy, with its mobile division of labor and often isolated existence for the individual, has not, contrary to expectations, enchanted the elderly.

That young people cannot escape this dialectical problem of progress seems obvious. Therefore, we must repeat at the end of this study the view that the most important problems facing youth today were already recognizable in the Federal Republic before the onset of the economic crisis and of youth unemployment. The earlier emancipation had helped young people toward independence, but the loss of authority of the older generations led to an increasing gap in intergenerational relations and to an increasing unsettling of the roles of individual youths in this society. The improved standard of living improved life chances but also provided an opportunity for the use of drugs, alcohol, and other means of intoxication among youth well before the first signs of youth unemployment. The evident structural changes occurring today are manifestations of a long-term problem and not the result of an economic crisis.

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R 3805-2.4

EDUCATION AND YOUTH EMPLOYMENT IN BELGIUM

Henri Janne

A STUDY PREPARED FOR THE
CARNEGIE COUNCIL ON POLICY STUDIES
IN HIGHER EDUCATION

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The Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education, 2150 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California 94704, has sponsored publication of this report as part of a continuing effort to obtain and present significant information for public discussion. The views expressed are those of the author.

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number LC 78-74915

International Standard Book Number ISBN 0-931050-09-X

First Edition

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Foreword

This is one of seven publications presenting studies commissioned by the Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education as a means of providing a global perspective for education and youth employment in contemporary societies. The remaining publications will be concerned with education and youth employment in Japan, by Hidetoshi Kato; Mexico and South Asia, by Alberto Hernández Medina and Carlos Muñoz Izquierdo and Manzoor Ahmed, respectively; Poland, by Barbara Liberska; Great Britain, by Stuart Maclure; Sweden and Denmark, by Gösta Rehn and K. Helveg Petersen, respectively; and the Federal Republic of Germany by Klaus von Dohnanyi. Margaret S. Gordon, associate director of the Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education, is the general editor of the series. To the authors of these studies, and to Henri Janne, whose work appears in this volume, we express our deep appreciation.

The German Marshall Fund generously provided support for two international conferences on education and youth employment which were attended by several of the authors of studies for this series and which have contributed significantly to the Council's deliberations on this subject. The International Council for Educational Development, under the direction of James A. Perkins, arranged for the participation of the essayists in this project. We acknowledge these contributions with profound thanks.

We also wish to extend our thanks to Mary Purnell Frederick and Diana Lorentz for their editorial contributions, and Sylvia Zuck for coordinating manuscript preparation.

CLARK KERR
Chairman,
Carnegie Council on Policy Studies
in Higher Education

1

Introduction

The age range 15 to 24, chosen as the focus of attention for these studies, is particularly appropriate for Belgium. Following six years of primary school, compulsory education terminates with an "observation" phase—the first stage of secondary education—for 13- and 14-year-old Belgian youths. At the age of 15, youths in Belgium can either begin to work (in most sectors of the economy) or attend noncompulsory secondary school (consisting of an "orientation" phase for 15- and 16-year-olds and ending with the "determination" phase for 17- and 18-year-olds). As in the United States, secondary school may be followed by college studies of four to six years.

By the age of 25, most Belgians have embarked on their real occupational careers, after diverse patterns of preparation involving vocational education, training preparatory to work, or irregular unskilled and rotation work. At this age, also, most people are married. The end of graduate studies ordinarily takes place at age 22 or 23 (with the exception of medical studies, which are longer, lasting seven to ten years after secondary school). Those completing their graduate studies usually spend one or two years in probationary or temporary employment

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*The author wishes to express his thanks to Pierre Desgain (University of Brussels), who prepared the statistical tables relating to youths in Belgium. The present study owes a great deal of revision—not only as to language but also as to organization of the text—to Margaret S. Gordon. Her suggestions have resulted in improved presentation of certain data as well as in their interpretation.

and then settle into a stable job. For people with less prolonged study, stable jobs are usually found, at least in the case of men, after a period of military service (generally at ages 19 to 20), although even in those cases some "trials" are necessary. And, of course, marriage is linked with job stability.

Belgium, one of the first countries on the continent to enter into the industrial revolution even before the nineteenth century, was influenced very deeply by the main cultures of Europe throughout its history. It was annexed at various times as a protectorate or "crown territory" to Burgundy, Spain, Austria, France, and the Netherlands. These powers, their elites, and their armies had a strong impact on the development of Belgium. Moreover, Belgium is geographically at the crossroads between Northern European civilization (historically marked by Germanic culture) and Southern Europe (basically "Latin" and associated with the Roman Catholic Church). The boundary between these two civilizations divides Belgium into two parts: 59 percent of the population is Flemish (Dutch speaking) and 41 percent is French speaking.

Paradoxically, at present the Flemish people (the northern sector) are more devoted to the Roman Catholic Church than the Walloons (in the south), who are more influenced by the ideology of the French Revolution and "laic" radicalism and by a strong agnostic socialist movement. The Flemish people are "organizational"–pragmatically minded, political rather than ideological, and possessing a high cultural and imperialistic sense of community. The Walloons are more ready for violent social struggles, more inclined to ideologies, and more disposed to take an angry defensive position about their French culture and language. These differences become very clear in relation to the socialist and trade union movements: the Flemish movements resemble German or Scandinavian social democracy, and the Walloon movements resemble Mediterranean socialism. But as a result of the common base and tradition in Belgium, the Belgian Socialist Party has been until now the only party that has not succumbed to the pressure of the regional communities problems.

Thus, Belgium is a synthesis of Europe and, with its cultural and linguistic divisions, is really a sociological laboratory. It is, of course, customary to consider youth as a workshop for the future. But these mixed and opposed sociological characteristics complicate the problem of identifying the most significant characteristics, signs, and trends.

Demographic Changes

From 1961 to 1974, the rate of increase of the youth population (ages 15 to 24) was 31.2 percent, compared with only 6.5 percent for the total Belgian population (Table 1). This rate of increase however, has recently been diminishing, having reached its peak among those 19 to 20 years old in 1974 (that is, born in 1954 or 1955). From 1961 to 1974, the rate of increase was only 10.8 percent for 15-year-olds, compared with 49.3 percent for 19-year-olds and 60.4 percent for 20-year-olds. This trend will continue (with a falling birth rate) and slow down the increase in the youthful population.

What is especially meaningful is that the growth of the relative position of youth in society was very important in the 1960s. Moreover, the present demographic position of youths continues to be a strong factor affecting the evolution of culture. Figure 1 demonstrates that the increase in the relative size of all youths, ages 15 to 24, from 1960 to 1974, was more pronounced than for subgroups of youth separately. Nevertheless, there will be a decrease in the size of these age groups in the 1980s.

Roughly 60 percent of the youth population of Belgium lives in the Dutch-speaking region, while about 30 percent resides in the French-speaking region, and the remaining 10 percent in Brussels (Table 2). The French-speaking region gained slightly in its share from 1961 to 1970, and the Dutch-speaking region lost slightly. The changes, however, were less pronounced for the younger of the two age groups.

Family Status of Youth

In Belgium, girls marry earlier than boys and usually marry older boys. According to the 1961 census, among those 19 to 24, there were about 163,000 married women and only 82,000 married men (about half). The 1970 census indicated that there were about 224,000 married women and 133,000 married men

Table 1. Changes in youth population by age and sex, 1961 to 1974
(numbers in thousands)

Age	*1961*			*1970*			*1974*			*Percentage change, both sexes, 1961-1974*
	Male	*Female*	*Total*	*Male*	*Female*	*Total*	*Male*	*Female*	*Total*	
15	73.2	70.2	143.4	75.8	73.4	149.2	81.0	77.9	158.9	10.8%
16	61.7	60.1	121.8	75.1	72.5	147.6	79.9	76.4	156.3	28.3
17	62.0	59.9	121.9	74.1	70.9	145.0	79.2	75.2	154.4	26.7
18	59.4	57.1	116.5	74.4	70.9	145.3	77.7	75.0	152.7	31.1
19	51.9	50.0	101.9	71.6	69.1	140.7	77.6	74.6	152.1	49.3
15 to 19	308.2	297.3	605.5	371.0	356.8	727.8	395.4	379.1	774.4	27.9
20	47.5	46.7	94.2	72.5	69.9	142.4	77.1	74.0	151.1	60.4
21	52.9	52.2	105.1	72.3	64.5	141.8	76.9	72.7	149.6	42.3
22	57.9	58.3	116.2	74.1	71.6	145.7	77.5	72.0	150.5	29.5
23	59.9	59.9	119.8	74.6	71.3	145.9	74.6	70.7	145.2	21.2
24	58.4	57.7	116.1	75.6	71.5	147.1	75.6	71.2	146.8	26.4
20 to 24	276.6	274.8	551.4	369.1	348.8	717.9	381.7	360.6	743.2	34.8
Total aged 15-24	584.8	572.1	1,156.9	740.1	705.6	1,445.7	777.1	739.7	1,517.6	31.2
Total population	4,496.9	4,692.9	9,189.8	4,721.9	4,929.0	9,650.0	4,792.1	4,996.1	9,788.2	6.5
Youthful age groups as a percentage of the total population										
15-19	6.8	6.3	6.6	7.9	7.2	7.6	8.2	7.6	7.9	
20-24	6.2	5.9	6.0	7.8	7.1	7.4	8.0	7.2	7.6	
15-24	13.0	12.2	12.6	15.7	14.3	15.0	16.2	14.8	15.5	

Sources: 1961 data are from the Belgian decennial census of December 31, 1961; 1970 data are from the decennial census of December 12, 1970; and 1974 data are official estimates for December 31, 1974.

Figure 1. Youths as a percentage of the total population, 1955–1974



Table 2. Percentage of population aged 15–19 and 20–24 in the three regions of the country, 1961 and 1970

Date and age group	*Brussels*	*French-speaking region*[a]	*Dutch-speaking region*	*Total*
1961				
15–19	9.3	30.5	60.2	100.0
20–24	10.1	30.0	59.9	100.0
1970				
15–19	9.1	32.6	58.3	100.0
20–24	11.0	33.1	55.9	100.0

[a] Includes some German-speaking areas.

Source: Belgium, decennial censuses of 1961 and 1970.

in this same age group (a somewhat larger ratio of men to women than nine years earlier). The point to be emphasized is that marriage is not a dying custom in Belgium; people are marrying earlier, and the proportion of marriages occurring at an early age is increasing more rapidly for boys than for girls, as Table 3 indicates.

Living together outside of marriage for young couples—for a "trial" marriage or a consciously temporary association—is obviously more frequent than in the past. I have personally had

Table 3. Percentage of youths, aged 18 and 24, who are married, 1961 and 1970

Age and year	*Male*	*Female*
18 years		
1961	0.8%	8.7%
1970	1.3	9.6
24 years		
1961	51.0	75.0
1970	60.0	79.0

Source: Belgium, decennial census, 1961 and 1970.

the opportunity to observe this way of life among students at the University of Brussels. It is true, however, that the number of unmarried persons living together as couples is relatively much higher in a university environment and in a large city than among other sociocultural groups of young people and in other regions.

2

Youth at Work

Labor-Force Participation

Among the very young (14 years of age) and those in their late teens (15 to 19), the number of Belgian youths participating in the labor force declined from 1961 to 1970 (Table 4). For 15- to 19-year-olds, the decline in numbers in the labor force was associated with an increase in school enrollment. Taking into account the growth of the population in this age group, the stagnation in numbers implied a substantial decline in the percentages in the labor force, as the data for both sexes indicate.

The trend was very different among those aged 20 to 24. The number in the labor force increased considerably, as did the percentage of that age group in the labor force. However, the increase in the percentage was entirely attributable to an increase in the labor-force participation of women in this age group—for men, the percentage declined somewhat.

Data on the labor-force participation of all age groups in Belgium indicate that the highest ratio of working women is in the 20 to 24 age group; after that, the ratio of working women to the total population of women in each age group steadily decreases, but remaining higher in Brussels than in other regions.

Differences among the three regions do not follow the same pattern for all age groups or for both men and women. For all persons aged 15 to 19, the lowest participation rate (30 percent) in 1970 was in Brussels, while it was 36 percent in the

Table 4. Youth working population by age and sex, 1961 and 1970

	Number (in thousands)		*Percentage of population in age group*	
Sex and age	*1961*	*1970*	*1961*	*1970*
Men				
14	12.7	6.5	1.1	0.6
15–19	154.8	153.1	50.3	41.3
20–24	242.3	307.6	87.6	83.3
25–29	292.8	281.2	97.2	96.0
Women				
14	8.2	4.2	0.8	0.4
15–19	120.7	123.1	40.6	34.5
20–24	143.5	215.5	52.2	60.9
25–29	110.0	140.3	36.5	49.7
Total				
14	20.9	10.7	1.0	0.5
15–19	275.5	276.1	45.5	37.9
20–24	385.8	523.2	70.0	72.4
25–29	402.8	422.5	66.9	73.3

Source: Belgium, decennial censuses of 1961 and 1970.

French-speaking region and 40 percent in the Dutch-speaking region; this reflects higher rates of school enrollment in Brussels. Differences are slighter for the 20 to 24 age group.

Along with changes in labor-force participation rates, there have been significant changes in the socioeconomic structure of the labor force. The census divides the working population into six categories:

1. Employers and independent workers (agriculture, industry, commerce, craftsmanship, transport, services, liberal professions).
2. Heads of undertakings under an employment contract (not working for their own benefit).
3. Employees (including civil servants, priests, teachers, military officers, judges, staff members, policemen).
4. Workers (all categories, including agriculture, foremen, at-home workers).
5. Auxiliary workers (wives, sons or daughters working regularly in a family shop, or in assimilated kinds of work).

6. Unknown activities.

There were a number of significant changes in the types of work performed by young people from 1961 to 1970 (Table 5). Women, who participate more and more, have tended increasingly to become employees (especially teachers). In fact, in the 20 to 25 age group, a majority of women (58 percent) were employees in 1970, whereas, for men in this age group, only 31 percent were employees and 60 percent were workers.

Younger men 15 to 20 have tended increasingly to be employed as workers. Among men 20 to 25, the increase in the percentage employed as workers from 1961 to 1970 was less pronounced, and there was a decrease among those 25 to 30. These contrasts indicate that rising school enrollments and the relative lack of qualifications of younger men who leave school at an early age tend to enlarge the gap between these young men and those who go to work after more prolonged study.

The proportion of young people who are employers and independent workers is, of course, smaller than in the total structure of the working population.

In Belgium, as elsewhere, the proportion of young people employed as auxiliary workers has tended to decline, reflecting the decrease in the relative importance of employment in agriculture and in small business. Moreover, the recession that began in 1974 wiped out or severely changed many marginal firms, activities, technical skills, and occupations. The pressure toward concentration of firms and specialization of occupations has been very strong in this period.

Youth Unemployment

The number of persons officially included among the unemployed varies among countries, of course, according to legal provisions and socioeconomic status. In Belgium, to be registered and compensated, an unemployed person must have worked a minimum of 300 days. In this case, he will receive 60 percent of the average salary earned during the last six months, with a minimum of 10,500 Belgian francs (about $273) a month and a maximum of 615 francs (about $16) a day. The amounts are adjusted for changes in the cost of living. The

Table 5. Percentages of the youth working population in each socioeconomic group, by age and sex, 1961 and 1970

Year and socioeconomic group	*Men*			*Women*			*Total*		
	15–20	*20–25*	*25–30*	*15–20*	*20–25*	*25–30*	*15–20*	*20–25*	*25–30*
1961									
All workers	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Employers and independent workers	0.7	4.7	11.4	1.9	5.7	12.0	1.3	5.1	11.6
Employers under contract	0.0[a]	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.3	0.8	0.0[a]	0.2	0.5
Employees	8.0	23.2	29.2	26.3	44.1	39.8	16.1	31.0	32.1
Workers	61.8	55.6	53.0	62.7	41.0	38.1	62.2	50.1	48.9
Auxiliary workers	12.9	7.7	4.0	6.8	6.6	7.2	10.3	7.3	4.8
Unknown	16.6	8.6	2.1	2.2	2.3	2.1	10.2	6.3	2.1
1970									
All workers	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Employers and independent workers	0.5	4.1	10.1	0.7	3.7	8.2	0.6	3.9	9.4
Employers under contract	0.0[a]	0.3	0.8	0.1	0.5	0.8	0.1	0.4	0.8
Employees	13.3	30.8	38.0	34.9	57.8	55.8	23.5	42.2	43.8
Workers	79.1	60.4	48.8	60.3	34.5	29.8	70.1	49.5	42.7
Auxiliary workers	6.7	4.0	1.8	3.6	3.1	4.9	5.3	3.6	2.8
Unknown	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.5

[a] Less than 0.05 percent.

Source: Belgium, decennial censuses of 1961 and 1970.

minimum represents a very low level of living, while the maximum affects only highly qualified employees and means a large loss in income for them. If the unemployed person is not a family head (married or not), the compensation decreases by 40 percent after one year, and the individual remains subject to the tax system. Family allowances are maintained in favor of children of the unemployed.

Young dropouts or graduates may become registered and compensated after 75 days, but at the minimum level if not a family head. The unemployed must present themselves daily to the local controller of the National Office for Employment.

The unemployment rate in Belgium was very low throughout the 1960s and early 1970s (see Figure 1 in Gordon, 1979). Then, with the onset of the recession that began in 1974, it shot upward quite rapidly. Unemployment among young people under the age of 25 also rose sharply from the summer of 1974 on (Figure 2). Moreover, throughout the period from the end of 1972 on, unemployment of women was constantly significantly higher than that of men. This suggests the beginning of a structural phenomenon of young female unemployment.

Figure 3 shows unemployment rates for young men and women under the age of 20 and ages 20 to 25. Among those 20 to 25, the unemployment rate of women was higher than that of men in the same age group throughout 1959 to 1975. Furthermore, the unemployment rate of women in this age group increased constantly from 1971 on, whereas this was not the case for the men, whose rates displayed cyclical fluctuations. Since 1974, the impact of the economic crisis has affected workers of both sexes, especially women. Thus, structurally there has been a persistent problem of unemployment among women in this age group, and recessions accentuate the difference.

Significantly, however, among those under 20 years of age, there has not been a persistent difference between the unemployment rates of the sexes. Prior to the early 1970s, the unemployment rate of women was relatively more constant than that of men and in some years was lower. However, the crisis has also affected women in this age group particularly severely.

Figure 2. Changes in the number of totally unemployed under 25 years of age, by sex, end of each month, 1971–1975



Source: Belgium, National Office of Employment, *Annual Report 1975.*

Figure 3. Unemployed youths as a percentage of the working population in the age group, and ratios to national unemployment rate, by sex, 1959–1975



Sources: Belgium, National Office of Employment, 1975; and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, *Labour Force Statistics* (Paris; annual).

The persistent rise in *relative* unemployment among women is brought out clearly in Table 6, which shows how unemployment changed for the various age and sex groups from September 1975 to September 1976. For men the increase in unemployment was very moderate and for those under 20 years of age there was actually a pronounced decline. For women, however, the rise in unemployment was much more pronounced, though women under 20 experienced a slight decline,

Table 6. Changes in the number of registered totally unemployed by sex and age, September 1975–September 1976

	Men			Women			Both sexes		
Age	*1975*	*1976*	*Percentage change*	*1975*	*1976*	*Percentage change*	*1975*	*1976*	*Percentage change*
Total unemployed	87,277	90,559	3.7	98,681	132,426	34.1	185,958	222,985	19.9
Less than 20 years	9,132	6,450	-29.3	12,610	12,401	-1.6	21,742	18,851	13.2
20–24 years	14,748	15,170	2.8	27,012	37,045	37.1	41,760	52,215	25.0
25–39 years	18,601	21,505	15.6	31,469	47,872	52.1	50,070	69,377	38.5
40–49 years	11,980	14,474	20.8	14,116	18,524	31.2	26,096	32,998	26.4
50 years and over	32,816	32,960	0.4	13,474	16,584	23.0	46,290	49,544	7.0

Source: Belgium, National Council on Work (Conseil National du Travail).

and the hardest hit were women 25 to 40. Viewed from the perspective of the developments of the past several years, the unemployment situation of women appears catastrophic.

There was, however, a slight improvement in the comparative unemployment situation of youth between September 1975 and September 1976. The proportion of total male unemployment represented by men under 25 fell from 27.5 to 24 percent, while for women the corresponding proportion declined from 40 to 37.5 percent.

In terms of aptitude for work, young people under 20 prove to have a superior aptitude, according to data compiled by the National Council for Work. These findings are inconsistent with general Belgian public opinion, according to which young people show less aptitude for work than do adults. The record is least favorable for older workers (over 40 years of age). If, however, we consider the proportions of each age group unemployed in relation to degree of aptitude, we find that normal aptitude does not protect young people against unemployment. This suggests that there is some prejudice against youth in the labor market, perhaps because they seem less responsible and lacking in experience. In addition, at ages 19 to 20 the danger of being drafted into the military is a negative employment factor.

On a national basis, unemployment improved very slowly from September 1975 to September 1976; the rate of increase slowed down, but the numbers continued to grow each month. An annual average of 6 percent of all workers with normal aptitude to work remained unemployed in 1976. In the spring of 1977, however, total unemployment fell slightly—from 265,000 to about 250,000. Of these, about 150,000 were women, while nearly 82,000 were young people under 25. Thus young people represented about one-third of the unemployed, and among these unemployed youth, two-thirds were women.

But in the autumn of 1977, the signs of relative economic recovery slowed down, and unemployment rates began to increase again—not just for seasonal reasons. In September, the national unemployment rate was 6.5 percent, and nearly three-quarters of the unemployed were women. Unemployment among those under 25 rose to almost 84,000, and 69 percent of these young unemployed people were women. In just one month—from August to September—the increase was very pronounced.

Unemployment of youth is especially shocking to the Belgian public; they consider it a "sin" of society to be unable to integrate a significant proportion of young people as normal workers and citizens. This shocked attitude toward youth unemployment is shared by the man in the street, parents, and young people themselves.

Tables 7 and 8 show data classifying young unemployed persons by their educational attainment (including the types of studies they had performed). Our hypothesis about the relationship between educational attainment and unemployment consists of two tentative statements:

1. The younger the unemployed, the smaller will be the proportion that have performed primary (compulsory) studies only.

2. The more numerous the unemployed of a given age group, the more numerous will be those among them who have performed only primary studies.

Let us now consider those who have completed university studies. During the period 1970 to 1975, as we shall see later, women represented only about one-third of all students. In 1970, among the women registered as unemployed, those who held university degrees were a smaller proportion of the total than among the men. However, in 1975, under the impact of the economic crisis, the proportion of unemployed women with university degrees markedly increased. In September 1976, 1,135 women graduates were unemployed, whereas the corresponding number of men was only 434, in spite of the fact that every year there are twice as many degrees awarded to men as to women. Thus unemployment for this highly educated group is also more serious for women.

Reflecting the general worsening of the unemployment situation from September 1976 to August 1977, the number of job applicants among holders of university degrees rose from 7,741 to 8,522, or 10 percent. A sex breakdown, however, is not available.

Table 7. Percentage distribution of totally unemployed persons under 25, by educational attainment and sex, 1970 and 1975

	1970		*1975*	
Educational attainment	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*
General education				
Primary, whether or not completed	43.3%	36.4%	46.2%	40.0%
Lower secondary	4.1	7.7	3.1	6.0
Upper secondary	6.4	2.9	7.3	5.6
Technical education				
Lower secondary	10.8	7.6	11.1	7.6
Upper secondary	8.8	5.1	8.8	8.0
Upper, first degree	4.0	2.1	3.7	2.6
Upper, second degree	3.3	0.1	1.8	0.1
Upper, third degree	0.1	0.0[c]	0.2	0.1
Professional education				
Lower secondary	9.4	11.8	10.8	12.8
Upper secondary	0.5	3.7	0.6	6.3
Complementary	0.1	0.4	0.0[c]	0.4
Normal school education[a]				
Preprimary	0.0[c]	9.5	–	3.1
Primary	1.6	5.8	0.3	1.2
Competitive examination, lower technical secondary	0.1	1.4	0.2	0.7
Competitive examination, upper technical secondary	0.1	0.4	–	–
Competitive examination, *régents*[b]	0.5	2.0	1.1	2.7
Competitive examination, evening course	0.0[c]	0.0[c]	0.0[c]	0.0[c]
University	1.5	0.4	2.4	1.2
Completed apprenticeship	2.1	0.9	2.1	1.2
Other studies	3.3	1.9	0.3	0.4

[a] Normal schools train the teachers for preprimary to lower secondary level instruction (inclusive).

[b] In principle, "regents" are teachers for scientific disciplines or for literary disciplines for the lower secondary level.

[c] Less than 0.05 percent.

Source: Belgium, National Office of Employment.

Table 8. Totally unemployed women, by age and educational attainment, September 1976

Educational attainment	Under 25		25 or over		Total	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Total	46,907	100.0%	76,363	100.0%	123,333	100.0%
General education						
Primary, whether or not completed	19,870	42.3	55,998	73.3	75,868	61.5
Secondary	5,643	12.0	6,661	8.8	12,304	10.0
Technical education	8,137	17.3	5,048	6.6	13,185	10.7
Professional education	9,558	20.3	5,881	7.7	15,439	12.6
Normal school education[a]						
Preprimary and primary	1,275	2.7	857	1.1	2,132	1.7
Other	1,198	2.6	535	0.7	1,733	1.4
University	508	1.1	627	0.8	1,135	0.9
Completed apprenticeship	604	1.3	286	0.4	890	0.7
Other studies	177	0.4	470	0.6	647	0.5

[a] Normal schools train teachers for preprimary to lower secondary level instruction (inclusive).

Source: Belgium, National Office of Employment, [Collection études economiques et sociales (Collection of Economic and Social Studies)] (C.N.T.-C. 40-D. 76-23. C.C.E. 1976/545. September 1976).

Policy Measures

We emphasize that the numbers and proportions just discussed represent unemployment that exists in spite of efforts to improve employment opportunities of young people. However, the phenomenon of unemployment as a possible continuing problem is relatively recent (the starting point was the midsummer of 1974). Thus, since labor policy in favor of youth is more or less recent, its implementation is partial and the results are not yet known.

In combatting unemployment, general antirecession economic policy (including cooperation among the Western countries) must ultimately be given primary emphasis in a program to reduce unemployment as a whole (including youth unemployment). But as long as unemployment of youths remains a significant fact, special measures are necessary.

In the first place, we must take into account the fact that young people, with their families' approval, often prefer to continue their studies, entering university or nonuniversity postsecondary education, rather than be registered as unemployed. This is clearly not a policy measure, but it does have the effect of reducing the numbers of youthful jobseekers.

In fact, as we shall see at a later point, the higher education system in Belgium is largely open, selection taking place not at entrance but through performance in the studies themselves (especially at the end of the first year, which is a "turning point").* In fact, higher education now serves a "parking" function for many. This is reflected in the recent increase in the number of new entrants to the universities and other postsecondary institutions. In 1974-75, the increase for universities was 2.5 percent (1 percent represents around 800 students), while other postsecondary (nonuniversity) institutions showed a growth rate of 13.7 percent in 1973-74. Taking into account the widely accepted opinion that those receiving degrees in the coming years will tend to experience unemployment, the "waiting" seems to be an important reaction to the menace of immediate unemployment. In any case, it is a way of using time fruitfully instead of being in a rejected status.

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*The exceptions are the faculties for applied sciences (engineering, which has a legal selective entrance examination); recently the faculties in medicine adopted screening measures to adjust the numbers to the training capacities of university hospitals.

Second, a very active network of vocational centers–aimed at readaptation through more training–has been developed and has been used by unemployed youth more than in proportion to their share of unemployment. These centers serve as buffer institutions between studies and work, with the subsistence costs of the learners covered by unemployment insurance. However, it appeared that unemployed youth needed more individualized care and guidance. For this reason, the government decided late in 1974 that the National Office of Employment (ONEM) should be required to create "special centers for the observation and orientation of the young unemployed."

Under the program of these centers, the first step is to test the skills and aspirations of the young and to adapt them to possible job opportunities with the least cost of time and effort. The second step consists of building up schemes of realistic and enriching motivation based on the personalities of the young. The third step, if immediate adaptation proves insufficient, consists in determining the specific program of studies and training that the individual might follow in a given vocational center. At this stage, also, the possibility of a "term of probation" in a private firm or in public service is investigated.

It is too early to determine the results of this program, but it seems that the process, which started on an experimental basis, is likely to play the expected intermediary role of paramount importance. Let us not forget, however, that even the most successful process of vocational training cannot create more jobs. In the long run, higher qualifications and appropriate adaptation of manpower might play a role in improving productivity and, in this way, the competitive power of the national economy. But this is a very lengthy process.

A third measure against unemployment involves facilitating the entry of young people into employment by influencing the "terms of probation" for those seeking work. The principle is to transform a first period of unemployment into a term of probation, that is, to transform the young unemployed into probationers. The method is to determine a probationary term consistent with the studies performed (a reasonable adaptation or reorientation often being necessary). Within the public services, difficulties arose over budgetary allocations for the program, because there are always cuts in times of crisis. Within private firms, where the periods of probation might lead to further careers, the obstacle was reluctance to receive unneeded workers during a period of retrenchment. This became translated into disputes over the real financial burden of the process. After the first efforts revealed the difficulty of implementing the program, the government decided that compulsory legal quotas were the only solution.

The economic recovery law of March 30, 1976, included articles organizing "terms of probation" for unemployed persons under 30 who had never been employed before and were holders of degrees awarded at the end of regular studies. All private firms and public services employing more than 100 workers were compelled to employ about one percent of probationers (*stagiaires* in French) for a period of six months, with a salary that was between unemployment compensation and normal pay. The ONEM budget provides for part of the cost, using savings in unemployment compensation resulting from the program, with the rationale that "it is better to pay a little more for work than for compulsory leisure."

Application of the law, however, seems to be difficult. The trade unions are suspicious because they fear the law will result in creation of legally underpaid manpower. Statistical results are not yet available, although the general impression is that results are far from those anticipated on a legal basis.

A fourth employment measure is a developing effort on the part of the school system to create and strengthen bridges between study and work. For example; the Minister of National Education (French-speaking sector) recently created the *Centre de recherche et d'information sur les Études et les Professions* (Center for Research and Information on Studies and Work Activities–CRIEP.) This institution seeks the active participation of all the involved ministries (including ONEM), of the employer and trade union organizations, of the parents' federations and families' organizations, and of the two National Councils of Youth formed by the representatives of all the movements in the French-speaking and Dutch-speaking sectors. These movements include political, social, and cultural groups, as well as specialized groups such as scientific youths, musical youths, scouts, and so on. The goal of the center is to propose and evaluate policies on youths that will integrate studies, work, and leisure.

A royal decree of April 7, 1975, institutionalized the "Regional Committees on Unemployment" that were created on the basis of the proposals of the National Conference on Employment of April 1973. These committees bring together active representatives of education, industry, commerce, and the trade unions on a regional basis, in an attempt to integrate all the relevant institutions and socioeconomic forces to achieve maximum employment, using the most qualified workers possible. Youth is recognized as a basic factor in the objectives. The vocational centers and the "centers for observation and orientation for the young unemployed" mentioned above are, of course, basic means for achieving this regional policy. A very important part of the process is the "recycling" of specialized teachers from technical schools in order to adapt the training of students to the actual skills needed by industries in the region. In fact, associations of employers have themselves organized this kind of retraining—for example, Fabrimetal (the federation of metal industries), the Belgian bank associations, insurance companies, and others. A few years ago, the federation of contractors created a fund for occupational training in the use of new materials and new types of equipment; the fund is used to train teachers of building activities in technical and vocational schools.

In this connection, there exists in all technical schools a managing committee—or at least a consultative body—composed of representatives of employers and trade unions in the region. In difficult periods when problems such as changes in technology, changes in the division of labor, or unemployment arise, these committees and bodies become decisive work groups. But all of these processes are merely methods to build bridges between the existing school system and the existing jobs. Sociologically it is a coadaptation process of great importance, but with very definite limits.

3

Belgian Education

Enrollment of children and youth in the various parts of the Belgian school system in 1975–76 is indicated in Table 9, which the reader will find a convenient point of reference throughout this section. The total number of students (full-time and part-time) was 2,335,000, or 24 percent of the total population. However, pupils younger than 15 accounted for 1,735,000, or nearly three-fourths of the total. Thus, enrolled youth in the 15 to 24 age group totalled about 600,000, or approximately 40 percent of the age group. On the basis of data for 1969–70 relating to full-time students (see Table 12), we may estimate from past enrollment trends that about 500,000 were full-time students and 100,000 were workers or employees enrolled in part-time studies.

The total number of students enrolled in the general upper secondary level was about 200,000, while there were 83,000 students in universities. Those involved in technical studies (upper and higher) appeared to be nearly 160,000.

Lower-Secondary Level

We begin our more detailed discussion of school enrollment with the lower-secondary level. At first glance, this level does not seem to involve the age group with which this study is concerned, since it normally enrolls those aged 12 to 14. However, also enrolled in the lower-secondary schools are significant numbers of laggers in the 15 to 18 age group (Table 10). If we take the total number of laggers among boys aged 15 to 18, we

Table 9. Youth at school by sex, level, and type of studies, 1975–76

Educational attainment	*Male*	*Female*	*Total*
Preprimary			
Ordinary	221,996	212,979	434,975
Special	1,754	1,192	2,946
Primary + 4th degree (ages 12 to 14)			
Ordinary	470,203	450,900	921,103
Special	23,453	14,459	37,912
Secondary			
General			
Traditional lower	88,201	81,263	169,464
Traditional upper	60,914	55,003	115,917
Technical			
Traditional lower	72,179	45,080	117,259
Traditional upper	36,558	32,780	69,338
Vocational			
Traditional lower	29,169	46,828	75,997
Traditional upper	4,570	31,170	35,740
Renewed (lower and upper)	105,567	90,689	196,256
Normal schools			
Preprimary	4	973	977
Primary	1,499	3,774	5,273
Secondary	3,757	6,303	10,060
Technical secondary	580	1,532	2,112
Technical			
1st degree	15,933	22,407	38,340
2nd degree	10,783	659	11,442
3rd degree	4,427	2,182	6,609
Universities	55,587	27,514	83,101
Total	1,207,134	1,127,687	2,334,821

[a] 60 percent at the "lower" level.

find they comprised nearly half of the pupils aged 14 enrolled in 1971–72. Among girls, the number of laggers 15 to 18 years old was only 10,000, or about one-third of the pupils enrolled at the 14-year-old level. Although the table shows that the situation was worse in 1960–61 and 1965–66 than in 1971–72, the phenomenon was of the same general order of magnitude. Let us remember that girls, on the average, are more adapted to the school system than are boys—that is, they are more conformist and more motivated.

Table 10. **Number of pupils enrolled in lower general secondary schools, by sex and age, 1960–61, 1965–66, and 1971–72**

	1960–61		*1965–66*		*1971–72*	
Age	*Male*	*Female*	*Male*	*Female*	*Male*	*Female*
12	24,005	22,859	28,054	26,212	36,042	33,520
13	30,040	26,065	31,122	27,661	36,568	34,020
14	26,386	22,800	26,262	24,181	31,493	29,775
15	11,993	8,721	12,348	9,400	11,072	7,864
16	3,966	2,836	3,598	2,724	2,945	1,868
17	846	696	742	648	577	350
18	114	191	97	139	94	65
Total	99,799	86,209	104,498	92,772	121,014	109,342

Source: Belgium, Direction Générale de l' Organisation des Études (Ministère éducation nationale française).

These laggers have little chance of pursuing further studies. They represent a fraction of youths "against school," with a bad start in life. Many of them are antisocial as well and in many cases engage in deviant, dysfunctional behavior. We shall return to this question in our discussion of social origins and studies, because lagging in studies is related to the sociocultural status of families.

The data in Table 10 relate only to those enrolled in general lower secondary education. However, the situation is very bad also in the technical sector and in the vocational/technical programs as well. Before discussing this, we need to define the content of these two sectors.

At the lower-secondary level, the purely technical sector provides training for semiqualified skills in mechanics, decorative arts, domestic work, body and beauty care, tourism and so on. (Higher qualifications will be attained by those who go on to the upper secondary technical level.) The vocational/technical sector provides less qualified skills than the technical sector: domestic dressmaking, low domestic training, elementary mechanics, building work, commerce, textiles, wood, tourism, iron work, and so on.

Although we do not have complete data for the number of laggers in the lower technical and vocational/technical secondary schools, we can develop estimates from statistics on the general secondary schools for the entire country and on all three types of schools in the French-speaking sector (Table 11).

Upper-Secondary Level

Once a student has progressed to the upper secondary level, where the normal ages are 15 to 18, schooling is no longer compulsory. The numbers of students and enrollment rates in 1960–61 and 1969–70 are indicated in Table 12.

At age 15 (end of compulsory education), the most recent census (1969–70) indicated a retention rate of nearly 90 percent. This retention rate decreased to nearly 37 percent by age 18. The rate for girls was equal to that for boys at age 15, but represented only about one-third (32 percent) at 18, compared with 41 percent for the boys. This retention, among the best in Western Europe, significantly improved between 1960–61 and 1969–70.

In 1960–61, 90 percent of men 15 to 17 were enrolled in the general or in the vocational/technical secondary level and were about equally divided between these two types of secondary programs (Table 13). A few were in normal schools, training for teaching. By age 18, only 68 percent were in the general or vocational/technical programs, again equally divided between them. Of the remainder, about half were in university or other higher studies, and the others were almost equally divided between teacher training and higher technical training. At age 19, the proportion in university or other higher studies was considerably higher, as would be expected, while the proportion in secondary schools was much lower, but still was about 40 percent (laggers who did not graduate at the normal age of 18). About 12.3 percent of 19-year-old men were in teacher training and 13.3 percent were in high technical training.

Among girls, the proportion in the general secondary level was lower than among the boys at ages 15 to 17, but was

Table 11. Estimates of the number of laggers in the three types of lower-secondary schools, French-speaking and Dutch-speaking regions, by sex, 1971–72

	General			*Technical*			*Vocational and technical*		
Networks	*Male*	*Female*	*Total*	*Male*	*Female*	*Total*	*Male*	*Female*	*Total*
Dutch-speaking	8,681	5,774	14,455	15,000	6,000	21,000	30,000	20,000	50,000
French-speaking	6,817	4,673	11,490	10,866	4,483	15,349	19,523	15,455	34,978
Total	15,498	10,447	25,945	26,000	10,500	36,500	49,523	35,455	84,978

Table 12. Number of young people enrolled in full-time study in school or postsecondary education, and enrollment by sex as a percentage of population in the age group, by age, 1960–61 and 1969–70

	Number enrolled			*Enrollment as percentage of age group*					
				1960–61			*1969–70*		
Age	*1960–61*	*1969–70*	*Percentage change*	*Male*	*Female*	*Total*	*Male*	*Female*	*Total*
15	75,429	131,093	73.8	65.6	58.6	62.1	88.9	90.3	89.6
16	59,227	100,030	68.9	53.8	43.9	48.9	71.7	66.5	69.2
17	41,657	78,811	89.2	41.3	30.1	45.7	57.0	51.9	54.5
18	25,434	51,462	102.3	31.2	18.9	25.1	41.0	32.3	36.7
19	16,279	36,247	122.7	22.5	12.4	17.5	29.9	21.1	25.6
20	12,091	24,979	106.6	16.5	6.7	11.6	22.2	13.0	17.7
21	11,509	18,594	61.6	14.3	5.8	10.0	17.5	8.0	12.8
22	6,034	11,031	82.8	8.7	1.5	5.1	11.3	3.6	7.6
23	4,300	7,485	74.1	6.3	1.1	3.7	7.9	2.1	5.1
24	2,317	4,144	78.9	3.7	0.4	2.0	5.4	2.0	3.3
15–18	201,747	362,196	79.6	48.7	38.8	43.8	65.0	60.6	62.8
19–24	52,530	103,480	97.0	11.6	4.4	7.2	16.0	8.2	12.2

Table 13. Percentage distribution of students by type of study, sex, and age, 1960–61

Sex and age	*Primary*	*General secondary*	*Vocational and technical secondary level*	*Higher technical*	*Arts*	*Primary teacher training*	*Lower secondary teacher training*	*University and non-university higher education*	*Unknown*	*Total*
Males (total)	29.0	33.3	26.3	2.3	0.4	1.8	0.8	6.0	0.1	100.0
15	2.6	48.2	46.5	–	0.3	2.1	–	–	0.3	100.0
16	1.0	45.1	48.5	0.6	0.5	4.1	–	–	0.2	100.0
17	0.6	45.1	43.3	1.9	1.1	5.8	0.2	2.0	–	100.0
18	0.3	34.2	34.1	6.1	1.6	7.2	2.1	14.4	0.0[a]	100.0
19	0.4	18.5	23.8	13.3	1.5	6.5	5.8	30.2	–	100.0
20	0.2	9.0	17.0	10.4	1.7	4.2	9.0	39.5	0.0[a]	100.0
21	0.1	4.8	11.4	22.0	1.7	2.9	8.5	48.6	0.0[a]	100.0
22	0.2	2.8	7.9	22.6	1.8	1.7	6.7	56.2	0.1	100.0
23	0.2	2.3	6.6	20.0	1.8	1.2	4.7	63.2	–	100.0
24	0.0[a]	2.0	4.4	17.8	1.7	0.7	3.0	70.4	–	100.0
25 or over	0.2	2.1	4.8	10.1	2.3	0.8	2.2	77.5	–	100.0
Females (total)	32.2	31.2	27.9	1.5	0.4	3.8	1.1	1.7	0.2	100.0
15	3.4	41.8	47.6	–	0.2	6.2	–	–	0.8	100.0
16	1.6	36.2	48.7	1.0	0.7	11.0	–	–	0.8	100.0
17	1.0	32.5	45.8	2.8	1.1	13.9	1.6	1.3	–	100.0
18	0.6	19.5	33.0	9.1	1.6	17.8	9.4	9.0	0.0[a]	100.0
19	0.5	9.9	25.9	15.5	2.0	11.7	18.1	16.4	0.0[a]	100.0
20	0.5	6.3	21.4	22.2	2.7	6.6	15.9	24.4	–	100.0
21	0.2	4.0	14.7	22.6	3.5	4.6	11.9	38.5	–	100.0
22	0.5	3.3	12.2	18.8	4.6	5.5	7.1	48.0	–	100.0
23	–	3.1	12.3	15.1	6.4	7.9	5.0	50.2	–	100.0
24	0.2	5.8	14.3	17.6	5.6	8.7	4.5	43.3	–	100.0
25 or over	0.2	4.0	16.8	25.7	5.6	11.7	6.4	29.5	0.1	100.0

[a] Less than 0.05 percent.

Source: Belgium, school census of 1960–61.

practically equal to that of the boys in the vocational/technical secondary level. From age 19 on, the proportion of women in vocational/technical training was considerably higher than among men—double at age 23 and triple beyond that.

What changes occurred between 1960–61 and 1969–70? We find that among the boys 15 and 16, about 90 percent were still in general or vocational/technical secondary schools in 1969–70 and were about equally divided between them (Table 14). But at age 17, the percentage in vocational/technical secondary training dropped, whereas the proportion in higher technical training was much larger than in 1960–61 (about triple). At age 18, a major difference in 1969–70 compared with 1960–61 was the much higher proportion in university and other higher studies—21 percent versus 14.4 percent. The proportion in higher technical training was also considerably larger than it had been nine years earlier. These differences were also apparent for 19-year-olds, with the proportions in university or other higher studies and in higher technical training considerably higher than they had been in 1960–61. Thus, over the nine-year period, the increase in access to higher studies was very noticeable in Belgium for young men.

Young women also showed an increasing tendency to reach higher levels of education. By 1969–70, the percentage of girls in the general secondary level was as high as among boys, and at age 17 there was only a slight difference. However, at age 18, the percentage of girls in secondary schools dropped sharply, reflecting, as among the boys, increased enrollment in university and higher technical education. At ages above 18, the percentages of women in both types of secondary education were higher than among men, but the numbers were small. The various stages in the transition from school to work in Belgium, for the two sexes combined, are indicated in Figure 4.

Considerable reform is taking place in the French-speaking schools at the secondary level. The traditional organization characterized by rigidly structured "streams" and by the conventional classroom system is being changed in the following ways:

- Three cycles of two years each—(1) observation, (2) orientation and (3) determination—are replacing the previous two cycles of three years each—lower and upper.
- There are no more "streams" with specific and rigid programs but more options consistent with a chosen general orientation (from age 14 on, a very free observation cycle), and a strengthening of the basic choices (quantitative orientation, language orientation, cultural orientation, and so forth) during the last two years, while retaining emphasis on basic knowledge.
- There is a continuous evaluation of performance instead of annual examinations, along with decisions on the annual reorientation by a council of the teachers.

This change took place six years ago. Thus, the universities are just beginning to receive, among first-year students, newcomers who have been educated in the "renewed" secondary level. The change, however, has only been partially accomplished. By 1975-76, there were about 115,000 in "renewed" programs and 200,000 in "traditional" programs in French-speaking secondary schools. Table 15 shows how they were distributed among types of schools under both free (Catholic) and official (public) auspices. Although "renewed" programs account for 37.5 percent of the students, only 21 percent of those in the Catholic schools are in renewed programs, compared with 50 percent in the public schools.

The Dutch-speaking schools are generally more hesitant and are still in an experimental phase. The Catholic and municipal schools are moving slowly, whereas the schools under the auspices of the state and the provinces have made a firm decision and are proceeding directly with the changes.

These reforms are too recent to permit drawing conclusions on the value of the renewed compared with the traditional programs or about their impact on enrolled youth. Furthermore, the budgetary cuts brought on by the economic crisis have not helped these reforms, which need financial resources for their accomplishment. Besides, there are many fierce debates about the respective values of the two systems. It is a new

Table 14. Percentage distribution of students by type of study, sex, and age, 1969–70

Sex and age	*Primary*	*General secondary*	*Vocational and technical secondary level*	*Preprimary and primary teacher training*	*Lower secondary teacher training*	*Arts*	*Higher technical*	*University and non-university higher education*	*Unknown*	*Total*
Males (total)	31.1	27.7	24.1	0.3	0.4	0.8	4.5	9.8	1.3	100.0
15	4.4	46.8	46.2	0.1	—	0.2	—	—	2.3	100.0
16	2.6	44.8	44.8	0.8	0.2	0.7	5.6	0.2	2.3	100.0
17	1.6	46.5	39.1	1.1	0.3	1.2	6.1	1.8	2.3	100.0
18	1.3	28.7	28.7	1.4	0.9	2.2	13.5	20.7	2.6	100.0
19	1.2	13.7	19.1	1.2	1.9	2.8	20.0	37.7	2.4	100.0
20	0.9	5.8	10.9	0.8	2.5	3.3	24.0	49.3	2.5	100.0
21–22	—	1.6	4.9	0.3	2.0	3.5	21.8	63.2	2.7	100.0
23–24	—	1.2	2.5	0.2	0.8	3.3	14.2	73.9	3.9	100.0
25–26	—	0.6	1.6	0.2	0.6	2.4	10.2	78.2	6.2	100.0
27–29	—	—	—	—	0.3	2.0	8.2	82.5	7.0	100.0
30 or over	—	—	—	0.0[a]	—	2.5	8.6	79.3	9.6	100.0
Females (total)	33.2	29.6	24.1	1.2	0.8	0.7	3.9	5.2	1.3	100.0
15	4.6	48.5	43.0	0.8	—	0.5	—	—	2.6	100.0
16	3.0	45.1	41.5	2.7	0.3	1.0	3.9	0.2	2.3	100.0
17	1.8	43.9	38.9	3.6	0.5	1.4	5.8	1.8	2.3	100.0
18	1.3	20.7	27.1	6.1	4.0	2.4	16.2	19.4	2.8	100.0
19	1.5	8.4	18.6	4.6	6.6	3.1	24.4	29.8	3.0	100.0
20	1.4	3.9	11.8	2.4	6.1	3.5	28.6	39.2	3.1	100.0
21–22	—	2.1	6.8	1.1	3.6	4.1	21.7	56.7	3.9	100.0
23–24	—	2.9	6.5	1.0	2.5	4.4	10.9	66.2	5.6	100.0
25–26	—	3.4	5.4	1.1	2.2	5.2	10.1	63.2	9.4	100.0
27–29	—	—	0.1	—	1.8	4.7	15.1	67.7	10.6	100.0
30 or over	—	—	—	—	0.1	5.5	14.5	64.5	15.4	100.0

[a] Less than 0.05 percent.

Source: Belgium, school census of 1969–70

Figure 4. Selected stages in the transition from school to work, Belgium



[a] Unemployment was negligible for this age group in 1970 but was an estimated 3 percent in 1976 (as a percentage of the age group).

[b] There was very little unemployment in this age group in the early 1970s, but estimated unemployment rates in 1976 were 4 percent of the men and 9 percent of the women (as a percentage of the age group).

Table 15. Numbers of French-speaking pupils enrolled in "traditional" and "renewed" secondary education in Catholic and public schools, 1975–76

	Traditional		*Renewed*	
Catholic	General	70,126	General	14,007
	Technical	47,374	Technical	17,164
	Total	117,500	Total	31,171
Public	*General*		*General*	
	State	37,433	State	42,338
	Provinces	481	Provinces	2,187
	Municipalities	9,922	Municipalities	1,528
		47,836		46,053
	Technical		*Technical*	
	State	5,367	State	11,087
	Provinces	8,198	Provinces	18,885
	Municipalities	21,315	Municipalities	7,878
		34,880		37,850
	Total	82,716	Total	83,903
Total		200,216		115,074

version of the *querelle des Anciens et des Modernes*—the conflict between old and new. Personally, I favor the "renewed" secondary programs in principle. The flexibility of the new approach to learning will favor adaptation to life and work and the achievement of greater social equality.

Higher Education

Enrollment in higher education amounts to 19.3 percent of the age group, which may be contrasted with the high enrollment rate of 15-year-olds in the first year of the upper-secondary level.*

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*All data on higher education are from the statistics of the Fondation Universitaire, Brussels.

In 1969–70, 87 percent of those leaving upper-secondary school received their certificates (diplomas) to enter the university. Not all of these certificates were used, however. The actual percentage going on to the university in 1969–70 was 64 percent, with relatively more participation on the part of French-speaking and male students.

By 1974–75, some important changes had occurred. During this five-year period, the percentage of the age group leaving upper-secondary school had increased to 24.6 percent compared with 19.3 percent in 1969–70. Moreover, the inequality between girls and boys was greatly reduced. In the last year of secondary school, the proportions of boys and girls are now about equal in the French-speaking schools, but in Dutch-speaking schools there is a small difference (48 percent are girls).

An interesting point, because it resists basic trends toward change, is the continued existence of a "scientific special" or elitist section found in the "best" high schools, based on intensive training in higher mathematics, which prepares students for the very selective "faculties in applied sciences." This section is small in numbers but includes 460 pupils in the French-speaking school system compared with only 172 in the Dutch-speaking system. In both systems, it is characterized by very weak participation of girls—only 85 in all—of whom the great majority (68) are in the French-speaking schools. It is disturbing to observe that the number of pupils in this section was higher in 1969–70 (722) than in 1974–75 (632). Perhaps the decline occurred because the future of industrial activities seemed less promising.

Among those receiving certificates of completion of upper-secondary school, equality with boys has been achieved by the French-speaking girls and approached by the Dutch-speaking girls, who received 43.5 percent of the certificates awarded to Dutch-speaking students in 1974–75. The decline in the rate of use of certificates—only 55.6 percent of those leaving upper-secondary school went on to the universities in 1974–75 compared with 64 percent in 1969–70—reflects the waning interest in attending universities. Even so, the absolute numbers entering increased from 15,594 to 19,538.

Two points need emphasis. First, the growth rate of new entrants, which was very high throughout the 1960s and the first few years of the 1970s, fell in 1972-73 and the following years (Table 16). However, the high growth rate for girls helped to compensate for the negative rate of boys. Secondly, girls have made remarkable progress. particularly at the upper secondary level, but noticeably more slowly at the university level. Only slightly more than 36 percent of the new entrants were girls in 1973-74.

Another point that needs emphasis is the importance of the last year of the technical section. In 1974-75, more than one-half of the total students in the last year of upper-secondary schools were in this section—amounting to 20,788 students.

A significant conclusion is that the transition from upper-secondary school to the university has until now been a real threshold, and heavy losses of the opportunity to study further occur at this point. However, there is continuous progress of the Dutch-speaking youth and relatively rapid progress for women. This trend raises the issue of the meaning of university studies. If they are considered as preparing young people for jobs of high status, enrollments will depend on evaluation of the labor market. If they are considered, on the other hand, as a means to self-accomplishment, the economic outcomes are less relevant.

University enrollments. The total number of university students was nearly three times higher in 1975-76 than in 1960-61 (Table 17). (Foreign students represented 12 percent of the total in 1975-76—four times more in French-speaking than in Dutch-speaking institutions.) Also striking, women numbered less than a quarter of the male students in 1960-61 and half of them in 1975-76. This means that women were 32.6 percent of the total in 1975-76, compared with 19.1 percent in 1960-61. As suggested earlier, the increase in female participation has been a factor in bringing about a slight growth in total enrollment in the 1970s, whereas enrollment of males has been stagnating. These developments are similar to those in the majority of Western European countries.

Table 16. Enrollments in university and nonuniversity higher education, and new entrants, first-level degrees, and doctorates in universities, 1966–67 to 1974–75

	Enrollments						*New entrants – universities*		*University first-level degree*		*Doctorates*	
	Universities		*Nonuniversity institutions*		*Total*							
Year	*Number*	*Percentage Change*	*Number*	*Percentage Change*	*Number*	*Percentage Change*	*Number*[c]	*Percentage Change*	*Number*	*Percentage Change*	*Number*	*Percentage Change*
1966–67	53,792	10.2	37,759	7.3	91,551	9.0	12,532	8.6	5,031	5.8	276	31.4
1967–68	59,172	10.1	40,777	8.0	99,949	9.2	13,615	8.4	5,729	13.9	245	-11.2
1968–69	64,779	9.5	47,432	16.3	112,211	12.3	14,755	5.7	6,565	14.6	332	5.5
1969–70	69,634	7.5	49,650	4.7	119,284	6.3	15,594	10.1	7,413	12.9	342	3.3
1970–71	75,106	7.9	–	–	–	–	17,178	8.0	7,872	6.2	338	-1.2
1971–72	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
1972–73	84,218	3.9	56,523[b]	–	140,741	–	18,522	-0.2	8,613	-1.2	455	0.1
1973–74	86,013	2.1	63,674[b]	12.7	149,687	6.4	18,299	-1.2	9,212	6.9	514	13.0
1974–75	80,980[a]	1.9	–	–	–	–	18,538	1.3	–	–	–	–

[a] Does not include higher technical education at the third level. The percentage increase from 1973–74 to 1974–75 has been computed from data for 1973–74 (79,477) which also exclude higher technical education at the third level.

[b] Does not include art education for Dutch-speaking students (1,128 students in 1970–71).

[c] Does not include higher technical education at the third level.

Source: Hecquet, Verniers, and Cerych (1976, p. 87).

Table 17. Number of students enrolled in universities, by sex, 1960-61 and 1975-76[a]

	1960–61		*1975–76*	
Age	*Male*	*Female*	*Male*	*Female*
Under 18 years	472	247	542	419
18	2,514	1,067	7,031	5,175
19	3,329	1,070	8,283	4,996
20	3,658	921	7,872	4,258
21	3,586	889	7,229	3,807
22	3,234	621	6,468	3,000
23	2,344	342	4,957	2,072
24	1,615	189	3,499	1,257
All ages	24,837	5,855	55,587	27,773
Total	30,692		83,360	

[a] Foreign students, who accounted for 10 percent of all students in 1965 and 12 percent in 1975, are included.

Source: Fondation Universitaire, Brussels.

If we compare the enrollment of students 18 to 24 in 1975–76 with the relevant age group in the general population in 1974, we find that approximately 8 percent of the age group was enrolled, compared with about 4 percent at the beginning of the 1960s. (The figure of 8 percent, of course, is only approximate, because the population data are for an earlier year than the enrollment data, and the age breaks are not quite the same; see Table 1 for the population data). However, the number in the 18 to 24 age group increased from 775,800 to 1,048,000 during the same period, so that an increase of 35 percent in the relevant population must be compared with an increase of 175 percent in the number of students. In other words, an increase in the social demand for higher education was far more important than the demographic evolution in explaining increased enrollment. Among women, 5.5 percent of the age group were enrolled in the mid-1970s compared with only 1.6 percent in the early 1960s. These data are consistent with those presented in the recent study by Hecquet, Verniers, and Cerych (1976), although the age group included in that study (18 to 20) differs from ours (18 to 24).

Nonuniversity enrollment. Higher education, of course, does not consist only of universities. Data on the nonuniversity sector, shown in Table 16, indicate that this sector continues to be less important in terms of numbers of students than the university sector, accounting for 42 percent of total enrollment in higher education in 1965–66 and 42.5 percent in 1973–74.* Although there have been some fluctuations from year to year in relative rates of growth, the nonuniversity sector has not been growing more rapidly than the university sector.

The nonuniversity sector prepares students for specific high-level technical jobs such as social workers, primary and lower-secondary teachers, nurses, staff secretaries, interpreters, professional librarians, technical engineers, artists, architects, actors, media technicians, and so forth. Its failure to grow more rapidly than the university sector reflects prejudices of both individuals and their families, who have tended to value the traditional prestige of the university as the best social and economic investment.

Nevertheless, there is a dialectical relationship between a very high sensitivity of the public to events in higher education and the traditional high regard for the university. The "hot May" of student unrest in 1968 exploded in Belgium as a consequence of similar events in Paris. In Belgium, the reaction took the form of an "occupation" of the center of Brussels University and of the School of La Cambre, a famed teaching institution for arts and architecture. In the fall of 1968, enrollment in the nonuniversity sector shot up by 16.3 percent, compared to 8 percent in 1967 and 4.7 percent in 1969 (Table 16). At the same time, however, enrollment in universities was not appreciably affected, rising by 9.5 percent from 1967 to 1968 compared with 10.1 percent in the preceding year. There was, however, an apparent impact on the number of new entrants, which showed a rise of only 5.7 percent, compared with 8.4 percent from 1966 to 1967. But in the following year, the rate of increase jumped again, as we shall see in a more detailed discussion of new entrants.

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*We have relied heavily on the study by Hecquet, Verniers, and Cerych (1976) for data on the nonuniversity sector. The Belgian portion of this excellent report, prepared by Hecquet and Verniers, who are Belgian researchers, is especially relevant.

New university entrants. The turmoil in the spring of 1968 did not have a lasting effect on the general attitude about the positive value of the university. Some newly affluent families, considering the possibility of higher education for their children for the first time, seemed to prefer the nonuniversity sector in October 1968 because of the troubled image of the university. However, following the slow-down in the fall of 1968, the rate of increase in university entrants rose sharply in 1969, suggesting a kind of compensatory effect. The rise was also quite pronounced in the following year. In any case, in my opinion, the exceptionally large increase in enrollments in nonuniversity types of institutions in the fall of 1968 must be related to the psychological consequences of the turmoil of the preceding spring.

A rather different phenomenon has appeared in the 1970s. As we saw earlier, since 1972–73, there has been a decided slowing down in the rate of increase of university enrollments and an actual decline in the number of new entrants in certain years. This development is not due to pure chance but is linked with the spreading opinion that the degrees awarded by the universities do not meet the structure of demand in the labor market. In fact, for the first time, unemployment affected graduates, and those that did get jobs did not find the type of job they expected on the basis of their degrees. Many of them were underpaid or misemployed, whether outside or inside the field normally open to persons with their degrees. This indicates a structural discrepancy between the production of graduates and the actual division of labor, a phenomenon that emerged just before the onset of the economic crisis, which tended to enlarge the gap.

Unemployment of graduates. In 1975, the total of unemployed graduates (of all ages) reached 3,255, of whom 2,051 were men and 1,204 were women. Unfortunately, we do not know how many graduates participate in the labor force, but the number of unemployed graduates in 1975 represents about one-third of the number who received degrees in 1973–74. We also know that the proportion of graduates among unemployed men rose from 1.5 percent in 1970 to 2.4 percent in 1975, and among unemployed women from 0.4 to 1.2 percent (Table 7).

In 1970, graduate unemployment was "frictional" temporary unemployment, although there was also a small number of people whose unemployment was attributable to individual lack of skills, personal characteristics, or ages. These causes of unemployment remain, of course, but do not account for most of the unemployment of university people, which increased by nearly 60 percent for men and tripled for women in 1975 after two years of economic crisis. In terms of numbers, the unemployment of male graduates tripled between 1970 and 1975, while that of female graduates increased ten times. During this same period, total national unemployment increased 2.5 times. Thus, the increase in unemployment has been more severe for university graduates, especially women.

Another development that confirms the new adverse attitudes about universities is that as the number of new entrants to universities fell, the rate of increase of nonuniversity types of enrollments rose—by 12.7 percent in 1973–74. Nonuniversity studies were considered more "specific" and more attractive than in the past and were also shorter and less selective. The economic crisis, as usual, tended to make the majority of people more realistic. Even so, as we saw earlier, nonuniversity enrollment continues to represent about the same percentage of total enrollment in higher education as in the mid-1960s.

After two years of economic recession, however, with the heavy increase of unemployment in Belgium, attitudes appear to have changed. Many people seem to think that, after all, it is better to participate in some kind of higher education than to be registered as unemployed (taking into account the low cost of higher education, the opportunity to get study allowances, and the right to continue to receive the relatively generous Belgian family allowances if enrolled in school). Thus higher education in a period of widespread unemployment is becoming, economically at least, a "parking" institution. As Cerych has shown

(Hecquet, Verniers, and Cerych, 1976), total enrollments grew significantly again in 1975, after an earlier decline in the rate of growth, in France and the Netherlands (6 percent and 6.8 percent), while the number of new entrants rose by nearly 6 percent in Great Britain and the Netherlands, and by 12 percent in Sweden.

What about Belgium? In the fall of 1974 university enrollment increased 1.9 percent, and in the fall of 1975 the rate of increase was 2.5 percent. The difference is not very conclusive, but nevertheless it is pertinent to observe that the negative rates of increase of new entrants in 1972 and 1973 became positive ones in 1974. Though the increase has been small, it supports Cerych's argument. The move is also consistent, however, with an improvement in the economic situation in terms of production, consumption, and exports, though the unemployment situation is still bad.

A slight renewal of the growth of enrollments seems to be correlated with a slight overall economic improvement. Taking into account, however, the structural gap between the production of graduates and the division of labor, it seems that the increase of new entrants conforms more to the "waiting" hypothesis than to the goal of specific preparation for entrance to the working population.

Entrants by fields of studies. There were significant shifts in the fields of studies chosen by new university entrants from 1965–66 to 1974–75 (Table 18). (In some cases, we have been able to add data for 1975–76 gathered by the Fondation Universitaire.)

In engineering—called technology in Table 18—there has been a relative decline. It seems that the needs of Belgian industry depend on a rigidly defined technological structure using a small number of engineers as organizational and technical staff. Engineering is largely a closed field for women, although there has been some progress, with an increase from 0.3 percent in 1965–66 to 1.0 percent in 1974–75 of women enrolled in this traditionally male field. However, one swallow does not make the spring, as we say in French. In 1975–76, the total number of new entrants of both sexes was 1,251, confirming

Table 18. Percentage distribution of new university entrants by field of study and sex, 1965-66 to 1974-75

	Men			*Women*		
Field	*1965-66*	*1970-71*	*1974-75*	*1965-66*	*1970-71*	*1974-75*
Total new entrants	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Pure science	14.0	10.5	11.2	16.0	12.6	14.1
Technology	13.2	9.7	10.1	0.3	0.7	1.0
Agriculture	4.1	6.5	7.1	0.4	2.1	2.8
Total science and technology	31.3	26.7	28.4	16.7	15.4	17.9
Medical science	20.4	26.2	26.5	20.2	26.5	26.2
Humanities	17.8	11.4	14.6	42.3	31.3	24.4
Law	9.4	13.2	12.3	7.9	12.5	11.6
Social sciences[a]	21.1	22.5	18.2	12.9	14.3	9.9
Other	0.0[b]	–	–	0.0[b]	–	–

[a] There are no relevant data for education and fine arts.

[b] Less than 0.05 percent.

Source: Hecquet, Verniers, and Cerych (1976).

the rigidity and selectivity of this technological field. In Belgium the five faculties of applied sciences have much prestige. They are the only programs with a legal entrance examination, which is highly selective and difficult. The small section of special scientific studies at the upper secondary level, discussed earlier, represents the only practical way to enter these faculties–in spite of the law prescribing that the only requirement for entry is to succeed in the entrance examination. Thus, the faculties of applied sciences play the same role and enjoy the same prestige in Belgium as do the *Grandes Écoles* in France. Moreover, the drop-out rate is very low, despite the pressure of sophisticated programs and high quality of performance. The same situation exists in the two Belgian *Écoles de Commerce*, with other highly selective procedures taking place through the whole cycle of studies. These are in fact business schools of high quality, such as the *École de Commerce Solvay* of the University of Brussels.

In the case of agronomy–called agriculture in Table 18–the relative number of new entrants of both sexes grew significantly during the period from 1965–66 to 1974–75. By 1975–76 it seemed that a stable level was attained. The attraction of agronomy may be explained by the concern of youth about ecological and environmental matters and the need for a harmonious coadaptation of man and nature. In fact, many new technologies are emerging within this field.

In medical sciences (including pharmacy in Table 18), there was very rapid growth from 1965–66 to 1970–71 but after that a slackening of growth. The proportions of men and women in this field behaved similarly, although the rate of increase in numbers of women was more rapid (reflecting the more rapid rate of increase in total enrollment for women). This is not a feminization process, as in Eastern Europe, but a move toward an equilibrium. However, the data compiled by the Fondation Universitaire, which separates medicine and pharmacy, shows a recent drop in the number of new entrants in the medical sections of the universities—from 3,601 in 1974–75 to 3,439 in 1975–76—as a result of the growing belief that there is a surplus of medical doctors, which is only true in the cities. But the number of degrees awarded will continue to grow for a number of years because of the increase in new entrants in the recent past (the basic studies to become a doctor of general medicine cover seven years).

In pharmacy—a section of the universities now dominated by women—there have been difficulties in opening up jobs for women graduates in recent years, with the result that there has been a real slowdown in the recruitment of new entrants.

In law there was a boom in enrollments in the later 1960s, followed by stagnation to 1974–75. There were fewer jobs for lawyers, especially for barristers. However, as a professor of sociology in the law faculty, I have been told that lawyers are frequently recruited for staff jobs in business firms. There was also a sharp increase in the proportion of women enrolled in law in the late 1960s, followed by stabilization of the proportion but a continued increase in numbers. In 1974–75, women represented a third of new law entrants.

In the social sciences, there was a steady and important increase in enrollments of both men and women from 1965–66 to 1970–71; women doubled their numbers in these fields in five years. But in the early 1970s, the trend was reversed, and, as an exception to the general trend (though paralleled in pharmacy), the proportion of women enrolled dropped sharply. The social sciences had become very popular after World War II, because the "social question" in all its aspects was at the center of political and cultural development in Europe. But the economic recession indicated clearly how degrees awarded in this field lack the "specificity" to qualify for jobs. The blow of the crisis hit the employment of university graduates in this field first.

Young people in the social sciences (still 18 percent of the men and nearly 10 percent of the women in 1974–75) tend, more than students in other fields, to participate in political and social action and to engage in very lively criticism of society and the "establishment." Their social origins, in general, are lower than in other fields. These factors explain why they are a ferment of activism inside the universities and a source of left-wing political militancy in general. This phenomenon is not a minor one, nor is its impact limited by the numbers involved, which are in fact fairly sizable. The consequences might be compared to those of the *Encyclopédie* in France before the Revolution. Now, however, the nucleus is not an established intellectual elite but a fraction of intellectual youths making youths appear–rightly or wrongly–as a central factor and basic problem in Western society.

Finally, we need to take account of the humanities–one of the biggest sectors of Belgian universities (21.8 percent of the total). Here, in contrast with other fields, there was a relative increase in enrollment among men from 1970–71 to 1974–75, following a decline in the late 1960s. And, although the number of women entrants enrolled in humanities increased throughout the nine-year period, there was a substantial decline in the proportion of women students enrolled in this field. The explanation of these shifts is to be found in changes in relative job openings in the secondary schools. The humanities indeed train teachers for this level, as do less exclusively the pure sciences. But the impact of changes in the teaching job market on those in the pure sciences is softened because of the availability of other types of employment and also because of the higher selectivity in the sciences. In the pure sciences, men remain predominant in numbers, with women representing 41.5 percent of the total. This is, of course, an example of the traditional image of women as less quantitatively minded and more attracted by literature.

Conflict and the structure of studies in the university. In 1974–75, 34 percent of new university entrants were enrolled in the two faculties–humanities and pure sciences–whose function is to produce secondary teachers. Students enrolled in these fields represented 38.5 percent of the women and 25.8 percent of the men in the universities. These students tend to be from middle-class and in some cases from working-class origins. They know that they are being trained for a vocational status lower in earnings and prestige than that anticipated by students in law, engineering, and medicine. They are educationally minded and eager to transmit their knowledge. They are very receptive to the message of the social sciences, in which they take courses that are common to a number of fields. This message, which tends to be negative toward the established order, becomes transmitted to youth by their teachers, especially at the upper-secondary level.

The impact of this phenomenon has been perceptible in Belgium since the 1950s and was important to the incidents of 1968. I do not want to formulate any value judgments about the contents of this "critical" ideology; in fact, I think that our society deserves many fundamental and obvious criticisms. What I am attempting is an interpretation of the mechanisms involving youth and the universities in the production and dissemination of this ideology. Many teachers at the secondary level, frustrated by their status and lacking other types of work experience (they leave school to go back to school), and devoted to cultural and educational work, are very susceptible to the critical, conflict-oriented, utopian approach to social problems, and in good faith they inculcate this ideology in youth. This does not mean that the majority of them are militants.

If one considers that large faculties are involved in this milieu, one must conclude that about one-half of new university entrants are exposed to this ideology and are affected by a propensity for negative political action and conflict. That does not fully explain the upheavals in 1968, which were not a pure product of the university but of the social system as well. However, it helps to explain why public opinion turned against the universities and became suspicious about youths; why the state imposed more and more control and restrictions on the budgets and on the management of the universities; and why nonuniversity types of higher studies were officially favored, developed, and more appreciated than in the past. But the situation is ambiguous and dialectical: the prestige of the university is so rooted in tradition that the evolution, after its massive growth in the 1950s and early 1960s, did not wipe out the shiny image of the institution. When the Queen sins, she is still the Queen.

Adults and the university. There is an enormous literature on the development of adult education and "permanent" or "recurrent" education. Many experts think that a better structure of higher education and, at the same time, greater equality of opportunity for all, will be realized by these new trends and principles. The British "Open University," the Empire State College of New York, and the Extended University of the University of California, which open the university to all age groups; the laws favoring adult education (for example, the expanded role of *Volkshochschule* in Rhein-Westphalia in the German Federal Republic); the educational paid leaves in many European countries—all these efforts are in the realm of recurrent education and increase opportunities for adults. In the traditional university, the goal should be to open it more widely through less formal requisites for entrance and through recognition of work experience, through more flexibility in options and in definitions of degrees, through compensation schemes for losses of earnings, through new degrees awarded after shorter studies, and through the organization of "distant" learning processes, such as correspondence courses, and the use of new technologies.

This trend toward recurrent education is very important for the youth problem, because the image of the university will totally alter if these changes are effected. It will no longer be an institution for a specific age group (18 to 25, the majority being 18 to 22), emerging from the secondary school without experience of life and work. Rather, the university will be an institution used by all age groups, including the elderly; it will no longer consist of continuous cycles of studies following the upper-secondary school, but of recurrent periods of studies with long interruptions. (The studies might frequently start after a more or less prolonged participation in real vocational work.) There are signs of this kind of development in the Belgian universities but they are very small and very recent. The most significant project is the Faculté Ouverte de Politique Economique et Sociale (FOPES), which was founded in 1974 to promote studies in the political, economic, and social sciences. The "Open Faculty" awards regular degrees (graduate level) and is open to people with enough experience (irrespective of formal prior studies) or to holders of the I.S.C.O. certificate (which will be discussed later). As usual in this type of institution, the choice and sequence of studies are very flexible. The sponsors and organizers are the Catholic French-speaking University of Louvain, the Christian political workers movement, and a Foundation *Travail-Université* (workers' university) promoting the training of responsible people for the trade unions and for other social institutions. They also train *animateurs socioculturels* (educators through informal ways). F.O.P.E.S. is too recent to be fairly evaluated. Besides, it seems to be heavily influenced by the university tradition: there is pressure to maintain the quality of awarded degrees because of public opinion, and this constraint favors tradition.

The age distribution of adults in the university showed amazing stability from 1965 to 1974. Adults represent only about 14 percent of the students (among them young medical doctors training for specialization and postgraduates pursuing their studies). The striking fact is the lack of change in age structure during a period of expansion. If one considers the age distribution of new entrants in 1974 the tendency is confirmed:

adults (23 years old and over) represent *less* than 4 percent. Eighty-five percent of the new entrants are 18 and 19 years old and are continuing their studies. The share of female students among adults entering the university (23 years old and over) is only 2.8 percent. Thus, we must sadly emphasize that in Belgium recurrent education toward basic degrees is still a negligible phenomenon through the channel of universities. Of course, there are many university study schemes for doctoral degrees and short recycling sessions and refresher courses for former graduates. The cause is obvious: universities remain traditionally closed to newcomers on account of prerequisites, modalities of studies, and examinations. This is confirmed by the fact that in 1973–74 94.6 percent of new entrants had a general school-leaving certificate (which is equivalent to the high school diploma). We must add that in Belgium no measures are taken to limit the number of young entrants in the universities, but public opinion increasingly considers this institution a producer of overqualified graduates who are ill-adapted to the needs of the economy. No wonder there are political debates about the need to organize a "numerus clausus"–a strict numerical limit on admissions–that would be either general or applied to overcrowded sections of the university. The Ministry of Education is studying a method to adjust the number of awarded degrees to the number of open jobs, especially for teachers.

However, the Ministers of Education (French-speaking and Dutch-speaking) first tried to establish a numerus clausus for entrance to the "normal" schools (nonuniversity type) training primary and preprimary teachers. Concerned public opinion, the youth movements, and the trade unions resisted heavily, and only dissuasive measures were adopted, like entrance examinations (not very selective). In the universities there are still no measures of this kind, except that foreign students from rich countries now have to pay fees more consistent with the unit costs of their section of studies. We still do not know the results of these measures.

An exception to the rule is that since the nineteenth century, admissions to the faculties of medicine have been proportioned to the capacity of hospitals to train students (the number of beds in university hospitals). Also, in some sectors of pure science, the selection is based on the availability of equipment, which is sometimes sophisticated and costly. However, there has been and is no general policy aiming, as in other countries, at upgrading nonuniversity studies, with an important exception due to the European Economic Community (EEC) concerned with "equivalences," that is, with the upgrading of the highest level of technical engineers to the university level, with the title of "industrial engineer." There is no policy to create new attractive institutions of this level, like the University Institutes of Technology (IUT's) in France or the *Gesamthochschule* (Comprehensive University) in the German Federal Republic. It has seemed necessary only to create a small number of new institutes devoted to training highly skilled people for the hardware and software use of media and communications equipment.

The following conclusions can be drawn regarding higher education in Belgium:

1. The general trend can be characterized as a tripling of the numbers of 1960–61, except that since 1972 there has been a stagnation (with a slight decrease shown by the new entrants); in 1975–76, there was again an increase, but it was very limited.
2. Female enrollment is growing very rapidly—more than male enrollment during the expansion period; this trend has continued, but slowly, compensating in total numbers for the losses of males.
3. The participation of the relevant age group in university education is relatively weak in Belgium—less than 10 percent of 19- to 22-year-olds (doubled since 1960–61). The participation of adults in the universities is very slight and does not increase.
4. However, nonuniversity higher education has represented about 42 percent of enrollment in higher education since 1965–66; this sector expanded at the same rate as the universities, but with little creation of sections for new kinds of studies.
5. As a result of the 1968 crisis, there was a momentary peak of new entrants to the nonuniversity sector in October 1968 *without* a decrease in the growth of the universities.

6. Unemployment among holders of university degrees seems to be slight but is growing more rapidly than unemployment among people with lower educational attainment; this is really striking for women. The reason is structural, but the economic recession enlarged the gap.

7. The renewal of increases in enrollment since 1974–75 might be explained by the "parking" function of the university. Analysis of the Belgian data tends to confirm this view.

8. The distribution of new entrants among fields of study shows that one-half of the students (social sciences, pure sciences, and humanities) participate in a mechanism producing a political and cultural counterideology out of a frustrated and relatively lower social status. The consequence—manifested sensationally in the 1968 crisis—is loss of support for the universities from both public opinion and political institutions.

9. If we consider the distribution of new entrants' fields of studies, we find that many fields have shown slow growth—in some cases a slight decrease—since 1972. The changes appear to correlate roughly with changes in the economy. Expansion of university enrollment seems to be encouraged by full employment. Stagnation and a decrease in numbers of entrants seems to be associated with a first phase of growing unemployment. In terms of entrance rates, the loss is substantial; in terms of numbers, it is relatively small. In a second phase, when it appears that the recession might endure, there has been a slight renewal of growth of total student enrollment, but in medicine, in pharmacy, and in the social sciences the decrease continues.

Regarding the sections of the universities that train teachers for the secondary level, the educational system is, to a considerable extent, a mechanism feeding on itself (nearly 50 percent of university enrollment). This closed circle constitutes a special milieu, with a considerable negative impact on the stability of the entire society, because its function consists of "processing" youth at the key ages of 12 to 18, before entry into society or into higher education—destined to form the elite of the social system. But the sectors training the people responsible for the economy and for the organization of the social system constitute together the "other" half of the university (medicine, engineering, law, business, and the most sophisticated sections of economics or of postgraduate studies). This technocratic product of higher education tends to resist strongly, at all levels, the negative critical ideology of the teacher-training section. The influence of upper-secondary teachers on the minds of students planning to study medicine, engineering, and so on is real, but has a weak political impact. These students remain conservative and in the university resist the critical influences. The explanation of these differences is to be found mainly in the social origins of the pupils at the upper-secondary and at the university levels. Here is a basic factor shaping differences in the minds of youth, differences that tend to become more and more pronounced in adult life.

Adult Education

Outside of the formal school system, there is a growing sector providing opportunities for studies for those who have completed compulsory schooling and are older than the normal age for participating in given studies. This is the sector of adult education modeled on the principles of "permanent," "lifelong," or "recurrent" education. In view of the recent marked expansion of initiatives in this area, it is not very easy to offer a complete survey. In addition, in many cases it is difficult to measure the participation of young adults, who are the focus of this study. We will try to give a sketch of the situation in Belgium.

Correspondence courses. The center for correspondence courses (*Cours par correspondance*) is a service of the Ministry of Education that was institutionalized by the law of March 5, 1965. The courses take the form of the exchange of written messages and materials between the teaching center and the learners. Since 1969–70 there have also been auxiliary verbal courses, designed to create a personal relationship between the teachers and the learners and to assist the learners in their methods of work. (In 1973–74, there were 7,737 sessions for the Dutch-speaking sectors.) At present the Dutch-speaking sector is preparing auxiliary courses through television and radio, while the French sector is investigating such a program.

In fact, the correspondence courses will soon become a kind of "Open University." We emphasize this development here because we know that the great majority of the learners are young adults.

The goals of correspondence courses are:

- To prepare for the examinations before the *Jurys d'État* (public boards) at the lower- and upper-secondary levels (general and technical). The degrees awarded are legally equal to the certificates awarded by the relevant full-time schools. In the French-speaking sector there are now 3,160 students, the great majority of whom are less than 25 years of age.
- To prepare for administrative examinations for many occupations and levels (for example, the examination for the occupation of administrative secretary, the lowest grade of the highest category, open only to university graduates or bureau chiefs in the ministries). Here again there are now 3,000 learners.
- To train teachers (especially in modern mathematics or in languages, audiovisual pedagogy, and so forth). A multimedia approach is used, and 4,000 young teachers are now involved in this process.

The total number of students involved in these programs is now more than 10,000, of whom the majority are young adults.

Teaching for "social promotion." Since World War I, a legal system has been built up piece by piece to provide opportunities for full-time manual and intellectual workers desiring more education. Now there is a parallel network of courses using the school buildings during the evenings and weekends and also using teaching equipment and full-time teachers. There are also evening teachers who come from office, factory, or civil service jobs. This teaching is organized in all types of schools by the administrative network that manages the school itself, but the staff responsible for these "promotional" evening schools is different from the regular staff.

This type of instruction is developing in all types of secondary schools–general, technical, vocational, and special (for people with handicaps)—and exists also at the higher technical level of nonuniversity higher education. It is available for all age groups after the compulsory period of schooling. In 1974–75, there were 180,000 students, of whom 76 percent were less than 25 years of age.

Table 19 provides detailed data on enrollment in the French-speaking "parallel" network. We observe the very large proportion of enrollment under the auspices of the municipalities (nearly one-half), followed by the Catholic school system (nearly one-third). The municipalities are the only sponsors providing courses in arts on an evening or weekend basis, and they are successful. More than 85 percent of the students, however, devote their efforts toward technical upgrading (that is, to the improvement of their careers) at the secondary level, and 6 percent aim at nonuniversity higher education qualifications. At the higher education level, we must call attention to the efforts of the provinces, followed by the Catholic school system and the municipalities. There are also more than 2,000 teachers aiming at being upgraded—from the preprimary to the primary, and from the primary to the secondary. All of these facts are very encouraging.

The situation is nearly the same in the Dutch-speaking school system, with the Catholic network playing a more important role and the provinces a less important role.

There are two types of "social promotion" courses: (1) long studies (that is, longer than the time required in full-time regular schooling), awarding regular degrees, which mean vertical promotion; and (2) short studies, awarding new certificates of specialization, which mean horizontal promotion (higher but at the same degree levels). The long studies, for example, award regular degrees of technical engineer or commercial engineer and licenses in accounting and financial sciences. The majority of students, however, achieve a legal technical secondary degree (originally they had only lower-secondary or complementary vocational certifications). Short studies frequently cater to the needs of workers whose employers, since World War II, have increasingly wanted their employees to obtain new degrees in communications, marketing, and the like.

Table 19. Enrollment of French-speaking young adults in courses for "social promotion," 1975–76

Types and levels of teaching	*State*	*Provinces*	*Munici-palities*	*Free (Catholic)*	*Total*
Secondary technical	12,862	6,513	37,099	24,133	80,607
Higher technical	906	1,659	1,498	1,570	5,633
Technical special	–	13	–	468	481
Normal technical, primary and secondary	281	901	301	695	2,178
Arts, secondary	–	–	3,757	–	3,757
Arts, higher	–	–	283	–	283
Total enrollment[a]	14,049	9,086	42,938	26,866	92,939

[a] We know that girls represent nearly one-half, but they are more numerous at the lower levels of these studies.

Source: Belgium, Direction Générale de l'Organisation des Études (General Administration for the Organization of Studies).

A ministerial decision of February 20, 1970, provided for the structuring of secondary part-time studies, technical and vocational, in terms of credits (*unités capitalisables* in French). This makes possible complete individual choice of the scheduling and length of the studies or allows the individual to obtain certification only for the courses he or she actually needs to achieve a personal, professional purpose. This sector, one of the most promising in Belgium, attracts an elite of highly motivated young adults and is a forerunner of "permanent" education.

The new legislation on crédits d'heures. A timid first step toward the new legislation on *crédits d'heures* (credits of hours) was a law of 1963 in favor of young workers 16 to 20. An opportunity was provided to get paid leave for a few days (no more than a week annually) for "social promotion" studies. The small budget covering this program was never fully used. The reason, I believe, is that employers, many of whom were reluctant to recruit young workers because they were "unstable," did not like this new complication in the organization of work, and their pressure discouraged workers from applying for the leave. This was followed, however, by the law of April 10, 1973, which provided for a program to remunerate the hours devoted to "social promotion" studies without loss of earnings. This law covers all workers and employees (including servants), Belgian or foreigners, of less than 40 years of age and occupied full time in private firms under a labor contract (the usual situation).

In the same year, the law covering general and vocational training was extended to architecture, industrial and technical design, and agriculture. The advantages provided are as follows:

- If the worker is a new entrant to studies, he or she will be released from work and paid for one quarter of the hours required by the chosen course (for example, the worker will receive full pay for 25 hours if the course requires 100 hours).
- If the worker has completed one year of a course covered by the law successfully, he or she will receive pay for one-half of the hours required for a new course.
- If the worker has completed two years of regular studies, he or she will receive pay for all the hours of a new course.

The *Conseil de l'Entreprise*—a legal institution composed of representatives of employers and employees responsible for all social questions and for the management of the firm—may organize the time schedules of workers or employees wishing to use *crédits d'heures*, or the schedules may be arranged under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. In October 1974, the law was extended by royal decree to full-time workers who became new entrants into universities for regular courses on a part-time basis. Then in March 1975, also by royal decree, the law was extended to cover general courses aiming at economic, social, and cultural knowledge. The institution organizing courses of this kind was to be agreed upon by the government.

The financing of the *crédits d'heures* law is provided half by the state budget and half by a small employer payroll tax, which started at 0.1 percent in January 1973 and was raised to 0.2 percent in September 1973. The employer contribution is paid into a fund through the social security system. Thus the employer has no financial interest in discouraging use of the law. Nevertheless, it is once more discouraging that 90 percent of the employees entitled to benefit from the law did not take advantage of it. Only 12,233 workers took advantage of the law in 1973–74, and only 17,820 in 1974–75—though we know that 100,000 workers are part-time students in the network of the school system. (Among them, we must keep in mind the large proportion performing "long studies" through the "social promotion" scheme.)

In any case, what is important is that this legislation provides the principles and structure needed for a general organization of lifelong education. Passing a law is never enough; also required is the will of people (and that calls for education, also).

Vocational centers. The National Office of Employment (*Office National de l'Emploi*—ONEM) founded vocational centers after World War II that were open to all workers encountering difficulties in their jobs, such as obsolescence of skills, unemployment, industrial accidents, a need for retraining because of disability, a need to be "recycled," or a need to master new techniques and processes. They were also open to persons who had a capacity to be trained for higher qualifications needed by the economy. The centers were sometimes established with the help of decentralized bodies—employer organizations, large firms, or technical schools. When necessary, ONEM was allowed to require unemployed workers to submit to readaptation in a vocational center.

This network of centers, operated by the Ministry of Labor and Employment, might be called the readaptation educative network. With the onset of the economic crisis and the growth of unemployment, these centers, which are quite varied, became more and more important and were confronted with recurrent and pressing emergencies that were difficult to handle. But their work is valuable and useful, in spite of the fact that in this type of training self-accomplishment is necessarily neglected in favor of rapid practical achievement. Nevertheless, this training institution might become more positive as a bridge between studies and work in many ways, if it were no longer constrained by the impact of economic crisis. Moreover, from the perspective of our focus on youth, the ONEM centers give priority to young workers. There is a good reason for this—the young are closer to education, having been at school recently, and are more accustomed to educational relationships.

Apprenticeship. The principles governing apprenticeship, set forth in the Royal Decree of April 13, 1959, and revised by a decree of February 25, 1971, are as follows:

- There are two recognized statuses: qualification and independent employer (*patronat* in French). Qualification is performed by working under the authority of an agreed independent employer for a maximum of four years.
- Apprenticeship may begin only after compulsory schooling (after age 14).
- Qualification is performed under the terms of a written contract negotiated by an apprenticeship secretary approved by the Ministry of Middle Classes. This contract certifies that the legal conditions are observed.
- Under the supervision of the boss (the independent employer to whom the apprentice is linked through the contract), the apprentice is obliged to learn a craft by working and to enroll in technical courses organized by the Chamber for Crafts and Commerce and also in general courses organized or approved by the same body. The apprenticeship secretary supervises the entire process in order to ensure the observance of the legal conditions.
- The general courses are complementary to the practical ones and to training on the job. There are only 72 hours of courses during the first year, followed by 132 hours of general and 124 hours of vocational courses during the following three years. The courses are submitted for approval to the inspectors of the Ministry of Middle Classes.
- At the end of the fourth year, the candidates must take a qualification examination, successful completion of which leads to a certificate awarded by the ministry.

Young persons under 18 years old and who have a certificate awarded at the end of an apprenticeship or have a lower-secondary degree must serve a "term of probation" to become an independent employer. This is especially valuable for sons or daughters of independent employers (expecting eventually to take over the business of the father) or for young people provided with family investment funds to create a new business. Here they are trained to become independent employers with courses in accounting, social and financial legislation, and with practical training. This program takes two years. Certificate holders who can provide a financial guarantee are eligible for a loan from a special public credit network, the *Caisses Nationales de Crédit Professionel.*

The qualification stage has been subject to strong criticisms. First, many of these apprentices are used by their employers as a cheap and totally dependent source of manpower or as domestic servants, with vocational training neglected. The inspectors are too dependent on the Chambers for Crafts and Commerce, which in turn are too influential politically in relation to the Ministry of Middle Classes. Second, the general courses account for only three or four hours weekly, which is not enough. The technical courses also have too few hours of instruction. In addition, these courses, with some exceptions, are noticeably weaker than those under the supervision of the Ministry of Education. Finally, some critics claim the practical apprenticeship begins when people are too young (only 14 years old the first year).

The number of new apprenticeship contracts increased from 8,693 in 1960 to 10,520 in 1974, while the total annual number of contracts remained fairly constant—19,702 in 1960 and 19,253 in 1975. In Brussels and in the Walloon region, there are 15 training centers (*centres de formation*) equipped for both general and technical courses. For the general courses, teachers in the formal school system are recruited for additional work on a part-time basis.

Paradoxically the principles involved in this kind of training correspond to the most advanced reforms now being proposed in several countries for the age group from 15 or 16 to 18 or 19, which include the following:

- A systematically organized alternation between work and studies, with practical and related contents;
- Payment to be received for the work;
- The studies to be closely linked to the work and also aimed at general personal development;
- The status of the young person to be based on a contractual

procedure that contemplates the completion of a learning project;
- The training to be under actual conditions of production ("to go to the knowledge and skills resources").

The success and value of this approach depend on relevance at each level, democratization of individual rights, and reliable guarantees and controls to ensure observance of the appropriate statuses. At present, a new law on apprenticeship is being prepared to meet the various criticisms and to improve the educational and social quality of this teaching network.

Institut supérieur de culture ouvière–ISCO. The Higher Institute for Workers Culture was founded in 1962 by the Christian Workers Organization of Belgium, which is a political movement linked with the Christian trade unions. This innovative institution is devoted to offering genuine higher education in important historical, political, social, and economic fields for people with valuable personal experience. To achieve its purpose, there were to be no prerequisites in terms of formal studies, and the style of the studies is distinctive:

- The structure is based on self-managed groups of 30 to 40 students, but the real work is carried out by small units of four to seven people and is based on friendship and exchange.
- There is neither competition nor individual selection. Self-evaluation within the group, through the group, and by the group itself is continuously associated with the process of studies and guides its progress step by step.
- The pedagogical relationship takes the form of equal cooperation between the students and teachers (who are of university level), who try to use personal experiences in order to master new knowledge and methods.
- Besides the acquisition of knowledge, the goals are to qualify people to express themselves well in speech and writing, to work together as a team, to handle conflict situations, and to solve the practical problem of relations of ends and means.
- The acquired knowledge is action oriented.

Four years of study are necessary to get a special certificate–30 Saturdays and 60 evenings each year, together with the defense of a final report on a relevant topic. Usually, the participants must pay a small fee. Their studies are covered by the law on *crédits d'heures* discussed earlier.

These studies are highly valued for advancement in social and political organizations or as a way to self-accomplishment. In addition, the certificate allows one to enter the new "Open Faculty" created in 1972, which has a program of very flexible studies leading to regular degrees under the academic certification of the well-known faculties of the Belgian Catholic higher education network. This aspect of the program, which is very promising, is too young to be evaluated qualitatively or quantitatively.

The ISCO experience is old enough to be recognized as a solid institution with its own identity. "Space-free," it operates through 20 centers in the French-speaking region of Belgium. The program is outlined in Table 20, but there are large options concerning actual content within the constraints posed by the need to study specific approaches, methods, and basic terms of reference.

In 1972, when ISCO was 10 years old, a survey was made of its student population, which revealed the following interesting characteristics:

- Total number: 800 (a third being women)

- Age groups:

20 to 25 years old	23 percent (the minimum age for admission is 20)
26 to 30	23 percent
31 to 40	28 percent
more than 40	26 percent.

- Occupational activities, main categories:

high level	5.7 percent
teachers and social workers	7.3 percent
qualified office employees and middle-level staff	27.0 percent
skilled workers and foremen	16.4 percent
low-level office employees	25.1 percent
unskilled workers	9.4 percent

Table 20. Educational program of the Higher Institute for Workers Culture

	1st year		*2nd year*		*3rd year*		*4th year*	
		hours		*hours*		*hours*		*hours*
Disciplines and courses	Economics	50	Economics	50	Economics	50	Seminars in economics or sociology	40
	Sociology	30	Sociology	30	Sociology (institutions and cultural practices)	20	Art (institutions and cultural practices)	30
	Social history	30	Social history	30	Philosophy, sciences, and technology	20	Philosophy	20
	Practical initiation to mathematics	20	Political initiation	30	Social rights	20	Social rights	10
Methods (individual and collective)	Method and expression	40	Method and expression	30	Method and expression	20	Methods and techniques for observation and analysis of social facts. Practical work preparing for the final report	25
Group life through the enlarged council of year-groups		10		10		10		10
Total Saturday courses (30)		180		180		180		180
Work in subgroups (2 hours/week)		60		60		60		60
Total		240		240		240		240

(Thus a quarter are workers and a quarter are low-level employees.)

- Number of work years before the entrance into ISCO:

one or less	14 percent	these are young adults
2 to 5	20 percent	
6 to 9	15 percent	
10 to 15	21 percent	
more than 15	30 percent	

4

Social Origins and Studies

On the basic problem of equality of opportunity in education, there are few reliable, up-to-date, and comprehensive sets of data in Europe. Until now in Belgium we have had only sporadic data—enough to perceive that there are important inequalities in our educational system, but not very precise and lacking national quantitative perspectives.

Fortunately, very recently a valuable inquiry on this subject has been completed relating to French-speaking youths in Belgium (Belgium, Ministry of National Education and Culture, 1974). In spite of the progressive institutionalization of its regions, Belgium remains a national society. The social structures, involving the same school system, are not very different in the Dutch-speaking and French-speaking regions. The expansion and democratization of the educational system were relatively backward in the northern part of Belgium until the 1950s, but in recent years differences in participation have been rapidly wiped out.

The inquiry was based on a structured sample of more than 37,000 pupils of both sexes in the French-speaking school system, from the primary to the upper-secondary level, in 1973-74. It sought to determine the relationship between social origins on the one hand and (1) success in studies in terms of percentages of laggers in all school years, streams, and sections, and (2) choices of studies at all levels, beginning with the lower-secondary level, on the other hand.

We are primarily interested in youths 15 to 24—and thus in relation to this particular inquiry with youths 15 to 18—who are normally in the upper-secondary level. The reliability of the sample, especially at the upper-secondary level, is indicated in Table 21, which compares the structure of the sample with that of the total French-speaking school population.

Social Origins of Laggers

We begin with a discussion of laggers at the primary level, because the effects at the primary level carry over to the secondary levels. Laggers represent nearly one-fifth of all pupils in the first year of primary school and nearly 40 percent by the sixth year (Table 22). The highest percentages of laggers (25 percent in the first year and 43 percent in the sixth year) are sons and daughters of unskilled workers. The lowest percentages

Table 21. Percentage distribution of pupils in the 1973-74 survey of pupils compared with the total French-speaking school population, by levels and types of instruction

		Sample	*Total Population*
Primary		50.8%	54.2%
Lower secondary		32.2	28.6
Education:	general	13.8	9.6
	technical	6.5	4.6
	vocational	5.2	5.4
	renewed	6.7	9.0
Upper secondary		13.5	13.4
Education:	general	7.2	6.8
	technical	3.8	3.5
	vocational	1.4	1.6
	renewed[a]	1.1	1.5
Higher, nonuniversity type		3.5	3.8
TOTAL		100.0	100.0

[a]See Table 15 and the accompanying discussion on the renewed school programs.

Source: 1973-74 survey of school pupils.

Table 22. Percentage of laggers according to the occupation of the head of the family, primary level

	Average	*High staff*	*Teachers*	*Medium staff*	*Lower staff*	*Agriculture*	*Skilled workers*	*Unskilled workers*	*Retailers craftsmen*
1st year	19.4	4.9	5.7	12.2	11.9	12.2	17.4	25.0	18.8
2nd year	25.5	4.4	8.6	8.3	9.2	29.3	26.4	33.8	21.0
3rd year	31.4	2.3	5.9	14.0	18.6	24.5	32.1	40.1	21.5
4th year	34.7	5.4	4.8	17.9	22.8	36.1	35.4	47.2	34.5
5th year	35.7	12.5	4.5	15.4	24.5	28.3	38.8	42.8	31.8
6th year	37.1	10.9	14.3	21.0	25.3	37.2	36.0	43.0	29.9

Source: 1973–74 survey of school pupils.

(less than 5 percent in the first year and less than 11 percent in the sixth year) are children of high staff people (high managerial positions, industry, civil service, and professional activities such as medical doctors). Thus the chances of falling behind in elementary school are five times greater in the first year and four times greater in the sixth year for the children of unskilled workers than for those of the "ruling class," in spite of efforts of primary schools to promote as many pupils as possible. Significant also is the fact that, in the sixth year, the second-best record—in terms of a relatively small percentage of laggers—is obtained by the children of teachers. This indicates that the primary factor is the cultural level and motivation of the families more than their income level. There is, of course, a correlation between both factors, but the primary one is the cultural position.

The sons and daughters of migrants are included in these statistics, but are not shown separately. It is obvious that their low social status and their language and cultural differences are factors tending to cause lags in their primary studies. Does their participation increase the calculated inequalities among native Belgian French-speaking children? Table 23 shows that 19

Table 23. Foreign children as a percentage of school students, by school level, French-speaking and Dutch-speaking sectors, 1972–73

School level	*French-speaking sector*	*Dutch-speaking sector*
Total	17.0%	2.3%
Preprimary	16.5	2.4
Primary	18.9	2.4
General lower secondary	11.7	1.9
General upper secondary	6.8	1.2
Technical lower secondary	17.1	1.8
Technical upper secondary	14.4	1.2
Vocational lower secondary	26.5	3.5
Vocational upper secondary	17.8	1.4

Source: Belgium, Ministry of Education and Culture, French-Speaking Section, *Inquiry of the General Directorate of the Organization of Studies,* Statistical and Programmatic Service, No. 9, 1974.

percent of the pupils in the primary schools are children of foreigners. Assuming that two-thirds of the fathers are unskilled workers and that about 80 percent of the foreign pupils in the primary schools are likely to be laggers, we see that this situation does not change the structure of inequality in the schools. This may be due to the fact that many migrants, after years of work, become skilled workers or workers in the service sector, and some foreigners are members of the staffs of international organizations. However, these foreign children require, of course, special efforts to overcome their handicaps.

At the lower-secondary level--even in the general secondary programs (with which Figure 5 is concerned), where the social origins of parents are more homogeneous and generally at higher occupational levels than in the technical and vocational streams—the impact of social origins is obvious and strong. In the third year, the sons and daughters of agricultural families show a leveling off in their losses (compared with the first year) that puts them in a relatively better position than the children of staff people and equal to that of children from teachers' families. This may reflect that agricultural children drop out between the first and third years, leaving the more able children in school. What seems paradoxical is that the largest increases in percentages of laggers between the first and third years is shown by the teachers' children, who displayed the smallest percentage of laggers in the first year. I am not certain about the reason for this, but the majority of teachers are preprimary and primary teachers and are experts in guiding their children at the elementary level. Teachers used at the secondary level, where disciplines are taught by more specialized people, are not as able to help their children at that level. But the children of teachers improve their relative position at the upper secondary level (Figure 6), because those remaining at that level are more likely to be the sons and daughters of upper secondary and university teachers, all of whom are educated in universities.

The most important point, however, is that in the third year of the lower secondary level, the laggers in general education remain between 30 and 40 percent.

Figure 5. Percentages of laggers according to the occupation of the head of the family, lower-secondary level, general education program



Lower secondary: 1st year.



Lower secondary: 3d year.

Source: Belgium, Ministry of Education and Culture, French-Speaking Section, *Inquiry of the General Directorate of the Organization of Studies,* 1974.

Figure 6. **Percentages of laggers according to the occupation of the head of the family, upper-secondary level, general education program**



Source: Belgium, Ministry of Education and Culture, French-Speaking Section, *Inquiry of the General Directorate of the Organization of Studies,* 1974.

What will they do? The sons and daughters of high and medium staff will be forced to continue, with longer and longer delays, in the upper general secondary level, and this explains the high rate of losses for these groups in the first year of the upper secondary level (Figure 6). The worst laggers will continue in technical and vocational studies. That will be more generally the spontaneous choice of the other social groups, but, at the end of the lower secondary level, a substantial proportion will go to work or into an apprenticeship, with only complementary part-time further studies of a low level. Whether these young people continue in vocational or technical studies or go to work, they must be considered frustrated and deprived of satisfaction in relation to their early socio-economic goals and aspirations.

These suppositions are confirmed if we compare these findings with those relating to the technical and vocational stream. As a result of the selection process that has occurred, the average percentages of laggers for each school year represent the majority (60 percent, 56 percent, and 64 percent in the successive years). Thus, compared with the general education stream, these streams are second-rate studies for generally second-rate pupils according to school standards. The majority of laggers are headed for work, except for the sons of high or medium staff people, who will continue, with increasing lags. The relatively better position of those from agricultural families may be explained by the practical attitudes of these pupils and their tendency to study agronomy and horticulture. The same applies to the comparatively improved position of the retailers group, who enter commercial training, where motivation is high.

At the upper secondary level, the general tendency is for the percentages of laggers to decrease from the first to the third year (Figure 6). The explanation is that at this level enrollment is no longer compulsory. Thus, after a last attempt in the first year, failures take the form of dropouts. This is indicated by the retention rates in upper secondary schools, which decrease from 70 percent of the age group at age 16 to 40 percent at age 18.

The smallest decline of laggers occurs among children of skilled and unskilled workers. The explanation here is apparent: obviously the cultural differences between the entire society and the working class make the speech and culture of the upper secondary level difficult for children of workers. At this level, the general education program is the most humanistic, especially reflecting the bourgeois culture.

The percentages of laggers in the general education program continues to be very high at age 18 (24 to 41 percent) despite the declines. This means fewer opportunities to continue into the university and more cruel frustration of individual goals after a longer effort and higher initial aspiration than at the lower secondary level. Thousands of young people are traumatized at this stage of life. As adults they will become disappointed lovers of the university, wanting it for their children but criticizing its privileges, as we have seen.

In the diversified technical and vocational streams of the upper secondary level, the percentages of laggers are even higher, amounting to 54.5 percent, even for the occupation group with the lowest rate, in the first year and to 54 percent in the third year. In general, they increase through the three years, reaching an average of nearly 74 percent in the third year, and amounting to 88.2 percent for children of agricultural families, 81.2 percent for sons and daughters of retailers, 77.3 percent for those from lower staff families, and 70.6 percent for children of skilled workers. Thus, completion of this sector of studies is infrequent; only a few pupils perform their studies at the normal age for their level.

Choices of Studies and Social Origins

A choice of studies is possible for the first time in the seventh school year (after age 12), when one selects the general, technical, or vocational stream. The general stream is later divided into substreams at the upper-secondary level: Latin-Greek, Latin-math, Latin-sciences, scientific A (strong mathematics, but no Latin), scientific B (less emphasis on mathematics), economics, and human sciences. In addition, there is the "special scientific" program in a few schools, discussed in Chapter III.

At the lower secondary level, more than 90 percent of children of high staff people, lawyers, medical doctors, and teachers are in the general stream, while their participation in the vocational stream is negligible (Table 24). (The percentages for children of lawyers and doctors are not statistically reliable, however, because of small samples.) In the technical stream, very small percentages of children from these families are

Table 24. Percentages of pupils in the three educational streams, lower-secondary level, by sex and sociooccupational category of parents

Sociooccupational category	*Total*			*General*			*Technical*			*Vocational*		
	Male	*Female*	*Total*	*Male*	*Female*	*Total*	*Male*	*Female*	*Total*	*Male*	*Female*	*Total*
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	57.3	61.6	59.3	28.8	20.6	25.0	13.9	17.8	15.7
High staff (public)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	90.3	95.5	—	9.7	4.5	—	—	—
High staff (private)	100.0	100.0	100.0	96.1	90.2	93.6	3.9	9.0	6.1	—	0.8	0.3
Law	100.0	100.0	100.0	93.8	87.5	91.6	6.2	—	4.2	—	12.5	4.2
Medicine	100.0	100.0	100.0	92.3	96.4	94.4	7.7	3.6	5.6	—	—	—
Teachers	100.0	100.0	100.0	88.6	93.4	91.0	9.8	4.9	7.4	1.6	1.7	1.6
Medium staff	100.0	100.0	100.0	82.0	87.1	84.3	16.5	9.8	13.4	1.5	3.1	2.3
Lower staff	100.0	100.0	100.0	76.5	76.7	76.6	18.9	15.4	17.2	4.6	7.9	6.2
Agriculture and related activities	100.0	100.0	100.0	45.7	57.7	51.2	37.9	20.6	30.0	16.4	21.7	18.8
Skilled workers	100.0	100.0	100.0	54.5	60.6	57.5	32.5	22.2	27.5	13.0	17.2	15.0
Unskilled workers	100.0	100.0	100.0	36.1	50.8	44.1	45.0	26.7	35.0	18.9	22.5	20.9
Retailers/ craftsmen	100.0	100.0	100.0	66.4	66.2	66.3	27.1	22.2	24.6	6.5	11.6	9.1
Arts	100.0	100.0	100.0	60.0[a]	62.5[a]	61.5[a]	20.0[a]	25.0[a]	23.1[a]	20.0[a]	12.5[a]	15.4
No profession	100.0	100.0	100.0	25.7	57.1	45.1	61.5[a]	30.2	42.2	12.8	12.7	12.7
Profession not defined	100.0	100.0	100.0	58.8[a]	57.2[a]	58.1	17.7[a]	21.4[a]	19.3	23.5	21.4[a]	22.6
Profession not registered	100.0	100.0	100.0	52.8	56.1	54.3	29.9	21.8	26.3	17.3	22.1	19.4

[a] Percentages not significant because of small number of cases.

Source: Belgium, Ministry of Education and Culture, French-Speaking Section, *Inquiry of the General Directorate of the Organization of Studies*, 1974.

enrolled—for example, 3.9 percent of the boys and 9 percent of the girls from high staff families. In contrast, among sons and daughters of workers and agricultural parents, participation in the general stream is around 50 percent; in the technical, about 30 percent; and, in the vocational, about 20 percent.

All of these tendencies are very pronounced, and the correlations with social origins are significant. Thus, for the higher socioeconomic categories, only a small minority of children have no real chance to enter the university whereas 40 to 50 percent of the children of workers and peasants lose this opportunity. And they lose it at age 12 or 13, while the effects continue afterwards. The survivors become more able to resist adverse selection by the end of upper secondary studies.

The data for the upper-secondary level reveal the impact of new influences (Table 25). Among children of high staff people in the private sector, for example, 89.5 percent are in the general education stream, but this proportion is lower than that which prevailed at the lower-secondary level (93.6 percent). However, the shift away from general education occurs among boys but not among girls. In fact, female pupils of this age and in this social class seem to be more motivated as they become more and more "liberated" and conscious about sex equality and women's rights. Inheriting the traditional female status, however, they remain psychologically more ready to follow conformist patterns and are less resistant than boys to the school system, which for women means a conquest and a way of entering society on equal terms. In contrast, a significant proportion of boys have shifted to the technical stream, which at the upper-secondary level accounts for 11 percent of those from high staff (private sector) families compared with only 4 percent at the lower-secondary level. Clearly there is a shift from general to technical, explained by school failures. For the girls, however, the shift goes from the technical (which accounted for 9 percent at the lower-secondary level and only 4.3 percent at the upper-secondary level) to the general stream.

Of interest is the evolution in the teachers' category, with a 28 percent loss for the boys (88.6 to 60.3 percent) and only a 13 percent loss for the girls (93.4 to 80.6 percent). The data indicate that the shift takes place to the technical stream.

Table 25. Percentages of pupils in the three educational streams, lower-secondary level, by sex and sociooccupational category of parents

Sociooccupational category	*Total*			*General*			*Technical*			*Vocational*		
	Male	*Female*	*Total*	*Male*	*Female*	*Total*	*Male*	*Female*	*Total*	*Male*	*Female*	*Total*
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	60.4	59.2	59.9	34.7	23.1	29.6	4.9	17.7	10.5
High staff (public)	100.0	100.0	100.0	85.7	87.0	86.4	14.3	8.7	11.3	—	4.3	2.3
High staff (private)	100.0	100.0	100.0	87.6	92.8	89.5	10.7	4.3	8.4	1.7	2.9	2.1
Law	100.0	100.0	100.0	88.9	91.7	90.5	11.1	8.3	9.5	—	—	—
Medicine	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	94.1	97.1	—	5.9	2.9	—	—	—
Teachers	100.0	100.0	100.0	60.3	80.6	70.0	39.7	12.9	26.9	—	6.5	3.1
Medium staff	100.0	100.0	100.0	76.6	78.9	77.4	20.7	15.8	19.0	2.7	5.3	3.6
Lower staff	100.0	100.0	100.0	74.1	73.2	73.7	24.0	15.6	20.1	1.9	11.2	6.2
Agriculture and related activities	100.0	100.0	100.0	35.3	66.0	48.3	57.4	14.0	39.0	7.3	20.0	12.7
Skilled workers	100.0	100.0	100.0	56.8	63.9	60.1	37.9	17.8	28.6	5.3	18.3	11.3
Unskilled workers	100.0	100.0	100.0	47.9	56.4	51.8	47.4	26.4	37.9	4.7	17.2	10.3
Retailers/ craftsmen	100.0	100.0	100.0	66.2	62.9	64.7	29.9	22.7	26.8	3.9	14.4	8.5
Arts	100.0	100.0	100.0	75.0[a]	60.0[a]	66.7[a]	25.0	40.0[a]	33.3[a]	—	—	—
No profession	100.0	100.0	100.0	52.0	48.7	50.0	44.0	35.1	38.7	4.0	16.2	11.3
Profession not defined	100.0	100.0	100.0	50.0[a]	100.0[a]	75.0[a]	50.0[a]	—	25.0[a]	—	—	—
Profession not registered	100.0	100.0	100.0	56.0	49.4	53.2	37.8	28.2	33.6	6.2	22.4	13.2

[a] Percentages not significant because of small number of cases.

Source: Belgium, Ministry of Education and Culture, French-Speaking Section, *Inquiry of the General Directorate of the Organization of Studies*, 1974.

The lower socioeconomic categories (workers and peasants) tend to conserve their relative positions, as expected, because at the upper-secondary level their sons and daughters are more selected and more motivated. (The influence of selection helps them to remain in the general stream, but the decrease of laggers, as we have seen, is smaller than for pupils belonging to higher social strata.) This tendency shows up clearly in the unskilled category: at the lower secondary level, 44 percent of pupils in this group are in the general stream, while the proportion is nearly 52 percent at the upper-secondary level. Among boys, the proportion in the technical stream changes very little, while there is a shift from about 19 percent to 5 percent in the vocational stream. Thus, improvement occurs in all sectors

As for inequality among socioeconomic categories, however, the devastating effect of the laggers influences the structure of participation in the three types of studies at first, but later the relative position of the survivors of the lower socioeconomic groups progressively (though slowly) improves as is evident at the upper-secondary level. But here we have to take into account the proportions of the age groups. The trend seems to be one of strong overall inequality but progressive equality among social categories for survivors in school.

Social origin is not the only factor affecting the choice of studies or success in them (through needs, aspirations, traditions, and so on). We saw, for instance, how sex is a factor, and we also must consider the number of children in the family. The data show that families with three or fewer children achieve better positions in the school system than families with four or more children.

Let us now consider the substreams in the general education stream at the upper-secondary level, for they determine in large part the situation at the university. In analyzing Table 26, we must distinguish between the "noble" sections, which traditionally and actually lead to university studies, and the "less noble" ones, which lead to professional activities at a middle level, such as medium staff, craftsmen, retailers, and small business. There are also high technical studies, lasting one or two

Table 26. Percentages of pupils in the general stream of the upper-secondary level, by type of study and sociooccupational category of parents

Sociooccupational category	*Total*	*Total Latin sections*	*Latin/ Greek*	*Latin/ math*	*Latin/ sciences*	*Scien-tific A*	*Scien-tific B*	*Econ-omics*	*Human sciences*
Total	100.0	40.6	15.3	11.9	13.4	12.4	17.6	26.6	2.8
High staff (public)	100.0	54.1	18.9	8.1	27.1	16.2	10.8	13.5	5.4
High staff (private)	100.0	46.7	16.6	11.7	18.4	18.4	18.4	14.1	2.4
Law	100.0	61.1	33.3[a]	16.7	11.1	—	16.7	22.2	—
Medicine	100.0	67.6	40.7	35.3	17.6	11.8	14.7	5.9	—
Teachers	100.0	51.8	16.0	17.3	18.5	13.6	18.5	12.4	3.7
Medium staff	100.0	53.2	18.3	12.7	22.2	15.9	10.3	14.3	6.3
Lower staff	100.0	39.9	16.2	12.7	11.0	9.7	20.2	26.4	3.8
Agriculture and related activities	100.0	34.1	9.1	13.6	11.4	13.6	20.5	29.5	2.3
Skilled workers	100.0	29.1	10.3	8.5	10.3	13.9	14.4	40.8	1.8
Unskilled workers	100.0	25.5	13.5	6.0	6.0	8.3	16.6	48.1	1.5
Retailers/craftsmen	100.0	39.0	15.5	10.3	13.2	11.0	24.3	25.7	—
Arts	100.0	—	40.0[a]	20.0	—	20.0	20.0	—	—
No profession	100.0	40.7	11.1	18.5	11.1	11.1	14.8	29.7	3.7
Profession not defined	100.0	—	33.3[a]	—	—	16.7	—	50.6	—

[a] Percentages not significant because of small number of cases.

Source: Belgium, Ministry of Education and Culture, French-Speaking Section, *Inquiry of the General Directorate of the Organization of Studies*, 1974.

years in general, and nonuniversity higher studies, such as social work, nursing, technical or industrial engineering, industrial design, architecture, mass media and communications, marketing, computer programming, arts, and so on. These latter studies usually lead to high middle-class professional positions or less frequently high professional positions (equal to those resulting from university studies), but the results depend on personal qualities and career qualifications.

If we consider the proportions of students in the Latin sections (the "noble" streams), we note a distinct division between the socioocupational groups. The majority of children of public high staff people, lawyers, physicians, teachers, and medium staff people are in these sections, along with about 47 percent of the children of private high staff people. (This is true in spite of the reluctance of youths to study Latin and the growing loss of prestige of the ancient languages.) But the majority of children in the other sociooccupational groups are in the "less noble" streams.

This dichotomy is characteristic of Belgian society. It does not represent two strictly defined social classes, because the frontiers are fluid. But the structure of participation in the various sectors of the school system reflects, as do other sociological phenomena, the contrasting status of a majority of dependent workers in the active population (employees, industrial workers, small farmers, craftsmen, and retailers) and a minority of the highest, most independent social categories, composed of those in the high government staffs, big business, technology, administration, trade unions, higher education, religion, the military, cultural production and mass media, and the "liberal professions" (medicine, law, art and literature, including prominent journalists).

We saw earlier that through the educational system (and, of course, through political parties and trade unions), the "intelligentsia" is divided between technicians serving the functional life and central values of society, and "critical analyzers," who are against its structures and values. The former are the majority of sons and daughters of the "ruling" minority; the latter are the minority of sons and daughters of the "dependent" majority.

Social Categories

The social categories that constitute the majority of the society are the minority in participation in the "noble" sections of the upper-secondary schools. Structurally speaking, this is absolutely normal in industrial societies (including the Eastern and Western countries, with, of course, differences in degrees). Within this general framework, we shall try to interpret the variations in participation of the different sociooccupational groups.

The highest percentage of participation in the Latin sections is among pupils coming from the medical sociocultural milieu. In spite of the so-called omnivalence law, which I defended before Parliament in March 1964, the majority of the professional class sticks to Latin as a necessary discipline to prepare for the university. The lowest percentage is among pupils coming from families of unskilled workers, while the next lowest is among children of skilled workers.

The percentage of the high staff in the private sector is comparatively low (46.7 percent). Here many fathers who have succeeded in business do not have humanistic traditions but consider themselves "realistic"—"What does Latin mean in our society? What use is it? Let them learn more English!" In many cases, exhausting business practices keep the businessman from participating in cultural activities and values.

The lowest section in prestige among the streams is economics (better described as "commercial"). The highest percentages in this section are among the children of workers—48 percent for unskilled, 41 percent for skilled, 29.5 percent for peasants, and nearly 27 percent for craftsmen/retailers. The lowest percentage here is among the children of physicians—only about 6 percent.

If we consider the most selective of the "noble" sections—the Latin-math section, which prepares for the special examination to enter the faculties of applied sciences (the Belgian *Grandes Écoles* for engineering)—we find that the highest percentage is among children of physicians (35 percent) and the next highest is among children of teachers. The lowest is among children of unskilled workers, the second-lowest those of skilled workers.

All of the differences found in this analysis are quite normal, given the structures of our society. These structures are reproduced generation after generation, and inequality generates inequality. There are, of course, changes resulting from social mobility, for which the school system is a channel. Our data show, however, that social mobility is slowed down by flows that appear to be individual choices but are in fact actions conditioned heavily by social forces in the broader society. The result for youth is an inherited sociocultural heterogeneity, which generates diverse social classes among youth itself. At the same time, youth is also becoming a more and more specific entity in society. Thus the problem for the sociologist in understanding youth is one of dialectical tension between the heterogeneity of youth (in structures, values, way of life, work, and studies) and the homogeneity of youths (in comparison with society as a whole).

Social Background and Higher Education

Although we do not have recent and reliable data about the social origins of university students in relation to their fields of study, we know that selection has played its role throughout all the former years and there are significant differences in opportunities to enter the university. We have also seen that in the university, there are "noble" and "less noble" fields of study with very different outcomes. The choices again seem to be correlated with the basic structure produced at the upper-secondary level. In fact, we have three levels of studies in the university in terms of the value of their outcomes:

1. *Studies awarding specific degrees leading to high staff and high technical positions (engineering, business) and to "liberal" professions (medicine and law).* In these cases the degree is a title to practice a profession (after probationary training periods that are included in the regular program of studies in medicine or performed afterwards in law). In engineering and medicine the length of study is longer than for the other two levels of study. In engineering the period is five years, in general medicine seven years, and in law four years (with an additional probationary year to become a barrister or judge). In all of

these fields, specialized postgraduate studies are desirable and are usually undertaken by the best students or by those not under economic pressure. Advanced studies in economics in fact enjoy the same status as those in medicine, engineering, law, and business.

2. *Studies awarding specific degrees to become a teacher in a given discipline at the secondary level.* These degrees, valuable only academically (in the areas of classical or Germanic languages, history, geography, mathematics, and natural sciences) must be supplemented by a special certificate of pedagogical ability, obtained after undertaking specific courses and probationary terms performed during the course of university studies. Although these programs are officially of university status, their lower prestige and earnings since the beginning of the century have given them a "second-rate" reputation. They are more attractive for women of all social classes because of their attitudes toward professional activities and their appreciation of the relatively free use of time and longer vacations (more suitable for mothers). Men pursuing these studies come chiefly from lower- and middle-class strata.

3. *Studies not awarding specific degrees but having a scientific or cultural value.* This channel of studies includes the social sciences, psychology, political science, pedagogy (not complementary to a degree in sciences, philology, or history), philosophy, economics (without postgraduate training), law (when limited to the general license degree of four years for people not belonging to prestigious legal families and not undertaking legal probationary training),* and commercial university studies. In these fields, the occupational level of the job obtained depends on the honors awarded in the studies, intelligence, character, and social poise of the degree holder, as well as on luck. Until four years ago, men found jobs easily, especially in the large trade and service sector, but many women experienced discrimination and prejudice in job recruitment and

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*Lawyers of this type perform counseling and technical work in private firms and public agencies; they may also become "poor" barristers performing their probationary terms in the offices of "poor" older barristers (the "proletariat" in the Palaces of Justice).

"escaped" into marriage. Now the men also find closed doors.

All of the degrees awarded by universities open up the opportunity to participate in the state competition to become an administration secretary (*secrétaire d'administration*), which is the lowest level in the central administration (followed by *chef de bureau*). The great majority of graduates aiming at this type of career come from the middle class. The status involved is equal to that of a secondary teacher but includes more opportunities to rise to higher positions. People in this category in the public sector are underpaid compared with those in similar positions in the private sector, but they enjoy more security in their jobs.

The first level of university studies represents, as we have seen, about one-half of the student population. These people are prepared to be the technical and management category in our society. More and more of them become medium staff (middle management), where obviously a specific set of values tends to develop. They become a kind of "third estate" (*Tiers État*) in our society; they are conscious of its failures and of some injustices in its structures, but they are in general technocratically minded. Thus we have here the ruling intelligentsia and the "servant" intelligentsia, also, but in a setting leading to an autonomous consciousness of role. In fact, they represent a new social category or class in our postindustrial society, the *cadres* in French.

Students in levels 2 and 3 together—because of their common social origins and their "less noble" streams of studies at the secondary and university levels—represent an intelligentsia more critical of society, with a very strong impact on youths in the school system and on society through their teaching activities and managing of mass media.

5

Integration and Politicization of Belgian Youth

Early in 1969, the Belgian section of the International Association of the Friends of Robert Schuman decided to conduct a large study in the upper secondary schools on the attitudes, values, and activities of these 16- to 18-year-olds toward Europe (as exemplified by the European Economic Community—the Common Market). The first results were published under the title, *Enquête Europe jeunesse 1969.* Mrs. Nicole Loeb-Mayer of the Institute of Sociology at Brussels University had the scientific responsibility for this inquiry, with the help and advice of a committee set up by the EEC and with assistance from IBM-Belgium in the computer work. She sought to check the possible correlations between the social integration and politicization of this sample of students (taking into account sex, social origins, and so forth) and all aspects of their appraisal and involvement in Europe.

We shall present some of the Belgian data here to indicate how significant categories of youth react positively or negatively to Belgian society, its values, the family, the school system, and so forth.

In 1969, a questionnaire was sent to 1,563 secondary schools, to be answered by the pupils in the last two years of the general upper secondary level, in the last three years of the primary and preprimary normal schools, and in the last two years of the technical upper-secondary level. By May 1, 1969, responses came from 1,010 schools and 18,872 pupils. The sample was satisfactorily representative as to sex, age, and spoken languages. There are, however, certain limitations. The results relate to 1969, so that the impact of the economic recession is not involved. We still must question how unemployment and modest restrictions on consumption may have changed the attitudes of youth. The fact that the study was conducted in 1969 does, however, provide an opportunity to search for possible correlations with the turmoil of 1968 in the universities and high schools. A second limitation is that the study relates only to students aged 16 to 18; but differences among students in various types of schools may suggest differences in attitudes among social categories.

Integration, according to Mrs. Loeb-Mayer, means "processes by which the individual acquires and adopts the dominant values and norms of his social environment (especially the total system)." *Politicization* means "the consciousness of belonging to a political society (at the local, regional, national, or world level) and the will to participate in it."

Questions relating to integration involved three aspects: family relations, trust in technical progress, and evaluation of the school system. There were 12 items in all relating to these attitudes (Tables 27, 28, and 29).

As Table 27 shows, less than 9 percent were dissatisfied with the understanding attitude and permissiveness of their parents. In general, the scores were very positive, with 84 percent of the students being "satisfied enough" or "very satisfied." These results are very similar to those of the recent survey of Yankelovich (1974) on American youths.

On trust in technical progress (Table 28), the responses were also quite positive, with 57 percent indicating that they were "trusting" or "highly trusting." But one-tenth of the

Table 27. Family relations–Belgian School Inquiry, 1969

Items		*Scores (percentages)*[a] 1	2	3	4	5
1.56	My parents are able to understand my worries	11	20	7	36	26
	I agree that I am free enough to decide					
1.62	About the use of my leisure time	9	12	1	30	48
1.63	About the management of my work	5	9	3	29	54
1.64	About my companions	8	13	2	32	45
1.65	About the way to spend my money	8	15	3	35	39
1.66	About my professional future	3	6	2	25	64
1.67	About my political choices	3	5	22	19	51

	Distribution of scores N	%
Unsatisfied	1,599	8.5
Neutral	1,444	7.7
Satisfied enough	11,971	63.4
Very satisfied	3,858	20.5

[a] Scores range from 1 (the lowest level of satisfaction) to 5 (the highest).

answers were "distrustful" and about one-third "neutral." Let us not forget that progress has been the central value of Western industrial societies since the end of the eighteenth century. In fact, since 1968 my intuitive distribution of Western European youth has been: counterculture, around 10 percent; indifference or hesitation, more than 30 percent; and acceptance (at least of the functioning of society), more than 50 percent.

In contrast, the evaluation of the school system (Table 29) tended to be very negative. The indicators reflect doubts about the validity of the school examinations and the relevance of school's preparation for real life, with one-fourth of the young people very critical and 45 percent critical. Only 16.5 percent were satisfied, while 15 percent were neutral. This was the consistent pattern of responses from more than 1,000 schools and more than 18,000 pupils! This appears to be one of the crises of Belgian society; the other is the status of youth at work.

Table 28. Trust in technical progress—Belgian School Inquiry, 1969

Items		*Scores (percentages)*[a] 1	2	3	4	5
1.15	Owing to technical progress, our society is better organized than that of our grandparents	5	8	5	30	51
1.31	I am happy to live in the age of the computer	6	10	34	27	21
1.40	Technical progress will help to solve the problems of humanity	16	23	3	36	16

	Distribution of scores *N*	%
Distrustful	1,948	10.3
Neutral	6,168	32.7
Trusting	8,449	44.8
Highly trusting	2,307	12.2

[a]Scores range from 1 (the lowest level of satisfaction) to 5 (the highest).

Table 29. Evaluation of the school system—Belgian School Inquiry, 1969

Items		*Scores (percentages)*[a] 1	2	3	4	5
1.29	The results of the school examinations are a good test of the real value of the individuals	50	27	4	14	5
1.58	The school prepares us to live in the actual world	34	27	5	24	10

	Distribution of scores *N*	%
Highly dissatisfied	4,396	23.3
Dissatisfied	8,460	44.8
Neutral	2,909	15.4
Satisfied	3,107	16.5

[a]Scores range from 1 (the lowest level of satisfaction) to 5 (the highest).

Paradoxically, considering the many sociological studies of the generation gap, the family remains the strong point of integration. But the price of family unity is permissiveness, which makes young people more aware of the authoritative orientation at school. It also makes young people more aware of hierarchical authority in the work situation. Of course the students are at school and not at work, but what they know (or think they know) about their future work generates anxiety.

The results also shed light on variations among groups. For instance, in the Catholic schools, there was slightly less satisfaction with family relations (data not shown). Perhaps this is because permissiveness and understanding of youth are, on the average, higher in nonreligious families, where authority is less in favor. On the other hand, the dissatisfaction with the school system was significantly less acute than in the public schools (Table 30). The proportion who were "very dissatisfied" was significantly higher in the official "philosophically-religiously neutral" school network, whereas the proportion of "satisfied" was higher in the Catholic network. Moreover, combining the "dissatisfied" and the "very dissatisfied," it is clear that the proportion of critical students was significantly higher in the official network and in *both* networks of the French-speaking section. The French-speaking official schools were geographically and linguistically more exposed to the revolt of the *lycées* (upper-secondary schools) in France in the late 1960s. Nevertheless, there was a more marked difference between the two networks than between the two languages (although attitudes were slightly more positive for the Dutch-speaking pupils in spite of the higher percentage of those who were "very dissatisfied").

The negative evaluation of the schools is moderated by the fact that the dissatisfaction was strongest in the highest social classes and weakest in the lowest ones. For the lowest social categories, school is an avenue of upward mobility (Table 31).

Satisfaction with family relations is not related to the types of studies pursued (data not shown). But young people in the technical sector are more confident about technical progress

Table 30. Evaluation of the school system in public and Catholic schools, French-speaking and Dutch-speaking sectors—Belgian School Inquiry, 1969

	Public		*Catholic*	
	French	*Dutch*	*French*	*Dutch*
	N = 4,050	*N = 2,967*	*N = 3,775*	*N = 8,080*
Very dissatisfied	27	30	19	21
Dissatisfied	49	42	49	42
Neutral	13	14	17	16
Satisfied	11	14	15	21
Total	100	100	100	100

(Table 32) and are also more satisfied with the school system (Table 33).

These findings are more representative than might be thought, considering the fraction of young people remaining at school at the upper-secondary level. Underlying them is not just a segment of youth but a sample of the typical categories of Belgian life: the families throughout the country, the sexes, the varied sociooccupational groups, the Catholic and nonreligious circles, and the Dutch and French parts of the land, languages, and cultures.

The Yankelovich study (1974) showed that the attitudes of youth enrolled in the schools became more moderate and quieter in the 1970s than they had been in the 1960s, but that many attitudes typical of the 1960s had later spread to all sectors of American youth. This trend is sociologically understandable, and there are no basic reasons to think that the same phenomenon is not working to some extent in the Western European industrial societies.

To measure the degree of politicization, there were three items on the questionnaire, relating to (1) the usefulness of being interested in politics, (2) whether or not the young person was interested, and (3) the desire to vote at age 18.

The majority answered very firmly that, in their opinion, it was *not* useless to be interested in politics and that politics

Table 31. Evaluation of the school system, by father's occupation–Belgian School Inquiry, 1969

	Occupation of the father					
	Agriculture	*Unskilled worker*	*Skilled worker*	*Retailer or craftsman*	*Employee*	*Managing staff*
	N = 1,184	*N = 2,431*	*N = 2,828*	*N = 2,756*	*N = 6,109*	*N = 3,533*
Very dissatisfied	15%	19%	21%	22%	25%	28%
Satisfied	44	42	44	46	45	47
Neutral	17	18	16	16	15	14
Satisfied	24	21	19	16	15	11
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table 32. Trust in technical progress, by type of studies—Belgian School Inquiry, 1969

	Type of studies		
	"General" *N = 8,915*	*"Normal"* *N = 2,661*	*"Technical"* *N = 7,296*
Distrustful	12	10	8
Neutral	35	36	29
Trusting	42	45	48
Very trusting	11	9	15
Total	100	100	100

Table 33. Evaluation of the school system, by type of studies—Belgian School Inquiry, 1969

	Type of studies		
	"General" *N = 8,915*	*"Normal"* *N = 2,661*	*"Technical"* *N = 7,296*
Very dissatisfied	26	22	20
Dissatisfied	48	47	40
Neutral	14	17	17
Satisfied	12	14	23
Total	100	100	100

should not be left to the politicians (Table 34). There was also another fourth who were comparatively positive in their responses. Thus, about 76 percent in all were favorably disposed toward politics. But opinion apparently differs from behavior. Only 59 percent expressed personal interest in politics, while 27 percent were not particularly interested and 14 percent were very negative. Thus these responses were consistent with those on attitudes toward politics, but remarkably weaker. However, the majority of young people wished to become voters at age 18—38 percent strongly and 16 percent somewhat less so.

In relation to political parties (Table 35), attitudes were not particularly favorable. About one-half of the young people

Table 34. Attitudes toward politics–Belgian School Inquiry, 1969

Items		*Scores (percentages)*[a] 1	2	3	4	5
1.13	It is useless to be interested in politics, it is the business of the politicians	51	25	9	8	6
1.37	I am interested in politics	14	13	14	38	21
1.69	At 18 I would like to be allowed to vote	14	9	23	16	38

	Distribution of scores *N*	%
Not politicized	2,647	14.0
Neutral	5,009	26.5
Rather politicized	6,518	34.5
Very politicized	4,698	24.9
Total	18,872	100.0%

[a] Scores range from 1 (the lowest level of satisfaction) to 5 (the highest).

agreed that political parties are not able to defend "our real interests," and 22 percent were strongly opposed. But 24 percent refused to express opposition, and 7 percent disagreed with the statement. Also significant, only 30 percent considered the system of parliamentary democracy satisfactory, while 41 percent responded negatively and 28 percent were neutral. On the performance of those responsible for the economy, the responses were slightly more favorable, but only 38 percent were positive, and 37 percent were negative. As many as 13 percent were very critical, while only 9 percent were very satisfied.

These responses confirm an impression of the high politicization of these students–they are interested, but the majority negatively so. Here is a potential danger for parliamentary democracy and a pluralistic system. The answers in 1969, before the severe economic recession, about the role of those responsible for the economy, were very characteristic. This again suggests the impact of the 1968 student upheavals: anarcho-revolutionary activism is transformed into an "interest"

Table 35. Attitudes toward political parties, political institutions, and political leadership–Belgian School Inquiry, 1969

Items		*Scores (percentages)*[a] 1	2	3	4	5
1.23	Our political parties are not able to defend our real interests	7	17	27	27	22
1.47	Our parliamentary democratical system seems to me satisfactory	17	24	28	24	6[b]
1.61	The responsible people of the national economy properly assure the prosperity of the country	13	24	24	29	9[b]

	Distribution of scores *N*	%
Very critical	1,588	8.4
Critical	5,053	26.8
Neutral	8,656	45.9
Satisfied	3,575	18.9
Total	18,872	100.0%

[a] Scores range from 1 (the lowest level of satisfaction) to 5 (the highest).

[b] The percentages add only to 99 percent, because 1 percent did not answer the question.

expressed in terms of negative opinions about normal political life.

Another set of questions on political attitudes produced indicators about the feeling of pride in being Belgian–based on real facts and performances. The responses showed clearly that Belgian young people choose to be involved in national life as such. Very characteristic is the answer about the desire to be a citizen of a big country (Table 36). Nearly one-half (47 percent) preferred small Belgium, while only 17 percent (still nearly one in five) regretted being citizens of a small country. Cumulated scores on functional partriotism show that only 36 percent were "neutrals," while 49 percent were classified as patriotic.

Table 36. Attitudes toward involvement in national life—Belgian School Inquiry, 1969

Items	*Scores (percentages)*[a]				
	1	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*
1.16 I am proud when our political leaders play an important role at the international level	7	5	27	29	31[b]
1.26 I would like to be the citizen of a big country	24	23	46	9	8
1.36 When I hear about big space program advances, I think that I should be proud if my country had participated	9	7	17	26	41

	Distribution of scores	
	N	%
Nonpatriotic	2,763	15
Neutral	6,829	36
Rather patriotic	8,014	42
Very patriotic	1,266	7
Total	18,872	100%

[a] Scores range from 1 (the lowest level of satisfaction) to 5 (the highest).

[b] The percentages add only to 99 percent, because 1 percent did not answer the question.

To sum up, young Belgian students aged 16 to 18 are predominantly very politicized, but also very critical of parliamentary democracy—especially of political parties. Nevertheless, about one-half remain functionally tied to their small country, while only 15 percent are not patriotic. The potential danger spot consists of the large percentage of neutrals (36 percent) and the very small percentage of strongly attached (7 percent).

In fact, high politicization and a good sense of belonging through functional patriotism (just after 1968) may be encouraging starting points for further constructive developments. But the educated young society might, even so, be on "the razor's edge" tomorrow.

Thus far, we have been emphasizing national attitudes of young people. We shall now look more closely at variations by school network and other factors.

No striking differences appear between the Catholic and public schools or between the French-speaking and Dutch-speaking schools. This is evidence of the homogeneity of life in Belgium. But it is worth observing that the Dutch-speaking pupils of the Catholic school network are the most politicized and that, in general, in each network, the Dutch-speaking pupils are more politicized than the French-speaking pupils. Additional evidence on these points is provided by responses of exposure to the mass media (Table 37).

Girls, however, are significantly less politicized, and their desire to vote at age 18 is weaker, with 43 percent of the boys and only 32 percent of the girls strongly expressing this desire. Sex differences also seem to be related to the degree of exposure to the mass media (Table 38). Behind this is the traditional role of women at home: girls have to help their mothers with housework, whereas boys have more free time.

Interestingly, differences in age among these 16- to 18-year-olds have no influence on the degree of politicization, and, unexpectedly, social origins also do not account for significant differences in politicization or in the proportions of pupils exposed to the mass media. Types of studies are related to degree of politicization, in that those in technical programs are less

Table 37. Exposure to the mass media in public and Catholic schools, French-speaking and Dutch-speaking sectors—Belgian School Inquiry, 1969

	Public		*Catholic*	
	French *N = 4,050*	*Dutch* *N = 2,967*	*French* *N = 3,775*	*Dutch* *N = 8,080*
Percent regularly following the radio or TV news programs	63	77	64	77
Percent frequently reading newspapers	60	69	57	68

Table 38. Exposure to the mass media, by sex—Belgian School Inquiry, 1969

Information	*Boys*	*Girls*
Percent regularly following the radio or TV news programs	76	66
Percent frequently reading newspapers	73	55

politicized than pupils in other programs. This may be because there are fewer opportunities offered in technical studies to discuss political questions and because the teachers are less oriented to these concerns.

To sum up, students 16 to 18 are well integrated in a permissive family setting that allows boys and girls considerable freedom in decisions about leisure, management of work, companions, use of money, occupational choices, and political orientation. They tend to be trustful of technical progress, the most significant value of industrial societies. They are highly politicized and wish to become voters at age 18. (These findings, of course, describe majority attitudes.)

Belgian 16- to 18-year-olds, however, are not well integrated in school. They do not believe school selects pupils fairly and prepares them properly for adult life and work. They have negative attitudes toward politicians, political parties, and parliamentary democracy. Thus two key institutions of society, the educational system and the political system, are largely not accepted by these young people. Girls and children of workers are less opposed to school, whereas children of the highest social strata are especially opposed to school and to technical progress.

This sketch of the age group still at school reflects, in our opinion, the culture of Belgian youth as a whole and the general image of its integration in society.

Military Service and Youth

Although the proportion of young men drafted was very high before World War II, the numbers drafted and their proportion of the age group has steadily declined since the 1950s. In the age group from 19 to 23, from which most of those drafted are drawn, there were about 33,000 soldiers in 1961 and 29,000 in 1970. Comparing these numbers with the total male population of these ages (Table 1), we find that those in the armed forces represented 15.7 percent in 1961 and 10 percent in 1970.

The explanation of the small proportion of men in the armed forces is the highly technical character of the NATO armies, requiring physical, intellectual, and technical aptitudes. There are also exceptionally generous exemptions, and more and more specialized mercenaries are being recruited for a few years of service. The legal period of military service is only 10 months, and has been growing shorter and shorter. A reduction to six months is promised for 1980.

In general, with the exception of career interests in special services—such as the air force, the navy, commandos, and paratroops—Belgian young people are not very fond of military service. Nevertheless, some choose to go in order to be trained for a particular trade.

Delinquency and Youth

Data on delinquency of young people are available only for those who are considered legally minors, that is, those under age 21, since the age of majority is 21. Judicial sentences on older people are not classified by age. Fortunately the number of minors convicted is very small (Table 39). It is also encouraging that the percentages convicted are smallest for those 18 to 20. Among girls, as might be expected, the percentages are lower—less than half those of the boys. However, the data indicating changes in the early 1970s (Table 40) are less encouraging. Although they show a decline in the number of convictions of boys 15 to 17 in all of the regions, and among girls 15 to 17 in Brussels and boys 18 to 21 in the Walloon region, they show sizable increases for other groups. The worst aspect is the growing delinquency among girls 18 to 21 in all three regions; in the Dutch-speaking region female delinquency is growing at all ages. However, the phenomenon still has a very weak impact in daily life, taking into account very small absolute numbers.

Table 39. Number and percentages of young people convicted of crimes, by age and sex, 1973

	Numbers			*Percentage of the age group*		
Ages	*Boys*	*Girls*	*Total*	*Boys*	*Girls*	*Total*
15	389	224	613	0.49	0.29	0.39
16	478	249	727	0.61	0.33	0.47
17	578	208	786	0.75	0.28	0.52
18–20	483	223	706	0.21	0.10	0.16
Total	1,928	904	2,832			

Source: Belgium, Ministry of Justice.

Table 40. Indices of young people convicted of crimes in 1974 (on 1970 or earlier base), by age, sex, and region

	Indices for 1974			
	15–17		*18–21*	
Regions and base year	*Boys*	*Girls*	*Boys*	*Girls*
Brussels (1970 = 100)	72.0	84.8	151.4	153.2
Walloon region (1969 = 100)	87.9	107.3	63.7	151.3
Dutch region (1968 = 100)	83.2	129.7	154.0	179.1

Source: Belgium, Ministry of Justice.

There are, of course, gangs of troublemakers, especially in the big cities, who are arrested and sent before the courts. In addition, very small but active groups of left-wing young people despise the physical integrity and private property of neighbors. But none of these urban phenomena are numerous.

On the use of drugs there are no reliable data, especially relating to youths. Drugs are a matter of concern for police, parents, and educators, but more because of the serious consequences than because of a real threat. There are no signs of an actual danger for Belgian youth in the 15 to 24 age group. A professor of the faculty of medicine of Brussels University conducted a survey two years ago which indicated that cases of drug abuse were very scarce, especially the use of hard drugs.

Suicide is exceptional among young people. When it occurs, it is often during adolescence. There are no reliable data on suicide in Belgium, because it is not a crime under the Belgian legal system. Moreover, in Catholic families there is a tendency, for religious reasons, to present a suicide as an accident, if possible.

6

Implications—Past and Future

Toward a Sociology of Youth

There are libraries full of books in all languages dealing with theories of youth as an integrated social group, with specific characteristics and problems. This is the literature on the "generation gap" or the "new social class." Youth, of course, is a reality, but when we analyzed the phenomenon on the basis of various categories, we gained the impression that there are problems among groups of youths, rather than the problem of youth as a whole.

There is a misleading quality in the ideological research on youth as a group with consistent actions that are taken for granted. But, of course, youth in our consumer society should be considered a special potential market on the basis of biologically common traits and of an economically dependent mode of consumption. They are dependent because of being enrolled in school, lacking income, or because of low-paid and precarious first jobs. In fact, an important fraction of youths–at least, the great majority of the 15 to 18 age group–live in their parents' homes. They are potential consumers through pocket money when at school or through small earnings when they are at work. Thus the subculture of youth, based on a type of consumption, was created and strengthened by the economy and by the incentives normally present in our economic system.

This is not a problem as such; but, beyond the biological traits and the dependent economic status, this subculture makes youth more visible and specific. It pushes youth to become conscious of its identity.

It seems, on the basis of this study, that the main problems concerning youth are categorical and that the general youth problem is only an indicator of a total social crisis. To a large extent, the "youth problem" is created by the adult culture itself. Our doubts, anxieties, and uncertainties about values and how to apply them correctly are reflected in the acculturation of our children.

Beyond these general conditions, however, there are obviously crucial problems. There is a universally perceived *school problem* and a *work problem* associated with the paths leading from economic dependence on the parents to regular and stable work. There is also a *leisure problem* associated with the poor adaptation and low-level substitutes offered by urban society to the "play needs" of young people. And there is a *sexual problem* involved in the way people enter into normal, satisfactory, and accepted relationships.

The sexual and leisure problems are more general than the others, but they are also indicators of larger social problems, involving adults in relation to sex and the status of women and in relation to the uses and consequences of instruments of culture. Here youth appears more as a group involved in major social problems than as a group concerned with a specific age-linked problem.

The same cross-sectional dialectics might be applied to work and to the structure of division of labor. Job satisfaction, appropriateness of skills for their uses, and obsolescence of technical knowledge are not problems only of youth. They are general problems with special aspects for particular groups, such as newcomers to work. Which is the more consistent framework: a youth problem—of which work, studies, leisure, and sex are aspects—or a work problem—in which youth is one of the categories involved?

School, of course, is by definition a problem specific to youth, but it is only specific if it is considered in terms of actual existing structures, because education and training are becoming lifelong problems. It is said more and more frequently that the only possible way to approach the problem of education is to consider it as a totality from the preprimary until the "third age" educational stage. In this context, youth is a factor interacting with other sectors and aspects of an entire problem.

In abandoning the temptation to build up a comprehensive theory on the youth problem, we shall try, on the basis of our findings, to review and to define the problems of young people. After this attempt, we shall see whether there is a need for some type of general theory.

The sociologist might use three models to deal with the youth problem, conceiving these models through three graphic presentations as in Figure 7. Because this study is concerned with youth Model II, the age groups approach, seems appropriate. But with this model we lose the comprehensive and integrating aspects of the general problems of school, work, sex, and leisure. The weakness of Model I, in turn, is that the general study of the four problems–education, work, leisure, and sex–applied to youth necessarily involves the three other age groups not included in this study. Finally, Model III is the translation of an *a priori* thesis on the youth problem, which might or might not arise from an inductive, analytical, and concrete study. If this general explanation of the youth problem were to emerge from our findings–at the end and not at the beginning–Model III would offer a good framework for a systematic theory.

At this stage, except for the biological characteristics and the dependent economic status, there is no reliable basis on which to build up one consistent image of youths. We must keep in mind as a new trait, however, the fact that physiological maturity (after the crisis of puberty) occurs two years earlier than in the past. Also important is the exposure of children and youth to mass media information; family and school are no longer the only sources of knowledge. These biological and technical perspectives are common to all industrialized societies. Thus we must keep in mind three perspectives: youth as a biological entity, youth as an economic status, and the fact that young people are raised with television.

Figure 7. Three models of a sociology of youth

a. The *societal problems,* approach


Society
Education
Youth
Childhood
Adulthood
Old Age
Work
Youths
Adults
Retired
Leisure
Youth
Childhood
Adulthood
Old Age
Sex
Youths
Women
Adults

b. The *age groups* approach


Society
Childhood
School
Leisure
Youth
School
Work
Leisure
Sex
Adulthood
Education
Work
Leisure
Sex
Old Age
Education
Income status
Leisure

c. The *generation gap* approach


Society
(global culture)
School
Work
Sex
Leisure
Youth
(Counterculture)

Synthesis of Findings

1. The rise in the proportion of young people to 15 percent of the total population has meant that the problems of youth have achieved a perceptible and sensitive impact on the entire society and on national policy and public opinion. This quantitative importance of youth gives rise to possible myths, stereotypes, and prejudices.

2. Earlier marriages with very small differences in ages tend to create two new images of the family: The first is a companionship of equals, both working, postponing the birth of the first child, and both accepting new domestic roles more or less consistent with the modern image of the woman. These people are consumers of mass culture, who try to improve their economic and social status. The second image is based on the traditional roles (changed by the equality of ages), with the first child born earlier, and centered on private life. Time is spent with close friends of the same generation in a community spirit and on leisure in a natural environment. Work is only a means to ensure a satisfactory life, with relatively modest needs and without career goals. These new images do not, of course, totally suppress the traditional type of family and do not always attain a pure state of their own.

3. Unemployment affects this age group severely, especially women. This situation creates a sense of alienation and frustration. The problem is compounded by prejudice against youth in the adult world. Many employers think that young people are less able to work, even though data indicate that this is not true. They argue—and this is particularly frustrating—that young people do not have enough experience. How could they? The adult tendency to reject youth is linked with the "generation gap" myth—action and myth feeding on one another.

4. Young people at the upper secondary level, as we have seen, are critical of the school system, rejecting the evaluation procedures and feeling that school does not properly prepare them for life. This attitude prevails among a majority of both sexes, but less so for the girls than for boys. A related phenomenon is the amazingly high proportion of laggers at all levels and

in all sectors of studies. These pupils in many cases glide from the "noble" general stream to the "less noble" technical and vocational streams and are frustrated. They suffer a poor start in their vocational lives and feel like second-rate citizens. "Fed up" with school, they will never again be motivated to undertake any courses. Because the selection process—based on negative examinations which only recognize the capacity to continue or not, without positive guidance to other types of studies—is at work throughout the school system, including the university, the Belgian education system produces negatively-minded people who are against society and in many cases become "outsiders" (see Kerr, 1977, p. 142). In this connection we should add their higher education plays, as we have seen, a "parking" function, permitting the postponement of entry into working life when unemployment severely reduces job opportunities for those completing the upper-secondary level of school. But these students are not really motivated to undertake higher studies. They become adversaries of the university, where most of them cannot be happy and successful.

5. The distribution of youth among types of studies—general, technical, technical/vocational, apprenticeship—is closely related to social origins. Consciousness of this fact is now spreading among young people and the general public, and widespread opposition to this inequality is perceptible among pupils and students. They protest especially about the evaluation system. But access into the university also reveals three unequal levels of studies, related to social-class differences, as we have seen. In Belgium, almost half of the students are in level I (striving for professional degrees), while the other half are in the two lower levels. This distribution produces results that perpetuate the link between different levels of studies and social origins of the students. The graduates of level I—the faculties of medicine, engineering, law, and high-level business schools—represent an intelligentsia that is functional and prepared to serve and improve the society as it is. The outcomes of their studies assure high status. They are intelligent, selective consumers of the mass culture. In politics they are conservative and technocratically minded. They trust science and technology

and claim to be realistic and pragmatic. This is, of course, a sociological type, and there are exceptions.

The other half of the university students–roughly in the faculties of sciences, social sciences, psychology, and the humanities–become specialized teachers for the secondary level as well as sociologists, anthropologists, psychologists, political scientists, and so on. They have no specific job outlets except for a small number of teaching positions, which are of lower status in terms of income and prestige. Coming from lower social strata and pursuing courses on social matters (especially analysis of social systems), students of social sciences are trained to criticize social relations and structures. They are oriented against the existing system; interested in politics, they are left-wing and produce small groups of activists.

The future teachers, especially those in the humanities, have courses in common with future social scientists and are exposed to the same type of social criticism. With backgrounds only in the schools and the university, and returning to high schools as teachers, they are ignorant of the functioning of the economy and of the actual productive and organizational work in the private and public sectors. The "servant" intelligentsia may be too realistic, but the secondary teachers are too far from reality. Influenced by the critical attitudes of the social scientists in the university and unhappy about the fact that their status is lower than, for example, that of engineers, many of them communicate their negative analysis of society to their pupils. The pupils welcome this kind of message, and educationally minded teachers are eager to transmit their knowledge about societal problems. They behave, in fact, like cultural militants opposed to the actual society, and along with the social scientists, they create the new culture. They are the "critical" intelligentsia, as opposed to the "servant" intelligentsia.

This goes far to explain the turmoils of the 1960s (especially 1968) and the climate of conflict in the universities. The turmoils were preordained by the patterns of "noble" and "less noble" streams in higher education. Thus we can see how the minds of upper secondary pupils are formed and why they tend to be interested and involved in politics but negatively oriented toward parliamentary democracy. The social dichotomy of Belgian society, therefore, is preordained by the dichotomy of the structures of the postcompulsory school system as a whole and also perpetuates that dichotomy.

To conclude briefly, Belgian youth has the following four points of frustration, alienation, and *anomie*:

1. Unemployment is more severe for young workers than for others.

2. Work is "closed" to them because of negative attitudes of employers. Youths also feel that school did not prepare them adequately for the world of work, especially in the case of the laggers. This is related to the discrepancy between permissive family attitudes and the rigidity of the school system and of work.

3. Youths do not accept the evaluation methods, discipline, and program content of the schools or the inequalities fostered by the tendency for students to be oriented according to their social origins.

4. The cities do not provide satisfactory "playgrounds" for the use of leisure time, which is spent with peer groups. Instead, youths are the prey of the economic system, which manipulates them as a specific market, defining their needs (for clothes, records, radio sets, motor cycles, travel, sport, games, books, clubs, and so on). Thus the pocket money of students and young workers living with their parents is used unconsciously to transform a way of life into a subculture. This subculture in turn provides a framework for the counterculture fomented by the dissatisfaction that we have been analyzing.

Nevertheless, we must not forget some positive aspects:

1. Familial relationships are good in families that tend to be permissive.

2. Many young people learn successfully, and many from the lower strata are able to go through the school system and on to the university. Although we have nearly 150,000 laggers, we also have 100,000 young adults studying on a part-time basis.

3. The concern for politics, though critical and negative, is better than the indifferent attitudes of adults toward young people.

4. The new marriage trends are a promise of a better quality of life in the future–a quality emphasizing respect for human values.

5. The new generation of women displays, with the critical spirit of newcomers in a more open society, eagerness for work and motivation for studies.

There is a minority of youthful trouble makers, but there are also many young people who are generous human beings, ready to work for something useful and new. The difficulty is the large number of young people who are affected by the problems of society.

On the basis of our findings we shall try to sketch dilemmas and proposed solutions.

1. Youth needs *"deschooling,"* but society needs a strong organization of studies, adequate for the needs of a sophisticated technology–including efficiently functioning democratic social relations. Is this a dilemma? Not at all. Deschooling means the following:

- Individualization of training, based on the principle of self-managed learning linked with democratic group activities
- Continuous, positive orientation and guidance through an optimal and flexible credit system, suppressing negative examination procedures, but providing for basic elementary knowledge and for necessary prerequisites
- Alternatives to the classroom system with provision for diversity of age and size of groups
- Less instruction in learning rooms and more through activities carried out where things happen and where knowledge and skills are produced ("go to the resources")
- Use of multimedia communications sources
- Territorial decentralization, allowing for units covering the educational needs of a given population (a total comprehensive "campus" extending through the district, as proposed by Bertrand Schwartz [1974] for units of 50,000 people or by the recent Rhein-Westphalian law for adult education based on units of 40,000)
- Along with decentralization, definition of central power to

compensate for inequalities, define priorities, and provide for equality of levels of study and certification
- Diversification of the teaching functions at each level of studies, but equality of status and training for the full-time, professional, responsible teachers at all levels
- Alternation of work and studies for the 14 to 15 and 18 to 19 age groups, based on a national standards of equitable earnings
- Recurrent education provided on the basis of paid educational leaves, by law or collective bargaining, for all types of studies (professional, vocational, general), for self-improvement or for community life, and at all levels.

These points, of course, are only general guidelines for an educational policy, because the starting points, progressive implementation, priorities for target groups, actions of pressure groups, and choices concerning ways and means depend on the political parties, public opinion, institutional traditions in each country. In any case, deschooling does not mean less organization but rather more democratic control and management.

2. Youth needs to be involved early and progressively in working life, assuming opportunities for more studies actually become recurrent. The changes in education will provide more opportunities to engage in work. The responsibilities of employers need to be defined: employers should pay financial charges and technical support when the changes lead to improvements in their own productivity in the short or medium term, but should be reimbursed when their activities have supported general education and self-improvement. These equitable goals call for cooperative schemes involving all the concerned groups and institutions: the learners and workers themselves, the employers, the representative bodies (such as councils of the entrepreneurial or trade union delegations), decentralized educational authorities, teaching institutions, youth, women, cultural organizations, and others. These cooperative agreements ought to be formally institutionalized. Employers, as the organizers of work, must try to eliminate rigid and repetitious operations and institute less alienating procedures involving the workers in the management of their own jobs.

The problem of working youth, openly or implicitly, calls for an effective degree of industrial democracy. This approach will be judged in the future as a turning point, historically as important as Taylor's new perspective of industrial work in 1880, for the long-run benefit of production and humanity, especially for young people.

3. *Regardless of the stage of the business cycle, unemployment of youth must be totally eliminated.* Youth must be given the opportunity for suitable studies, work, or paid sociocultural services. Useful, rewarding, and gratifying activity cannot be closed to young people. When studies or work activities are not available, there must be a service organization available for them.

Should service be obligatory or should it be voluntary? This question has different meanings in different countries. In my opinion, it is essentially a question of diversity in the types of service activities available (including cooperation in developing countries) and in types of incentives. In Belgium, we are initiating this approach especially through subsidized terms of probation ("stages") for young workers, but there are many unmet needs in communities and among social categories that have not, until now, been satisfactorily provided through commercial or public initiative. It is a difficult problem, but there are a number of comparable experiences in various countries, and it is worthwhile to study this question on an international basis.

4. With respect to leisure, the problem is determining the extent it is possible to foment a "cultural revolution," based on the attitudes and values of our youth. Real culture is not passive consumption (to sit, to see, to watch, to bet, to comment); real culture is participation, which means creativity, spontaneity, and sharing of knowledge and experiences. If self-management is one of the main dimensions of democracy, then we should expect leisure-time culture to be self-managed by people and not consumed on the basis of commercial "choices," criteria, and behavior.

Ministries of culture must take the responsibility for working with representative youth movements to prepare, step by step, for such developments. Some perspectives have been provided by international organizations like the Council of Europe and UNESCO, but each country should be responsible for drawing out what is relevant for its own problems.

The problem of leisure and culture is a general and crucial problem of our industrial societies, with specific aspects varying among age groups. Why not use the framework of the youth subculture as the starting point for social change? Youths represent the future today.

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R. 3805-2.5

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Stuart Maclure

A STUDY PREPARED FOR THE
CARNEGIE COUNCIL ON POLICY STUDIES
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The Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education, 2150 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California 94704, has sponsored publication of this report as part of a continuing effort to obtain and present significant information for public discussion. The views expressed are those of the author.

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number LC 78-75167

International Standard Book Number ISBN 0-931050-08-1

Manufactured in the United States of America

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Foreword

This is one of seven publications presenting studies commissioned by the Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education as a means of providing a global perspective for education and youth employment in contemporary societies. The remaining publications will be concerned with education and youth employment in Belgium, by Henri Janne; Japan, by Hidetoshi Kato; Mexico and South Asia, by Alberto Hernández Medina and Carlos Munoz Izquierdo and Manzoor Ahmed, respectively; Poland, by Barbara Liberska; Sweden and Denmark, by Gösta Rehn and K. Helveg Petersen, respectively; and The Federal Republic of Germany by Klaus von Dohnanyi. Margaret S. Gordon, associate director of the Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education, is the general editor of the series. To the authors of these studies, and to Stuart Maclure, whose work appears in this volume, we express our deep appreciation.

The German Marshall Fund generously provided support for two international conferences on education and youth employment which were attended by several of the authors of studies for this series and which have contributed significantly to the Council's deliberations on this subject. The International Council for Educational Development, under the direction of James A. Perkins, arranged for the participation of the essayists in this project. We acknowledge these contributions with profound thanks.

We also wish to extend our thanks to Mary Purnell Frederick and Diana Lorentz for their editorial contributions, and Sylvia Zuck for coordinating manuscript preparation.

CLARK KERR
Chairman,
Carnegie Council on Policy Studies
in Higher Education

1

Introduction

This study arises from the difficulties that young people are presently experiencing in negotiating transitions from school to work and from youth to adulthood. Put baldly like that, it sounds like the patronizing concern of middle age. Youth tend to be seen by their patronizing elders in terms of "problems"—as if the very condition of being young needs specific and unpleasant remedies. However, this is not just a routine reflection of the anxieties of the middle-aged middle class. The difficulties young people face with regard to employment are apparent for all to see. In Britain, unemployment is at a postwar peak, and there has been a disproportionately large increase in the number of young unemployed people. In particular, school leavers have had difficulty in finding jobs: unemployment among 16- and 17-year-olds rose by 120 percent between January 1972 and January 1977, by which time these youth represented 9 percent of all unemployed (see Chapter 2). Furthermore, the present unemployment figures must be seen against a demographic trend that will increase the size of the relevant age groups over the next five to ten years and other social trends, including the return of more women to the work force, some of whom will be competing for jobs with teenagers and young adults.

In the light of all this, forecasts project a continuing high level of youth unemployment, and the conventional view is that full employment can be restored only if economic growth can

Note. **My thanks are due to Lois Rodgers and Mark Jackson, who have assisted me throughout this project. The final product is, of course, my responsibility.**

be sustained over a period at a higher level (5 percent) than has proved possible until now.

Youth unemployment has become a major political concern for government. At a time when expenditures on most public services are closely scrutinized, funds have been freely available for special programs of job creation and industrial training for youth (see Chapter 5). In Britain, as in most developed Western countries, labor-market questions continue to receive high priority.

The rise in youth unemployment affects those in the ages between the mid-teens and mid-twenties—a decade in which boys and girls become men and women and move out of the world of school and childhood and into the world of work and adulthood. Finding a job and working is part of achieving full adult status. It is one way of establishing an identity, a definition by which one knows oneself and is known by others. If the passage from school to work is interrupted, a "backwash" effect interferes with the process. Youth unemployment introduces uncertainty at a critical stage of development. Just as one receives status by having a job, one is also stigmatized and separated from the rest of the working community by not having a job. This is true not only for those who leave school and enter a period of idleness or intermittent work but also for young adults who lose their jobs in their early twenties or whose chances of settling in to permanent employment after an experimental period of job changing and transience are unduly delayed. Unemployment is higher than average for the 20- to 24-year-olds as well as for the younger age groups.

Unemployment, then, is one cause of discontinuity and uncertainty for the young. Other factors that have complicated the process can be identified in education and industrial training. An ever-lengthening span of primary, secondary, and tertiary education has been a feature of all the developed countries. Britain has been slower than most countries to expand secondary and postsecondary education, but even in Britain, the proportion of youths staying in full-time education to 18, 21, and older has risen steadily, thereby raising the average age of entry into employment by nearly three years in the past 30 years. As education has come to absorb more and more of the first quarter-century of every man and woman's life, the young have been required to spend longer in the "limbo" between childhood and adulthood. A contradiction is obviously implicit in lengthening social adolescence when improved diet and physical surroundings have lowered the age of the onset of puberty.

Education has also become more important in determining vocational opportunity. Entry into the labor market is linked to particular stages of education—to school examinations at 16 and 18, to university degrees and professional diplomas, and to vocational and technical training. The education system's function as a filter also shapes the self-image of potential adults, branding some as failures at an early age and marking others for success. Fortunately, there is no perfect correlation between education's assessment and that of the outside world, but there is enough correlation to make the system work and to have a dispiriting effect on the bottom third of the school population.

The 30 years of educational development since the end of the Second World War have widened educational opportunity and extended access at the upper levels but have not seriously altered the close links between educational success and social class (as we shall see in Chapter 4). The socially disadvantaged and some ethnic minority groups are strongly represented among the least successful sections of the school population and are most likely to be hostile to school and least equipped—psychologically as well as technically—for employment.

Industrial training in Britain is a responsibility of industry (see Chapter 3) and a great deal remains to be done to put it on a sound basis and to insulate the training function more effectively from fluctuations in economic conditions. But the basic structures of industrial training, like the traditional mechanisms of apprenticeship, interact with the trade unions and the system of industrial relations. The tasks of incorporating people leaving school and college into employment and equipping them with the changing skills of modern industry are caught up in the larger issues of the power of management and unions and the balance of interunion strength. The shortcomings of industrial relations in Britain, therefore, have their impact on the lives of young workers and their opportunities for job satisfaction.

Other factors that have affected youth employment have arisen from shifts in the balance of industrial activity. The long-run decline of employment in manufacturing has continued, with a corresponding increase in service jobs, many of them in the public sector. Different types of employment have meant different types of recruitment and different training and educational requirements. Some jobs have been automated, requiring less skill; at the same time, new openings for technicians have been created—not enough to offset increasing unemployment, but continuing to provide vacancies for men and women with certain skills. Much of the energy of the industrial training boards has gone into locating such imbalances and trying to eliminate them.

Alongside the changes that have arisen from technological advance and economic retreat have been those originating with social and fiscal policy. The growth of public-sector employment has resulted from political priorities of how national resources should be divided among public and private consumption, investment, and savings.

Changes in employment patterns have resulted in sharp differences in unemployment levels in various parts of the country. Southeast England has been more severely affected than less heavily industrialized East Anglia (see Figure 9 in Chapter 2). The reduction of employment in the London area has been accentuated by the movement of manufacturing out of the metropolis for planning reasons. The result has been an inner ring, where service jobs have not increased fast enough to fill the vacuum created by the exodus of manufacturing. High unemployment figures have resulted, particularly among young West Indians congregated in particular inner-London areas.

Changes in the structure of industry, in industrial relations, and in social policy have also been reflected in the wage structure and the economics of youth employment. Technological and organizational changes have altered the demand for different kinds of labor and different forms of skill. British politics since the mid-1960s have revolved in large measure around the power of the trade unions and the use of their bargaining power. Both political parties have looked at ways of curbing the unions. Sir Harold Wilson's Labor Government of 1966–1970 examined proposals for limiting union power but dropped them in the face of opposition. Mr. Edward Heath's Conservative Government of 1970–1974 brought in the Industrial Relations Act, which sought to impose a new legal framework on industrial relations. This, too, aroused the unremitting opposition of the unions. When attempts to enforce a wage policy broke down, a strike by the miners in direct opposition to the Parliament-backed policies of the Heath government precipitated the General Election of 1974 and a new majority in the House of Commons. The new Labor Government of 1974 was committed to the repeal of Conservative industrial-relations legislation and to the operation of a so-called social contract between government and unions which led in the fiscal year 1974–75 to a period of unparalleled wage inflation* and made the unions the effective arbiters of government economic policy until the summer of 1975.

The effect of this wage explosion in the two years that followed has been to increase sharply the earnings of the lower paid (including the young) relative to the rest of the labor force. The dominant figure on the trade union side has been Mr. Jack Jones, leader of the Transport and General Workers Union, the largest general union, whose members include a large number of lower-paid workers. The effect of these measures on those under 21 has been accentuated by the delayed consequences of lowering the legal age of majority to 18. With their freedom to alter pay rates limited by wage policy, the trade unions have turned their attention to fringe benefits and similar side issues. More and more settlements have provided for the payment of the full adult rate at 18 instead of 21, telescoping the period of pay at lower rates for younger workers. Also, the raising of the school leaving age from 15 to 16 has had the effect of raising starting rates. In the same period also, early legislation on equal pay has begun to take effect, causing women's wage levels to rise faster than they would otherwise have done.

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*This is not, of course, to say that the social contract was the only factor causing the inflation of 1974–75 or to exclude the oil price increase and the economic and monetary policies of the Heath government between 1970 and 1974. However, the social contract dominated political argument and influenced social and industrial policies affecting employment.

Along with increases in wage rates there have been steady increases in social payments—unemployment benefits that depend on contributions debited during employment and paid for in an initial period on an earnings-related basis. There are also supplementary benefits which are paid without any qualifying period of employment and other forms of compensation payable to workers who are laid off after a minimum period of employment with the same firm. These payments, like higher unemployment pay and supplementary benefits, are intended to cushion the effect of being put out of work. How far the cushion itself has raised the residual level of unemployment by extending the waiting period between jobs remains an open question. It was a deliberate aim of policy in the mid-1960s to increase unemployment benefits to facilitate what was then euphemistically called "redeployment" of labor—that is, the redistribution expected as part of any modernization process. It is certainly likely that the benefits have had some effect in increasing the number of young people registered as unemployed: whereas formerly youngsters leaving school might have been content to look around for some weeks before regarding themselves as unemployed, now immediate registration has prompt cash value.

British social policy has so far proved incapable of dealing with the anomalies that follow from income-related cash benefits, especially the so-called poverty trap where social benefits may actually exceed compensation for employment, resulting in a clear disincentive to work. For example, former university students and graduates of teacher-training colleges, because of generous social-welfare payments, can spend a longer time searching for openings in their preferred occupations. Jobs for teachers have been many fewer in number than the qualified candidates emerging from the colleges. There is evidence that many who have been unsuccessful in their quest for a teaching post have taken several months to become convinced that they must turn to something else and, for them, the difference between living on supplementary benefit and living on a student's maintenance grant is small. Nevertheless, improved social benefits are certainly a marginal factor in raising the level of unemployment.

A survey carried out by the Manpower Services Commission (MSC) in the winter of 1976–77 examined the attitudes of employers, unemployed young people, and young people generally. The results (MSC, 1977, p. 17) show that most unemployed young people "are actively seeking jobs; 40 percent of those interviewed had applied for more than six jobs, and very few had refused an offer of a job." There is no evidence that there are plenty of "dirty" jobs available which young white boys and girls reject as beneath them.

The survey showed that "about half the employers believe that the caliber of young people has deteriorated over the past five years in terms of their motivation and basic education" but that they expected to employ the same proportion of young people in the future as in the past. In most cases, young people were seen to be in competition for employment with other age groups. Only in entry to skill training did recognizable "young people jobs" exist. Employers complained about the attitude, personality, appearance, manners, and inadequate knowledge of the "three R's" of the young people they interviewed for jobs. Even if this release of pent-up criticism of youthful mores and of modern education cannot be taken at face value, the criticism does relate to more serious doubts about inadequate links between school and work and the suspicion that the tradition of English liberal education (not to mention the tendencies of radical members of the teaching profession) is hostile to industry and industrial employment.

Some 14 percent of unemployed young people, according to the survey, "reported that their fathers were also unemployed; 22 percent that brothers or sisters were unemployed; and 19 percent were living in households where no one was in full-time employment." The survey did not collect information on other forms of social disadvantage, but families with several members out of work would be expected to suffer other social misfortunes such as overcrowded housing, poor health, and a lifetime of poverty.

Another social policy that has had an important bearing on youth concerns the protection of the employment of those already working. Employees have been given legal protection against unfair dismissal as well as compensation if they are laid off. The new laws back up the already strong trade unions and have the effect of raising the liabilities of employers who take on staff. This is one of several measures that may have increased the cost of employment; it is likely that if any economies of labor are needed, they will be achieved by stopping recruitment rather than by letting older workers go. There are good reasons for trade unions to favor such legislation, just as there are good reasons why those who have clambered aboard the rescue ship should kick down the ladder before it becomes overburdened. But the effect, like the operation of the sacred principle of "last in, first out," now also underwritten by case law, has the effect to make sure that young people are disproportionately likely to appear in the unemployment statistics.

Such inflexibilities as these need to be seen against the background of a lengthy period of very low postwar unemployment to the early 1970s and an industrial economy with low productivity per worker, reflecting, in many industries, overhiring as a result of union strength and management weakness. Both inflexibility and low productivity can be linked to the structure of trade-union organization—the continued strength of craft-based unions and the measures taken to maintain sharp demarcation among skills—and the paradoxical strength of unions in declining industries (for instance, dock workers), where unions have striven with some success to gain the recognition of workers' rights to obsolescent jobs. The printing industry is another where a strong rear-guard action is being fought against technological redundancy.

To sum up, therefore, the present state of youth unemployment is connected to three sets of cyclical and structural factors:

Cyclical and demographic factors. Youth unemployment is high because all unemployment is high and because the age groups concerned are large. Given an upturn in the level of the economy, the number of people without work would be much reduced. By the same token, the macroeconomic policies required to put things right are the same for younger and older alike.

"Full employment" is a commitment of all the major political parties, and most discussion has been based on the hypothesis that cyclical factors are dominant—that if only the management of the economy, domestic and international, could be set right, youth unemployment would cease to be a problem. However, this argument must be seen in the context of steadily rising unemployment over the past two decades. The residual level of unemployment at the high point of the economic cycle has risen, and as a result there is little agreement on the definition of "full employment." (See Worswick, 1976, for a comprehensive discussion.)

Demographic trends indicate that the numbers in the 16-24 age group will go on rising into the mid-1980s and then decline through the 1990s. In the long term, therefore, the demographic trend will reduce pressure on employment for younger people; in the short term, it will accentuate it (Figure 1).

Technological and structural factors. Another set of developments bearing on the employment of young people relates to changes in the industrial process—changes that lead to the "de-skilling" of some jobs and the upgrading of other (perhaps fewer) jobs, thus affecting the range of training positions traditionally provided for young people. The balance between the manufacturing and service sectors changes. Old industries become obsolete and new ones (hopefully) take their place, changing the demand for particular skills and kinds of labor. International competition causes one industry to contract,

Figure 1. 1974-based population projection for Great Britain, to 2001, age group: 16 to 24



Source: Central Policy Review Staff, 1977.

another to expand, and in the process takes employment away or gives it to particular groups of workers.

Social policy changes. Youth employment is also affected by social policies adopted by governments and by influence exerted by political parties and pressure groups, such as employers' organizations and trade unions. Wage policy, job protection legislation, women's rights, social security payments, trade-union power, taxation policy—in all these areas action has been taken that has affected the cost of employment and the flexibility of the labor market and, directly or indirectly, altered the relative chances of employment among different groups of potential employees. The social policy measures include various temporary programs (described in Chapter 5) that have alleviated youth unemployment and, by creating or subsidizing jobs for particular categories of workers, have sought to counteract the pressures arising from other policies.

The way in which these structural, demographic, technological, commercial, social, and political factors interact remains a matter of lively controversy. What is clear is that the pressures that have built up behind policies indirectly inimical to youth employment show no signs of abating, and there is little reason to doubt that unemployment among young workers will continue at a high level over the next five years. True, there is a widespread conviction that if the economy were to bounce back (aided by the temporary boost to the balance of payments provided by North Sea oil), there would be an immediate improvement in employment among the young. But to some extent this belief is based on a possibly correct but unflattering estimate of the acumen of British management; against it must be set the suggestion that there is scope for a considerable improvement in output within present manning levels and without any substantial increase in recruitment of young people.

The present industrial strategy—adopted by government, industry, and the trade unions in 1975—is linked to increasing the resources of manufacturing industry and export-oriented commerce. It assumes that the expansion of the public-service sector will be restrained to allow the extra resources to flow into export-led growth and therefore does not envisage any marked expansion in national and local government service which, until recently, has absorbed increasing numbers of workers.

The growth of youth unemployment in Britain—essentially a recent phenomenon which has appeared in the wake of overall economic recession—is consistent with a larger scenario of post-industrial development. One component of this scenario is the steadily expanding period of secondary and postsecondary education, causing a postponement of entry into the primary labor market until the early or middle twenties and lengthening the period spent in higher and vocational education, temporary employment, and reliance on social benefits. This implies a yet longer period of socially imposed "youth," a social adolescence to be served as probation before gaining access to the settled realm of employment and to penetrating the defenses that adult workers erect to protect themselves from the insecurity of rapid industrial change.

The British experience, however, is not entirely consistent with such a scenario. Britain still has a long way to go in the process of industrial development. Though teenage unemployment (for short periods) is a cause of worry, most youth under 18, and the very great majority of those aged 16 to 25, work most of the time. The education system is developing slowly. It loses most young people well before the end of secondary school, and only a small fraction of the age group continues into full-time postsecondary education. However, the development of a large program of work experience—offering an alternative to unemployment for a large proportion of young people who would otherwise find themselves on relief (see Chapter 5)—comes at a time when questions about the appropriate form of secondary education for an industrial society are being asked with new persistence.

The work-experience program (which will include elements of education and industrial training) is an attempt to rationalize the ad hoc schemes that have developed since 1975 and been financed on a short-term basis. What is now proposed still is not necessarily a "permanent" program but a countercyclical instrument to expand or contract according to the state of the economy and the level of employment. And, as the official forecasts assume high youth unemployment to 1981 at least, the work-experience program will tend to develop a life of its own and have a direct impact on other public provisions for the 16 to 18 age groups in schools and colleges of further education.

Most obviously, the work-experience program is likely to affect teenage economics: each boy or girl accepted into a work-experience scheme will qualify at once for £18 a week—considerably more than the educational maintenance allowances offered by education authorities to children from poor families who remain in school or college beyond the age of 16. Concern has been expressed by the Manpower Services Commission and the Department of Education and Science about the difficulties this may cause when children who take advantage of a work-experience opportunity later recognize the need to return to full-time education. Widespread development of work-experience schemes could lead to recurrent education and easier two-way transit between the worlds of work and education, but not unless this financial barrier can be bridged.

When all is said and done, the main determinant of the level of unemployment will still be macroeconomic policies constrained by cyclical economic fluctuations, internal politics, the need to curb inflation, pressures on the balance of payments, and the terms of trade. But educational policies—especially industrial training policies—can marginally increase the government's capacity to run the economy at a high level by ensuring that the right skills are available in adequate numbers and by eliminating shortages of specific skills. Any policy for youth unemployment must include a plan to improve the quality of the labor force and use some of the slack caused by unemployment to train and retrain workers for skills that are or will be in high demand.

Attempts are being made to do this in Britain through the Manpower Services Commission and the Training Services Agency, but nothing less than a transformation of the attitudes of employers and trade unionists toward training is needed. Along with this goes the need for a much closer relationship between education and industry.

Officials are depending greatly on the industry curriculum development project being undertaken by the Schools Council in cooperation with both the Trades Union Congress and the Confederation of British Industries. This project will generate teaching materials for social studies in secondary schools aimed at increased knowledge of industry and greater realism on the part of the schools about the world of work. But it would be fantasy to suppose that the study of industrial history will necessarily make young people more willing to accept the disciplines and values of the capitalist economy or improve their attitudes toward the production line.

The measures now proposed—expansion of career education, work experience in the later years of school, introduction of teachers to industrial matters through in-service training, and large-scale development of work-experience schemes for the 16- to 18-year-olds—eventually raise the key British questions about growing up in a rather unsuccessful industrial nation in the last quarter of the twentieth century. They also raise questions about the quality of life in the factory and in the city; about job enrichment (which is more talked about than pursued) and job impoverishment (a continuing aspect of the division of labor in the not-very-assiduous pursuit of productive efficiency); about whether rising standards of material well-being outside work can compensate for a life of boredom and frustration at the work place; and whether economic growth can take place quickly enough to keep pace with the rise in consumer aspirations. Anecdotal evidence of alienation among the young is not difficult to assemble: it can be found in violence and crime, football hooliganism and mindless vandalism, drug and alcohol abuse, poor attitudes to school and later to work. But these are clearly young people with a lot to be alienated against. Even the use of the term "alienation" appears to be an ambiguous comment on their situation. Political and social attitudes in modern Britain are not clear-cut, and alienation is an ambiguous concept. What is clear is that the uncertainty about how young people are integrated into the mainstream of adult society goes to the central political questions in contemporary Britain: What is the future of the mixed economy and the open society? Do enough people care about it sufficiently to defend it? Can it be made to work sufficiently well to hold off the Marxists on the one hand and the exponents of the corporate state on the other?

2

Young People and the Labor Market

It is necessary first to consider the fortunes of young people in the labor market against the background of demographic trends since the end of World War II, including changes in the birth rate, changes in the rate of staying on at school and college beyond the minimum school-leaving age, and changes in the proportion of the relevant age groups of both sexes available for employment.

Published information on the employment trends of young people is less than satisfactory owing in many cases to changes in the method of collection and in particular to the incompatibility of British labor statistics with those published by the United States and Japan and other OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries.* Within these limitations, however, we can examine the British figures and determine how the trends of the 16-to-19 and 20-to-24 age groups compare with those of the rest of the adult community. We will discuss differences relating to wage differentials, employment protection, industrial relations, and the availability of

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*Comparability between the U.K. and other members of the European Economic Community (EEC) will be remedied as results from the 1973 and 1975 EEC Labor Force Survey become available. The first impact of the survey can be found in "New Projections of Future Labour Force" (Department of Employment *Gazette*, June 1977, pp. 587–92).

social benefits. We will also consider some of the more vulnerable groups—those with the lowest educational qualifications, those belonging to ethnic minority groups, and those living in regions that have been particularly severely affected by rising unemployment during the present recession.

Demographic Background*

The pattern of the United Kingdom's birth statistics follows a familiar line. Immediately after World War II there was a baby boom. The birth rate subsided in the early 1950s but began to rise again in the mid-1950s and went on rising until 1964; since then there has been a continuous decline (Figure 2). The projected trend begins to rise again by the later 1970s, reaching another hypothetical boom by the year 1990. This upturn has been consistently forecast throughout the present decline on what may be called the "jam tomorrow" principle, but it has not so far shown overt signs of actually happening.

The downturn in the birth rate for the country as a whole cloaks important differences among social classes. Between 1970 and 1976 there was almost no change in the total number of births to families in professional, managerial, and administrative categories, while births to manual working-class families declined by about a third.

The population figures for the 15-to-19 and 20-to-24 age groups are now showing the consequences of the postwar fluctuations. In 1961, 15- to 19-year-olds numbered 3,695,000 and 20- to 24-year-olds numbered 3,306,000 (Table 1). By 1976 these figures had risen to 4,252,100 and 3,895,000, respectively. The 15- to 19-year-olds will peak in 1982 at 4,705,000. They represented 28.3 percent of the population available for employment in 1961; by 1971, those under 25 had increased to 31.5 percent of those economically active. However, the rise reflected an increase in the size of the total age group, whereas, except for married women, percentages of young people who

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***Some of the figures used here relate to the U.K., some to Great Britain (excluding Northern Ireland), some to England and Wales only. This is because of vagaries in the system of statistical collection for different purposes. England and Wales account for 89 percent of the U.K. population.**

Figure 2. Annual births, United Kingdom, actual 1945 to 1975, and projected 1975 to 1995 (semilogarithmic scale)



Source: Office of Population Censuses and Surveys; and the Government Actuaries Department.

Table 1. Number of young persons aged 15 to 19 and 20 to 24, United Kingdom, actual 1951 to 1971, and projected, 1976 to 1991 (numbers in thousands)

Year	*15 to 19 years*	*20 to 24 years*
1951	3,175	3,393
1961	3,695	3,206
1971[a]	3,832	4,237
1971[b]	3,860	4,255
1976	4,252	3,895
1981	4,691	4,276
1991	3,720	4,484

[a] Census estimates of resident population, *Annual Abstract of Statistics.*

[b] Estimates and projections based on mid-1974 estimates of resident population, *Population Projections 1974–2014,* Office of Population, Censuses, and Surveys.

were economically active declined, especially among those aged 15 to 19. A recent estimate of the labor force for 1977 showed that those under 25 available for employment had decreased between 1971 and 1977 from 5,102,000 to 4,964,000.* However, for this period, precise comparisons of labor-force participation rates cannot be made because of changes in the age breaks for which data are available (Table 2).

Educational Activity

Throughout the period since World War II, the proportion of those 15 to 19 remaining in full-time education has been increasing in Britain as elsewhere. Among those in their early twenties, the percentages are of course much smaller, but there has been a similar trend toward remaining in full-time education (Table 3). These trends are discussed more fully in Chapter 4.

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*The labor-force estimate incorporates the EEC Labor Force Survey for 1975 as well as revisions of projections of the number of full-time students. The comparison of those under 25 who are economically active excludes students and only deals with those under 16, eliminating the problem of the removal of the 15-year-olds in 1974 from the labor force as a result of raising the minimum school leaving age to 16.

Table 2. Percentages of young persons in selected age groups in the labor force, Great Britain, 1971 to 1977

Year	*Men*		*Unmarried women*		*Married women*[a]	
	15–19	20–24	15–19	20–24	15–19	20–24
1961	74.6%	91.9%	73.2%	89.4%	41.0%	41.3%
	15–17	18–24	15–17	18–24	15–17	18–24
1971	48.2	91.0	48.8	85.6	–	45.7
1972	52.0	91.7	48.8	84.0	–	45.7
	16–17	18–24	16–17	18–24	16–17	18–24
1973	62.7	90.6	57.0	83.5	–	49.7
1974	55.6	89.7	51.8	78.3	–	49.2
	16–19	20–24	16–19	20–24	16–19	20–24
1975	65.8	88.9	60.2	77.0	51.9	54.3
1976	64.7	88.5	58.8	76.7	51.9	54.6
1977	64.0	88.2	57.7	76.7	51.9	54.9

[a] There are no estimates of female students by marital status for years other than 1971, so the labor-force participation rates of married women for 1975 to 1977 include students. The number of married female students is small, and there is little difference between the rates including and excluding students.

Source: 1961–Decennial Census Data; 1971 to 1974–*General Household Survey*, Office of Population, Censuses and Surveys (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office); 1975 to 1977 – "New Projections of Future Labour Force," *Department of Employment Gazette*, June 1977, pp. 587–592.

Table 3. Percentage of young people in full-time education, by age, Great Britain

Age group	*1961–62*		*1974–75*	
15–19	21.0%		47.9%	
	Men	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*
20	6.6%	4.0%	13.3%	9.9%
21–24	3.6	1.1	6.3	3.8

First Employment

Information on first employment was collected until 1974 through the local education authorities' careers service. When a school leaver took a job, he or she had to get a national insurance card allocated through the careers office. The last survey made before these cards were disposed of (insurance numbers are now issued by the Department of Health and Social Security) shows that there were 512,648 school leavers aged 16 and 17 entering first employment. Among the big employers of male first entrants were manufacturing industries (36 percent), followed by construction and the distribution trades. Young women went in great numbers into public administration, utilities, professional services, and insurance and banking.

Table 4 shows the industrial distribution of first entrants in 1974 compared with the 1971 census, as well as with the two surveys carried out for the Manpower Services Commission in the winter of 1976. The MSC surveys concerned only 3,000 young people aged 16 to 19 and 550 unemployed young people.

Unemployment Rates: International Adjustments

British unemployment statistics differ in important respects from those assembled by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and, as a consequence, understate the rates of unemployment when compared with those calculated for countries that use the American method of collection.

An unemployed person in Britain becomes a unit in the statistics by registering for employment at a Job Center (or what used to be called a Labor Exchange). Only by registration can someone who is unemployed obtain unemployment benefits, but not everyone looking for a job (and not all those who register are looking for a job, though refusal to accept a suitable job should entail the forfeiture of benefits). If not every unemployed person registers, it follows that statistics based on registration are likely to understate unemployment. This is most obviously true in the case of married women (some of whom do not qualify for benefits if they have only paid half-rate insurance contributions), those who become voluntarily unemployed (and who are, therefore, not immediately eligible for benefit), and young people. Young people are not entitled to unemployment pay unless they have been working and making social insurance payments for a specified period, but they do qualify for means-tested supplementary benefits.

It is government policy to improve the employment services administered on behalf of the Department of Employment through the Employment Services Agency of the MSC. Behind the bureaucratic nomenclature lies the intention to make former Labor Exchanges more acceptable to users—hence the decision to rechristen them Job Centers—and take a leaf out of the private employment agencies book by making the Job Centers more customer oriented and attractive. Whether this has reduced, or will in time reduce, the amount of nonregistration, nobody can as yet say. The MSC only came into being under a law passed in 1974, and the first attempts to change its image have come against the background of already strongly rising unemployment figures.

To make British unemployment statistics comparable with those of other industrial countries under the terms of the International Labor Conference (1954) and the even more comprehensive definition of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, the unregistered category must, of course, be included. There are, however, two further categories that must be considered: those on temporary layoff and adult students seeking work. The United States definition includes both categories, the magnitude of which tends to be heavily dependent on the operation of the labor market in the country involved. There has been no tradition of students working during their education in Great Britain on the North American scale, but as the total number of students in full-time higher education has grown, so has the number of them who depend economically on working during vacations. Students are eligible for maintenance grants from the local authorities; in the case of students on degree courses these are mandatory, but many others are dependent on "discretionary" grants, which local authorities have been less willing to

Table 4. Distribution of workers of all ages and of young workers, by industrial groups, Great Britain, selected years, 1971 to 1976–77

	1971 census employment		*Employees in employment, June 1974*		*1976 MSC 16–19 survey*		
Industrial Grouping	*All ages*	*15–19*	*All ages*	*First entrants*	*Employed*	*Unemployed*	*1976–77 MSC unemployed survey*
Males:							
Extractive industries[a]	6.0%	5.8%	4.7%	5.6%	6.0%	1.0%	4.0%
Manufacturing industries	37.9	38.4	41.5	36.4	35.1	15.0	41.0
Construction	10.6	12.3	9.3	15.2	17.6	21.0	13.0
Utilities	2.0	1.5	2.2	1.1	1.5	b	1.0
Transport and communication	8.7	5.1	9.5	4.2	20.3[d]	31.0[d]	28.0[d]
Distribution	9.9	13.2	8.3	14.9			
Insurance, banking, and finance	3.1	2.3	3.9	2.6	4.0	b	0
Professional and scientific services	6.8	2.8	7.4	1.9	2.3	1.0	1.0
Public administration and defense[c]	7.4	7.0	7.3	7.2	5.2	6.0	5.0
Miscellaneous services	7.1	10.2	5.9	10.8	7.9	24.0	5.0

Females:							
Extractive industries[a]	2.6%	0.8%	1.4%	0.8%	1.3%	4.0%	b
Manufacturing industries	25.2	35.0	32.1	31.1	32.4	28.0	43.0
Construction	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.4	1.6	4.0	1.0
Utilities	0.7	0.6	0.9	0.8	0.7	b	1.0
Transport and communication	3.0	3.0	3.7	3.1	25.1[d]	36.0[d]	34.0[d]
Distribution	18.0	21.6	14.1	25.8			
Insurance, banking, and finance	5.5	10.0	7.4	11.8	10.7	4.0	2.0
Professional and scientific services	21.1	9.9	21.7	8.2	8.5	9.0	2.0
Public administration and defense[c]	5.4	4.6	7.6	5.0	7.8	4.0	2.0
Miscellaneous services	14.8	11.8	10.0	11.9	11.9	12.0	12.0

[a] Extractive industries include agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining and quarrying.

[b] Less than 0.1%.

[c] Defense not included in MSC surveys.

[d] Distribution and transport and communication not distinguishable.

Source: June 1974 data–Department of Employment *Gazette*, December 1975, p. 1272; and *British Labour Statistics Yearbook 1974* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1976), p. 226. All other data–Manpower Services Commission, *Young People and Work* (May 1977), p. 13.

award in a period when public expenditure is being held down. Both mandatory and discretionary grants are subject to a means test of the student's parents unless the student is over 21 and has been self-supporting for three years.

In recent years, the National Union of Students has discovered that the regulations governing unemployment benefits and supplementary benefits can be turned to the students advantage and has successfully organized the increased registration of students as unemployed during the vacations. In February 1976, it was decided to exclude adult students from the main unemployment statistics on the grounds that they had distorted the general picture for the previous six months.

The temporary layoff category depends on the decision when to collect information. In some surveys of the labor force, the relevant date is the day on which the information is collected. In the United States, only the individuals who are suspended from work for a complete week are counted. In Great Britain, workers are on temporary layoff usually for no more than two or three days in a week, but still on the employer's payroll, and it is regarded as misleading to include them in the unemployed total. Adjusting to the U.S. definition would, therefore, mean adding into the total labor-force figure those who are unregistered and unpaid family workers while deducting an estimated number who have crept into the statistics by doing more than one job. On the basis of the 1971 census, this would mean adding some 60,000 to make a grand total of 24.2 million in the labor force.*

The *General Household Survey,* in spite of its small size, produces the best published estimate of the unregistered and those on temporary layoff. Their estimate of the unemployed is much closer to that worked out by the Bureau of Labor Statistics than the figures published on a regular basis by the Department of Employment.

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*Sources of information that are used to supplement the Department of Employment's figures (for example, for the unregistered) are the *General Household Survey* (annually from 1971), the EEC *Labor Force Survey* (biennially from 1975), and the census returns (which give snapshots of the employment situation in the census years—for our purposes, these are 1961, 1966, and 1971).

Table 5. Estimates of unemployment: Great Britain

Year	*General Household Survey*	*Bureau of Labor Statistics (U.S. definition)*	*Department of Employment (excluding adult students)*
1971	3.9	3.8	3.4
1972	4.2	4.2	3.7
1973	3.2	2.9	2.6
1974		2.9	2.6
1975		4.9	4.1

The unregistered unemployed, broken down by age group, using 1966 census data and the *General Household Survey* for 1972 and 1973, are shown in Table 6.

In general, the effect of the adjustments for unregistered people is to raise the published British unemployment rates, and the adjustment is especially large for the youth age groups. It is clear that unemployment generally has been on a rising trend: at each successive trade cycle, the level has risen more at the trough of the recession and gone down less at the top of the ensuing boom (Figure 3).

Against the background of the rising trend, the tendency has been for unemployment among young people under 25 to rise still more sharply, especially during the steeper recession of

Table 6. Estimates of the number of unregistered unemployed, Great Britain (numbers in thousands)

	1966		*1972*		*1973*	
	Males	*Females*	*Males*	*Females*	*Males*	*Females*
15–24	29.7	36.0	36.9	52.5	33.0	40.0
25–54	39.6	67.2	36.9	106.75	48.0	104.0
55–64	13.5	8.4	9.9	12.25	8.0	12.8
65 and over	7.2	8.4	6.3	3.5	11.0	3.2
Total	90.0	120.0	90.0	175.0	100.0	160.0

Source: 1966—census data; 1972 and 1973—*General Household Surveys.*

Figure 3. Number of unemployed persons, all ages and those under 25, Great Britain, 1950–1976 (semilogarithmic scale)



Source: 1950–64–Department of Employment;
1965–76–Parliamentary Question, November 17, 1976.

Note: Method of collection changed in 1955 to those unemployed under 25.

the mid-1970s. Table 7 shows the change in unemployment rates of young men and women between 1975 and 1977 in relation to those for the remaining age groups. Females were relatively better off in 1975, having an unemployment rate of 10.4 percent for those 16 and 17 contrasted to the male rate of 13.8 percent. This was no longer the case in January 1977, when the roles were reversed. But it can be seen that youth unemployment is running well ahead of the unemployment of other age groups.

Figure 4 shows the rising unemployment rate separately for men and women under 30 and for those 20 to 24. The rate among girls and young women has been higher than the overall unemployment rate throughout the period. But in the case of young men and boys, it was only in 1969 that their rising trend line crossed that for unemployment generally.

Table 7. Estimated unemployment rates by age, Great Britain, selected dates, July 1975 to January 1977

	Males				*Females*			
	July 1975	*January 1976*	*July 1976*	*January 1977*	*July 1975*	*January 1976*	*July 1976*	*January 1977*
16–17	13.8%	12.3%	26.7%	12.8%	10.4%	12.0%	25.6%	14.1%
18–19	9.6	11.2	10.7	11.1	6.1	8.1	9.2	9.9
20–24	6.8	10.0	9.3	10.1	3.1	5.3	5.9	7.0
25–29	5.2	7.0	6.6	7.3	2.1	3.1	3.5	4.4
30–39	4.4	5.9	5.6	6.3	1.0	1.5	1.8	2.2
40–49	3.7	4.8	4.6	5.1	0.9	1.2	1.4	1.7
50–59	3.7	4.7	4.6	5.1	1.3	1.7	1.9	2.2
60 and over	7.8	9.1	9.1	9.5	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Overall rate	5.4	6.9	7.2	7.2	2.1	2.9	4.0	3.8

Source: Department of Employment *Gazette*, July 1977, pp. 718–719.

Note: Unemployment rates by age have not been calculated since the withdrawal of National Insurance cards in 1974. The EEC labor-force data have been used with certain adjustments along with information from education departments for the younger age groups to give the estimates. Their proviso runs: "While the figures are presented to one decimal place, they should not be regarded as implying precision to that degree."

Figure 4. Unemployment rates of young persons relative to overall unemployment rate, by sex, Great Britain, 1966 to 1975



Source: Metcalfe, 1976.

Employment Forecasts

The forecasts set out in *Towards a Comprehensive Manpower Policy* (MSC, 1976) assume that between 1976 and 1981 the total labor supply could increase by 774,000, or about five times the increase between 1971 and 1976. This is made up of an increase in the male labor force of 220,000, an increase in the number of married women in the labor force of more than 500,000, and an increase in the number of young people entering employment of about 50,000. The MSC view (1977), which has not been challenged, is that "whether unemployment among young people is a structural or cyclical phenomenon, there will be relatively little improvement if total unemployment remains high or falls only slowly." It is assumed that a 3 percent rate of growth of output per annum is necessary to prevent the unemployment rate from continuing to rise, and that to return to full employment in five years would require an annual growth rate over that period of nearly 5 percent (National Institute for Social and Economic Research, 1977, p. 51). This is unlikely to be achieved in the present and prospective economic climate. The MSC (1977) concluded that past changes in occupational structure are unlikely to be reversed; that demand for unskilled and unqualified workers would continue to decline; and that the trend in conventional apprenticeships would be downward as the result of "de-skilling" more occupations, while demand for technicians and semiskilled workers would continue to rise somewhat.

Assuming that the key influence on youth unemployment is the level of total unemployment, the MSC (1977) offered three projections for the years between 1977 and 1980 (Figure 5). Each reflects the seasonal pattern of schooling, with the worst unemployment levels concentrated in the third quarter of the year. In the most pessimistic projection, youth unemployment rises to nearly 450,000 in 1978 and is still more than 350,000 in the third quarter of 1981. None of the projections sees youth unemployment peaking at less than 100,000.

Industrial and Trade-Union Policy

A recent MSC report (1976, p. 13) notes the especially rapid rise in unemployment among young people that occurred between July 1973 and July 1976: the proportion of total unemployment represented by those under 20 rose from 12.5 to 27.8 percent. The length of time young people were remaining out of work, though still on average considerably shorter than for older workers, has risen sharply. "Young people now account for a significantly larger proportion of longer term unemployment" (see Figure 6). The report recognized this as part of a longer-term tendency for youth unemployment to rise relative to the total and forecast that this "would continue, and might indeed be intensified because of the increase in the numbers of young people entering the labor force by 1981, and because employment protection legislation, etc., may make employers more reluctant to recruit additional employees" (MSC, 1976, p. 15).

As we saw earlier, the Labor Government of 1974 took office in a period of acute industrial strife. There were three parts to Labor's policy towards the unions. The first, which is not relevant to this discussion, involved a commitment toward

Figure 5. Unemployment among young people: projections of the Manpower Services Commission, Great Britain, quarterly, 1977 to 1981 (in thousands)



Projection A assumes a moderate recovery of the economy followed by two years of improved employment before a cyclical decline in the early 1980s.

Projection B assumes that unemployment continues to rise before a similar cyclical pattern of recovery occurs.

Projection C assumes that unemployment ceases to rise in 1977 and the recovery of the economy is sufficiently sustained and rapid to approach full employment in the early 1980s.

Source: MSC, 1976, p. 12.

Figure 6. Percentage distribution of medium-term and long-term unemployed, by age group, Great Britain, July 1974 to July 1976



Source: Department of Employment *Gazette*, August 1976 and earlier issues; and MSC, 1976, p. 12.

worker participation in the direction of industry and the setting up of a commission to report on this topic. The second part concerned the repeal of labor legislation passed by the outgoing Conservative government, and in particular those parts of the 1971 Industrial Relations Act which curbed the power of the unions and limited their immunity at law. To do this, the Labor government brought in a Trade Union and Labor Relations Bill, which passed into law in 1974. This restored the unions' legal exemptions and gave them the power to enforce the closed shop. The third measure, the Employment Protection Act of 1975, strengthened collective bargaining as well as introducing a "bill of rights" for employees, ranging from guaranteed payments for those on short time to establishing the length of maternity leave with a guarantee of either the same or similar job on return.

The MSC's reference to employment protection legislation quoted above is, therefore, well taken: legislation has greatly increased the costs to the employer both of employing people and of laying them off. The law provides for a scale of minimum payments to all workers of more than two years standing who lose their jobs through redundancy, with the provision of an appeals procedure to independent tribunals in case of dispute. These legal minimum entitlements then become the basis of larger negotiated claims made by trade unions.

The effect of all this is to make job-protection legislation—not by itself, but together with the energetic defense of existing jobs by trade unions acting on behalf of threatened workers—a major consideration in the minds of management in contracting industries or in companies seeking to raise individual productivity by cutting staffing levels, who come to regard a declaration of "no compulsory redundancy" as their best, and perhaps their only chance of reducing the number of their employees without major industrial disruption.

Against the background of Britain's industrial decline, the rise of unemployment, and especially of youth unemployment, is not in itself surprising; indeed, any other outcome would be unexpected. There has been a steady reduction in employment in manufacturing, which in 1961 accounted for about 38 percent of all employment and in 1975 only 33 percent. The big growth areas for employment have been in local government and in service industries (Figure 7). Public-sector employees increased from 5.8 million in 1961 to 7.4 million in 1976. In terms of wages and salaries, this 27 percent increase in manpower pushed up the public sector's share in the national payroll to 30 percent compared with 24 percent in 1961.

Figure 7. Employment by sector, United Kingdom, 1959 to 1974



Source: Central Statistical Office

Wage Differentials

It has been suggested that one factor contributing to the increase in unemployment among the young--particularly school leavers and those under 20--is the reduction in wage differentials between adults and young workers. This can be seen from a comparison of earnings in 1968 and 1975. According to the *New Earnings Survey* matched sample,* in 1968 young men under 18 had median earnings amounting to 30.5 percent of all male workers' median earnings. By 1975 the percentage had risen to 42.5. A similar, though less marked, increase affected the 18- to 20-year-olds, whose median earnings were up from 55.9 to 65.6 percent of all male workers' median earnings.

In the case of female workers, the differential in 1968 was already less than for young men. Even so, among those under 18, the percentage rose from 53.6 to 63.5 while for 18- to 20-year-olds it rose slightly from 80 to 83.5 percent. The earnings of 20- to 24-year-olds, in contrast, remained about the same relative to the earnings of all women.

The reduction in the differential has been most marked since the government and the trade unions have joined in attempts to operate a wage policy that discriminates in favor of lower paid workers. The so-called social contract made between the government and the Trades Union Congress in July 1975 and July 1976 put specific limits on wage increases. The first contract restricted pay increases to £6 a week, a flat rate raise which automatically favored those at the lower end of the pay scale and did not allow for any increases for those earning more than £8,500 a year; the second contract was based on a formula which, in effect, also allowed lower-paid workers a bigger percentage raise than those with higher incomes.

Taken together with the tendency for collective agreements to specify the age of 18 for the introduction of adult rates (an increase from 38 to 67 percent of all agreements between 1970 and 1974), young people's pay raises have been

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*The *New Earnings Survey* is an annual survey of employees by the Department of Employment from April 1970 (Great Britain) and from April 1971 (Northern Ireland). Results from September 1968 were based on a pilot study for the *New Earnings Survey*.

considerably higher in percentage terms than those of most employed people (Figure 8).

Figure 8. Percentage increase in median gross weekly earnings of full-time manual and nonmanual employees,[a] by sex and age group, Great Britain, April 1970 to April 1975



[a] Excluding those whose pay was affected by absence

Source: Department of Employment, *New Earnings Survey*.

The *New Earnings Survey* showed how this policy affected the earnings of young men and women between 1974 and 1975:

Table 8. Percentage increase in average weekly earnings, by sex and age, Great Britain, 1974 to 1975

	Men	*Women*
Under 18	73.3	59.0
18–20	50.3	49.0
21–24	35.4	41.7
All ages	29.5	38.7

Source: Department of Employment, *New Earnings Survey*.

It has to be conceded that pay increases on the order of those won by workers under 18 would be astonishingly high at any time. There is a bizarre coincidence between this movement in pay and a sharp recorded rise in youth unemployment, which might have been expected to reduce the bargaining power of young workers. Part of the rise is obviously due to the direct intervention of government and the trade unions through the social contract, which amounted in a sense to an attempt to suspend the laws of supply and demand.

To whatever effect this may have had on juvenile employment was added the piecemeal introduction of equal pay for women, another factor raising the earnings of lower paid workers. Between 1970 and 1976, female manual wages increased from 59 percent of the male equivalent to 71 percent. The number of economically active women rose 17 percent during the 20 years up to the 1971 census, while the active male labor force declined by 2 percent during this period. Thus, women entering and remaining in the labor force were competing in increasing numbers for marginal jobs with school leavers.

How to interpret the consequences of these sharp changes in relative earnings is a matter of on-going controversy. In a letter in *The Times* on November 15, 1976, Professor Wilfred Beckerman and seven other distinguished economists concluded: "There is now very substantial quantitative evidence that the 1966 increases in unemployment benefits, which halved the net cost of being unemployed, led to a substantial increase in the natural or equilibrium rate of unemployment. There has been an additional potent force at work for the last four years—the income policies of successive governments. These have had an effect broadly equivalent to introducing a minimum wage at 30 percent above the previous minimum. There is overwhelming evidence from other countries that the effect of a minimum wage law is to raise unemployment."

On October 6, 1966, the earnings-related supplement to the unemployment benefit was introduced. At that time the weekly supplement ranged from 5p (for annual earnings of £450 before unemployment) to £7 (earnings beyond £2,100).

The present supplement peaks at £12.18 for those earning in excess of £3,450. The earnings-related supplement can be claimed only after receiving unemployment benefits for two weeks and then runs for 26 weeks. The amounts available are shown in Table 9.

Table 9. Weekly unemployment and supplementary benefits, Great Britain, 1977

	Age		
	16	*17*	*18 & over*
Unemployment benefit			
Single person, plus earnings related element up to £12.18 for 6 months only	£12.90	£12.90	£12.90
Supplementary benefit			
Single (nonhouseholder)	£7.80 plus £1.20 rent	£7.80 plus £1.20 rent	£10.15 plus £1.20 rent
Married couple, both unemployed, any age (nonhouseholder)		£21.95	
with accommodation		£20.65 plus rent	

Source: Department of Health and Social Security.

Vulnerable Groups

Some young people are more vulnerable than others because they live in regions of the United Kingdom where unemployment is particularly severe. Table 10 shows how youth unemployment relates to adult unemployment in various parts of the country. It can be seen that the rise of youth unemployment has been relatively large in the hitherto prosperous southeast region since 1974. Although the increase during the recent recession has been least marked in Scotland and the north (with a historically high rate of unemployment), the actual levels of unemployment among young people remain highest in the traditionally less favored areas, as Figure 9 indicates.

Table 10. Unemployment by region, age, and sex, Great Britain, January 13, 1977

	Unemployed under 20		*Unemployed of all ages*		*Percent change (under 20): from July 1974*	
	Males	*Females*	*Males*	*Females*	*Males*	*Females*
Southeast	30,225	22,939	262,418	80,346	+314	+619
East Anglia	3,234	2,652	28,378	8,538	+347	+560
East Midlands	6,761	5,968	57,350	18,920	+162	+300
Yorkshire and Humberside	10,316	10,277	86,599	28,527	+120	+250
North	10,445	10,438	78,027	29,113	+ 63	+159
Northwest	21,615	17,425	151,762	51,201	+114	+270
West Midlands	12,344	12,087	94,441	34,689	+185	+396
Southwest	9,597	8,737	84,688	28,431	+288	+557
Scotland	22,509	18,458	129,306	54,112	+ 88	+240
Wales	8,352	7,949	61,042	22,330	+171	+289
Total	135.398	116,930	1,034,011	356,207	+152	+318

Source: Department of Employment *Gazette*, February 1977, biannual tables on age and duration of the unemployed by region, pp. 136–137.

Figure 9. Unemployment rates of persons under 20 years of age, by region, Great Britain, January 13, 1977


Scotland
16.2
8.3
North
8.2
15.5
Yorkshire and Humberside
North West
5.0
9.7
East Midlands
West Midlands
East Anglia
Wales
2.3
South East
6.4
South West
21.1
7.3

Young people are more likely to change their jobs during the first years of employment and are most likely to be offered temporary jobs than men and women in older age groups. This is partly a reflection of restlessness and experimentation on the part of the young themselves, and it is partly inherent in the kinds of jobs young people, especially those with modest qualifications, are likely to be offered. Between 1972 and 1974, there was some evidence from the *General Household Survey* that job changing was on the increase. Whereas in 1972 about a quarter of the relevant age groups changed jobs, by 1974 this had gone up to nearly one third.

School leavers with poor educational qualifications are certainly among those most vulnerable to unemployment. A survey carried out in 1972 by the National Youth Employment Council brought this out very clearly. Only about 11 percent of the young people registered at Careers Offices had passed any recognized school examinations. That means that 89 percent were drawn from among the bottom third of the academic range who left school with no diploma. Since 1972 this tendency has continued: the least well qualified suffer most. The proportion of those who have passed at least one examination has risen to 80 percent, but so too has the chorus of complaints from employers about the poor educational standards of potential recruits. Attention, therefore, has been focused on the academic achievement of young school leavers, and there have been attempts to link this with their employment prospects—a belief that "If only they had better qualifications in the basic subjects they would be able to get work." There is no evidence that this is so. An inadequate level of public education might contribute indirectly to the structural weakness of British industry or even to the political inadequacy of economic management at the national level. But there is no reason to suppose that were there suddenly to be an increase in the proportion of pupils passing examinations, this would lead to substantially more of them being employed until eventually the present recession is succeeded by more buoyant economic circumstances. A trend toward achieving more basic knowledge might, however, lead more boys and girls to stay on in full-time education, thereby removing some potential job seekers from the statistics.

The most obvious of the vulnerable subgroups is that composed of members of ethnic minorities, mainly West Indians and Asians. The ethnic minorities have worse employment prospects than the rest of the population at all stages of the cycle: even when there is full employment, although they benefit with the rest of the community, they are always likely to have difficulty in obtaining employment commensurate to their education and talents.

The 1971 census showed that those of "new Commonwealth" origin constituted 2.2 percent of the economically active population. Estimating minority group unemployment levels is complicated by the large number who fail to register and are therefore likely to be left out of the official statistics. The Community Relations Commission (1976) estimates that up to 50 percent of young West Indians are unregistered, and statistics in general reflect only recent immigrants—the definition of ethnic minorities extends only to first- and second-generation immigrants from certain countries of the Commonwealth and Pakistan—and the numbers consequently are very small. The following data show the increase in unemployment of the minority men and women under the age of 25 since 1974:

	February 1974	*February 1975*	*February 1976*	*February 1977*
Males	2,676	5,231	11,966	12,301
Females	832	1,906	5,280	7,012
Total	3,410	7,137	17,246	19,313

Unemployment among the registered minority group workers under 25 increased more than fourfold between 1974 and 1977, during which period it only doubled for the rest of the population.

According to the 1971 census, unemployment among West Indian youth was already twice the national average:

	All males	*West Indians*	*Indians*	*Pakistanis*
Great Britain	8.1	16.2	6.7	6.8
South East	7.0	15.8	6.8	5.2

Once again regional imbalance is accentuated. Nearly half of all ethnic minority unemployment is to be found in the Southeast, in particular in London. A recent study of London (Lomas, 1975) referred to the "high level of unemployment among young black people" which "gives rise to particular concern. Minority unemployment is chiefly a problem of the West Indian community and is concentrated largely among the under 25s. The numbers are rising. In some parts of London, one in four of the total unemployed is colored. The average period of unemployment for this group is lengthening."

In the case of young Asians, difficulties caused by prejudice and discrimination are compounded by differences in culture, religion, and family background. They are often academically successful and well adjusted at school and often leave their native lands with unrealistic expectations. A recent survey (Community Relations Commission, 1976) found that more than half of those questioned in a sample of over a thousand minority people expected to go on to further education in medicine, law, or some other profession. High expectations are easily frustrated, however: 60 percent of those questioned found it difficult to get the jobs they wanted. In many cases they blamed this on racial discrimination. According to another study by the Community Relations Commission, now known as the Commission for Racial Equality (December 1976), this understates the full measure of the local problem. In one London borough, Lewisham, young West Indians made up 40 percent of those registered as unemployed. In the case of Asian minorities, up to 50 percent are likely to remain in education in pursuit of high qualifications after completing compulsory school. But even if they are disappointed in the jobs which eventually materialize, their prospects are in general much better than those of the West Indians and more likely to take them into higher status occupations.

3

Youth Employment and Industrial Training

Industrial education and training have been the subject of prolonged debate since the end of World War II, culminating in 1973 with the Employment and Training Act, which created the Manpower Services Commission (MSC) to preside over manpower, employment, and training services, including many of the functions formerly undertaken by the Ministry of Labor (renamed the Department of Employment).

The history of industrial training in Britain is complex. The 1944 Education Act (like the 1918 Education Act before it) envisaged the development of part-time day-continuation schools (part-time schools for apprentices or persons in other types of training), modeled loosely on the lines of the German *Berufschule*. After World War I, attempts to go ahead were impeded by the postwar slump, and after World War II, the "county colleges"–the 1944 version of the day-continuation schools–were given low priority compared with the reform of the secondary system and the provision of extra places and teachers for the enlarged school population. By the end of the 1950s, the raising of the school-leaving age from 15 to 16 (completed in 1972-73) had displaced day-continuation schools as the favored next stage of educational reform, and the voluntary extension of day release tailed off.

All of these proposals for day release (one or two days off per week to attend classes) for young workers assumed that industrial training was the responsibility of industry. The colleges of further education—providing a variety of vocational, technical, and general courses at many different levels for students of 16 and older—worked closely with industry to provide educational services where necessary. Traditionally, these services had been offered in night school and evening classes, but part-time and full-time day courses were coming to the fore. Vocational education was not seen as the job of the secondary schools in the postwar era (except in a few areas such as shorthand and typewriting). Both industry and educators regarded vocational education as industry's affair.

Apprenticeship remained the main instrument of industrial training, usually carrying with it admission not only to the traditional craft lore but also to the craft trade unions. Craft apprenticeship was largely a male realm. In all, some 24 percent of entrants into employment were admitted to apprenticeship in 1974; 43 percent of all boy entrants and only 6 percent of girls (mainly in hairdressing). Tables 11 and 12 provide a breakdown of the type of employment of new entrants.

For many reasons the tradition of apprenticeship has been a liability. The mechanisms of apprenticeship have always been restrictive, designed to bind the apprentice to his master and to restrict the master in the admission of others to his field of mastery. This mechanism has placed industrial training squarely within the arena of industrial relations and made the quality of training secondary to the maintenance of industrial peace and the exploitation of the temporary strengths and weaknesses of industrial management and trade unions. The maximum age of admission to apprenticeship is also important in the circumstances of a developing education system. It relates to the duration of the training period, which in turn relates to the level of pay for apprentices, the age at which they become eligible for the full adult rate, the time it takes to train a specific level of skill and the issue of whether all apprentices need the same training period. All these matters become further complicated because of the need to facilitate adult retraining and because

Table 11. Type of employment of first entrants, Great Britain, 1974

	Apprenticeships	*Employment leading to qualifications*	*Clerical*	*With training*	*Other*
Males:	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining, and quarrying	3.7	1.5	0.9	4.9	9.2
Manufacturing	39.3	18.5	19.2	41.0	35.1
Construction	24.4	8.2	3.4	7.6	9.6
Transport and communications	3.9	4.3	10.7	4.4	2.9
Distributive trades	4.8	4.8	8.1	18.1	29.0
Administration, professional services, etc.	10.1	57.0	54.1	14.1	5.1
Hotels, personal services, etc.	13.8	5.7	3.6	9.9	9.1
TOTAL, all industries and services (100.0%)	43.0%	1.3%	7.0%	17.1%	31.6%
Females:	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining, and quarrying	0.8	0.1	0.4	0.6	1.3
Manufacturing	6.4	4.7	23.4	54.4	34.4
Construction	0.5	0.5	3.2	0.3	0.2
Transport and communications	0.4	0.4	5.4	4.0	0.6
Distributive trades	5.2	2.5	13.4	20.1	48.7
Administration, professional services, etc.	11.7	87.8	49.0	14.3	3.9
Hotels, personal services, etc.	75.0	4.0	5.4	6.3	10.9
TOTAL, all industries and services (100.0%)	6.5%	1.8%	40.5%	17.2%	34.0%

Source: British Labor Statistics Yearbook, 1976, p. 226, Table 100.

Table 12. Numbers of young persons entering employment, by age and class of employment, Great Britain, 1965 to 1974
(numbers in thousands)

	Age at entry into employment							
	Boys				*Girls*			
	15	*16*	*17*	*Total*	*15*	*16*	*17*	*Total*
1965	201.2	66.9	23.2	291.2	188.4	56.6	23.6	268.5
1966	185.7	64.2	20.3	270.2	176.1	53.8	21.8	251.7
1967	167.2	66.4	19.3	252.8	159.1	53.9	21.0	234.0
1968	164.7	70.2	20.9	255.8	154.9	55.8	21.8	232.4
1969	158.8	74.4	20.9	254.1	149.4	57.5	22.0	228.9
1970	148.9	76.9	22.3	248.2	141.9	58.1	23.8	223.8
1971	146.0	74.8	21.4	242.1	141.4	56.5	22.5	220.4
1972	151.2	82.9	24.8	258.9	143.6	59.9	24.8	228.2
1973	15.0	96.9	28.6	140.5	10.5	69.4	27.2	107.0
1974	–	254.8	20.0	274.8	–	217.0	20.9	237.8

	Class of employment entered					
	Apprenticeship to skilled occupation	*Employment leading to recognized professional qualifications*	*Clerical employment*	*Employment with planned training apart from induction training, not covered in previous columns*	*Other employment*	*Total*
Boys						
1965	118.1	4.4	29.1	37.0	102.6	291.2
1966	114.4	3.5	24.7	35.3	92.3	270.2
1967	107.7	3.3	22.1	32.9	86.8	252.8
1968	110.0	3.1	21.3	34.2	87.1	255.8
1969	108.2	3.1	21.2	35.5	86.0	254.1
1970	104.9	3.3	19.8	35.2	85.0	248.2
1971	95.6	3.1	17.6	38.7	87.1	242.1
1972	100.2	3.4	18.4	42.6	94.3	258.9
1973	66.0	3.3	17.8	20.4	33.1	140.5
1974	118.2	3.5	19.2	47.0	86.9	274.8
Girls						
1965	16.6	4.6	108.2	33.7	105.5	268.5
1966	16.7	4.4	101.0	34.4	95.2	251.7
1967	16.8	4.3	91.7	32.5	88.7	234.0
1968	17.1	4.3	90.3	33.6	87.1	232.4
1969	16.3	4.1	90.8	34.7	83.0	228.9
1970	15.8	4.1	89.5	34.0	80.4	223.8
1971	16.7	4.1	78.8	37.5	83.4	220.4
1972	18.0	3.9	78.3	40.5	87.5	228.2
1973	5.0	4.0	62.3	12.4	23.3	107.0
1974	15.5	4.2	96.3	41.0	80.9	237.3

Source: British Labor Statistics Yearbook 1974, page 223, Table 96.

the development of industrial technology does not conform to the lines of demarcation rigorously laid down between craft unions.

Thus, the reform apprenticeship has been on the agenda since the end of World War II, and at each turn in the development of public policy on industrial training, attempts have been made to loosen the rigidity of the system and to increase its adaptability to modern conditions.

In 1964, the Industrial Training Act brought into being industrial training boards for each industry, charged with the overseeing of training policy. This act also brought in the principle of levy and grant: companies within a given industry had to pay a levy on their staff roll. This was paid into a fund from which grants were made to companies according to the training they engaged in, provided they conformed to the training policies laid down by the Industrial Training Board. The effect was to stimulate training activities and the growth of training staffs and, especially in the case of engineering and the construction industries, to encourage the reappraisal of skill-training schemes and their reorganization on a modular basis in conjunction with colleges of further education. More and more of the first year of training has been conducted off the job in college or group-training centers.

In 1973, the levy-grant system was modified. The rate of the levy was limited to a maximum of 1 percent of payroll and there was provision for a wide range of exemptions. The work of the industrial training boards was augmented by the formation of the Training Services Agency (TSA), with substantial funds (£110 million in 1976) to support and promote industrial training. The MSC and TSA have an existence outside government but are financed from public funds and staffed by civil servants. Thus they have more independence of action than a government department while still being essentially part of the public service. Six of the ten Manpower Services Commissioners are drawn in equal numbers from industrial management and the trade unions, with minority representation of local government and education. This alliance between the Confederation of British Industries and the Trades Union Congress gives the MSC its muscle and at the same time limits what can and cannot be done. During its short life so far, the commission has been strongly backed by the government with funds and political support, and, because the Labor Party is currently dominant, the trade-union leadership in the MSC has been particularly strong.

Statistical Background

Statistics about the training and allied vocational education of young workers are far from perfect. The method of collection is such that the classifications used may not be interpreted in a uniform manner. As a starting point for policy making and action, however, the Training Services Agency has used analyses based on the census returns and figures collected by the National Youth Employment Council (1974).

Between 1964 and 1974, the total number of young workers under 18 declined by one-sixth (MSC, 1975). There were several reasons for this: smaller age groups, the raising of the minimum school-leaving age, more voluntary staying on beyond 16, and higher youth unemployment. More than half the boys, but only one in eight of the girls, were in apprenticeships or other employment with planned training extending beyond 12 months (Table 13). Another small group of boys and girls were receiving training of from two to twelve months. In the case of girls, a large group (40 percent) were in clerical occupations where the amount and quality of training for many is virtually nonexistent, especially in various office operations that have been divided into their component parts so as to require minimal instruction. In the case of both boys and girls, about a third of those entering employment, in addition to those listed above under the clerical work heading, receive training of less than eight weeks.

When the apprenticeship figures were analyzed, they showed marked regional differences reflecting the industrial structure of the country. Pupils stay on at school longer in the Southeast (where proportionately fewer enter apprenticeship) and have more opportunity for professional training and clerical

Table 13. Distribution of boys and girls entering employment by class of employment entered, Great Britain, 1964 to 1974

	1964		*1970*		*1972*		*1974*[b]	
Employment entered[a]	*000s*	*%*	*000s*	*%*	*000s*	*%*	*000s*	*%*
Boys								
Apprenticeship	114.5	36	104.9	43	100.2	40	118.2	43
Professional	5.2	1	3.3	1	3.4	1	3.5	1
Clerical	34.0	11	19.8	8	18.4	7	19.2	7
Employment with planned training over 12 months	30.5	10	20.7	8	23.8	9	26.4	10
Employment with planned training 8 weeks–12 months	16.5	5	14.6	6	18.8	7	20.5	7
Other employment	114.2	37	85.0	34	94.3	36	86.9	32
Total	314.8	100	248.2	100	258.9	100	274.8	100
Girls								
Apprenticeship	16.9	6	15.8	7	18.0	8	15.5	6
Professional	5.0	2	4.1	2	3.9	2	4.2	2
Clerical	114.9	39	89.5	40	78.3	34	96.3	40
Employment with planned training over 12 months	13.3	5	11.0	5	12.6	6	13.5	6
Employment with planned training 8 weeks–12 months	24.4	8	23.0	10	28.0	12	27.5	12
Other employment	119.0	40	80.4	36	87.5	38	80.9	34
Total	293.5	100	223.8	100	228.2	100	237.8	100

[a] The classification embraces training of all types—off the job, on the job, and simple experience training—and includes provision for further education in some instances.

[b] Provisional (analyses by age, region and industry not yet available). The figures for the year are probably affected by the raising of the school-leaving age in 1973.

Source: Manpower Services Commission, 1975, page 4, Table 2.

employment than in the less prosperous North, where there is more employment in heavy industry as well as more craft apprenticeship (Table 14).

A major concern over the past quarter of a century has been the extent to which access to industrial training has fluctuated with the state of the economy. Persistent shortages of skilled labor have been found at all phases of the economic

Table 14. Percentage of boys obtaining apprenticeships, by region, Great Britain, 1962 to 1972

Department of Employment Region	*1962*	*1964*	*1966*	*1968*	*1970*	*1972*
London and Southeast	27	26	30	32	32	28
East and South	34	36	41	42	41	36
Southwest	38	38	40	39	37	34
Midlands	35	35	42	44	43	37
Yorkshire and Humberside	44	45	51	51	51	47
Northwest	44	43	51	49	48	46
North	41	41	50	48	47	47
Wales	26	29	37	38	36	33
Scotland	39	40	45	46	47	45
Total Great Britain	36	36	42	43	42	39

Source: Manpower Services Commission, 1975, p. 5, Table 3.

cycle, accentuated by the employers' practice of reducing their intake of trainees when the economy is in recession (Figure 10). The result of their actions is not fully felt until the economy has begun to operate at a level nearer to full capacity, when the apprentices who would then have been completing their training are missed. When confidence returns, the recruitment of apprentices increases, and by the time they are trained, the cycle has entered another phase.

Many of these problems are highlighted in the training experience of the engineering industry. In recent years, the British engineering industry has reflected the poor performance of Britain in world markets. Between 1967 and 1974, engineering employment (as a percentage of all employment) declined from 19.5 to 15.5 percent. In the 10 years to 1974, the number of

Figure 10. Cyclical variations in apprentice intake and total notified vacancies (all industries and services), Great Britain, 1962 to 1972



Source: Manpower Services Commission, 1975, p. 6.

engineering apprentices dropped by about 40 percent, while the total number of skilled workers employed in engineering dropped from 830,000 to 688,000 (a 17 percent drop).

Attempts have been made to increase the annual intake of engineering apprentices, which fell from about 20,000 in the late 1960s, to 12,000 in 1972-73, and by 1974 was back to 18,700. The intake of technicians has followed the same trend. A recent report stated that "it now seems inevitable that there will be in 1976-77 and the two subsequent years fewer craftsmen available than employers will wish to employ" (Engineering Industries Training Board, 1975, p. 23). In fact, even in a period of high unemployment there is a recognizable shortage of skilled labor.

Engineering apprenticeship, however, even in a period of juvenile unemployment, is not oversubscribed. Fewer "well qualified" young people are now said to be seeking engineering training. Some possible reasons for this have been put forward in a paper by Gerry Eastwood (1976), trade union leader, and general secretary of the Association of Pattern Makers and Allied Craftsmen for the British North American Committee. This paper points to the rapid erosion of the differential between skilled and unskilled wages. Using figures collected by the Department of Employment for men's wages in the engineering, shipbuilding, and chemical industries, Eastwood calculates that the differential advantage of skilled time workers (paid by the hour) over nonskilled time workers dropped from 44 percent to 32 percent. According to his reckoning, a 16-year-old apprentice in 1976 could expect to receive £17.85 a week (or 42.5 percent of the full craft rate), while a 16-year-old junior manual worker without training or obligation to study could earn £17.

Analysis and Proposals

Long-term training. It is generally agreed that there have been considerable improvements in the quality of long-term training, including apprenticeship, since the early 1960s, although a great deal more remains to be done. (See Chapter 4 for a discussion of short-term measures to increase both training and employment.) The Industrial Training Boards have gone a long way toward systematizing training programs and requiring an effective combination of on-the-job training with off-the-job vocational education. More flexibility has been introduced, and there are more courses aimed at providing a common preparation for more than one craft skill. Less rigid rules about the age of entry into apprenticeship have been negotiated, but this has usually meant no more than extending the range of possible exceptions to otherwise restrictive regulations; the use of these exceptions still depends on the liberalness of employers and local union branches. Considerable progress has been made on adult retraining, with official union support but not without reserve at grass-roots level. This same reserve extends to most attempts to admit young adults to apprenticeship.

In the summer of 1976, the MSC and the Department of Employment put forward a scheme aimed at insulating long-term training more effectively from short-term economic considerations. The proposals recognized that many essential skills were not peculiar to individual companies but extended across companies on an industry-wide scale. Firms that trained too few of their own apprentices relied on recruiting those trained by others. Persistent "poachers" thus saved money on the cost of training by living off the public-spirited activities of others, while restrictive trade-union practices inhibited the normal market mechanisms that might otherwise have compensated for fluctuations in the trade cycle.

The core of the MSC/Department of Labor proposals was a scheme of collective funding to cover the first, most expensive part of the apprentice's training course, mainly off the job in a further-education college or group training center. Without specifying details, the proposal assumed that more than half the cost would be borne by an expanded levy on payrolls and the remainder by a government grant. Collective funding was justified on the grounds that a shortage of skilled manpower was damaging to the national economy. It was, therefore, linked to the idea of a manpower analysis that would identify national needs for particular kinds of skill.

In the months following publication of the proposals, *Training for Vital Skills* (MSC, 1976), the trade unions welcomed the recommendations, while opposition from employers mounted. The trade unions welcomed the idea not only because they recognized a shortage of skilled workers but also because they wished to see the proportion of young people in recognized forms of training increase and because their collectivist inclinations led them automatically to favor the injection of public funds. The initial readiness of the employers' organizations to cooperate cooled as grass-roots hostility to the scheme emerged during consultations. What happened, in fact, offers an instructive commentary on the politics of industrial training within the larger field of British industrial relations. During the months following the publication of *Training for Vital Skills,* the parliamentary position of the Labor government weakened. Some by-election results, including the loss of two Labor seats, encouraged the Conservatives and strengthened the resolve of employers who believed that under a Conservative government the present strength of trade-union representation on the MSC would weaken. Because of the erratic course of public policy in this area of industrial affairs over the past 15 years, there is no confidence that any controversial policy can actually be carried through, and this gives the maximum incentive to resolute opposition and determined temporizing on the part of those waiting for another swing of the political pendulum.

With regard to the proposal for collective funding and a systematic attempt to increase training for specific skills, the employers have one powerful argument on their side. While accepting that there is a general shortage of skilled labor, they accuse the unions of creating artificial shortages by maintaining narrow and unrealistic job classifications that prevent the efficient distribution of the skilled workers now available. Nobody doubts that there is a great deal of truth in this accusation, which links up with the larger criticisms of overmanning and low productivity in British industry. The employers see the proposal for collective funding and the expansion of apprenticeship as an attempt to dodge the issue and further strengthen the restrictive practices that were established to defend freehold rights in traditional skills.

This is another example of industrial training issues being subsumed within the larger debate on industrial relations—a debate in which rational argument is much less important than economic power. The response of the MSC (where the trade unions are the dominant voice) is to step back now to prepare for a jump forward later and to remit the whole question to further study (and further delay) by a committee of labor and management representatives.

The episode shows the narrow angle of vision adopted in Britain in consideration of public policy for those under 18. The formal theory maintained is that industrial training is a purely technical affair of concern largely, if not exclusively, to employers and trade unions. The argument is reduced to questions of specific shortages of skill and specific restrictive practices by trade unions, about the precise numbers of workers who should be admitted to particular crafts, how their training should be paid for, how long it should last, and who should be allowed to enter a haven that could easily become overcrowded.

The policy makers are aware that there are other considerations. They compare Britain, where only 30 percent of employed youth under 18 are in some form of long-term planned training, with West Germany, where the equivalent figure is more like 70 percent. They recognize that a well-organized period of training for an older teenager in industry is a worthwhile and formative experience, even if it does not lead to life-time employment in the particular industrial context in which the training was received. They believe that no special disadvantages would attend training more than might appear to be needed to fulfill specific manpower targets; that, in any case, versatility is the principal requirement; and that versatility is more likely to be cultivated by sound initial training than by none. But the policy makers are imprisoned within an administrative structure that limits the range of arguments that can be brought into play. The larger social considerations are in the realm of educational policy, while manpower and industrial training are more down to earth. The language of industrial training policy has to reflect this: objectives must be defined in economic terms, and a managerial structure must be designed to achieve them. Thus the policies affecting the 40 percent who remain in full-time education and those affecting the 60 percent who enter employment are sharply divided; the departments of employment and education, who are responsible for the young people concerned, remain at arm's length, divided not only by function but also by philosophy; and an overarching policy for the youth under 18 years old in the community as a whole remains an elusive and apparently unattainable ideal.

Short-term training. As has been noted, the majority of young people entering employment, if they receive any instruction, receive only modest forms of industrial training or on-the-job training lasting less than a year. In many cases, the kinds of jobs young people enter require only limited training. A few industries receive large numbers of youths into these low-skill jobs. One in six boys and one in four girls entered the distributive trades in 1974. Boys are heavily concentrated in engineering (17 percent), miscellaneous services (11 percent), and construction (15 percent). Girls go in large numbers into the manufacture of clothing and footwear (7 percent) and textiles (16 percent).

The MSC (1975, p. 11) cites examples of short-term training from the clothing, hosiery, and knitted-goods sectors. "In clothing, training currently takes about eight weeks. This often takes the form of supervision of developing machine skills, rather than training in manipulative skills; training specific to the particular task in mass production could take only four weeks. In the hosiery and knitted-goods sector, training up to experienced worker standard takes 12 to 16 weeks." The policy of the industrial training boards is to encourage the further systematization of short-term training, and there is evidence that this has been happening in recent years. But there are limits to what can be done within the present assumptions.

Relatively few of those receiving short-term training get day release to colleges of further education. Some of the larger organizations, especially among the nationalized industries and public services, offer day release for general education (Table 15)–the old county-college idea surviving in attenuated form, but only on a small scale.

Employers in general are more prepared to consent to day release–often it is strongly encouraged by industrial training boards–when it is directly linked to vocational education, and in the great majority of cases this means for apprentices only (Table 16). Nonvocational day-release classes are notoriously difficult to teach and, of course, this is especially true when the students are boys and girls in jobs requiring the least vocational instruction, who tend to have been the least successful and the least well motivated at school.

Currently, however, the most obvious need for improvement is not in vocational training but in general education, with

Table 15. Young people under 18 on day-release work, England and Wales, November 1971 to November 1974

	Men					*Women*				
	1971[a] as percentage of number insured	*1971*	*1972*	*1973*	*1974*	*1971[a] as percentage of number insured*	*1971*	*1972*	*1973*	*1974*
Industry:										
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing	39%	6,017	6,474	5,281	5,482	9%	311	343	298	364
Mining and quarrying	53	5,249	3,867	2,992	3,587	24	124	116	105	131
Manufacturing industries	42	82,136	69,916	63,427	69,572	7	12,153	9,957	9,215	10,302
Construction	48	22,874	27,810	31,180	27,149	8	424	449	404	397
Gas, electricity, and water	96	5,178	4,606	3,750	3,862	35	932	796	773	983
Transport and communication	46	8,650	7,704	6,630	7,065	18	1,840	1,846	1,328	1,592
Distributive trades	6	5,414	5,446	4,425	4,373	2	3,387	3,398	2,527	2,570

Insurance, banking, finance, and business services	9	754	693	970	1,319	2	692	619	727	1,220
Professional and scientific services	37	4,270	4,411	4,638	4,330	26	7,990	7,407	6,662	6,366
Miscellaneous services	36	20,191	21,129	19,626	17,275	24	12,646	13,785	10,586	10,073
Public administration and defense	107	10,289	10,778	10,030	10,418	74	7,511	7,258	6,108	7,781
Total	36	171,022	162,834	152,949	154,432	10	48,010	45,974	38,733	41,779

[a] Numbers on day release at November 1971 as a percentage of those insured at June 1971. No equivalent figures available for later years.

Source: Department of Education and Science, *Statistics of Education*, 1974, Vol. 3.

Table 16. Comparison in selected industries of boys under 18 receiving further education and percentage of new entrants taking apprentice training, Great Britain, 1971

Industry	*Percentage receiving further education*	*Percentage taking apprentice training*
Food, drink, and tobacco	15	12
Mechanical engineering	75	69
Vehicles	59	71
Textiles	9	13
Gas, electricity, and water	93	76
Administration and defense	100	41

Source: Manpower Services Commission, 1975, p. 13, Table 4.

some outspoken criticism of the academic achievements of those entering employment. This criticism has been articulated by the Training Service Agency and has helped to fuel wider demands for more accountability from the school system and closer supervision of school curricula by the Department of Education and Science. Thus, at the lowest level of skill as well as at the highest, the distinction between vocational and general education breaks down. The raising of the school-leaving age from 15 to 16 might have been expected to help, but better basic standards of competence cannot be expected in the short term. It is, of course, doubtful whether the benefits of extended compulsory education will take a form satisfactory to employers, who are as concerned about attitudes and values among alienated young people as they are about levels of mathematical or reading ability. This is especially true in inner-city areas, where poor employment prospects and a dispiriting social environment combine to produce negative attitudes both to education and to work long before the end of the secondary school course.

One response, in Britain as elsewhere, has been to draw attention to the importance of career counseling. In the English context, a clear distinction has to be made between career teaching (teaching about careers and the world of work, undertaken by the regular staff of secondary schools) and career guidance (counseling and advice provided by vocational guidance staff from outside the school). A career guidance service is organized by each local education authority for the schools under its control (see Chapter 5) and is staffed by specialists whose counseling duties also include the provision of a placement service for school leavers' first employment. The quality varies according to the adviser's knowledge both of education and of industry. The guidance that 14- and 15-year-olds require is as likely to be educational as industrial, and the adviser needs to be well informed about the basic qualifications needed for entering all forms of qualified work, about the local availability of vocational courses in colleges of further education, and about the choices involved in continuing education at school. The MSC–possibly because it undervalues the importance of the link between vocational and educational guidance at this level and suspects that local career advisers are inadequately informed on the needs and opportunities of industrial employment–believes that responsibility for career guidance should be taken away from the education authorities and transferred to the MSC itself, which is responsible for employment services for the adult population. The education authorities (and the teachers and educational administrators) believe equally strongly that career guidance should continue to be a part of the education service.

The local career service, though separately administered by each local education authority, provides a career structure that is national rather than local. A career adviser is likely to work for a number of different local authorities in the course of his or her career. While the quality of the service inevitably varies to some extent from one authority to another, the existence of this national career structure helps to counter some of the more obvious parochial limitations of a local service.

In recent years more emphasis has been placed on educational guidance in English schools (and still more in Scottish schools). Further, because of the development of larger schools (as a result of the creation of comprehensive secondary schools in place of separate grammar and secondary schools), there has been a greater willingness to allow guidance and counseling to emerge as teaching specialties. However, this development has depended mainly on the policy of individual schools and head teachers rather than on any national initiative or decision by local education authorities. There is a long-standing tradition in English education that the general counseling function (as opposed to counseling specifically related to careers) is part of the professional responsibility of all teachers, and educators are reluctant to allow it to be concentrated in the hands of a team of specialists, as it is in North America. But however attractive the tradition may be in theory, it has often failed to produce either good career teaching or counseling. The unevenness of the services provided among various schools and education authorities has attracted much criticism. A survey undertaken by Her Majesty's Inspectors of Schools for the Department of Education and Science in 1971-72 (Department of Education and Science, 1973) found that career counseling within the schools is seriously inadequate. While 94 percent of secondary schools in England and Wales had at least one member of staff designated as careers teacher, in nearly half the schools the time set aside for this work only amounted to 20 percent of one teacher's time. One school in four provided no careers education for pupils 14 years and older.

There have been many suggestions that one way of improving career teaching would be to attack the isolation of the teaching profession and to encourage more teachers to learn about industry at first hand. One method would be to require, or at any rate encourage, would-be teachers to spend a minimum period in employment before entering teacher training. Another would be to expand small-scale schemes like the one now run by the Confederation of British Industries for practicing teachers who are given leaves from their schools for periods of industrial experience. It has so far proved extremely difficult to get beyond the talking stage, however, because of the considerable cost involved in even a small expansion of such schemes, and perhaps also because most public statements on this subject seem to express conventional pieties rather than real conviction.

For the 300,000 or so boys and girls who start work each year and receive no long-term training, the TSA proposes the development of "gateway" courses "of a recognized national standard . . . to enable young people to undergo vocational preparation off the job. The courses would inculcate knowledge relevant to jobs within broad occupational bands, and their length should depend on the time required for the young people to absorb the content—say, in many cases, three months" (MSC, 1975, p. 20). These courses would be conceived of as continuing basic education, vocational education, and industrial training, and would not only be simply a variant of those already provided by further education colleges: they would include an element of induction training.

A similar idea arose in the Department of Education and Science, and this has come to fruition in a scheme known as "Unified Vocational Preparation," which was launched in November 1976 on an experimental basis. As first announced, the projects were for "16- to 19-year-olds who leave school and go into jobs with little or no further education or training" and "will provide a basis for planning future provision for this age group" (Department of Education and Science, 1976b). Some were to be located in colleges of further education, others in TSA skill centers and on employers' premises. While it is too soon yet to assess the lessons learned from the pilot schemes or to draw conclusions from them about the feasibility of a national scheme, it appears to have been very difficult to get the pilot projects off the ground. The pilot scheme was only intended to involve 6,000 young people throughout Great Britain, and it looks as if even this modest goal will take several years to achieve. It has proved much more difficult to get employers to grant young workers the three-month block release to attend the courses than had been expected, notwithstanding the government wage subsidies of £10 per worker. In some cases, quotas have been filled by recruiting youngsters who have not previously secured employment or by incorporating unified vocational preparation into work-experience schemes. (See Chapter 4 for a description of the work-experience scheme.) It already looks unlikely that block release will be used in future to the exclusion of other forms of part-time and day release.

It is disappointing that the experiment was on such a limited basis and that the preliminary difficulties proved so formidable. To make a success of these courses, some hitherto unsolved educational puzzles have to be tackled; hopefully some important lessons can be learned from the various approaches being tried out in the pilot projects. Many of those who take part will be resistant to learning because of their school experience. In many cases, the courses will represent an attempt in three months to repair the results of educational failure over many years. The TSA recognizes also that a majority of employers are skeptical about the need for, or value of, more initial training for the group of young workers who now receive least. Furthermore many courses will take place in colleges of further education along with other courses for 16- and 17-year-olds who are expected to be maintained by their parents or who at most are eligible for exiguous maintenance allowances. Assuming that more than half the boys and girls entering employment from school each year need these courses, it is worth asking whether they should not be provided within the framework of secondary education instead of outside it.

4

Changes in Education and the Consequences

The development of the English educational system has passed through several phases in the years since World War II.* The basic education law passed in 1944 remains in force and still provides the framework within which development takes place. The relationship between the central government's Department of Education and Science (DES) and the local education authorities that administer the public system remains largely unchanged except for one major legislative innovation (in 1976) which laid down a national policy of comprehensive secondary schools and gave the DES power to insist on the provision of nonselective schools.

Changes in Primary and Secondary Education

The pre-1944 education system provided for nine years of compulsory education. Children entered the public elementary schools at five; at eleven those successful in a scholarship examination, plus those who could satisfy a minimum entrance standard *and* whose parents chose to pay the necessary fees, transferred to publicly maintained and grant-aided grammar schools. Of all elementary school leavers, about 13.5 percent made the transfer to grammar school. The remainder stayed in the elementary schools. In some areas 13-year-olds in elementary schools have the chance to transfer to technical schools. Two-thirds of them left at age 14, and of those who stayed beyond their fourteenth birthdays, all but a handful had entered employment by the time they were 15, with or without further training.

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*Material concerning primary and secondary schools refer to England and Wales; Scotland has its own education laws. Most information in the section on universities (pp. 73-83), however, is collected on a "Great Britain" basis.

Of those who went on to grammar school, nearly half left at age 16 after the first external examination—the School Certificate. Those continuing on to the sixth form included students taking the Higher Certificate examinations, from which the entrants to the universities were drawn. The winnowing process was severe: in 1938 there were 908,000 18-year-olds; of these, only 1.7 percent went on to university and 2.7 percent went on to all forms of higher education. Of the 15,500 university entrants, only 4,225 were from "grant-aided" schools. ("Grant aided" in this context covers all schools maintained by local authorities or otherwise receiving grants directly from public funds.) A private school system flourished alongside the system of schools paid for, or assisted by, public funds. The private school sector was very small compared with the grant-aided sector but provided a high proportion of those who completed the full secondary course and went on to the universities.

The pre-1944 education system was divided, therefore, into an elementary system from ages 5 to 14; an overlapping secondary system running from ages 11 to 16 or 18; and a parallel system of private or independent schools (which included the English "public" schools).

The 1944 Education Act made important changes. The minimum school-leaving age was raised to 15 in 1947, and provision was made for it to be raised to 16 in 1973. Instead of elementary schools and secondary schools overlapping each other, all children (except those in private schools) were to start in primary schools at age 5 and transfer at age 11 to secondary schools. All fees were abolished in the secondary schools and, decade by decade, the numbers of students in the secondary schools staying on beyond the minimum leaving age have risen.

Meanwhile, there has been some contraction in the private sector, but 6 percent of all pupils remain in the private primary ("preparatory") and independent secondary schools (which include the "public" boarding schools) although costs and fees have soared.*

Figure 11 shows how the profile of the education has developed since 1961-62. The funnel remains narrow but the base has widened, and there has been some widening all the way up as the rate of attrition has been slowly reduced. But the ambiguities in the concept of secondary education for all have inhibited this process of change to a mass system.

In general terms, the structural changes initiated by the 1944 act can be seen as transition from a narrow, exclusive system to one with much more open access. But the transition is far from complete. The secondary school curriculum is geared to an elite academic program, early specialization in academic subjects, advanced work on a narrow front in the last two or three years at school, and a pattern of specialized first degrees in the universities. The universities themselves have been geared to selecting students on a competitive basis. They have combined this selective entry with a short (three-year) first degree and a low dropout rate (14 perccent)—all of which has reinforced the dichotomy between "academic" and the "non-academic" students within the schools.

This dichotomy has dominated the development of the post-1944 secondary school. At first there was a large measure of agreement that if secondary education was to be provided for everybody, it had to be provided in separate forms: an academic form, corresponding to that of the traditional grammar schools (once the only form of secondary education), and a "modern" form for the less academically oriented pupil. There was also the suggestion that between the grammar schools and the modern schools, there should be "technical schools," but few of

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*Combining some characteristics of both the maintained and independent sectors were the "direct grant" schools, supported partly by fees and partly by direct government grants, where at least 25 percent of the places had to be free. The direct-grant system is not being phased out as part of the government's plans for comprehensive secondary schools.

Figure 11. Percentage of young people enrolled in educational institutions, by age and sex, Great Britain, 1961–62 to 1974–75 (semilog scale, percentages)



▩ **1961–62**: *Source:* Committee on Higher Education, 1963.

▦ **1974–75**: *Source:* Department of Education and Science, 1974.

these were provided, and many local authorities never built them into their secondary systems.

The grammar schools took roughly the top 25 percent of IQs; the modern schools took the rest. Each local authority ran its own "11-plus examination" to decide which children should go to which schools. During the 1950s, the change from the prewar system was considered a triumph for liberal reform. By abolishing fees, an attempt had been made to free educational opportunity from its historic connection with parental wealth. The secondary selection procedures purported to examine the potential of each child and discover latent talent which could be allowed to flourish within the meritocratic ideals of the time. In this there was, of course, a great deal of wishful thinking; no diagnostic testing devices existed that could fulfill this specification, but the wish behind the thought was essentially that of the liberal reformer.

Within limits, the new secondary schools were remarkably successful. They certainly did expand opportunity, though the social-class composition of the grammar schools was still heavily skewed toward the middle classes. In addition, the selection tests used were not culture free and the limited experiment in equality of opportunity resulted in a continuing inequality of outcome. But the numbers completing secondary education rose steadily after 1950, as did the numbers staying on beyond the minimum school-leaving age and those taking the main examinations at 16–the General Certificate of Education at ordinary level (GCE-0 level) and the new Certificate of Secondary Education (CSE) which was initiated in 1965. Increasing numbers of students also qualified at the advanced level of the General Certificate of Education (GCE-A), as reflected in the growth of numbers in higher education at the universities and in the polytechnics, colleges of education, and other colleges of further education where higher education courses were developed.

The rapid growth of higher education in the 1960s is the most obvious fruit of the first postwar reform of secondary education, which expanded the maintained grammar schools and created a structure of selective and nonselective schools based on the 11-plus examination. But just when this expansion was at its height, the liberal conscience of the social democrats in the Labor Party turned against the grammar school, the meritocratic ideal, and the 11-plus selection process as negations of all that universal secondary education stood for. There had always been left-wing critics of the selective system. Some large local education authorities, including the one in London, had long committed themselves to the idea of comprehensive schools. (As early as 1934, London's Labor politicians had demanded "multi-type" or "multi-bias" schools, where all children of secondary age could be schooled together.) By the time the Labor Government of 1964 was formed, comprehensive schools had become an article of party faith.

The years since 1964 (but for the 3-1/2 years when the Conservatives were in power and Mrs. Margaret Thatcher was Secretary of State for Education and Science) have seen steady progress toward comprehensive education. In 1966 about a quarter of all secondary school children were in comprehensive schools. By 1976 the proportion had risen to three-quarters. The Education Act of 1976 was intended to set the seal on the transition. The Conservatives resolutely opposed the bill, believing that it should be left to the local education authorities to decide what kind of secondary organization they preferred. If there is a change of government at the next election, the Conservatives are pledged to repeal the act, but the movement toward comprehensive education may already have gone too far for them to halt it.

The transition to comprehensive education has undoubtedly led to some disruption and disturbance, and it will be some years before the necessary administrative adjustments have been made at the sixth-form level to insure that teaching resources are used in an economic manner. There is some evidence that the change to comprehensive organization has been accompanied by a deterioration of examination performance. It looks as if the combined effect of comprehensive reorganization and the raising of the minimum school-leaving age to 16 was to interrupt, if only temporarily, the trend toward more voluntary staying on to age 17. But it remains a matter for debate whether comprehensive reorganization, as such, will produce its own boom in further and higher education, comparable with the boom that followed the expansion of the grammar schools in the 1950s. Experience in Scandinavia and elsewhere has suggested that it should do so, provided the structure of postsecondary education is sufficiently flexible to accommodate new forms of student demand.

To date, the reform of English secondary education has not been accompanied by any national attempt to explore the curricular consequences of institutional change. The organizational changes have been carried through on the assumption that comprehensive schools simply provided a fairer, more effective way of offering the same curricular programs as had hitherto been offered in the various separate schools. Now, however, as the last phase of comprehensive secondary reform unfolds, educational debate has suddenly taken a sharp conservative turn. Both political parties have responded to public anxiety about educational standards by emphasizing the importance of public accountability. The Department of Education and Science has entered the debate about curriculum and examinations, criticizing progressive methods and demanding more carefully defined objectives for a core of studies for all students. The emphasis in the political discussion of education has changed with startling rapidity since the prime minister initiated a process of review in a major speech in October 1976. For 20 years past, the dominant educational concerns of left-wing English politics have been social equality and compensation for social disadvantage, the role of educational policy within the wider framework of social policy, and the expansion of opportunity for social mobility. Now the focus is on the links between education and the world of work, on the contribution the schools make to the preparation of men and women for work in the wealth-generating sectors of the economy, and thus on the transmission of essential skills for productive life.

This change of direction will not encourage the kind of curriculum and examination reform to which the secondary reorganization policy might otherwise lead. A long, drawn-out review of the secondary school examination structure is in hand. This is directed at broadening the 16-plus examination by combining the GCE-0 and CSE examinations within a single system of exams and at broadening the sixth-form course to a nucleus of five subjects instead of the present three. But there is obvious anxiety lest more changes lead to a decline in levels of attainment just when public concern about educational standards has become a matter of political debate. And behind this anxiety lurks the larger doubt about whether the educational needs of the economy are best met by putting more and more students through a watered-down academic program.

The more likely next step is a partial reorganization of educational arrangements for the 16 to 19 age groups. Support has been growing for a new range of "tertiary" institutions combining the several forms of full- and part-time courses, academic and vocational, for people 16 years and over. Upper secondary schoolwork, preparing some people for higher education, demands highly qualified staff who could be used more effectively if larger teaching groups could be established in tertiary institutions. Many sixth forms in comprehensive schools are now very small, and, because of the declining birth rate, are destined to get smaller. There is already some overlap between the secondary school sixth forms and the existing colleges of further education. Thus there are several administrative advantages to tertiary institutions, which could also provide a more adult atmosphere for older teenagers.

However, the same academic tradition that is undergoing anxiety about educational standards will resist any attempt to dismantle the traditional sixth form, which is regarded as the jewel in the secondary school crown and the guarantor of high standards of teaching in lower grades. This tradition also stresses the value of continuity and a smooth transition from stage to stage and reflects a strong conviction that time will be wasted and momentum lost if a major institutional change is scheduled at age 16. (There are also solid institutional obstacles in the way of a change across the board, relating to teachers' salaries and career structure.)

Whatever happens, the time may be coming when the present boundaries between secondary and postsecondary education have to be redrawn. In recent years the number of students under the age of 18 in the colleges of further education has grown steadily. There are now (1975) some 130,000 full-time and 526,000 part-time students under 18 enrolled in colleges. Some 80,000 students (mainly 19 and under) were enrolled in full-time further-education courses leading to the main, recognized school qualifications—GCE-0 and GCE-A, Certificate of Secondary Education, and the Scottish Certificate of Education. Another 239,000 were working for similar exams in part-time day or evening courses.

Higher education is defined in the British context as postsecondary education beyond the advanced level of the General Certificate of Education or similar standard. The universities, colleges of education, and colleges of further education where advanced work is undertaken (notably the polytechnics) provide the institutional resources of higher education. The growth of numbers in these institutions can be seen from Table 17.

It is likely that in the 1980s, the argument about institutional hierarchies and social discrimination in higher education will become more intense. The existence of a high-prestige "autonomous" university sector and a separate, much more varied, low-prestige public sector (the polytechnics and advanced further education) is in itself seen by many as a divisive barrier to the attainment of a greater equality in education. The differences in prestige of the two sectors are reflected in differences of administration. The autonomous sector is financed through a University Grants Committee, deliberately designed as a buffer between the government as paymaster and the universities as "chartered" bodies. The public sector, in contrast, is both financed and controlled by government, central and local, and such institutional freedom as has been attained by these colleges is much more circumscribed than that of the humblest university. It will have to be an object of policy to develop an administrative structure that can accommodate considerable diversity without institutionalizing this in a form seen as unacceptably divisive.

Changing Patterns of Postsecondary Education

The development of the nonuniversity sector of higher education was a major feature of the decade from 1963 to 1972. It was based on the expansion of both the colleges of education and the colleges of further education and the designation some of the latter as "polytechnics," offering an alternative to the universities for degree students. It was intended that these institutions should be more responsive to the needs of government, industry, and commerce than the universities and should aim to provide courses with a more professional orientation. But the

Table 17. Number of students enrolled in postsecondary education, by type of institution, United Kingdom, 1964–65 to 1974–75

Home and overseas students

(numbers in thousands)

	Universities[a]						Colleges of education[b]	Advanced courses in establishments of further education[c]			
	Full-time			Part-time							
	Under-graduate level	Post-graduate level	Total	Under-graduate level	Post-graduate level	Total	Full-time	Full-time (including sandwich)	Part-time day	Evening only	All students
1964–65											
Men	83.0	20.5	103.5	8.8	6.9	15.6	21.7	47.1	58.0	51.0	296.9
Women	34.0	5.4	39.5	1.7	1.4	3.0	51.9	10.3	2.8	2.0	109.5
Total	117.0	26.0	143.0	10.5	8.2	18.7	73.6	57.4	60.8	53.0	406.5
1966–67											
Men	112.4	25.8	138.1	2.9	11.3	14.2	27.9	47.2	62.1	48.5	338.0
Women	44.4	6.7	51.1	1.4	1.8	3.3	70.3	13.3	4.0	3.7	145.7
Total	156.8	32.4	189.3	4.4	13.1	17.5	98.2	60.5	66.1	52.2	483.8
1968–69											
Men	127.1	30.0	157.1	3.0	14.3	17.4	32.5	63.3	70.3	42.1	382.7
Women	51.9	8.4	60.3	2.0	2.5	4.5	86.0	20.2	5.6	4.4	181.0
Total	178.9	38.4	217.4	5.0	16.8	21.8	118.6	83.5	75.9	46.5	563.7
1970–71											

Men	133.9	33.1	167.0	3.0	14.9	17.8	34.4	72.7	69.8	39.8	401.5
Women	58.6	9.7	68.3	2.3	3.2	5.6	89.4	24.8	6.7	5.0	199.8
Total	192.4	42.8	235.3	5.3	18.1	23.4	123.8	97.5	76.5	44.8	601.3
1972–73											
Men	134.7	35.8	170.5	2.1	16.2	18.2	37.5	78.1	68.5	34.5	407.3
Women	65.2	11.1	76.3	1.4	4.0	5.3	89.7	29.9	8.7	4.9	214.8
Total	199.9	46.9	246.8	3.4	20.1	23.6	127.2	107.9	77.2	39.4	622.1
1974–75											
Men	136.3	36.1	172.4	1.8	17.1	19.0	32.5	84.1	76.5	33.7	418.1
Women	72.8	12.5	85.3	1.6	4.9	6.4	85.0	37.4	12.9	5.4	232.5
Total	209.1	48.6	257.7	3.4	22.0	25.4	117.5	121.5	89.4	39.2	650.6

[a] From 1971–72 on, students at universities on courses "not of a university standard" are included in the figures for undergraduate level.

[b] Public sector and assisted only.

[c] Excluding departments of education in polytechnics, but prior to 1973–74 Northern Ireland students on teacher training courses at the Ulster College are included.

Source: Department of Education and Science, *Education Statistics for the United Kingdom* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1976), p. 61, Table 39.

distinction between the sectors in terms of philosophy and function has not been easy to maintain; nor has it yet been as important as the distinction between different forms of financing and administration.

British policy has assumed that the number of teacher-training places should be related to manpower planning forecasts of the likely number of teachers required. This now means sharp and swift reductions in teacher-training numbers and a rapid, painful, and highly disruptive reorganization in which many colleges are to be closed or merged. Many will cease offering teachers' courses and become part of the larger pattern of further and higher education by developing other kinds of degree or diploma courses.

The prospect of any substantial development of two-year postsecondary courses in the near future does not look bright. The attempt to promote the two-year diploma of higher education through the Council of National Academic Awards (CNAA—the national body set up to supervise nonuniversity degrees) has so far met with only modest success. The diploma of higher education and the diplomas of the Technical Education Council and the Business Education Council could provide a structure of two-year qualifications on which to build, and this could be seen as a logical progression from development through the 1960s and the early 1970s, but the momentum has been lost and must be re-created.

The assumption in the government's 1972 white paper, *Education: A Framework for Expansion* (Department of Education and Science, 1972), was that the public and private sectors should continue to grow, but that the main expansion should be in the public sector, reaching parity in size between the two sectors by the early 1980s. This posited a 1981–82 higher education population of 750,000. Since 1972, projections have been scaled down several times—in the 1975 Public Expenditure White Paper to 600,000 and in a government statement early in 1977 to 560,000. The main reason for the reduction in planned growth (and therefore lower levels of planned public spending) is a reduction in the forecast level of demand in the early 1980s. The projections of the growth of the number of school students attaining the minimum level required for university entry were lowered in the light of figures collected for 1974 and 1975. The strong trend toward more advanced-level candidates that characterized the 1960s has been faltering. Since 1975, demand has shown some signs of hardening, but the prospects of a demographic downturn in the 18-to-24 age group by the late 1980s leads the government to believe that pressure of numbers will only be temporary and that long-term expansion should be governed by the long-term trend. (The most recent figures take account of the expected effect of higher fees on the recruitment of overseas students.)

The number of 18-year-olds in the age group peaks in 1982 at 924,000 (about 100,000 more than in 1977) and then begins to decline. No official forecasts of university enrollment extend beyond 1981. The Association of University Teachers (AUT) has published its own study (1977), which concludes that there will be a reservoir of women and older students to accommodate a continuing rise in university places even after the size of the relevant age groups begins to decline. Table 18 shows the AUT projections. Government assumptions about the supply of qualified candidates are much less sanguine, and there is a greater inclination to consider contraction of higher education as a possible way of reducing demand on exchequer resources, which could be diverted to other social purposes.

The AUT suggestion that adults will enter higher education in much larger numbers reflects a continuation of present trends and a belief that government policy and trade-union policy will promote these trends. Some growth in the number of older students seems virtually certain, though the immediate effect of cutting down the number of teacher-training places has been greatly to reduce opportunities for older students (especially women). But there are, as yet, no British equivalents at the conventional university level of the open-access arrangements found in North America; nor is there a policy such as that in Sweden, whereby a specific amount of working experience is accepted in lieu of academic entry qualifications. Individual universities, notably Sussex, have small-scale schemes. Most university regulations provide for the waiving of entry requirements in

Table 18. University student enrollment projections, United Kingdom, 1974–75 to 1987–88

Source of projected changes	*1974–75*	*1981–82*	*1985–86*	*1987–88*
1. Male undergraduates of U.K. origin under 25 (very slow growth comparable with recent years)	115,000	119,000	121,000	122,000
2. Female undergraduates of U.K. origin under 25 (growth at the same rate as past 10 years)	64,000	93,000	115,000	116,000
3. Change in numbers due to population from 1974–75 level (assuming constant Age Participation Rate [7% in 1974–75], and effective length of undergraduate course, i.e., 3 years)	- - -	26,000	25,000	19,000
4. Undergraduates (male and female) of U.K. origin over 25 (continuing growth rate since 1968–69)	12,000	19,000	25,000	28,000
Subtotal of undergraduates (1 + 2 + 3 + 4) of U.K. origin	191,000	257,000	286,000	285,000
5. Undergraduates from overseas (male and female) (from 1977–78 stabilized at numbers in 1976–77)	12,000	15,500	15,500	15,500

6. Postgraduates from overseas (male and female) (from 1977–78 stabilized at numbers in 1976–77)	16,000	17,500	17,500	17,500
Subtotal of overseas students (5 + 6)	28,000	33,000	33,000	33,000
7. Postgraduates (male and female) of U.K. origin (assuming postgraduates of U.K. origin are a constant 15.62% of undergraduates of U.K. origin-position in 1976–77)	32,000	40,000	45,000	45,000
Subtotal of postgraduates (6 + 7)	48,000	57,500	62,500	62,500
Subtotal of undergraduates (1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5)	203,000	272,500	301,500	300,500
TOTAL UNIVERSITY ENROLLMENT (1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7)	251,000	330,000	364,000	363,000

Source: Association of University Teachers, *University Student Numbers,* April 1977, p. 7, Table 8.

Note: In the context of the vested interests of British university teachers, public policy toward overseas students has a major bearing on the totals; but the conclusions about home students generally are highly relevant to the British youth scene.

exceptional cases, but few exceptions are made. Similar exception clauses are usually provided by polytechnics and further-education colleges offering CNAA degrees, and in some cases these have been very liberally interpreted. However, at the national level there has been little governmental encouragement of policies supporting adult education. "Recurrent education" and "continuing education" have not captured the imagination of U.K. politicians as they have in Scandinavia or in France. The Trades Union Congress has spoken up for wider opportunities for older students but has not shown much conviction on the subject, except insofar as specifically trade-union adult education is concerned.

The Open University (OU), however, has in seven years done more than any other British institution of higher education to demonstrate the possibility of running high-quality courses for adults, many of whom lack the formal qualifications that the universities would demand. Present enrollment in the OU is about 56,000, and so far 21,230 students have graduated. Much attention has been focused on the social composition of the OU student body and on the high proportion of teachers among the initial intake (see Table 19). The OU acknowledges that the students who enroll for courses are likely to include more middle-class occupations than in the community as a whole but points out that if note is taken of their father's occupation instead of their own, they have a much more working-class complexion. The OU provides a further ladder of opportunity, in fact, for those working-class-born men and women who have already become socially mobile before they enroll in OU courses—a means for those who have already made it to make it a bit better.

Earlier official assumptions that the nonuniversity sector would get the lion's share of growth are increasingly challenged. It now seems more reasonable that the universities should have first claim on available students, and there is a tendency to give more respect to traditional public preference (as expressed by student choice) along with more conservative attitudes toward education policy generally. This disposition is powerfully reinforced by convincing evidence amassed by the universities that

Table 19. Occupation of provisionally registered students in 1971 by faculty, Open University, Great Britain

	Total students	*Arts*	*Social science*	*Math*	*Science*
Base: all students = 100%	*24,220*	*7,751*	*7,970*	*6,901*	*6,790*
Occupation	%	%	%	%	%
Housewives	9.3	15.7	12.5	4.1	4.9
Armed forces	1.7	0.8	0.9	2.5	2.3
Administrators and managers	5.2	4.7	6.0	5.7	5.1
Education	37.0	41.1	45.1	31.4	27.2
Professions and arts	8.9	11.9	11.7	5.3	7.3
Scientists and engineers	6.5	1.6	1.5	12.1	11.9
Technical personnel	12.4	2.7	2.9	21.4	24.2
Skilled trades	1.7	0.6	0.9	2.2	2.6
Other manual	1.4	1.4	1.2	1.1	1.6
Communication and transport	0.8	0.9	0.7	0.9	0.9
Clerical and office workers	6.7	9.6	7.7	5.3	4.0
Shop and personal services	3.3	3.7	3.7	2.3	3.3
Retired, not working	1.6	2.2	1.7	1.3	1.1
No information	3.3	2.9	3.3	4.2	3.2

Source: McIntosh, Calder, and Swift, 1976, p. 90, Table 10.

Note: The McIntosh, Calder, and Swift study was of the first cohort entering the university. In this cohort, some white-collar groups, notably nongraduate teachers, were more strongly represented than in subsequent years. Only 17 percent of OU students are from routine nonmanual and manual occupations. Reclassified according to their fathers' occupations, however, the percentage rises to 65 percent (see McIntosh, Calder, and Swift, 1976, p. 139).

over a large range of academic teaching their costs are lower than in the public sector.

In the light of demographic trends, official attitudes toward the division of responsibility in higher education have changed. The attempt in the mid-1960s to link the polytechnics more closely than the universities with the world of work and the application of knowledge has only partly succeeded. In science and technology, students have not been forthcoming to fill the available spaces in both the polytechnics and the universities. Increasingly (and disconcertingly) the polytechnics have filled their places with marginal students in the arts and social sciences, and the sharp reduction of teacher-training courses is likely to further increase the numbers in non-vocationally-oriented humanities. However, the most recent figures (1976 enrollments) show a significant rise among engineering entrants.

There will clearly be room within existing institutions in the mid-1980s for a large expansion of postsecondary education at an intermediate level. It should be government policy to encourage this expansion and to revive the idea of two-year courses for the new diploma in higher education, which could serve as either a terminal or an intermediate qualification. To promote two-year courses, it would almost certainly be necessary to relax the current 2 A level entry qualification attached to the diploma of higher education. There is also likely to be an increase in other two-year courses, and this expansion could precipitate the lengthening of the university first-degree course to four years (a development which many regard as inevitable sooner or later but discourage on financial grounds), establish formal credit links between two- and four-year courses, and make possible a new and integrated structure of two- and four-year institutions.

All of the above developments assume a continuing increase in the proportion of 18- to 24-year-olds remaining within the education system, full or part time, and therefore a continuing increase in the commitment of public funds to education. The latter is unlikely in the short and medium term but not necessarily out of the question in the long term.

If the logic of mass secondary education is carried through, both in terms of organization and curriculum, it will undoubtedly demand an extension of the range of postsecondary opportunities along some such lines as these. The pace at which this extension becomes explicit will be governed by the level of expansion that can be afforded at the upper level. It must be conceded that educational expansion is not currently a high priority for social policy makers in any political party or for senior administrators within the government service.

The Department of Education and Science has recently issued a discussion document (1978) giving high, medium, and low projections of students in higher education up to 1995-96. (These were not broken down between the university and non-university sectors.) The medium projection reflects the general demographic trend, peaking at 603,500 in 1985-86 and coming back to 519,500 in 1995-96. This projection assumes that the "age participation rate"—the proportion of the age group going on to higher education given the continuation of present entrance requirements—will rise from 13.5 percent in 1977-78 to 18.1 percent in 1995-96.

The policy issues addressed in the document concern the best ways to accommodate the expansion and subsequent contraction suggested by all the projections. Several strategies for minimizing costs and staffing problems are outlined in the form of a choice of policy responses.

Among ministers at the DES, there is preference for the strategy that would fill up vacant places in higher education by increasing opportunities for lower socioeconomic groups, women, and adult students.

Social Class and Educational Opportunity

In Britain, as in most European countries since the end of World War II, a principal objective of educational policy has been to extend access to education at all levels to all social classes, thereby broadening equality of opportunity generally. Exactly what equality of opportunity is, or exactly how it should be interpreted as a political goal, has been one of the burning arguments of the past 25 years; but nobody has disputed that a middle-class child has much better chances than a working-class child of staying on beyond the minimum school-leaving age, obtaining good school qualifications, and going on to higher education. It has been assumed that the disparity is too wide and that, by changing the system, it should be possible to make educational opportunities less dependent upon social background. How far has this been achieved? How far have the structural changes in the education system already described (not to mention the system of means-tested maintenance and fee grants available for students in higher education) succeeded in reducing the social imbalance in the upper reaches of the education system?

The research suggests that the social imbalance has been reduced somewhat, but it is the nature of educational reform that its effects cannot be measured for a full generation, and most of the evidence now available measures the effects of educational reform only up to the middle 1960s. It is not yet possible to show what the effect of the change in secondary school organization from separate, selective grammar schools and nonselective modern schools to comprehensive schools has been or will be when it is completed. In 1974, more than half the pupils from maintained schools who entered the universities still came from grammar schools that had not yet been absorbed into the new comprehensive system. It will be a good 10 years before any speculation about the effect of comprehensive reorganization on access to higher education can be based on hard evidence.

Some information about the social origins of students is collected annually by the Universities Central Council on Admissions. This can provide some indication of changing trends, but it does not cover the large sector of higher education outside the universities, for which statistics can only be collected through specific research projects. Such information as there is, therefore, really takes account only of the big postwar expansion of the grammar schools, the abolition of fees, and the first stage of expansion of postsecondary education.

The benchmark in much of the discussion is provided by the Glass study (1954), in particular Floud's analysis (1954) of the educational data assembled in 1949, measuring *inter alia* the educational record of groups of people born up to 1929. (A child born in 1929 reached the school-leaving age in 1943, and might–if not required to do National Service–go on to university in 1947-48 and graduate in 1951-52.)

The Glass study provided a social breakdown of boys entering grammar school between 1930 and 1941, of whom 40 percent were sons of professional and managerial parents, 20 percent of clerical and other nonmanual parents, and 40 percent of parents in manual occupations. In 1960, the Central Advisory Council for Education carried out its own survey on education between the ages of 15 and 18 (the Crowther Report). The survey included an investigation of the social composition of the cohort of boy grammar school entrants between 1946 and 1951 (that is, boys born between 1935 and 1940). The change in access in the 11 years between the period covered by the Glass study and the Crowther Report is shown in Table 20.

Table 20. Social origins of boys entering secondary grammar schools before and after 1944, England and Wales

	In percentage	
Occupations of fathers	*1930-41*	*1946-51*
Professional and managerial	40	26
Clerical and other nonmanual	20	18
Manual	40	56

Source: **Glass, 1954, p. 129, Table vii; and Central Advisory Council for Education, 1960, p. 130, Table x.**

On the basis of the Crowther figures, the professional and managerial group occupied one in four of the grammar school places, though they only numbered one in seven of the total population. The manual group, in contrast, comprised 77 percent of the population at large but only 56 percent of the grammar school population. These are figures for *entry* to grammar schools, and it must be borne in mind that the manual group tended to drop out of grammar school before age 18 in much larger numbers than the nonmanual group, so that working-class children were even more underrepresented at the top end of the school and in the university entrance group. By the time pupils reached the sixth-form level, about 55 percent came from nonmanual groups (Central Advisory Council for Education, 1954, p. 76).

The Report of the Committee on Higher Education (1963), known as the Robbins Report, continues the Crowther comparison by showing the extent of this social imbalance at the university level:

Table 21. Percentage of boys aged 18 in 1928–47 and 1960 entering university: by social class

	Percentage	
	Boys aged 18 in	
	1928-47[a]	*1960*[b]
Social class		
A. Nonmanual	8.9	16.8
B. Manual	1.4	2.6
C. A-1 boys	3.7	5.8
A divided by B	6.4	6.5

Survey of 21 year-olds

[a] Data for 1928–47 relate to England and Wales; data for 1960 to Great Britain. It is, however, reasonable to compare the two sets of figures, especially those in the bottom row.

[b] The data for 1960 were computed as follows: The percentage of all children aged 18 in 1960 who eventually enter university was assumed to be the same as the percentage of the age group who entered in that year (see Part IV, Table 33). The social-class distribution of those entering was assumed to be the same as for all male home undergraduates in 1961-62 (as shown in the Undergraduate Survey). The social-class distribution of the total age group was taken from the Survey of 21-year-olds.

Source: 1928–47–Floud, 1954, p. 137; 1960–Part IV, Table 33, U.G. Survey. Reproduced in Report of the Committee on Higher Education, 1963, Appendix I, Part II, p. 54, Table 15.

Additional statistics on university entrants' fathers' occupations are available from 1968 on from the Universities Central Council on Admissions. These are not strictly comparable with those used in the Robbins Report and only cover a short period, but they seem to bear more relation to the changing occupational structure within the community at large than to changes in social selection in the educational system.

Taken as a whole, these figures suggest what common sense also suggests–that wider access to education at all levels has most benefited those who were able to take advantage of it. Because English higher education started from such a narrow base, there were many capable students in the upper social groups in the prewar period who never went to university. The

Table 22. Parental occupation of home candidates accepted into university compared with census distribution: October 1968 and October 1974

Great Britain	*Percentages*			
Parent occupation	*Accepted candidates October 1968*	*Economically active males aged 45-59 1966 census*	*Accepted candidates October 1974*	*Economically active males aged 45-59 1971 census*
Administrative and managerial	14.0	6.0	15.0	7.0
Professional, technical, etc.	30.0	8.0	34.0	9.0
Other nonmanual	28.0	22.0	25.0	21.0
Manual and agricultural	28.0	64.0	26.0	62.0

Source: Universities Central Council on Admissions, 1967-68 and 1973-74.

first effect of broadening access has been to make extended education a much more widespread expectation for the sons (and to a growing extent, the daughters) of these already-privileged groups. The selective nature of the secondary school system—first through the mechanism of the grammar schools and later through the selective process still operated by examination options within the secondary course—provides a system that the offspring of middle-class families are better able to understand and to utilize than those whose traditional social expectation is to leave school at the earliest legal opportunity.

As the percentage entering higher education rises, the fraction of candidates who are drawn from the lower socioeconomic groups increases slowly until the threshold separating an elite system from a mass system is crossed. Britain is at present in the process of exploring this threshold at the secondary school level, but at the higher education level there is no suggestion that this threshold has yet been reached.

It is unlikely that within the next 10 years, the percentage of those entering higher education will exceed 25 percent of the age group. So long as that is so, there is no likelihood of any change in public policy that would radically redistribute access to higher education in such a way as sharply to reduce the opportunities of the advantaged section of the community and increase those of the less advantaged. It seems fairly clear that the speed with which secondary or higher education could change to provide more open access to opportunity is closely related to the development of the British economy generally and the functional needs of a society under severe industrial stress.

The elaborate system of means-tested grants for student maintenance and tuition fees has not operated as an effective method of equalizing access. It is arguable that without such a scheme there would be even fewer working-class students at the universities, but in practice the groups who gain admission to the universities and therefore become eligible for grants are already socially preselected and, notwithstanding the means test, much of the public money set aside for student grants goes to the sons and daughters of parents with better-than-average incomes. A recent government decision has somewhat increased this regressive effect by relieving the parents of all eligible home students of the payment of tuition fees, no matter what their income.

The principle of "to him that hath, shall be given" is further supported by the sharp division made between degree and degree-equivalent courses on the one hand and other postsecondary courses of a lower academic standard, including many professional and vocational courses, on the other. Degree courses carry "mandatory" awards: the local authorities are required by law to pay student fees and maintenance grants for such courses. But for other postsecondary students, grants are "discretionary": the local authority has the discretion to decide which to support and how much to pay, and in times of economic stringency (like the present) such discretionary payments are cut down severely. It so happens, of course, that the social composition of the two sets of students is likely to be different: those applying for mandatory awards will generally be drawn from families higher up the social scale than those who seek discretionary grants.

Educational Development and the World of Work

How, then, should we assess the results of 30 years of educational development since the end of World War II on young people growing up and entering the world of adulthood and work? Empirical and statistical evidence are notoriously unreliable with regard to such qualitative judgments, so we must turn to the complicated interrelationship between education and society that reflect the culture as a whole, and in which the tenuous link between educational development and social action is impossible to trace with any certainty.

The quantitative expansion of the education system has been reflected in a qualitative change in the jobs pursued by young men and women when they emerge from school or university. For most of the 30 years, employment has been remarkably buoyant, and the increase in the demand for higher skills (as a result of both technology and the upgrading of jobs formerly done by people without higher qualifications) has kept pace with the growth in the numbers of better educated people.

The resulting period of full employment has only recently ended. Which is the exception to the rule: the period of full employment (and low productivity growth and investment), which has been accepted as "normal" in the British postwar context; or the higher level of unemployment that has characterized the 1970s and threatens to continue over the medium term? While the period of full employment lasted, the education system seemed to mesh fairly well with employment, if only in the sense that young people were successfully absorbed and socialized. There is no proof that they were especially well prepared for work but, equally, there is no proof that they were not. Now that the postwar prosperity seems to have come to an end, however, critics have sought part of the cause of economic failure in the schools, universities, and colleges. They are almost certainly right to do so, in that the schools, like industry and business, provide cockpits where national neuroses can be observed: they encapsulate the cultural priorities and values which, in another context, are expressed in low productivity and bad industrial management and labor relations, no less than in more commendable aspects of life in modern Britain. A feature of the "great education debate" initiated by the prime minister's speech in October 1976 has been strong criticism of the education system as being out of touch with the world of work. A critique prepared by the Department of Industry, as part of an examination of constraints on economic growth, includes a general condemnation of the antitechnological, anti-industrial bias that distinguishes the English academic tradition. Sir Alex Smith, Director of the Manchester Polytechnic and Chairman of the Schools Council for Curriculum and Examinations (a body set up to oversee publicly supported curriculum development and advise the Secretary of State for Education and Science on examinations) has asked why Britain is so much better at getting Nobel prizes than at making and selling industrial products. Why has the rate of enrollments in social, administrative, and business studies in institutions of higher education gone up from 60,000 to more than 120,000 between 1965 and 1973, while numbers in engineering and technology steadily drifted downward during the same period? "These trends are alarming enough; yet if one looks more closely at the figures, some of the details are even more disturbing. Engineering and technology cover a range of subjects; within them production engineering is a study for which there is very little demand in view of its importance. In advanced courses in further education, for every new student enrolling in 1973 to study production engineering, there were five in economics, twelve in law, sixteen in sociology and forty in business and commerce" (Smith, 1976, p. 15). On the one hand, this trend reflects a decline in the relative importance of employment in manufacturing and a growth of employment in service (particularly public service occupations). In part, therefore, it represents the way in which the education system has responded to external factors, as it was bound to do. If the external environment—in employment, in social philosophy—had been different, so too would the choices of students and the growth areas in higher education. On the other hand, the enrollments also can be seen as the result of an increasingly irrelevant academic tradition, which gives pure science and research a higher status than applied science, technology, and production and which is oriented away from productive industry and toward the professions, the civil service, and the social services. This tradition is related to a history of elite education, once geared to the needs of a governing class and an overseas empire, which has never come to terms with the demands of manufacturing industry. Instead, it has enabled its educated elite to avoid manufacturing industry throughout their working lives and thereby enhance their own status.

It is difficult to influence directly such an educational tradition in a country where primary and secondary education administration is highly decentralized and where concepts of academic freedom inhibit any government intervention at the higher education level. One proposal is to create a range of government scholarships in technological subjects and the applied sciences, giving those who win them greater economic benefit than students on other grants. Another suggestion is to reorganize the whole student-grant system to give preferential treatment to students in disciplines with current technological applications. Action along these lines has not been taken because of the strong opposition this would arouse, particularly from the universities, but also because few people have confidence in the manpower-planning assumption built into any determined attempt to shift the balance of academic studies in this way. Within the total higher education budget, some funds have been made available at a few institutions to promote high-level science and technology courses in the area of management rather than research. The first students will enter these four-year courses (one year longer than the regular undergraduate course) at Birmingham; Imperial College, London; Strathclyde; and Manchester. Half their time will be devoted to engineering and the remainder divided between mathematics and management studies.

Such indirect methods of influencing student choices at the higher education level complement measures (referred to already) to encourage teachers to become better informed about industry, and, in particular, measures encouraging would-be teachers to gain some work experience in factories or offices before embarking on teacher training. This could be done by taking advantage of the present "buyers' market" for teachers, and making such experience a prerequisite for teacher training, or by the development of a vigorous program of in-service training undertaken jointly with industry.

What is obvious is that measures of the kind being discussed here, small in themselves, would only become important if they *reflected* a much larger change in the social climate. Such a social change would require a positive attitude toward the private sector within a mixed economy and toward the creation and enjoyment of wealth; it would also require teachers to hold up to their pupils a new and more favorable image of industry. Many people doubt that these attitudes reflect the current political climate in Britain, where conflict about industry is more evident than consensus and where political argument since the mid-1960s has been marked by ambivalence, which the schools have faithfully, if unconsciously, reflected. Some argue that this ambivalence has resulted in the undermining of the authority of the teachers and in what outsiders take to be a permissive attitude toward antisocial pupil behavior. Others link *this* to progressive attitudes toward competition in school—to the apparently misconceived antithesis between cooperation and competition on which much informal primary education is based—and to the unresolved arguments about setting, streaming (tracking), and mixed-ability grouping in the secondary school.

Education in England is noteworthy for the high degree of reliance placed on the independent professional judgment of the teachers. Because of the gradual introduction of the comprehensive secondary school, curricular controls on the primary schools have been progressively dismantled over a period of years. The primary schools have, therefore, been especially susceptible to trends in social science and educational philosophy that have transmitted the changing cultural mood. At the secondary level, the elitist tradition has ensured that practical subjects have been undervalued. The curricular revolution, which has gradually but effectively eroded this tradition, has not produced a confident, technological substitute. Moreover, early specialization—the three-year specialist university first degree—and the extent to which the universities have been excluded from professional training have all helped to perpetuate the idea that higher education is first and foremost a process of personal cultural enrichment and only secondarily a means of equipping people to play effective, wealth-creating roles in an industrial economy.

Just as universities have avoided professional training (with important exceptions such as the training of doctors), so too the schools have discarded their nineteenth-century functions with regard to vocational training. Any critical assessment of the past three decades of education must, therefore, ask if this dichotomy between general and vocational education has been beneficial. It is the logical outcome of the cultural background: vocational education had the lowest status; discarding it as a secondary school option was a means of gearing all secondary education to the more elitist educational assumptions of the favored sections of the school community. The dichotomy is also related to the growing power of the trade unions over craft skills (which, with shorthand and typewriting, form the basis of most vocational education, as the schools understand it) and the subordination of factory-level vocational training to the day-to-day pressures of industrial relations. In these circumstances, both trade unions and teachers wished to replace vocational education (which was often narrow and limiting) with watered-down forms of general education.

The result in the middle 1970s is a growing awareness that the secondary school curriculum needs to be overhauled but little unanimity on how this should be done. From the industrial side, there is a two-pronged argument for more attention to basic survival skills along with more attention to what the world of work is like. Now that industrialists are able to be more selective in their hiring, they complain bitterly about low standards. But industrialists are not alone in demanding better and more realistic education for those who are likely to enter employment straight from school at 16. Manpower economists see young people in competition for jobs with the people over 50 and with mature women. They regard greater general competence on the part of young people as being necessary if they are to get a fair share of such jobs as exist.

Both of these arguments have to be taken with a pinch of salt. The schools are likely to respond to the current pressure from industrialists and economists by tightening up and clamping down. Contrary to popular view, schools have always been concerned with basic competence, but in recent years the quest for methods of stimulating deprived, unmotivated urban pupils has sometimes obscured this fact. Schools will now become more conventional, and the curriculum will be pared down somewhat (perhaps to some advantage); but the problems of motivation and social control that have led to the educational developments—now interpreted by outsiders as fripperies and irrelevances—will remain. Only the most optimistic reactionary can really hope to reconstitute nonexistent good old days.

None of these predictions, however, answer the unresolved questions about vocational education. Is it possible to change the curricular diet of boys and girls at school so that they can actually learn skills that will help them to get a job and earn a living? Of course, better reading and arithmetic skills are likely to be useful in many jobs; but can the schools actually impart specific working techniques—as once, for example, a highly successful London trade school trained 13-year-olds in the craft of watchmaking? It is fairly clear that this is inconceivable in the present industrial context, where the union card as much as the technical skill identifies the craftsman and where technological change is, in any case, transforming training requirements. It is also impractical because, for a large proportion of boys and girls, there is no form of vocational education likely to be vocationally relevant: their employment expectations at best will take them into routine work for which four to eight weeks of on-the-job training is all that is required.

If a case for vocational education is to be made, therefore, it has to rest on more general grounds: on the idea that work is central to social life in a modern industrial society, and that vocational education may be a means of harnessing this fact to more general learning objectives. But vocational education on such terms as these becomes another motivational ploy to help resistant learners come to terms with their environment and with themselves and brings it back into mainstream arguments about education. It can hardly be doubted that if there is to be any serious attempt to extend the period of formal learning, either in full-time education or in the form of a mixture of employment, training, and education, progress will have to be made in this direction. Opponents of this view voice pessimism about work prospects in hard-pressed areas like the Northwest of England and Merseyside, insisting that survival skills in the present period include the resources needed to preserve self-respect and sanity in enforced idleness. "Education for unemployment" makes a poor slogan, but behind this poorly formulated notion lie questions about postindustrial society that challenge the concept of industrial employment as central to modern citizenship and, once again, plunge the education debate into the political and economic maelstrom. Any discussion of the present state of urban secondary schools, therefore, has to take place against this background.

There is a widespread belief that schools have become more tense and difficult, that teachers encounter much more aggressive hostility and verbal abuse and accept forms of hostile behavior as normal which would not have been tolerated in the early 1960s. There is a general acceptance that in many inner-city schools—London being the obvious example—an unacceptably large number of pupils are leaving school at 16 with poor standards of attainment in basic subjects, and that children from the West Indian community are strongly represented among those whose poor academic performance reflects their discouragement and despair over the youth employment problem.

There is little political support for the suggestion that the school-leaving age, which was raised to 16 in 1973–74, should be lowered; however, many would like to see a more flexible arrangment for pupils in their last year, who might be released from school, full or part time, into suitable forms of employment or work experience. Some limited schemes of release for work experience already exist under an education act of 1973, but only on a small scale. Teacher-opinion polls still show large minority support for the view that the decision to raise the school-leaving age was a mistake.

In other respects the formal education system, though in the process of being scourged by the current conservative backlash, is showing signs of recovering some confidence. Declining numbers of pupils and a smaller turnover of teachers combine to give the primary schools a greater stability. Having for years shown the ill effects of high staff turnover and a procession of young and inexperienced teachers, the primary schools are now in a better position to tackle their weaknesses than at any time since the end of the war.

5

Policies to Combat Youth Unemployment

Attempts by the government of the United Kingdom to intervene directly in the under-25 open labor market are recent and have for the most part been aimed at managing the supply of young workers. Measures designed specifically to stimulate demand for young workers have been meager in relation both to current youth unemployment levels and to the indirect impact of other public policies: deflationary fiscal and investment strategies; capital-intensive industrial modernization; regional planning; employee protection codes; and equal-opportunity legislation, which improves the competitive position of disadvantaged adult workers such as women and ethnic minorities.

Overall, the measures operated in the United Kingdom are similar to those adopted with varying emphasis in most of the other countries of the European Economic Community (EEC). They have evolved not as a comprehensively designed program but as a group of short-term, largely unrelated devices, intended to alleviate the effects of cyclical unemployment, superimposed on the established training and educational systems. Central government initiatives lean heavily on the activities already undertaken by local public authorities, voluntary agencies, and the industrial-training systems operated by both individual employers and by the government. Schemes of training and alternative work projects developed in these sectors are increasingly funded by central government and used as models by its agencies for their own large-scale interventions.

Some measures are not specifically aimed at young people but are intended to promote employment generally—for example, employment subsidies paid to employers to encourage them to take on or retain staff and early-retirement schemes aimed at creating vacancies by offering income support to workers in their sixties. Among the measures more specifically affecting young people are the following:

- *Alternative employment projects,* which reduce pressure on the labor market by providing gainful occupations—normally for a limited term—for a significant proportion of the young unemployed;
- *Full-time training courses,* which defer the entry of school leavers into the labor market and improve their qualifications, or remove older adolescents from the market for a time, or equip them with skills which are in demand;
- *Full-time work experience,* occupying the same role but confined to those who have had no experience of employment since leaving school;
- *Further-education courses,* provided under special arrangements for those out of work;
- *Subsidized craft training,* either carried out by employers or provided under the auspices of industrial training boards, and intended to maintain the intake of apprentices and other trainees during economic recession;
- *Vocational preparation,* for those in the lower years of the age group who are currently employed, aimed at increasing their general skills and effectiveness as workers (as well as producing other personal development), thereby improving their prospects of retaining their jobs or securing other posts in competition with adults;
- *Strengthening of the youth employment services,* intended to secure a better matching of jobs and applicants, and to optimize the use by the age group of the whole range of facilities and opportunities available.

The bulk of this activity, especially the portion directly funded by central government, has been initiated since the spring of

1975. It has absorbed a considerable part of the £800 million provided to keep jobs open, support training, or stimulate industrial expansion in Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Earlier Measures

Interventions in the youth labor market that occurred before 1975 were mainly the by-product of government measures aimed at other objectives or sponsored by bodies outside central government. The measure with the most impact on the supply of adolescent labor was the raising of the school-leaving age from 15 to 16 in 1974. Although the objectives of the measure were broadly educational and social, it had a marked effect both in the short and in the longer term. Industry found itself deprived of its normal intake of school leavers in the first year after the change, and it is thought that the adjustments many employers made at that time permanently removed a number of posts for workers under 18 from the general stock.

A further effect, increasingly manifested as other factors narrowed the job opportunities for 16-year-olds, was the tendency for more pupils to stay on voluntarily beyond the compulsory leaving age. This, in turn, reduced the supply of suitable recruits for many apprenticeship schemes with maximum recruitment age. Also in 1974, the provisions of a 1973 education act enabling state schools to release pupils for limited spells of work experience in industry came into force. Together with the professionalization of the youth careers advisory services—now reorganized as a wing of the education service operated by local authorities—these provisions laid the foundation for systematic educational attempts to improve the employability of young people.

During the early 1970s, a number of voluntary agencies, in particular those dealing with disadvantaged adolescents, experimented with small-scale projects designed to provide paid occupation for those who could not find work. Funded partly by charitable contributions, but often with subsidies from the local-authority youth services, they produced a number of models for the creation of work outside the normal labor market. Often the projects were aimed either wholly or partly at groups who needed remedial help, such as truants and delinquents; thus they emphasized a training or educational component. Among the more enduring of the formulas developed in this way was the "youth workshop," in which groups of youngsters learned to cooperate in the production of simple goods or services. One valuable by-product of these attempts to provide work was the provision of personal and career counseling to young people who would otherwise have been entirely divorced from the help of the voluntary and statutory youth services.

The largest of the projects to emerge at this time was Community Industry (CI), sponsored by the National Association of Youth Clubs. Set up in the winter of 1971, it operates a network of enterprises throughout Britain providing various goods and services to the community which would not normally be supplied by commercial industry. Young people working in the projects have the status of ordinary employees and are paid wages: they are expected to turn out work that meets the economic and quality criteria of the users, who are mainly local authorities and community groups. Some of the young people are assigned to craft or educational courses during their employment. The scheme is administered by a national management board representing the clubs, the Trades Union Congress, the Confederation of British Industries, and the Department of Employment. The wage cost of the young workers and of the 500 or so adult staff who run CI is funded directly through the department, unlike most of the other youth employment and training schemes, whose funds are channeled through the Manpower Services Commission. Local authorities provide sites and equipment. Entry to CI projects is limited to those under 18, who nominally spend a year or more with the undertaking. Local-authority career officers are closely involved both in recruitment and supervision of the youths.

Stimulating Labor Demand

The main way in which the U.K. government has attempted in recent years to increase the total stock of jobs available, or to modify the pattern of job-market contraction, is by the selective use of industrial investment grants. Some £300 million was made available in 1975 and 1976 for expansion, modernization, and regional development and for the acceleration of capital schemes already projected. The principal effect of such inducements is likely to be long term, although some immediate demand for labor in the construction and equipment industries may also have resulted. The net significance of such grants for future youth employment must be assessed in the light of:

1. the total industrial modernization strategy, with its heavy emphasis on the objective of reduced manning (a good example being the publicly owned steel industry);
2. the fact that additional demands for labor are distributed over all working-age groups, and because most modernization schemes reduce the relative requirement for unskilled and short-term workers, the distribution is likely to be less favorable to adolescents than in the past;
3. the emphasis on channeling new investment into manufacturing rather than into the distribution and service operations, which have traditionally provided a high proportion of the total market for youth labor.

Within the overall use of selective investment grants, there has been a minor attempt to encourage the kind of labor-intensive developments that are likely to replicate the traditional mix of age groups in the work force; the scale of these efforts is exemplified by the £1 million (out of the total of £300) allocated in 1976 for the construction of small factories in rural areas.

Not surprisingly, these long-term measures lack any attempt to ensure that the new capital projects make a specific contribution to the demand for youth labor; this is consistent with the attitude that youth unemployment is almost entirely a cyclical variable. It was not until the end of 1976 that this assumption began to be questioned publicly, albeit hesitantly, by the government's own advisers in the Manpower Services Commission. However, short-term measures to alleviate the effects of the economic crisis of the mid-1970s, in accord with this overall government view, have been based on the need to stimulate or preserve the demand for young workers or simply to reallocate unemployment by changing the relative chances of different groups. The devices employed have included differential subsidies to employers and inducements to (or pressures on) older staff to retire earlier than they otherwise would. Additional measures have been designed to maintain the general stock of jobs for all age groups and to improve the matching of vacancies and applicants.

Employment Subsidies

The Temporary Employment Subsidy was one unemployment countermeasure introduced in 1975 to help firms in those parts of the country designated "assisted areas" to defer layoffs due to obsolescence. Covering all age groups, the scheme was at first restricted to firms planning to lay off 50 or more staff; they were offered a subsidy of £10 a week for a maximum of three months for each post retained. Subsequent modifications increased the payment to £20 a week, reduced the minimum qualifying requirement to 10 layoffs, and extended the scheme to cover all private employers throughout Britain. By the 1977 budget, when the scheme was again modified and its duration extended to one year, subsidies had been paid for the retention of 224,000 workers, of whom about 10 percent were under age 21.

The Temporary Employment Subsidy affected, of course, only those who were already in employment. A few weeks after its introduction, at the beginning of the 1975-76 school year, the government announced a measure designed primarily to help those who had left school at the end of the previous term and had not yet found lasting employment. Employers who hired school leavers with six weeks or less of employment were to be paid £5 per youth for the first 26 weeks. Employers were debarred from claiming both subsidies for one employee, and school leavers could not be recruited to displace existing workers. In the 12-month life of the scheme, more than 30,000 school leavers benefited from it.

In September 1976 a replacement scheme was announced—the Youth Employment Subsidy. A good deal more flexible than its predecessor, it applied to anyone under 20 who had been continuously registered as unemployed for six months;

and because it was payable for any period between 8 and 26 weeks, it could be used to subsidize short-term employment.

The subsidy of £10 a week was payable to nationalized industries and private employers but not to other public service administrations or to voluntary agencies. In the first six months of the scheme, about 10,000 applications were approved, a considerably lower rate of take-up than had been provided for in the £5.4 million budget; nevertheless, the scheme was among measures whose extension was announced in the March 1977 budget.

Early Retirement

Pressures on staff to retire before the maximum age, either voluntarily or under compulsory procedures, increased during 1976, both in branches of the central government civil service and in local government administration. The pressures arose from a drive to cut staffs in absolute terms (rather than by any overt intention to change the age profile) and were in most cases strongly resisted by the trade unions. In the case of the bigger civil-service unions, this was one of the principal issues leading to union refusals to cooperate in work-experience schemes for the young unemployed. However, the retirement rate was clearly related in practice to the ability of agencies to recruit young people within the governing economic constraints, particularly since even one-for-one replacement offers significant savings where, as in these public services, the pay structure is incremental.

In September 1976, the Department of Employment announced a limited scheme to encourage some workers to retire in favor of young unemployed. The Job Release Scheme offered men of 64 and women of 59—that is, a year below their respective retirement ages—a tax-free allowance of £23 a week—payable until the date on which they were normally due to retire—if they gave up their jobs and were replaced by one of the registered unemployed. Also eligible for the allowance were those equally close to retirement age but unemployed, who could claim the benefit if they contracted not to work during the period for which it was available. The scheme, which came into effect at the beginning of 1977, operated only in designated assisted areas and has covered about 20,000 workers, of whom about half were previously unemployed. This has created a few additional spaces for young workers, although probably fewer than originally envisaged.

Employment Services and Moving Allowances

There is a wide range of government grants to help workers meet the costs of searching for work or taking jobs at a distance from home. The grants include reimbursement of fares to attend an interview and temporary separation allowances and rehousing grants (which can, in some circumstances, exceed £2,000) for those moving to new jobs. These grants apply to all age groups, and the only discernible provision relating especially to young workers is a rule that limits those under age 18 to only four assisted visits home, compared with the twelve to which older people are entitled. The main positive provision for young workers takes the form not of grants but of special placement counseling and selection facilities.

Occupational selection courses are run by the Training Services Agency for 16- to 18-year-olds who are undecided about what kind of work to seek. In addition to identifying vocational aptitudes, the courses, which last between 6 and 13 weeks, offer broad life and social skills training; they normally serve as a prelude to specific craft training either on TSA courses or in industry. Trainees receive a tax-free allowance on a scale which, at the beginning of 1977, offered 16-year-olds a minimum of £13.65 a week.

The main facilities for seeking and finding work, however, are provided through the Careers Service, which is entirely responsible for the placement of school leavers below the age of 18 and, in general, handles those in older age groups for the first two years after they leave full-time education. The responsibility for those under age 25 as a whole, therefore, is shared between the Careers Service and the MSC's Employment Services Agency, the national service responsible for adult recruitment and placement. The demarcation between the activities of the two bodies in relation to the placement of 18- to 25-year-olds is not a matter of statutory definition but a loose working arrangement between them. The Careers Service has existed in its present form since 1974. Reference has already been made to the legislation that reorganized the whole structure of government-funded manpower and training services. The youth section of the Department of Employment's placement services was merged with the careers advice departments already run by most local authorities as part of their educational provision. These new careers departments became an integral part of the local-authority-administered educational service; but whereas the authorities were responsible to the Department of Education and Science for the main part of their education function, the Department of Employment was responsible for overseeing their careers work.

In addition to their key statutory role of maintaining the school-leaver unemployment register, receiving notifications of vacancies, and handling placement, the careers departments are involved in a wide range of other interventions in the youth employment field, either directly as counselors, or indirectly as coordinators, communicators, and agents of access between young people, the education service, industry, and others concerned in the training and alternative work programs described below.

Because the service is administered by local authorities and its expenditure controlled by them, there is considerable variation in the level and range of activity undertaken in different areas of the country. This is partly a function of differences in staffing levels, and in order to help reduce this uneven allocation of resources, since 1975 the Department of Employment has begun to fund directly the appointment of a limited number of additional officers in the local-authority departments. Some concern was expressed in the national advisory council at the beginning of 1977 that this step had not been as effective as might have been hoped in evening up services; it was thought that a few of the less active authorities had taken advantage of the directly funded appointments to reduce their own expenditure on staff.

The basis on which local-authority expenditure is funded strictly limits the amount of direct executive action the central government can take. This has a bearing on the development of policy with regard to vocational education and training and the provision of career education and career advice. In particular, it affects activities in which there is no mandatory level of provision, such as courses for those who have left the school system.

The local authorities have wide discretion under the law to decide the level of service they will provide, so long as they meet whatever statutory duties are laid upon them, such as ensuring suitable educational facilities for children of school age. In principle, since they are also empowered to levy certain local property taxes, they are free to decide what their expenditures will be. However, a major part of each local-authority expenditure now comes from central exchequer funds, paid in the form of a grant to each authority (known as the Rate Support Grant). The annual grant is determined by calculating the level of provision the local authorities as a whole are expected to make in each of the principal services they administer—education, social services, highways, and so on—but no attempt is made to police the actual use of the funds. The central government may issue guidelines setting forth its priorities, but in the end local authorities make their own budgets and do not regard the block grant as made up of fixed components. In periods of retrenchment—and particularly when many local authorities are becoming anxious about the inflation of local tax rates—spending on one or more services may be cut back to substantially below the levels envisaged by the central government. Thus, while one may talk of the total sum that government intends to be spent on the Careers Service, it is not possible to ascertain exactly how much has actually been spent.

The role of the Careers Service in youth employment measures and in the developing complex of traditional educational facilities had become so important by 1976 that the government sought to protect it from the economies that local authorities were obliged to make in other parts of the education service. Thus for 1977-78 it increased the provision for careers work in the grant it made to local authorities to £24 million, a figure that assumed the authorities together would spend about

£35 million, which would allow for a 3 percent growth in the service.

Training Posts

Steps taken to expand industrial-training programs since 1975 have substantially affected the number of training places offered by employers and thus the short-term demand for youth labor. It is often argued that in the longer term all training measures should be seen as means of influencing the demand for youth labor both by improving the competitive position of the age group in the general market and by contributing eventually to national economic growth. Any government-sponsored alternative to unemployment is bound to provide some kind of experience likely to enhance employability. The measures undertaken in the training field are examined below, together with those other programs whose principal effect in the short term has been to withdraw significant numbers of young people from the labor market.

Job Creation Program (JCP). Derived from ideas first tried out in the United States in the 1960s (the New Careers experiments) and developed on a larger scale in Canada, the Job Creation Program has sought in essence to provide—at appropriate normal wage rates (subject to a maximum)—various kinds of work that benefit the community by improving the environment or by contributing to the solution of social and community problems. The interpretation of "community benefit" is wide enough to embrace some kinds of work within trade-union and political organizations, but it firmly excludes activities that produce commercial profit or are otherwise carried out by normal labor.

The government made it plain to the MSC that priority should be given to the young unemployed and their training requirements and, in the choice of projects, to urban renewal. It envisaged that the ability of the commission to defray wage costs would persuade a variety of local bodies—including private employers and voluntary organizations, local government, and the nationalized industries—to sponsor and run the projects. Ten area offices were set up by the commission to administer the scheme; the authorization of projects, however, was made the responsibility not of officials but of lay committees representing local employers, unions, and local authorities and headed by an independent chairman (usually a person of high standing in the academic community).

Because it was seen as an urgently required first-aid measure and was announced at a time when unprecedented high unemployment was producing acute political and union pressures, the JCP was brought into operation with considerable haste. There was an obvious temptation to concentrate activity on the most readily identifiable group of potential sponsors, the local authorities, who were known to have the management and physical resources at hand and might be best placed to suggest projects of community benefit. For the first six months, the program was largely dominated by local-authority-sponsored projects. Subsequently, however, an increasing proportion of the projects came to be sponsored by voluntary organizations, including the biggest of the ventures, a series of projects run in Sunderland by Community Service Volunteers, which provided work for about 250 adolescents in hospitals, community and youth centers, nursery schools, and old people's homes. The strict exclusion of profit-yielding projects, however, meant in practice that the response from either private employers or the nationalized industries remained almost negligible.

By the beginning of 1977, some 72 percent of all the projects had been sponsored by local authorities and other public bodies, with voluntary agencies running another 10 percent; these overall figures were heavily weighted by the early months, during which local authorities alone had sponsored 85 percent. By March 1977, the U.K. budget expenditure on the JCP had grown to £105 million and had provided a total of 75,000 jobs of an average duration of 31 weeks. The commission had fixed a maximum life of 12 months for projects, but in practice those that proved effective were normally extended; thus in effect the maximum limited only the length of time that an individual could be employed. One-third of the projects were concerned with the improvement of land features; 15 percent were concerned with construction tasks; 21 percent involved some kind of artistic, educational, or information activity; 17

percent dealt with the social and health services; and 10 percent were research or survey studies. Nearly 15 percent of all projects were located in inner-city areas.

A survey of former JCP employees in five areas undertaken by the MSC in September 1976 (MSC, 1977) convinced the commission that the program was reaching its main target group of the unqualified and untrained under age 25. It showed that the majority of those participating had left school at the earliest opportunity and that nearly two-thirds of them had no educational qualification. Although 60 percent of the whole group had worked since leaving school, this was true of only 30 percent of those under age 18. The majority said they had benefited from their JCP participation, mentioning either the general experience of work or of a particular skill, responsibility, and the fact that they had been kept active. There was general (but not universal) satisfaction with the supervision of the projects. The main criticism of the scheme—made by the trade unions (including the National Union of Teachers), by voluntary organizations, and by individual young people at conferences—are that the short-term nature of the employment and of the whole scheme limits the development of project content and the ability of the projects to provide anything of lasting value. A complaint that has been voiced a good deal by individuals and radical groups—and indeed by some local careers officers—is that the scheme simply takes people off the dole and returns them to it after a brief respite. The general secretary of the Trades Union Congress stated that it was intended to do precisely that. His phrase was "It's better than nowt."

The MSC 1976 validation survey data suggest that there are some lasting advantages attached to participation. About one-fifth of those in JCP left to take a job during the project; nearly half found work soon after completing their term with the program. The median wage among those who found work was £29 per week, compared with a median of £27 among those who were at work before joining the JCP. (The median wage in the JCP itself was £24.) However, the difference in median wage rates before and after JCP experience might in part be accounted for by a general rise in wage rates during the time when those involved in the JCP were out of the labor market.

A criticism that has been made both by the British Youth Council and by teacher organizations is the lack of training provided for the majority of the participants. The National Union of Teachers (NUT) has suggested that 77 percent of the projects provided no visible training component; the British Youth Council alleged that, despite the employment of more than 1,400 young teachers, most of them in a nonteaching role, 60 percent of the projects offered no more than on-the-job training, itself frequently barely existent. However, while the council implied that the teachers within the JCP should more often be used to provide active instruction, the NUT expressed dismay at their being used in any kind of teaching role, which it felt should be carried out by more experienced staff secured from the school system. In its March 1977 report on youth unemployment, the council estimated that only 15 percent of the projects had entailed any form of off-the-job training, which had been more difficult to provide as a result of financial cuts in the further-education colleges.

The MSC's own validation survey provided some evidence of a conflict of perspectives on training: 70 percent of the projects in which survey respondents had worked were throught to provide on-the-job training and 10 percent of the projects included day release; only 1 in 10 did not set out to provide any kind of instruction. But more than 70 percent of the respondents said that they themselves had received no training.

There has also been some complaints from voluntary organizations and statutory youth services staff of considerable disparity in the criteria adopted by the area action committees. The MSC had, however, accepted the risks of inconsistency and inequity inherent in a decentralized program for the sake of flexibility, participative democracy, and responsiveness to specific local needs and resources (and also, perhaps, because it was sensitive to accusations of bureaucratic centralism).

Work Experience Program (WEP). The 1973 Education Act provided for limited work experience as a kind of reverse day release for pupils in the latter part of their school career. The extension since then of the concept to include a full-time postschool program has been a potent source of confusion—not least to the young people involved.

The Work Experience Program, which has been operated since the autumn of 1976 by the MSC, is aimed at a subgroup within the same group of young people that has been the principal target of the JCP. The WEP was announced as part of a new set of unemployment countermeasures at a time when school-leaver unemployment had reached a record seasonal level; £19 million were allocated to provide for placement of unemployed young workers under age 19 in industrial or commercial enterprises for six months or more to gain experience of working life. They were to be neither employees nor trainees in the normal sense, although the program emphasized the need for a planned and properly supervised program of induction and subsequent training, including, whenever possible, formal instruction in general skills, either by day release for further education or through existing in-company and training-board facilities. The commission would pay the young people a flat rate, free of tax or social security contributions, of £16 a week, which was of the same order as the grants payable under many of the commission's other training programs and somewhat below the medium take-home pay in the Job Creation Program.

The terms and context in which the secretary of state for employment announced the new program made plain that whatever its merits as an innovation in transitional education, the principal justification for launching it at that time was the contribution it would make to removing a further 60,000 young workers from the labor market during the following 12 months. The fact that the program was regarded primarily as a temporary crisis expedient was underlined by the time limits initially set for it: rather than allowing sufficient time to gain acceptability among the employers, whose cooperation was essential, the program was sanctioned to operate only until the following September, which meant that applications would close in March. It was estimated that some 30,000 young workers might be placed during that period. As was the case of the JCP, access was through the Careers Service, except for those who had left school more than two years earlier, who applied through the

Commission's Employment Services Agency, which provided placement services for the adult labor market as a whole. The commission itself was to seek the places, inviting applications from employers through six area teams.

As it turned out, applications were very slow in coming in, and by the end of 1976, the target was revised downward to 20,000. Subsequently, and after some intensive publicity, interest among employers began steadily to grow. Whereas 68 percent of the first 4,000 places to be approved had been in the service industries (mainly the distributive trades), manufacturing and extractive industry together accounted for only 20 percent. The share taken by major companies was not as large as had been expected: with one or two significant exceptions, such as Imperial Chemical Industries and Chrysler, the only large organizations to show interest were the retail chains, and this may partly explain why in the first months more than 60 percent of the placements were girls. The majority of the projects continued to be operated by firms with less than 500 staff, although more places came to be offered in manufacturing. In February 1977, when the secretary of state agreed to extend the scheme for a further four months, it was within sight of its revised target, with the rate of applications still growing.

As a measure to relieve youth unemployment by removing a substantial number of young workers from the labor market for a limited period, the Work Experience Program may be seen as a more sophisticated, second-generation device, serving largely the same purposes as job creation. In that role, like the JCP, it pays young workers from central government funds to engage full time in an occupation that is only incidentally productive of goods or services, but is not primarily training in a defined skill area. However, in contrast to the mixed and ambivalent attitudes which the JCP has elicited, the WEP appeared from its early stages to win something close to universal approval. Unions, teachers, youth organizations, professionals of the Careers Service, and the often self-critical staff of the commission itself grew increasingly enthusiastic about both the concept and the way in which it was being implemented. Training managers in participating companies spoke glowingly of their experience with the first groups of young workers placed with them, and some admitted that it was leading to a change in the attitude of their managements towards the recruitment of school leavers. While the commission and the careers officers, through whom the applicants were channeled, continued to stress that work experience contained no implied offer of a job with the host company, there was nothing to prevent companies from recruiting the youth as permanent staff, and from the earliest months of the scheme a number did so. The development was observed with some reservations by the unions, who were concerned that some companies might use work experience as a means of bringing in recruits on probation, sidestepping the provisions of employee-protection legislation. It was unlikely, however, that the unions would press the issue unless there were clear signs that companies were deliberately using the process as a substitute for their normal methods of recruitment.

What has won approval for the Work Experience Program more than any other factor is that it is predicated on the need to provide lasting benefits for those participating. Its primary purpose in the eyes of the MSC is to facilitate transition from school to work and to provide young people with some understanding of the work environment and its realities before they choose a career. The seriousness with which the commission regards this scheme as an educative process is manifest in its concern that the experience for each participant be planned and supervised and include a training component. A random survey carried out by the MSC in the first weeks of the program showed that 10 percent of the projects contained a significant content of further education and that 16 percent of those participating were either studying on day release or receiving formalized in-company training. Subsequently the commission allocated £100,000 to fund further education courses in local-authority colleges specifically for WEP trainees. The commission prepared its own "life and social skills" syllabus and trained its own instructors to help employers to initiate courses in this field to undertake the instruction directly. The whole approach that the commission brought to the Work Experience

Program from its inception indicated that, whatever the circumstances under which it was launched, the MSC saw it as a long-term contribution to transitional education that would outlast the need to combat cyclical unemployment.

"Pump-priming workshops" and the Clerical Training Awards. Two smaller programs have developed as variants of the Job Creation Program and the Work Experience Program. In 1976, the Department of Employment sanctioned the allocation of 1 percent of the JCP budget to the funding of "pump-priming workshops." Unlike the mainstream JCPs, these commission-supported projects were intended to become permanent, viable enterprises producing goods or services, usually run on a cooperative basis.

Their problem, commercially, was that they started out with the costs of a work force and then had to find ways of earning sufficient revenue to stay in business, covering overhead even during the period when the program was paying their wage costs. By the beginning of 1977, about 50 workshop projects had been approved.

The Clerical Training Awards Scheme was a sister project to the WEP, devised by the MSC in the late summer of 1976 as a means of providing for unemployed young people in the same age group a combination of work experience and skills training which would equip them for clerical work. Work experience in offices was, indeed, available under the WEP itself; but the specialized scheme aimed to provide more specific training in clerical skills leading to a formal qualification. It was also seen as an opportunity for the local authorities to make a contribution, as a group of large employers, to the new measures for helping the young unemployed.

Under the scheme, financed by the commission's Training Services Agency (TSA) and administered through the Local Government Training Board, the larger local authorities, for the most part those that controlled educational facilities, were asked to provide a one-year course for unemployed prospective clerical workers. They were expected to recruit the participants in their own localities and offer them both practical training within civic departments and day-release studies in local colleges and institutions. The studies, where possible, would lead to the Certificate in Office Studies. For the duration of the course, the TSA would provide students with a £17-a-week grant. The agency would also fully reimburse the authorities for the costs they incurred in recruitment, provision of courses, and administration.

The program did not get off to a good start. The TSA was forced to launch the scheme in a rush early in 1977 in circumstances that were not particularly auspicious. At that time, the Civil Service Department was still trying to persuade the unions to agree to the introduction of the Work Experience Program in central government departments; the civil service unions, resentful of the staffing cuts being made as part of a major program of public economies, were refusing to allow even the MSC to take WEP trainees into its own offices. There was reason to suppose that there would be similar problems in some areas in getting union cooperation for the proposed clerical scheme.

In Northern Ireland, where political and economic imperatives brought about active government intervention in the labor market earlier than in the rest of Great Britain, certain other programs have been introduced alongside these schemes. Enterprise Ulster runs construction projects of community benefit in which unemployed workers—adults and youths—work and train for regular jobs, most of which will be in the construction industry. Over 15 percent of the 1,700-member work force is under age 20. Integrated work force units are similar in concept to the JPC pump-priming workshops; groups of about a dozen unskilled workers are trained in complementary skills so that they can eventually form an effective production unit, which may become the basis of a viable commercial enterprise.

Training Scheme Incentives

The various measures introduced to maintain, extend, and expand the training effort cover a diverse range of training objectives, but the twin need to stimulate the recruitment of young trainees into industry and to remove other young workers from the labor market largely dictated the timing of these measures and was the main justification for allocating large resources at a time of rapid retrenchment in other public expenditures. The one area of innovation to which this did not apply was vocational preparation for those already at work, which was embarked on when the need for countercyclical measures was thought to be diminishing. In addition to steps to maintain and increase training places within industry and selection courses, four separate training programs have been set up by the Training Services Agency.

Training Opportunities Scheme (TOPS). This scheme was introduced primarily to provide retraining for employed adult workers. Although a number of special courses have been mounted for unemployed school leavers, often in areas where there are specific local problems or requirements, the majority of the 600 courses that had become available by 1977 were for men and women over age 19; entry was restricted to workers who had been away from full-time education for three years or more and had not taken part in any government-funded training in the previous five years. The courses were open both to the unemployed and those already working who wanted to acquire new skills. TOPS training was available at nearly 1,000 establishments throughout Britain–including the 50 "skill centers"–training centers run directly by the TSA itself–colleges of further education, or on employers' premises. All together, these establishments offered a wide variety of craft courses, operator training, and short courses intended to adapt existing skills to new applications.

Those accepted for the courses received tax-free allowances based on an age scale and providing for dependents and traveling expenses. In the first two years of the scheme the emphasis was on expansion, and courses were initiated for virtually every identifiable need, providing a total of 80,000 places. In 1977, when it was clear that the scheme was firmly established and would have no difficulty in achieving its target numbers, the program became more selective, and the range of courses offered was more closely related to the existing and forecast needs of industry.

Short industrial courses. These three-month courses were intended to provide general skills that would qualify trainees to embark on semiskilled or clerical employment. They were normally oriented toward a particular occupation and frequently included instruction in life and social skills, particularly those related to finding and keeping a job. The courses were run either in colleges or on employers' premises.

Wider opportunities courses. These courses were aimed at young workers whom the Careers Service or the Employment Services Agency considered hamstrung by lack of motivation. Lasting up to 24 weeks, they were intended to help the young people to find out what sort of work they liked and were suited for and to build up the confidence and desire to embark on training or to tackle a job.

Preparatory courses. These were virtually courses of remedial education, provided at further-education colleges to provide basic skills for those unable to read simple instructions or make simple calculations of the type required either in general employment or to meet the entry requirements of TOPS courses. The length of the courses was matched to individual needs, running for a maximum of three college terms. The normal minimum age of entry was 19, the same as for general TOPS courses; but with immigrants in mind it was relaxed to admit unemployed young people over age 17 who had been living outside the U.K. for a year or more while of British statutory school age.

Local-Government and Other Public-Service Interventions

In addition to the countrywide measures sponsored or funded by the Department of Employment and the Manpower Services Commission, a great variety of initiatives has been undertaken independently by local authorities in various parts of the United Kingdom. Work preparation courses, literacy and arithmetic instruction, and alternative work projects have been begun by local education departments, usually involving the Careers Service or the statutory youth services, and often in cooperation with employers in the area. Individual further-education colleges, particularly in the period before the Training Services

Agency had become fully established as a major funder of work-related courses, put on special courses to help unemployed youth and those educationally disadvantaged.

Some city authorities have obtained substantial funds under the central government's provisions for urban aid to establish courses for specific groups of young people, such as those belonging to ethnic minorities. The Community Relations Commission, a government agency, has encouraged and assisted in these initiatives. There is also evidence that some local authorities, despite powerful pressures from the central government to reduce expenditures, deliberately set out to create a number of additional posts within their permanent services for young workers at the peak of cyclical unemployment.

Government Intervention Beyond 1977

As we have seen, by 1977 the U.K. government and its agencies—together with local authorities, the education service, and voluntary organizations—had become responsible for a wide assortment of interventions in the youth labor market. The range of measures operating has been progressively introduced on an ad hoc basis as various needs were identified, as pressures grew to act in a particular area, or because new solutions were offered by groups and organizations. The situation produced by this ad hoc process was increasingly criticized by voluntary agencies and teacher associations, among others, who pointed to the patchiness of the provision, overlapping of courses, and inconsistencies both in funding criteria for different activities and in allowances paid to young people participating in the various programs. More urgently, the critics pointed out, despite the very high total of resources committed to the activities, they did not succeed in providing constructive activity for all, or even the majority, of school leavers who were unable to obtain work on the open labor market.

By the middle of 1976, the major youth organizations in particular had begun to press for a comprehensive youth-opportunity program that would offer everyone up to age 18 who could not find a job some form of education, training, or paid work. They urged that the program have an integrated career and consistent structure that would relate to the long-term needs of those currently in their teens as well as to the future requirements of the community and the economy. By the end of the year, the MSC accepted the desirability of providing an integrated and comprehensive program if its feasibility could be established. In the autumn, a working party was set up under a senior MSC executive, Geoffrey Holland, to examine the feasibility of offering a universal guarantee of the kind that the youth bodies were urging. Because most of the current provision for unemployed young workers was funded under the government's short-term countercyclical measures, which might be allowed to lapse if there were any substantial improvement in the economy during 1977, the working party was required to complete its recommendations with dispatch.

The government committed itself to the Holland working party's proposals on June 29, 1977. These proposals are: £18 per week, including travel expenses, will be paid to those under age 19 participating. The only condition imposed is that unemployed young people will have to wait six weeks before they qualify for a place. In addition, there will be a Special Temporary Employment Program (STEP) to provide up to 12 months of work for those over age 19. The new STEP scheme will add 25,000 places and will concentrate on groups hard hit by the current recession in areas of heavy unemployment. The new scheme will also provide 8,000 places for unemployed adults to act as supervisors and instructors on work-experience projects. The JCP will be extended until the end of 1977 when it will be replaced.

There was nothing really new in the opportunities recommended for jobless youngsters. But the working party believed that the proposals broke new ground in their scope and comprehensiveness: no Western government had as yet attempted to intervene in the youth labor market on such a scale or as purposively.

The new MSC program was essentially a range of training or work-experience options, all of them of the kind already operated in the U.K. and in other countries, either as short-term devices to relieve pressure on the job market or as part of work force retraining programs. The commission, drawing on its own experience and that of the voluntary agencies, attempted to assemble a rational package of opportunities calculated to meet the needs of the different ability groups among those jobless under age 19 and to provide a constructive progression of experiences for those unable to obtain work after completing one kind of project or training course. The program proposed two main kinds of opportunity: courses designed to prepare young people for work and different kinds of work experience (Figures 12 and 13).

The availability of specific options from within this total range in each area of the country would be decided by a committee representing local civic, educational, community, management, and trade-union interests and would vary with local and seasonal needs. A wide range of choice is needed, said the commission, "because no single remedy is appropriate . . . . Young people object to being regimented" (MSC, 1977, p. 33).

An important principle in the scheme is the single flat-rate allowance—not varying with age, activity, or location—which was proposed for all participants. The figure suggested was £18 a week, normally to include travel expenses, although it was envisaged that where these were excessive there should be some additional payment. The idea of a standard allowance was that it would prevent money considerations from becoming a factor in participants' choice of options and would also facilitate free movement between different parts of the program, which the commission considered an essential part of its concept. The program was to be open to all those who had left full-time education and had not yet reached their nineteenth birthday, but was funded on the basis of providing for a maximum of 234,000 young people a year, only one-half of the commission's own forecast of what, pessimistically, the level of unemployment in the age group might reach in 1978. The commission did not intend to provide for those who were out of work for only a few weeks, either on their initial entry into the labor market or transitionally later. In fact, it feared this might actually damage the employment prospects of the young people (MSC, 1977). In addition, early computer studies had convinced the

Holland working party that to include the short-term unemployed would push the total costs above politically acceptable levels. The 130,000 places provided in the program (as distinct from the annual maximum number of young people involved) would only be enough to cover the average number of those unemployed during the trough months at 1977 levels.

The commission, with powerful trade-union and management representation on both its working party and among the commissioners themselves, examined but rejected the possibility of restricting participation by imposing a compulsory waiting period or by denying early entry to those who chose to enter the labor market as soon as they had reached the legal school-leaving age instead of waiting until the end of the school year. However, the commission hoped to prevent the scheme from being swamped by the transitionally unemployed by stressing the role of the Careers Service in guiding applicants; and it also appeared that procedural delays in processing applications might serve effectively to screen out many of the short-term unemployed who insisted on their right to participate.

The commission estimated that the gross cost of its program for a full year would be £168.5 million (at 1976 prices) as compared with an existing commitment to spend £105 million on programs for the young in 1977–78. But it calculated that resulting savings in social security benefits and other expenditures would bring the net cost of the scheme down to around £95 million and suggested that there was "every prospect" that parts of the program would rank for aid from the European Social Fund. However, there was also some indication that the program might produce additional state expenditure outside its own costs. The commission noted that many of the opportunities proposed would be provided within educational establishments and that wherever possible the other opportunities would provide a "fully integrated element of further education" (MSC, 1977, p. 33). Future educational contributions, both within and beyond the Holland program, to alleviate problems of youth unemployment were being discussed between the government and the local authorities. The commission noted that difficulties might arise if those who wished to move from the program to

Figure 12. Proposals of the Manpower Services Commission for a program of opportunities for young people, by types of opportunities, Great Britain, 1977

Type of Opportunity	Title	Objective	Duration and Targets	Location	Provider	Progression
A. Courses to train and prepare young people for work	1. Assessment and employment induction courses	Improve employability by assessing work most suited for and interested in, improving knowledge of world of work and providing basic social skills.	Most 2 weeks A very few (Wider Opportunities Courses) up to 12 weeks	Skillcentres Colleges of Further Education but primarily employers' establishments	TSA Local Education Authority Employers	Some to normal employment. Most to basic skill course. A few to further education. Some to a work experience opportunity.
	2. Short industrial courses	**Training for a specific though broad occupational area and employment at operator or semi-skilled level.**	About 13 weeks Annual throughput 25,000	Skillcentres Colleges of Further Education Employers' establishments	TSA Local Education Authority Employers.	Many to normal employment. Some to further education. Others to a work experience opportunity.
	3. Remedial and preparatory courses	Reach basic levels of literacy and numeracy and basic entry requirements for other opportunities	As long as necessary for individual to achieve objective	Colleges of Further Education Special Schools Industrial and MSC premises Residential training colleges	Primarily Local Education Authority Some role for ESA and TSA	A few to normal employment. Most to other opportunities within Programme.
B. Work experience	**4. Employers' premises**	To give first hand experience of different kinds of work on employers' premises	On average 6 months Annual throughput 60,000	Employers' premises	**Employers**	Many to normal employment. Others to work preparation course or to further education.

	5. Project based	To give first hand experience of different kinds of work through the medium of projects	Up to 12 months Annual throughput of 15,000		**Sponsors of various kinds including local authorities, voluntary organizations etc.**	**Most to normal employment. Some to further education. Others to work preparation course.**
	6. Training workshop	To give first hand experience of different kinds of work in a work group producing goods or services	Up to 12 months Annual throughput 10,000	Vacant factories and other premises or sites.	Sponsors as in 5 above	Many to normal employment. Some to further education. Others to work preparation course.
	7. Community service	To give first hand experience of different kinds of work through the medium of local community activities	Up to 12 months Annual throughput 15,000	Institutions (schools, hospitals, youth clubs, voluntary organizations) Specific community projects (health education services to housebound)	Social Services Voluntary organizations	Most to normal employment. Some to further education or work preparation course.
C. Community industry	8. Community industry	Provide help for seriously disadvantaged young people and those finding it hard to obtain and hold down jobs	On average 12 months Annual throughput 5,500	Local authority sponsored projects	Community industry working with local authorities	Most to normal employment. Some to work preparation course. A few to further education.
D. Incentive training grants	9. Premium grants training awards, etc	**Meet anticipated requirements for manpower at higher skill levels**	12 months or more Target 1977/78 41,500	Employers' establishments, Colleges of Further Education, Industrial Training Board premises.	Industrial Training Boards and industry level bodies outside the Industrial Training Board's sector	All but a very few to normal employment.

Source: Manpower Services Commission (1977, p. 41).

Figure 13. Proposals of the Manpower Service Commission for a new program of training courses and work experience

	Assumed Average Duration	Places	Annual number of young people involved[a]	Cost (millions of £)
1. Work Preparation Courses				
a. Assessment or employment induction courses	2 weeks	3,000	60,000	8·32
b. Short industrial courses	3 months	8,000	25,000	22·57
c. Remedial or preparatory courses	26 weeks (max)	1,700 (approx.)	2,200	2·32
2. Work Experience				
a. Work experience on employers' premises	6 months	30,000	60,000	28·08
b. Project-based work experience	1 year	15,000	15,000	14·04
c. Training workshops	1 year	10,000	10,000	9·36
d. Community service	1 year	15,000	15,000	14·04
e. Capital-contribution to (b)–(d) above	–	–	–	8·42
3. Additional Staff for Local Areas, etc.	–	–	–	2·63
TOTAL		82,700	187,200	109·78
4. Other Programs				
a. Incentive training grants	1 year	41,500	41,500	46·00
b. Community industry	1 year	5,500	5,500	12·53
OVERALL TOTAL		129,700	234,200	168·31

[a] These figures take account of some underoccupancy; since experience has shown that it is not possible for all courses to be full at all times.

Source: Manpower Services Commission (1977, p. 49).

full-time education were not eligible for the same allowance; the education service is reviewing this situation.

In spite of these considerations, the commission made it quite clear that the program must not be developed in isolation from other provisions for young people and from manpower policies as a whole. It must damage neither the incentive to be in full-time work or in full-time education, and it must help young people to develop vocationally relevant skills (which industry, in turn, must be encouraged to use) while meeting the personal needs of the youngsters. One paragraph in particular from the commission's report deserves to be quoted in full as exemplifying the philosophy and justification for the program:

> 3.6 A new programme should not stand apart from other programmes or policies for young people. Unemployed young people are not different from other young people except in the narrowest sense and in the shortest term. As they grow up and leave school or other forms of full-time education, the steps they have to take and the bridges they have to cross are the same as those their more fortunate friends and peers negotiate. Success or failure in getting a job is often a matter of luck and frequently determined by factors well beyond the control or achievement of the individual such as the state of the national economy, the local industrial structure, or the kind of preparation for work available at school. Unemployed young people are not failures: they are those whom others have so far failed. The kinds of needs unemployed young people have are essentially no different from the needs of others making the transition from full-time education to work, though those needs may sometimes be best met by different kinds of provision (MSC, 1977, p. 33).

It can be seen that the MSC proposals fall far short of the comprehensive scheme they had been invited to work out. They are deliberately pitched below the peak level of youth unemployment, trying to steer between the twin dangers of overkill and underprovision. If too many places are offered, some who would otherwise enter ordinary employment will be diverted into nonproductive work-experience schemes; if too few are offered, too many will remain jobless. The youth lobbies have criticized the scheme for providing too few places and suggested that what will follow will be a competition to get places, in which those whose prospects of ordinary employment are poorest will be the least successful. This is clearly an area of policy making where head and heart threaten to conflict, and the economist's quest for productive efficiency may clash with the social worker's concern for individual welfare. The resulting compromise is unlikely to satisfy either, but the cost of a fully comprehensive scheme, even if it were deemed to make economic sense, would be prohibitive.

Intervention in the Labor Market for Those Aged 19 to 25

Those aged 19 or over were the principal beneficiaries of the two major short-term unemployment countermeasures, the Job Creation Program and the TOPS training scheme. Job creation as a short-term measure was due to end in the summer of 1977, while TOPS changed its pace, subordinating its earlier priority of expansion to relieve pressure in the labor market to a concentration on quality, which would mean a more selective and smaller program. Although the government could simply refund the existing JCP for a further period, as it had done in the past, the MSC advised that, with the removal of those under age 19 into the Holland program, the opportunity should be taken to refine the JCP and turn it into a longer-term program aimed principally at those 19 to 25. The discussions that took place between the government and the commission over the Holland report included this question of a successor program to the JCP.

The youth organizations, in particular a body called Youthaid—a lobby formed by the British Youth Council and the National Youth Bureau (together with some of their respective member organizations), the National Association of Youth Clubs, and Community Service Volunteers—urged that the government fund on a much larger scale the employment of youth over the age of 19 in community service and youth work. In fact, the Holland working party, although it did not make this clear in its report, envisaged that many of the 8,000 adults whom it estimated would be required to lead its work-experience projects would be drawn from those aged 19 to 25. But Youthaid and the British Youth Council went a good deal further in their prescription for intervention in the youth labor market as a whole. They continued to urge that the government adopt a manpower strategy separate from its industrial strategy that would include deliberate investment in labor-intensive projects as a means of offsetting the increasing degree of structural youth unemployment, which they saw as unavoidable in any mainstream progress toward greater productivity.

6

Social and Cultural Changes in the Status of Youth

Much has been written about the development of a youth culture in the period since World War II. By the middle 1950s, the combination of increased affluence and energetic commercial activities to exploit it had focused attention on the tastes, aspirations, and consumption patterns of those 15 to 25 years of age. People began to talk of a new teenage/young-adult culture, bridging social classes and linking life-styles through the language of popular music and fashions. Staying on at school became a less exclusive mark of social or intellectual elitism; but at the same time expansion of further and higher education and the expectation that it would become part of the social initiation process for an increasing section of the community helped to formalize the prolongation of adolescence. Young people found themselves pulled in different directions: better diet and more affluence brought earlier physical maturity; changing social conventions brought more freedom and independence of parental control. Yet the extension of education and the sophistication of skills required by a complex industrial society lengthened the period of transition between childhood and adulthood for an increasing proportion of the population. A commercial, classless, youthful image emerged, based on the spending habits of employed young men and women. Yet for the growing minority who continued in education, the artificially extended adolescence was a time of relative poverty and low living standards. For them, economic gratification, which had traditionally been associated with middle-class social values as access to extended education was enlarged, was postponed, leading to rejection of middle-class values, to doubts that the pay-off would justify the sacrifice, or at least to resentment of the prolonged period of preparation required before enjoying the fruits of study and training.

One consequence of these developments was the growth of a self-conscious notion of the "student" and of a student class and student solidarity. This notion has gained only limited support in Britain, where student politics have largely been the preserve of a small minority of the politically active. These have included several constantly regrouping left-wing radical groups, with the Communists clearly recognizable to the right of most of the Marxist elements, while in the last two or three years groups affiliated to the Conservative Party student organization have made considerable progress, both at the level of individual universities and colleges and in the National Union of Students, where a broad left-wing coalition of Communist and other socialist groups dominates. It should be noted, however, that the electoral processes of student politics are ideally suited to produce undemocratic results, and the great majority of student opinion is much less radical and more apathetic than the contentious proceedings of the National Union of Students might suggest.

Sociologists have studied the development of the youth culture in depth, with special attention to the *rites de passage* by which the young pass from youth to adulthood. In Britain, alongside the new social phenomena connected with fashions and pop music and the outward signs of a distinctive life-style, there came and went a sequence of sociopolitical movements that attracted support from young people. There were the Teddy Boys and the Mods and Rockers, the men who wore their hair short and the men who wore their hair long, and the successful revolt against formal styles of clothing; but there was also the participation of young people in the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in the early 1960s and later in a welter of radical political movements and a more generalized indignation against environmental pollution. By the time the age groups born in the "baby boom" years just after World War II reached the university in the later 1960s, the student revolution had begun, and sociologists were presented with a rich selection of case studies from Berkeley to Berlin, Tokyo to Paris and Rome, the London School of Economics to the University of Essex.

Looking at the scene in the late 1970s, it becomes evident that the youth revolution was only a particular manifestation of a much larger revolution affecting society as a whole. The student revolt in Britain was always a pretty pallid affair; not only was the student community extremely small, it was also highly privileged and well looked after. Very few of the grievances that aroused the university student in Germany or France in 1968 were available to student militants in Britain, who had to be content with campaigning for more participation in academic decision making and against petty rules. As the universities themselves had lost confidence in petty rules and were prepared to accept student membership on university committees (on terms that in practice left the academics with effective safeguards), the necessary adjustments were made with relative ease.

Much more significant than the student revolt, or any other of the changes forced on society by disenchanted young people, were the larger social changes not specially related to young people but which greatly affected the world in which they were growing up. Within the space of a few years during the 1960s, Britain saw the abolition of the death penalty for murder; changes in the abortion, divorce, and homosexuality laws; new gaming laws; and the lowering of the age of majority (and the voting age) to 18. Having lived for many years with fairly conservative conventions about what could and could not be represented on screen and stage, Britain dismantled a centuries-old system of theater censorship and applied new liberal laws to obscenity in books and magazines. The "permissive society" materialized during the 1960s, and it became popular to talk of "swinging London." And with all this came a general loosening of family relationships and the abdication of discipline over children by many parents who saw the permissive society, in part at least, as removing from them responsibility for their children's behavior. In a different but no less forceful way, the use of contraceptive pills compounded the new freedom in sexual relationships and, with easier, legal abortion, modified relationships between young people. Many of these changes have diminished the influence of families over the behavior of children and increased the influence of peer groups and the commercial media.

During the 1960s, the proportion of mothers doing paid work outside the home increased by more than 70 percent. In 1971, 49 percent of the female population was classified as economically active, including 49.2 percent of the 18-to-24 age group and 56.7 percent of those 25 to 44. Also in 1971, there were an estimated 620,000 one-parent families with 1,080,000 children—10 percent of all households with dependent children. This group has grown steadily with easier divorce legislation and the rise in the number of divorces through the 1960s and 1970s. The present number is about 125,000 per year (double the 1970 figure) which compares with about 420,000 marriages. Alongside these developments has been the progress of the women's movement and the enactment of a Sex Discrimination Act in 1975 with very wide application. It remains to be seen how effective the legal remedies offered to women who are discriminated against will be, but this movement represents a major piece of public education indicating an important shift in public policy that is already modifying individual and corporate behavior.

There is room for endless argument on whether the generation gap has gotten wider or narrower or remained the same. If the changes affecting young people are themselves part of a social change affecting the community as a whole, there is reason to doubt that the generation gap has widened. For every item of evidence suggesting that young people are alienated and disenchanted, there are dozens more that show them fitting into the present society and accepting its competitive disciplines. The "dropout" emerged during the 1960s as a social phenomenon, worrying middle-class parents and associated with various forms of academic failure or the rejection of academic objectives. The practice of students "stopping off" for a year or so to go to Khatmandu or work on a building site became common in a period when it was still relatively easy for students to get well-paid, short-term employment. Even so, the great majority of university students continued to take the normal three-year degree course and to get suitable employment at the end. Graduate unemployment has not risen to serious proportions, though the length of time new graduates have had to wait before getting jobs has lengthened and shortened with the state of the economy, and, in anticipation of harder employment conditions, there has been a retreat from the less vocationally useful subjects in higher education and a rise in the number of would-be doctors, lawyers, accountants, and engineers. One consequence of the relatively low participation rate in post-secondary education is that those who find themselves in this sector of education in Britain have been less adversely affected in time of economic recession than they would have been had they been more numerous.

Therefore, while it is right to study forms of behavior among young people that can be taken as an index of alienation, it is well to begin by noting that conformity is more typical of youthful attitudes than rebellion or dissent. Professor John Egglestone of the University of Keele, author of a recent study of youth policy for the Department of Education and Science (1975), had occasion to draw attention to this.

> Our evidence does not support the sophisticated radicalism of young people, often assumed to exist by many writers on the "youth scene." . . . Whilst there is unquestionably a strong desire to "change society" in fundamental ways among some young people, our evidence suggests that this is not a majority view. It is confined to a politically conscious minority. It is more often held by adult workers, particularly in community action projects, than by members.

> The majority of members are well aware of the nature of contemporary society, and disposed to accept it. Most are content to find a meaningful place within it that provides a satisfying self-image; to be able to make decisions within the present society rather than refashion it. It is this that we mean by "counting for something." Indeed our evidence showed there was a widespread respect for structure, ordered relationships, and a stable framework of social organisation. The most radical position of the average member seemed to be the desire for some sort of redistribution of power by which he and others could share more readily in a largely unchanged society. (Often he may not wish to exercise power, only to know he could if he wished.)

Crime

The difficulties of making comparison from one year to another based on the criminal statistics are well-known: the definitions of criminal behavior change; so do the practices of the police and of the courts. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that crime among young people has risen steadily in recent years and that this rise in juvenile crime is steeper than the rise in crime throughout society. A third of all those found guilty of, or formally cautioned for, indictable offenses in 1975 were under age 17. Over 17 percent of the 14 to 18 age group were convicted or cautioned for indictable offenses in 1975; with all the qualifications that have to be made about comparisons, this was twice the juvenile crime rate a decade earlier. Crime among the 14- to 18-year-olds had doubled, while the increase for the community as a whole was only 70 percent.

Women and girls are between five and six times more law abiding (or more successful in evading discovery). Among both men and women there is a marked fall-off in the crime rate with age: young men aged 17 to 20 are 11 times as likely to appear in conviction statistics as those aged 30 and over; in the case of women, the equivalent ratio is about 5 to 1.

This growth of juvenile crime is linked in the minds of most commentators with social alienation. "There is little doubt," according to Professor F. H. McClintock, professor of criminology at the University of Edinburgh, "that part of our problem involving young people is the result of alienation from a social system created primarily by the adult population" (McClintock, 1974, pp. 5-6). He continues:

> A sense of apathy and alienation probably lies behind the criminal violence in schools and the growth of truancy. Also the repetitive and uninteresting jobs of many youths in industrial employment could be so lacking in satisfaction as to turn them to seek an outlet for their boredom in criminal excitement in a monotonous urban environment during leisure periods. A final point which ought to be made is that, although we are focusing attention on the criminality of youth, it has to be stressed that the vast majority of youth in this country never come into direct conflict with the law enforcement processes or get charged with criminal offences. Although the age groups that I am concerned with have much higher conviction rates than the adult population, and though such rates have been increasing in recent years, still no more than 6 young people are involved per annum for every 100 in the male population. While elsewhere I have indicated, by the use of a projection model, that only 20 percent of the male population and 3 percent of the female population will be recorded as involved in a crime of any sort between the ages of 10 and 20 years, the chances of a young male becoming a youthful recidivist is less than 4 percent. The vast majority of young people are never convicted of crime; of those that are involved in crime the majority have only one or two skirmishes with the law, but rarely do such skirmishes extend to criminal violence. The often-made assertion that the younger generation is identified as both criminal and violent, when examined carefully in relation to crime data in police returns and the demographic data on the population, is found to be a public myth.

> However, to make such a statement is not to deny that in Great Britain today there is a serious crime problem or to deny the continuous annual increase in the volume of violent crime recorded by the police. In England and Wales serious violent crime and robbery with violence increased from 17,000 in 1960 to 69,000 in 1973. In Scotland the corresponding increase was from 2,000 in 1960 to 5,000 in 1973. The increase in recorded violence during the last thirteen years was therefore 288 percent in England and Wales and 173 percent in Scotland.

Whatever the causes, the trend is getting worse, and many of the problems of the inner city on which youthful crime thrives are getting worse, too. A study by the Community Relations Commission looked at the linked problems of unemployment and homelessness and the existence of a small but recognizable group of young people from both majority and minority groups who drift into petty crime, prostitution, and join others supporting themselves after a fashion by hustling. While there are municipal social service agencies and voluntary organizations that theoretically provide welfare services to young people, the national and local resources devoted to them are inadequate to cope with the potential demand, and, in any case, many of those in need of help are reluctant to accept it from official sources.

Drug Abuse

In the area of illegal drugs, statistics are again notoriously imperfect. The number of registered addicts shows a trend which, on the face of it, might seem modestly encouraging (Table 23). The number of registered addicts in the under-25 age groups in 1975 was 600, compared with 773 in 1970. But the general view is that the figures grossly understate the extent of the problem and that there is currently an increase in hard-drug use that has begun to show up in the criminal statistics. The 1976 report of the Standing Conference on Drug Abuse also drew attention to the increasing number of "multiple drug

Table 23. Dangerous drugs: numbers of registered addicts, United Kingdom, 1970 to 1975

	1970	*1971*	*1972*	*1973*	*1974*	*1975*
Number registered as taking drugs on 31 December[a]:	1,426	1,549	1,615	1,815	1,972	1,954
Males	1,051	1,133	1,194	1,369	1,459	1,438
Females	375	416	421	446	513	516
Age distribution:						
Under 20 years	142	118	96	84	64	39
20 and under 25	631	722	727	750	692	561
25 and under 30	237	288	376	530	684	754
30 and under 35	90	112	117	134	163	219
35 and under 50	112	112	118	136	163	169
50 and over	195	177	165	180	198	194
Age not stated	19	20	16	1	8	18
Type of drug[b]:						
Methadone	991	1,160	1,278	1,439	1,552	1,543
Heroin	437	385	338	378	392	316
Morphine	105	100	89	83	82	70
Pethidine	77	70	59	50	61	62
Cocaine	57	58	46	51	47	23
Dipipanone	45	49	37	48	76	133
Dextromoramide	28	35	32	49	64	70
Other drugs	13	9	7	8	11	7

[a] Comparable figures for years before 1970 are not available.

[b] Addicts who are receiving more than one drug are shown against each drug they receive. Heroin and methadone are the drugs most commonly used together. In 1970, 254 addicts were receiving both drugs: the figures for 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974, and 1975 are 229, 201, 223, 243, and 212 respectively.

Note: In 1975 there were 36 hospitals holding special clinics for the out-patient treatment of drug dependence, all having access in-patient facilities. Treatment is also provided in general psychiatric units.

Source: Central Statistical Office, 1976.

misusers who engage in the indiscriminate and highly dangerous use of a wide range of drugs including alcohol and barbituates. Many are homeless and rootless, frequently overdose and are repeatedly admitted to casualty wards, some several times a day. . . . They lack any common identity with narcotic drug takers, appearing to be lonely, isolated and often very disturbed young people. With hindsight it would appear that the official perception of the drug problem in the mid-1960s was unduly narrow and probably distorted by the hysteria surrounding heroin addiction at that time" (Standing Conference on Drug Abuse, 1976, p. 3).

While the total annual number of criminal convictions for drug offenses of all kinds was about 14,000 in 1975, the number of offenses relating to cannabis is going down and those concerned with more dangerous drugs is going up. However, this is not necessarily a clear guide to actual behavior. It is generally supposed that soft drugs are relatively widely used, but that they have ceased to enjoy high status as evidence of a social problem. Schools and colleges are now much less concerned about cannabis; the consumption of alcohol has replaced cannabis as the headmaster's worry at boarding schools, but there is no reason to suppose that the use of cannabis has actually declined.

Alcohol

There has been a marked rise in the number of admissions to mental hospitals and units of men and women diagnosed as suffering from alcoholism or alcoholic psychosis (Figure 14). Since the middle of 1960s, the per-capita consumption of alcohol has increased by 30 percent, by far the biggest increase being in wines and, to a lesser extent, spirits. (Even so, both beer and spirits consumption [22 gallons and 0.8 gallons respectively] was well below the pre-1914 level). Young people are among the heaviest spenders on alcohol and therefore likely to be among those most likely to suffer from its excessive use. The Family Expenditure Survey (1973) shows that those in the 16 to 19 age group spend 92 percent of the average expenditure on alcohol by all persons aged 16 and over. Those aged 20 to 24 spend 156 percent of the average. In both cases males spend considerably more than females.

Britain can be seen as moving toward a new pattern of social provision for the older teenagers—that is, for those between the end of compulsory education and the official age of majority.

Figure 14. Alcoholism: Admissions to mental illness hospitals and units, England and Wales, 1966 to 1974[a]



[a] Figures are for hospitals and units under Regional Hospital Boards and teaching hospitals. They include patients whose first or second diagnosis was alcoholism or alcoholic psychosis.

Source: Department of Health and Social Security.

But it is not easy to see in current developments any substantial change in employment, education, and training for the 18-to-24 age group except on the basis of the gradual evolution of the present arrangements. As has been suggested, the lines of possible development in postsecondary education are visible, but in the late 1970s there is not much evidence of public support for forward movement along these lines. At the 16-to-19 age level, however, there are many more signs of movement and evidence of willingness on the part of the politicians to back ad hoc arrangements to alleviate the effects of youth unemployment. These arrangements will, of themselves, generate system changes that could be far reaching.

The MSC proposals of 1977 (Figure 13), while presented cautiously as countercyclical measures aimed primarily at containing the rise in youth unemployment, can be seen in this light. These proposals fit into the philosophical framework of a "youth opportunity guarantee." If this philosophy prevails, it will not be possible in the long run to offer such a guarantee to a strictly limited number of young people without extending it to all. What will emerge will add up to a system of vocational preparation, a series of organized experiences combining work experience with learning. Many things will follow from this. A local and regional structure will come into being to administer the scheme. This will operate alongside (but separate from) the system of local government that administers upper secondary schools and further education. The MSC schemes will be financed directly from national funds and, while particular projects will be developed on a decentralized basis by local groups, the central direction of the plan will be in the hands of the MSC. The educational system, on the other hand, lacks such clear-cut central direction, because the powers of the secretary of state are strictly limited by law, and in many respects coordinated action depends on persuasion and negotiated compromise.

If a system of vocational preparation through work experience and related schemes comes into existence parallel to the education system, there are soon going to be problems of selection: Who is going to be admitted to which project on the basis of what criteria? The schemes themselves will come to form part of the social selection mechanism. Until now, the Training Services Agency (the MSC's training arm) has selected candidates for its training projects on the time-honored basis of judging their capacity to benefit: the "likeliest lads" have been those most readily taken on. If the MSC proposals (and the £18 a week for all successful applicants) offer fewer places than there are potential candidates, will the criteria for admission still favor those most likely to do well? If so, the scheme is liable to mop up many who would otherwise be well placed to get jobs anyway and exclude many of those whose poor job prospects have helped to launch the scheme. However, to discriminate in favor of those least likely to do well would also raise problems.

Reference has already been made to the difficulties that a large-scale development of work-experience schemes could present to the education system. If the MSC schemes develop with a substantial element of training and vocational education, there will be direct competition for the allegiance of many young people between the full-time school and further-education system on the one hand and the MSC schemes on the other: the MSC schemes will pay out £18 a week to their chosen candidates and the secondary system nothing to theirs, except insofar as they may be eligible for education maintenance allowances. These latter allowances (EMAs) are at present heavily dependent on the discretion of individual local education authorities. Where paid at all, they average little more than £2 a week, and they are only paid to the poorest families. Inevitably—and rightly—the British government has blanched at the idea of subsidizing all young people to stay on at school when already, without any allowances, so many do so voluntarily, supported by their parents and their own weekend earnings. But the MSC proposals have brought EMAs back into the public discussion, and in so doing have highlighted the inadequately considered side effects that the MSC proposals will bring with them.

A logical development would be a new administrative link between the local-authority network of upper secondary schools and further education and the MSC's network of industrial training. But this is not easy to achieve. The philosophy and raison d'être of the education service is very different from that of the MSC; so are the vested interests concerned.

A take-over of training by the education system is a fantasy occasionally indulged in by empire-building teacher-trade-unionists, but not only is such a take-over improbable in the extreme, it would also give the educators a responsibility they could not carry out. Likewise, a take-over of a large part of post-age-16 school and further education, though another fantasy entertained by those who have been beguiled by the aggressive style (and long purse) of the MSC, is not within the bounds of probability and would certainly not be desirable. But it is clear that, on the educational side, there is some reason to think that the industrial and commercial point of view should be more strongly stated, and, if through the Holland proposals the MSC is going to be drawn more and more into this field, some new and formal mechanism to manage this is going to be required, especially if more experience of work and industry is to be offered to pupils before they reach the end of compulsory schooling.

If ordinary jobs for young people in industry, commerce, and the public services do continue to become more scarce and an increasing proportion of the age group remain in school, further education, or structured forms of work experience and vocational preparation, there will have to be a spectrum of opportunities for all, stretching from the traditional pursuit of formal academic education at one end to work experience with minimal training or education at the other. To achieve this there would have to be a determined attempt to reduce the artificial barriers that now constrain the schools and colleges and that in the short-term (if the MSC proposals for cash allowances are fully implemented) will likely be raised rather than lowered. With more part-time education, more passage in and out of school and in and out of work experience, the case for a new and essentially more adventurous approach to recurrent education is strong.

These speculations may well arouse skepticism. It is much easier to write of obstacles in the way of this kind of development than to express confidence that it will come about. The legal and institutional hurdles are formidable and would only be cleared by a government very determined and very clear about its aims and not required to modify every move to respond to immediate pressures. The structure of educational administration is tied up with the whole structure of local government. Local government has recently been reorganized (in 1973) at the cost of great political pain and grief. No political party will readily embark again on local government reform in a hurry. But there are signs that, within five years, there could be a major review of educational administration (brought forward, in part, by weaknesses in the present system). If this were so, many doors might open; the need for new patterns of organization for the 16 to 19 age group would be one of the pressures behind any new education law.

The potential cost of any major extension of the youth opportunity guarantee for the 16-to-19 age group is the most obvious deterrent to action and the most obvious reason why politicians prefer to wait and see what happens rather than make ambitious plans and drive them through against fierce opposition. Doubts about the nature of youth unemployment and the reasons behind its increase will also counsel caution. One reason why there is now a need to find ways of increasing the range of options for young people is that their prospects have been relatively worsened by the unforeseen side effects of other well-intentioned social policies. Behind any argument about how youth opportunities can be improved is a larger argument about the desirability of further large-scale public intervention in the labor market and the uncertainties surrounding the outcomes of most projected policies. The political sensitivity that attends the monthly publication of the unemployment figures has the effect of concentrating attention on the input of labor into the economy. If this were to divert attention from the output of the economy, it could do a disservice all around. A distinguishing characteristic of the British economy is low productivity. Common prudence suggests that any design for improving the induction of young people from dependence to independence, from school to work, must have in view improving productivity and increasing the wealth available at the end to pay for the material aspects of the good life which, in a democracy, is not to be prescribed by platonic guardians, but by the individual choice of voting citizens. Of course, fundamental questions about growth and its limits present themselves with increasing persistence. But so far no major political party in Britain has responded to the romantic appeal of the zero-growth economy. It would obviously have enormous impact on the whole question of employment, not just the employment of young people, and introduce into the discussion a wider range of intractable issues which could not be considered seriously without an entirely different conceptual framework.

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R 3805-2.6

EDUCATION AND YOUTH EMPLOYMENT IN POLAND

Barbara Liberska

A STUDY PREPARED FOR THE
CARNEGIE COUNCIL ON POLICY STUDIES
IN HIGHER EDUCATION

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IN HIGHER EDUCATION

EDUCATION AND YOUTH EMPLOYMENT IN POLAND
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The Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education, 2150 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California 94704, has sponsored publication of this report as part of a continuing effort to obtain and present significant information for public discussion. The views expressed are those of the author.

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number LC 79–50704

International Standard Book Number ISBN 0–931050-12-X

Manufactured in the United States of America

First Edition

Education and Youth Employment in Contemporary Societies

A Series of Special Studies

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These publications are available from the Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education, 2150 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California 94704.

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Foreword

This is one of seven publications presenting studies commissioned by the Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education as a means of providing a global perspective for education and youth employment in contemporary societies. The remaining publications will be concerned with education and youth employment in Belgium, by Henri Janne; Mexico and South Asia, by Alberto Hernández Medina and Carlos Muñoz Izquierdo and Manzoor Ahmed, respectively; Great Britain, by Stuart Maclure; Sweden and Denmark, by Gösta Rehn and K. Helveg Petersen, respectively; Japan, by Hidetoshi Kato, and The Federal Republic of Germany by Klaus von Dohnanyi. Margaret S. Gordon, associate director of the Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education, is the general editor of the series. To the authors of these studies, and to Barbara Liberska, whose work appears in this volume, we express our deep appreciation.

The German Marshall Fund generously provided support for two international conferences on education and youth employment which were attended by several of the authors of studies for this series and which have contributed significantly to the Council's deliberations on this subject. The International Council for Educational Development, under the direction of James A. Perkins, arranged for the participation of the essayists in this project. We acknowledge these contributions with profound thanks.

We also wish to extend our thanks to Mary Purnell Frederick and Diana Lorentz for their editorial contributions, and Sylvia Zuck for coordinating manuscript preparation.

CLARK KERR
Chairman,
Carnegie Council on Policy Studies
in Higher Education

1

Polish Youth in Perspective

The education and employment of youth were Poland's main socioeconomic problems in the 1960s. Their significance was due to the demographic situation at that time, characterized on the one hand by the baby-boom generation entering the labor force and on the other by the dynamic economic growth of the country that caused an increased demand for qualified labor. The issues of primary importance became the provision of places in schools, provision of new jobs, and opportunities for training in industrial enterprises for several million young people. Various government organizations as well as social and state institutions were put in charge of developing guidelines for youth education and employment policies.

First of all, detailed analyses of changes in the demographic structure of youth were made, taking into account numerous socioeconomic aspects of the transition into adulthood of several age groups from the post-World-War II baby boom. The analyses revealed the education and job orientation of youth as well as indicating appropriate guidelines for actions through which the state could influence the appropriate adjustment of educational trends and utilization of young people's qualifications in the socioeconomic development of the country.

Definitions and Categories of Youth

A number of definitions of youth can be given, taking into account legal, social, biological, or economic aspects of this population group. Most generally speaking, youth consists of those people who aim at leading independent lives through acquiring education and a job. They seek the material, cultural, and social independence that will enable them to make their own life decisions, assume particular social responsibilities, and find their places in society.

In Poland, more than 90 percent of youth aged 15 have completed compulsory education, and more than half of them set up their own families by the age of 25. Therefore, we shall discuss here the transition into adulthood of the age group 15 to 24. Let us consider the life situations in which young people 15 to 24 find themselves. Once they have completed compulsory elementary education at the age of 15, they can take up further education, enter on-the-job training, or remain dependent on their parents (Figure 1). In more detail:

1. They can continue education in:
    - (a) basic vocational schools (15- to 18-year-olds)
    - (b) secondary vocational schools (15- to 20-year-olds)
    - (c) general secondary schools (15- to 19-year-olds)
    - (d) postsecondary schools (19- to 21-year-olds)
    - (e) higher education institutions—universities and polytechnics (19- to 24-year-olds)
2. They can take up work:
    - (a) apprenticeship (15- to 18-year-olds)
    - (b) on-the-job training (15- to 18-year-olds)
    - (c) work accompanied by specialized training
3. They can start work while still attending regular evening schools.
4. They can stay out of work and out of school and remain dependent on their parents.
5. Males can complete two years of compulsory military service (19- to 23-year-olds).

Because of the significant role of youth in the future socioeconomic growth of the country, the state tries to create favorable

Figure 1.


Youth in 15–24 age group
employed
enrolled in school
out of school and out of work
military service
private sector
national economy
evening schools
day schools
training courses
graduates
farmers
craftsmen
regular employment
training within employment
elementary education
basic vocational education
apprentice-ship
on-the-job training
general secondary education
secondary vocational education
preemployment training
higher education

conditions under which they can enter social and professional life. The social policy of the state aims at:

- enabling youth leaving elementary schools to continue education by creating a complex system of secondary and vocational education;
- enabling youth to take up the right job at the right time by providing a sufficient number of new jobs and opportunities of employment in accordance with educational attainments;
- developing various forms of social services for young married couples (flats, nurseries, kindergartens, maternity leaves, and so on).

Legal Basis for the Transition into Adulthood

Age is the legal basis for recognition of the transition from adolescence to adult life and is expressed in various national legal systems. The border between adolescence and adulthood may be legally determined by admittance of those of a certain age to: (1) full responsibility for legal acts (civil law); (2) admittance to political rights (constitutional right to vote); (3) recognition of criminal offenses (criminal law); (4) legal right to enter a contract for employment (Employment Act); (5) legal right to marry (Family Act); or (6) compulsory military service.

According to Polish civil law, every citizen on reaching the age of 18 is responsible for legal actions—that is, can make and receive binding voluntary declarations. The Constitution of 1952 gives everyone 18 or over the right to vote for the *Seym* (diet) and *Rady Narodowe* (national councils). Full legal age embodied in civil law differs from that in criminal law, according to which responsibility starts at 17 years of age.

According to the Polish Employment Act, people 15 to 18 may accept contracts to work and may be employed in special cases in order to learn an occupation and obtain training in a particular kind of work, such as serving an apprenticeship under regulated working hours and conditions. Employment of those under 15 years of age is prohibited. Adult labor regulations are obligatory from 18 years of age on.

The Polish Family Act of 1965 has specified the age at which matrimony may be contracted as 18 years for women and 21 years for men. In special cases, with the consent of the legal guardians, it is possible to lower this limit to 16 years for women and 18 years for men.

The law also defines, in accordance with the constitution, the regulations concerning the general duty of military service, including army registration, recruitment, and actual service. Military service in general is compulsory for 24 months in the regular army or 36 months in the navy for men between 19 and 24 years of age. In certain cases (for example, during a shortage of labor) military service may be postponed. During their service, the recruits are on leave from their employers, who are at the same time obliged to accept them back again in the same or an equivalent position on their return. The syllabus of higher education institutions includes army training for students.

Demographic Structure of Youth 15 to 24 Years Old

Youth as a percentage of total population. Young people between 15 and 24 years of age constituted 14 percent of the Polish population in 1960; by 1965 their number had grown to 16.5 percent; and in 1973 it exceeded 20 percent (Table 1). In 1975, youth in this age group continued to constitute one-fifth of the population.

In terms of numbers, the youthful population nearly doubled between 1960 and 1975, growing from 4 million in 1960 to 7.5 million in 1975. During the same period, the total population grew by only 14 percent—from 29.5 million to 34 million. The group of 15- to 18-year-olds increased by more than 50 percent in the years 1960–1965, while 19- to 24-year-olds increased by about 40 percent in the years 1965–1970. (Data for 1975 are not shown in Table 1.)

Such a great increase in the number of young people in that period was a consequence of the post-World-War II baby boom and high birth rate in the years 1949–1959. The baby-boom generation was flowing through the elementary schools in the late 1950s and especially between 1961 and 1967. Many new schools were built to accommodate all children. This was achieved, among other things, through implementation of the

Table 1. Changes in total population and population in youthful age groups, selected years, 1960–1973 (numbers in thousands)

	Total population		*15–18 years*			*19–24 years*			*15–24 years*		
Year	*Number*	*Percentage Change*	*Number*	*Percentage Change*	*Percentage of total Population*	*Number*	*Percentage Change*	*Percentage of total Population*	*Number*	*Percentage Change*	*Percentage of total Population*
1960	29,561		1,695		5.7%	2,527		8.5%	4,222		14.2%
1965	31,496	6.5%	2,598	53.3%	8.2	2,627	4.0%	8.3	5,225	23.8%	16.5
1970	32,526	3.3	2,802	7.9	8.6	3,635	38.4	11.2	6,437	23.2	19.8
1973	33,363	2.6	2,819	0.6	8.4	4,008	10.3	12.0	6,827	6.1	20.4
1960–1973		12.9		66.3			58.6			61.7	

program called "A Thousand Schools for the Millenium of the Polish State." (In 1966, Poland celebrated the 1000th anniversary of its existence).

Between 1965 and 1973, the baby-boom generation was in the secondary schools and entering employment. The demographic situation called for further development of various forms of postelementary education, particularly with regard to job training. To diminish the pressure of youth on the labor market and on secondary schools, the elementary school period was prolonged by one year in 1967. At the same time, some 1.5 million new jobs were provided in the years 1966–1970 and another 1.5 million in 1971–1975. More than 85 percent of youth continued education after elementary school.

Another result of the high birth rate was an increase of 5 million people entering the labor force between 1960 and 1975, the annual average increase being over 300,000. The years from 1973 to 1980 are those in which the main pressure of youth on higher education institutions has been felt and is expected to continue.

Ages 15 to 19 and 20 to 24.

1. Structure by sex. Women constituted 49.5 percent of the 15-to-19 age group in 1960. Their proportion declined to 49.2 percent and 49.0 percent in 1965 and 1975, respectively. For the age group 20 to 24, the figures were 50.7 percent in 1960, 49.3 percent in 1970, and 49.1 percent in 1975, indicating a slight predominance of males in the 15-to-24 age group as a whole (Table 2).

2. Structure by place of residence. In the 1960s, about 51 percent of 15- to 19-year-olds and about 47 percent of 20- to 24-year-olds lived in rural areas. Due to increased migration of youth in the 1960s and 1970s, a significant number of young people moved from rural areas to the urban ones. In 1975, some 64 percent of youth 20 to 24 and over 50 percent of those 15 to 19 lived in cities. Thus urban youth predominated in the 1970s (Table 3).

Between 1966 and 1970, some 30,000 young people 15 to 17 and over 200,000 18- to 24-year-olds migrated from rural

Table 2. Women as a percentage of people 15 to 19 and 20 to 24, selected years, 1960–1975 (numbers in thousands)

	15–19 years			*20–24 years*		
Year	*All people*	*Women*	*Women as percentage of total*	*All people*	*Women*	*Women as percentage of total*
1960	1,934	958	49.5%	2,209	1,119	50.7%
1965	3,024	1,485	49.2	1,913	968	50.6
1970	3,479	1,706	49.1	2,958	1,459	49.3
1975	3,373	1,653	49.0	3,454	1,697	49.1

Table 3. Urban residents as a percentage of people 15 to 19 and 20 to 24, selected years, 1960–1975 (numbers in thousands)

	15–19 years			*20–24 years*		
Year	*All people*	*Urban residents*	*Urban residents as percentage of total*	*All people*	*Urban residents*	*Urban residents as percentage of total*
1960	1,934	993	51.3%	2,209	1,162	52.6%
1965	3,024	1,434	47.4	1,913	1,068	55.8
1970	3,479	1,978	56.8	2,958	1,679	56.7
1975	3,373	1,694	50.2	3,454	2,215	64.1

Table 4. Projected size of the population 15 to 17 and 18 to 24, selected years, 1975–2000 (numbers in thousands)

	Number		*Index (1970 = 100)*		*Percentage of population aged 0 to 29*	
Year	*15–17*	*18–24*	*15–17*	*18–24*	*15–17*	*18–24*
1975	1,979	4,880	94.1	113.6	11.0%	27.3%
1980	1,604	4,515	76.3	105.1	9.0	25.4
1985	1,509	3,739	71.8	86.9	8.8	21.7
1990	1,680	3,560	79.9	82.9	10.4	22.1
2000	1,704	4,124	81.1	96.0	11.0	26.6

areas to urban centers. Over 70,000 youth migrated annually from rural areas to cities.

3. Structure by marital status. Over 99 percent of the boys and some 95 percent of the girls 15 to 19 are single. More than one-half of women and 25 percent of the men 20 to 24 get married. In 1966, the median age of marriage was 22 years for women and 25 years for men. By 1975, the age had fallen to 21 years for women and 24 years for men (the median age of marriage in rural areas being slightly higher). In 1975, 60 percent of the newlyweds were below 24 years of age.

The rate of births for women 15 to 24 has dropped over the past 15 years. In 1960, it was 93 per 1000 women; by 1970, it had dropped to 64; and by 1975 it had risen again to 71. The rate of births was higher in rural areas than in the urban ones.

4. Demographic forecasts. The number of 15- to 19-year-olds is expected to drop by 250,000 between 1975 and 1980, reflecting the sharp drop in birth rates since 1964. After 1980, the number of 18- to 24-year-olds is expected to drop drastically—by nearly a million between 1980 and 1985 (Table 4). Resumed growth in the number of 15- to 24-year-olds is projected between 1985 and 2000.

Summary. The 1960s were characterized by the highest increase in the number of 15- to 20-year-olds in the whole post-World-War II period. Since 1974, the number of secondary-school-age youth has been declining, and beginning in 1978, the number of university-age youth will begin to decrease.

In the years 1975–1980, young people below the age of 30 will have constituted 45 percent of the total population entering the labor force, and most of the young persons in age groups characterized by high birth rates will get married. These demographic conditions in 1975–1980 will favor implementation of the new school reform—introduction of 10-year compulsory education.

2

Education in Poland

Education Policy

The social role of education is to combine harmoniously the general welfare with the interests of individuals. The educational system plays an important role in stimulating social initiative and in preparing young people to participate in the economic, social, and cultural development of the country.

The education system established after World War II eliminated social inequalities by creating conditions for young people from various social classes to participate equally and fully in the socioeconomic life of the country. Utilization of young people's abilities in professional work–resulting from the policy of full and effective employment–led to satisfaction with work and a rise in the social and professional status of the younger generation.

The general elements of educational policy are:

- an adequately expanded and flexible network of schools to provide educational opportunities for all who want them;
- a school-system structure that creates conditions for everyone to be able to continue education to the highest level, implying the greatest possible democratization of the school system;
- adaptation of education to the needs of the national economy and culture in terms of quantity and quality; and
- constant modernization of curricula and teaching methods and construction of new schools to bring the educational sys-

tem up to date so that it corresponds with modern civilization and the changing structure of the economy, occupations, labor market, and individual needs

This education policy takes into consideration the internal problems of the school system and the external impact of the educational system as a whole. The external problems of education—such as employment prospects and qualifications of the labor force needed for the national economy—determine the internal tasks of the school system.

Several factors had an impact on education policies in the 1960s. We have mentioned the increase in the size of the secondary school age group. Another important factor was significant progress in the economic development of the country and progress in science, which created new demands for highly qualified manpower. In these circumstances, Poland was forced to expand its network of vocational schools and develop training opportunities within employment for youth entering the labor market.

The Educational System

The Polish educational system is based on four fundamental principles: (1) uniform education, (2) free education, (3) universal education, and (4) compulsory school attendance to a certain level. The uniform school system ensures that all schools at the same level have the same programs of instruction, curricula, and teaching methods. The uniform system eliminates dead ends from education and makes it possible for each individual completing any one type of education to go on to further education, thanks to the so-called ladder system. Free education at all levels is guaranteed to every citizen by the Polish constitution. There are no tuition fees, and an extensive system of financial aid for students has been created. The universal character of the school system means that all schools are open to everyone who wants to attend them, regardless of social or financial status. Compulsory school attendance requires every child to attend elementary school until the age of 15. From 1947 to 1967, seven years of compulsory schooling were required; this was increased to eight years in 1967 and will be further prolonged in 1980 to 10 years of compulsory schooling.

Figure 2 illustrates the changes in the various educational paths followed after leaving elementary education. The following trends are revealed:

1. Nearly 100 percent of elementary-school-age children attended compulsory school in 1960, but only 85 percent completed it; in 1974, the proportion of students completing compulsory education grew to 90 percent.

2. The percentage of elementary school leavers who continued education in secondary schools grew constantly from 1960 to 1974, from 78 percent to 94 percent.

3. The main trend in postelementary education was toward basic vocational schools; the percentage of elementary school leavers choosing this type of education grew from 30 percent in 1960 to 51 percent in 1970 and nearly 55 percent in 1974.

4. The percentage of persons choosing general secondary school dropped from 25 percent in 1960 to 18 percent in 1965 and was stable in the 1970s at around 20 percent.

Educational Opportunities after Compulsory Schooling

At the secondary level, the educational system comprises two basic types of education—general and vocational—both of which offer day and evening courses. An individual completing elementary education can continue education in

- four-year general secondary schools;
- four- or five-year vocational secondary schools, or
- two- or three-year basic vocational schools training skilled workers.

Those from general secondary and vocational secondary schools who pass the final graduation examination with sufficiently high marks after completing coursework are eligible for admission to all types of higher education schools. There are also postsecondary two-year schools that train general secondary school leavers for professional work.

Those who complete basic vocational school can continue education in

- three-year general secondary schools or
- three-year vocational secondary schools.

Figure 2. The rate of transition from elementary to secondary schools of various types, 1960 to 1975



Figure 3 illustrates the various pathways through postelementary education.

The Polish education system, built on the principle of democratization, not only permits every individual who completes a lower level of education to go on to further education, but also gives a chance to working people to continue education through the evening school system at all levels. Working people enjoy certain education benefits such as paid leave, time off, reimbursement of travel expenses, and so forth.

The number of students in all types of education increased between 1960 and 1975. Enrollment in general secondary schools nearly doubled and grew by 157 percent in vocational schools, while in institutions of higher education it increased 158 percent (Table 5 and Figure 4).

The greatest increase in the number of students in secondary and higher education occurred between 1960 and 1965. In 1960, some 1.3 million students were enrolled in postcompulsory education, and in 1974 more than 3 million students attended postcompulsory schools.

One should note the particularly intensive development of vocational schooling. Vocational schools have been the main trend in postcompulsory education since 1965. The curricula and organization of these schools have been adapted to the increasing demand for qualified manpower due to the economic growth of the country. The number of students enrolled in vocational schools grew from 784,000 in 1960 to more than 2 million in 1974.

In 1960, 60 percent of persons enrolled in postelementary education attended vocational schools (Table 6). By 1970, 69 percent of the students were enrolled in these schools. The advantages of vocational schools lie in the great flexibility of programs and organization, which makes it possible both to adapt certain courses to the specific needs of training and the backgrounds of various groups of young people and also to adjust them to the needs of industry. For example, some vocational schools have courses for handicapped persons; in 1973, more than 15,000 students attended special schools for deaf, blind, and crippled children.

Figure 3. The education system in Poland


Age 24
23
22
21
20
19
18
17
16
15
9 years of schooling
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Higher education
Post-secondary
General secondary
Vocational secondary
General secondary
Vocational secondary
Basic vocational
Compulsory school
△ entrance examination
● graduation examination

Table 5. Enrollment in secondary schools and in institutions of higher education, selected years, 1960–61 to 1974–75 (numbers in thousands)

	General secondary schools			*Vocational secondary schools*			*Institutions of higher education*		
Year	*Total number*	*Percentage change*	*Percentage in day courses*	*Total number*	*Percentage change*	*Percentage in day courses*	*Total number*	*Percentage change*	*Percentage in day courses*
1960–61	337.6		77.4	784.2		83.4	165.7		67.2
1965–66	557.2	65.0	76.8	1,671.0	113.1	82.8	251.8	52.0	60.5
1970–71	537.5	-3.5	74.8	1,710.7	2.4	82.5	330.8	31.4	63.5
1974–75	648.5	20.6	74.5	2,013.3	17.7	79.6	426.7	29.0	60.5
1960–61 to 1974–75		92.1			156.7			157.5	

Figure 4. Number of students in secondary and higher education, 1960–1975



Table 6. Percentages of students enrolled in various types of secondary schools and in institutions of higher education, selected years, 1960–61 to 1974–75

Year	*General secondary*	*Vocational schools*	*Higher education*
1960–61	26.2%	60.9%	12.9%
1965–66	22.4	67.4	10.2
1970–71	21.7	69.0	9.3
1974–75	21.0	65.2	13.8

The increase in the number of graduates from vocational schools was particularly pronounced in technical, agricultural, and economic occupations. The proportion of graduates in technical occupations grew from 56 percent of all graduates in 1960 to 68 percent in 1975 (Table 7). Some 15 percent of graduates came from secondary economics schools and some 10 percent from agricultural schools.

The domination of vocational schools in secondary education has caused some controversy in recent years, with objections raised to the inadequate number of enrollments in general secondary schools compared with vocational schools. While students in vocational schools are trained for work, it is also expected that a considerable proportion of them will take up further studies. Some 20 percent of all students in the first years of higher education are vocational school leavers. As indicated before, students from basic vocational schools can go on to further education in either vocational secondary or general secondary schools.

Vocational schools in Poland are highly differentiated in structure, which gives the elementary school leavers the chance of choosing the path of further education that they consider to be the best. There are some differences between male and female students in choosing types of postelementary education. Relatively more girls than boys are enrolled in general secondary schools than in vocational schools. In fact, female students constituted 61 percent of general secondary school attendance in 1960 and 72 percent in 1974 (Table 8). In vocational schools, female students constituted 40 percent of attendance in 1960 and 45 percent in 1974. In higher education

Table 7. Graduates of vocational schools, by field of study, selected years, 1960–61 to 1975–76

	1960–61		*1965–66*		*1970–71*		*1975–76*	
Field of study	*Number*	*Percentage*	*Number*	*Percentage*	*Number*	*Percentage*	*Number*	*Percentage*
Total	142.2	100	363.7	100	441.1	100	526.8	100
Technical	78.4	56	193.4	54	271.7	60	356.8	68
Agriculture	20.4	14	52.6	14	42.8	10	49.7	9
Economics	14.8	10	56.0	15	77.4	18	81.1	15
Education	17.7	12	37.7	10	23.2	5	19.6	4
Medical	5.0	4	9.7	3	11.3	3	17.2	3
Arts	2.7	2	2.9	1	3.6	1	4.4	1
Other	3.2	2	11.4	3	11.1	3	—	—

Table 8. Female students as a percentage of total students in secondary schools and in institutions of higher education, selected years, 1960–61 to 1974–75

Year	*General secondary*	*Vocational secondary schools*	*Institutions of higher education*
1960–61	61.4%	40.0%	34.7%
1965–66	68.4	42.4	37.5
1970–71	72.0	45.8	47.0
1974–75	72.0	45.0	52.0

institutions, the proportion of women among the students rose from 35 percent in 1960 to 52 percent in 1974. Thus female students predominated in both general secondary and university enrollment. Consequently, women's educational attainment in recent years has been higher than that of men.

In terms of numbers, enrollment of female students in general secondary school doubled between 1960 and 1975 and was nearly three times higher in vocational schools and four times higher in higher education in 1975 than in 1960 (Table 9). In 1960, the total number of female students in postelementary education was about 570,000; by 1975 it had grown to 1.6 million—that is, nearly threefold.

Distinctive changes have taken place in the educational pattern of female students. In the 1950s, the humanities and economic subjects predominated. In the past 15 years, the number of women studying technical subjects and pure science has grown steadily. In 1960, women constituted 11 percent of total graduates in technical subjects; in 1973 their number had increased to 22 percent (Table 10).

The large number of female students enrolled in certain disciplines has resulted in some professions being dominated by women. Female graduates in economics grew from 36 percent of all graduates in that field in 1960 to 63 percent in 1973; in social sciences the increase was from 54 percent to 75 percent; in medical studies from 60 to 71 percent; and in pure science from 50 to 62 percent. Some 70 percent of graduates in education were women.

Table 9. Enrollment of female students in secondary schools and in institutions of higher education, selected years, 1960–61 to 1975–76

Year	*General secondary schools*		*Vocational secondary schools*		*Institutions of higher education*	
	Number (in thousands)	*Percentage change*	*Number (in thousands)*	*Percentage change*	*Number (in thousands)*	*Percentage change*
1960–61	207.3		313.7		57.5	
1965–66	381.1	83.8	708.6	125.9	94.4	64.2
1970–71	386.9	1.5	784.0	10.6	139.8	48.1
1975–76	447.5	15.6	934.9	19.2	230.4	64.8
1960–61 to 1975–76		115.9		198.0		300.7

Table 10. Female graduates as a percentage of all graduates of institutions of higher education, by field of study, selected years, 1960–1975

Field of study	*1960*	*1965*	*1970*	*1973*
Total	36%	36%	43%	46%
Technical	11	13	21	22
Agriculture	30	29	42	44
Economics	36	32	52	63
Law	30	29	38	43
Social science	54	59	71	75
Pure science	50	57	59	62
Medicine	60	63	65	71
Education	n.a.	n.a.	75	68
Arts	43	48	50	46

As a consequence of the increasing number of females enrolled in all institutions of secondary and higher education in the past 15 years, the employment of women in the national economy has increased significantly, and they have become dominant in such professions as teaching, law, medicine, and economics.

The high professional qualifications of women (in some groups higher than those of men) and their professional ambition have played a role in explaining the rise in employment of women, from 36 percent of all employed workers in 1964 to 44 percent in 1975 (Table 11).

Table 11. Total employment and employment of women, selected years, 1964–1975

	Employment (in thousands)		
Year	*Total*	*Women*	*Women as percentage of total*
1964	7,137	2,553	35.8%
1968	8,528	3,258	38.2
1970	9,408	3,884	41.3
1972	10,260	4,404	43.0
1975	11,366	4,996	43.9

A very important role in expanding education is played by the educational system for working people. Schools for working people have been developed at all levels—elementary, basic vocational, secondary, and higher education. Working people have open access to professional and personal careers through evening and correspondence courses. The number of people enrolled in evening studies grew from 260,000 in 1960 to 794,000 in 1975. Enrollment in these programs in general secondary schools nearly doubled; in vocational schools it increased 3.5 times, and in higher education institutions it grew more than threefold (Table 12). In 1975, evening studies students constituted 24 percent of general secondary school enrollment, 22 percent of vocational school enrollment, and 39 percent of higher education enrollment.

Evening schools also play an important role in the education of youth. In 1960, some 37,000 young people 15 to 18 years old attended evening courses, while 110,000 19- to 24-year-olds were enrolled (Table 13). By 1975 nearly 500,000 youths 15 to 24 were enrolled in evening schools. For the age group 15 to 24 as a whole, the number attending evening courses was more than three times higher in 1975 than in 1960.

Evening school students have all the privileges of normal school students as well as some other benefits, such as additional paid holidays to prepare for examinations, the right to leave work earlier than usual, and free time for consultations.

The number of graduates from higher education institutions doubled in 1975 in comparison with 1960 (Figure 5). The higher education system underwent far-reaching transformations, adjusting the fields of study of graduates more closely to the demands of the national economy and culture. The proportion of graduates from technical universities dropped from 41 percent of all graduates in 1960 to 35 percent in 1975, although their number nearly doubled at the same time (Table 14). Pronounced changes also took place in the field of economics, in which the number of graduates grew by 322 percent and rose from 6 percent of all graduates in 1960 to 10 percent in 1975. The number of graduates from science and agriculture also doubled between 1960 and 1975.

Table 12. Enrollment of evening school students as a percentage of total enrollment in secondary schools and in institutions of higher education, selected years, 1960–61 to 1975–76
(numbers in thousands)

	General secondary schools			*Vocational secondary schools*			*Institutions of higher education*		
Year	*Number*	*Percentage of all students*	*Percentage change*	*Number*	*Percentage of all students*	*Percentage change*	*Number*	*Percentage of all students*	*Percentage change*
1960–61	76.1	22.5		129.9	16.5		54.4	32.8	
1965–66	129.3	23.2	69.9	287.0	17.2	120.9	99.5	39.5	82.9
1970–71	135.6	25.2	4.6	300.6	17.6	4.7	121.0	36.6	21.6
1975–76	150.0	24.1	10.6	459.2	22.3	52.8	185.0	39.5	52.9
1960–61 to 1975–76			97.4			253.5			240.0

Table 13. Evening school students 15 to 24, by age group, selected years, 1960–61 to 1975–76 (numbers in thousands)

	15 to 18 years						*19 to 24 years*	
Year	*Total number*	*Percentage change*	*15*	*16*	*17*	*18*	*Number*	*Percentage change*
1960–61	37.5		1.7	2.1	15.8	21.3	109.8	
1965–66	56.9	51.7	0.8	4.3	17.3	33.0	206.3	88.7
1970–71	110.9	94.9	8.1	18.6	31.0	53.2	265.8	28.8
1975–76	128.2	15.6	5.5	13.7	32.5	76.5	359.0	35.0
1960–61 to 1975–76		241.9						226.9

Figure 5. Graduates from secondary and higher education, 1960 to 1975



Table 14. Graduates from day studies in institutions of higher education, by field of study, selected years, 1960–61 to 1975–76 (numbers in thousands)

Field of study	*1960–61*		*1965–66*		*1970–71*		*1975–76*	
	Number	*Percentage*	*Number*	*Percentage*	*Number*	*Percentage*	*Number*	*Percentage*
Total	16.0	100	16.5	100	28.4	100	37.0	100
Technical	6.6	41	4.6	28	10.1	36	12.6	35
Agriculture	1.2	8	1.4	9	2.3	8	2.5	7
Economics	0.9	6	1.0	6	2.6	9	3.8	10
Law	0.4	3	0.8	5	1.2	4	2.0	5
Social science	1.0	6	2.0	12	3.3	11	3.1	8
Science	1.3	8	1.9	11	3.3	12	2.9	8
Medical	3.1	19	3.1	19	3.8	13	3.5	9
Arts	0.5	3	0.6	4	0.8	3	0.9	2
Other	1.0	6	1.1	6	1.0	4	5.7	16

As a result of the growing number of students and graduates from secondary schools, the level of education of the generation born between 1945 and 1953 was much higher than that of the previous generation. The proportion completing elementary education rose from 83 percent of those born in 1945 to approximately 90 percent of those born in subsequent years. The percentages completing higher levels of education rose steadily for each successive year of birth, as Table 15 indicates.

Table 15. Educational attainment of persons born from 1945 to 1953, by year of birth

	Percentage of persons who completed			
Year of birth	*Elementary education*	*Basic Vocational education*	*Secondary education*	*Higher education*
1945	82.7	27.7	20.3	5.3
1946	88.4	30.7	23.3	5.9
1947	90.4	32.3	25.3	6.1
1948	92.9	33.2	26.0	7.5
1949	94.5	37.0	27.7	8.0
1950	90.5	47.4	27.0	*
1951	88.7	48.7	*	*
1952	86.3	50.1	*	*
1953	89.7	*	*	*

*Reliable completion data not yet available on these cohorts.

Dropouts from Secondary Schools

Not all of those who begin secondary education complete it. Some pupils repeat a class, and some drop out altogether. Among basic vocational school pupils, 2.3 percent repeat class annually. The figures for secondary vocational school pupils, general secondary school pupils, and postsecondary school pupils are 6 percent, 4 percent and 1.5 percent, respectively. Some 10 percent of all pupils drop out at some time during the school year for various reasons.

Research carried out by Reszke* among youth enrolled in school reveals several factors related to dropping out:

- recruitment methods and selection of candidates for certain types of schools and the information and guidance system
- socioeconomic status of the students' families
- attractiveness of the trade
- competition with other schools and on-the-job training

Students who drop out of school either leave school without undertaking any further education, change schools, or return to the same school after some time. The reasons for changing schools differ from those for giving up studies. Many students do not have sufficient information about the occupations taught when they make their choice of a school. One-fifth of students from vocational secondary and one-third of those from basic vocational schools were unaware of the vocational guidance service, while one-fourth had never heard of the information published on the occupations taught. Some 40 percent of students took advice from the vocational guidance service and information from published papers. Those who had less information about their studies were likely to give up or change schools more frequently than others.

Annual dropping out was higher in basic vocational schools (9 percent) than in secondary vocational (5 percent) or general secondary (4 percent). Moreover, the percentage of dropouts who did not undertake any further education was higher in basic vocational schools (about 45 percent) than in vocational secondary schools (28 percent).

Those who left school before completing studies were backward at school and had worse marks and more unjustified absences than others. Although failure in school work was most frequently quoted as a reason for dropping out, other factors—such as willingness to continue studies in another school or to take up work—affected many students' decisions.

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*I. Reszke, *Społeczne uwarunkowania wyboru szkoły zawodowej i odpływu uczniów ze szkoły* (*The Impact of Social Condition on the Choice of Vocational Schooling and on Dropping Out of Students*) (Wroclaw: Ossolineum, 1972).

Dropping out was more frequent among students from peasant families and unskilled-worker families than among students from other social groups. More students from families with lower economic status, whose parents were of a lower educational level, were likely to drop out. More dropping out also occurred among students from rural areas, particularly among those who had to commute to school from a long distance. Reasons for dropping out (in order of relative frequency) were:

- failure in school work
- lack of interest in the trade being taught (wrong choice of trade)
- willingness to go to work (have own money)
- burdensome travel to school
- necessity to work for family reasons (help on farms, earning money)

To lower the drop-out rate, educators must improve the possibilities for better choice of occupation (improve information and guidance services), change the network of schools (increase schools in rural areas), and build more boarding schools in urban areas.

Educational Programs Outside the School System

The increased public demand for self-educational development and the increasing need for skills and adaptability in employment in the past 15 years have stimulated the development of many organized forms of supplemental knowledge and training outside the school system.

Various forms of vocational training for youth beginning work have been particularly well developed in industrial enterprises: apprenticeship and on-the-job training as well as various kinds of professional courses designed to improve qualifications already attained or to encourage the acquisition of new qualifications currently in demand. Many enterprises offer regular training courses for improving qualifications or qualifying for a new job, and they play an important role in forming a positive attitude toward work.

There also exist numerous training courses outside of employment. A particular form of youth training is exemplified by the increasingly popular Voluntary Labor Corps. These are youth camps organized for a specified period of time during which young people live and work together, acquiring occupational qualifications while helping in industry or erecting new plants. On finishing the corps, young people can take a qualifying examination that will entitle them to work in the occupation for which they were trained.

Military service as an educational institution. Another form of occupational training outside school is that received by young males in compulsory military service. The compulsory two-year period of military service becomes an educational experience for a considerable number of young men from 19 to 23 years of age. As well as acquiring skills concerning the defense of the country, the recruits have a chance to attain several other qualifications during their service.

Military service is a significant link in the education system, preparing young men from different environments for their future occupations. The army even has a monopoly in training for certain modern occupations and, as a matter of fact, a considerable part of the army budget is used for its education program. About 90 percent of the soldiers who have not finished elementary education complete this during their military service; for example, in 1966–1972 about 53,000 soldiers took part in courses to complete their elementary education.

The army assigns considerable funds for special training of youth in selected occupations that are needed in the national economy. During their service in the army, soldiers may become certified as drivers, car mechanics, machine and heavy-equipment operators, or in building industry as brick layers, smiths, carpenters, welders, milling cutters, turners, grinders, and so forth. In this way the army provides general training in over 20 occupations.

In the 1960s and 1970s, the military education programs were broadened to a great extent in certain fields as a result of the general rise in economic and technical standards. Hundreds of thousands of soldiers acquired skills supporting the national economy in the following fields:

- 50 percent as car and tractor drivers, operators, fitters, and motor mechanics
- 25 percent as skilled workers in telecommunication, electrical work, and so on
- 15 percent in such skilled occupations as bridge and road construction, railway services, or building
- 5 percent as quartermasters (cooks, waiters, storekeepers, medical assistants, and so on)

During service in particular units, various supplementary courses are organized, depending on the interests of particular groups. For example, for the rural recruits there are courses on mechanization and the use of chemicals in agriculture or on methods of vegetable growing and cattle breeding.

Recruits from different social backgrounds and regions of the country, differing in standards of culture and development, not only receive training in defense and occupational qualifications but also benefit from comradeship, solidarity, social and cultural interests, and the like. These socialization experiences are an advantage when they return to their communities. The educational role of the army is just as important in its social benefits as in its military training.

Besides educating recruits during their two-year service, the army also has education institutions for its own purposes. Special army schools on a higher level give professional training for posts within the army.

The role of radio and television. Over the past few years, radio and television have increased their share in the system of national education. The second TV channel, established in 1970, devotes over 80 percent of its broadcasting time to education. TV and radio have regular programs for teachers (Radio-TV University for Teachers), for engineers (TV Polytechnics), for farmers (Secondary Agricultural School), and for working people (General Secondary School Program for Working People).

Radio and television educational programs function in cooperation with other education institutions and play an important role in developing valuable educational programs for the young. The development of such a great number of educational programs outside the regular school system gives all people the opportunity to acquire necessary or desired qualifications and education in accordance with their own interests.

Government Expenditure on Education

Between 1960 and 1973, government expenditure on secondary and higher education grew by 78 percent. This increase resulted from the need to extend the network of secondary schools in the 1960s in order to provide places for the oncoming baby-boom generation. The largest funds were allocated to the development of vocational schools between 1960 and 1965, when expenditures increased threefold, and to the development of higher education between 1960 and 1973, when investment increased almost six times (Table 16).

Annual expenditure from the state budget was two times higher in 1973 than in 1965, growing from 20.2 million to 40.9 million zlotys (Table 17). The largest sums were allocated to secondary education, although the sharpest increase in expenditure over the period occurred in higher education. The 1973 expenditure was almost 2.5 times higher than that of 1965. Expenditure on other types of schools nearly doubled in 1973 in comparison with 1965.

The number of youths receiving student aid from the government also increased. In 1960–61, about 780,000 students

Table 16. Government expenditures on investment in secondary and higher education (capital expenditures), selected years, 1960 to 1973 (amounts in millions of zlotys)

	Amounts				*Percentage change*			
Year	*Total*	*Secondary*	*Vocational*	*Higher*	*Total*	*Secondary*	*Vocational*	*Higher*
1960	3,898	2,742	601	386				
1965	5,564	2,919	1,685	750	42.7	6.4	180.2	94.0
1970	6,015	1,956	2,146	1,596	8.1	-33.1	27.4	112.9
1973	6,937	1,751	2,184	2,414	15.3	-10.5	1.8	51.3
1960–1973					78.0	-36.1	263.2	525.1

Table 17. Government expenditures on secondary and higher education (operating expenditures), selected years, 1965 to 1973 (amounts in millions of zlotys)

	Amounts				*Percentage change*			
Year	*Total*	*Secondary*	*Vocational*	*Higher*	*Total*	*Secondary*	*Vocational*	*Higher*
1965	20,187	11,840	5,117	3,230				
1970	28,506	16,753	6,630	5,123	41.2	41.5	29.6	58.6
1973	40,876	23,633	9,260	7,983	43.4	41.0	39.7	55.8
1965–1973					102.5	99.6	80.9	147.1

of general secondary schools, vocational schools, and higher education institutions benefited from this aid, while by 1975–76 their number had grown to 1.5 million (Table 18). Financial aid in the form of various scholarships was received in 1960–61 by nearly 9 percent of general secondary school students, 34 percent of vocational school students, and 54 percent of higher education students.

Due to the fact that the number of secondary and higher education students nearly doubled between 1960 and 1975, the percentages of students benefiting from government aid increased only slightly, and in the case of higher education students it even dropped. In 1975–76, government financial aid was received by about 10 percent of general secondary school youth, 32.5 percent of vocational school youth, and 46.5 percent of higher education students. At the same time, 7 percent of secondary school youth, 17 percent of vocational school youth, and 42 percent of higher education students lived in state boarding schools either free of charge or at reduced fees.

The annual cost of educating one student in higher education is about 25,000 zlotys, while expenditure on educating one secondary school pupil ranges between 3,000 and 8,000 zlotys, depending on the field and duration of study. To provide opportunitites in secondary and higher education for several million young people in the years 1960 to 1975, the government used about 5 percent of the GNP yearly.

Table 18. Number and percentage of students in secondary schools and institutions of higher education receiving student aid, selected years, 1960–61 to 1975–76 (numbers in thousands)

				Percentage of all students					
	Number of aid recipients			*Scholarship recipients*			*Recipients of boarding school aid*		
Year	*General secondary schools*	*Vocational schools*	*Institutions of higher education*	*General secondary schools*	*Vocational schools*	*Institutions of higher education*	*General secondary schools*	*Vocational schools*	*Institutions of higher education*
1960–61	250.7	477.4	59.4	8.8	34.6	53.7			
1965–66	417.3	905.1	72.4	6.8	30.0	48.0	8.2	16.0	43.9
1970–71	401.3	936.7	89.5	7.4	28.1	43.2	8.3	16.5	42.2
1975–76	471.6	998.2	130.6	10.2	32.4	46.5	7.0	17.2	42.0

Higher education students are not allowed to enter paid employment. They can hold part-time jobs in student cooperatives if granted permission by the authorities of higher education institutions. About 20 percent of students had part-time jobs in such cooperatives in 1975.

Access to Secondary and Higher Education

For many years after World War II, admission to higher education was limited by the inadequacies of secondary education. The steep rise in the number of students completing secondary education between 1960 and 1975 was more marked in vocational secondary education than in general secondary education. In fact, the number of graduates of vocational schools grew from 142,000 in 1960 to 527,000 in 1975. Enrollment in general secondary schools nearly doubled by 1974 in comparison with 1960 and was 2.5 times higher in vocational schools (Table 5).

The increase in secondary education enrollment was due to the following factors:

- a higher percentage of people completing compulsory schooling
- an increase in the rate of transition from compulsory to secondary schools
- an increase in the population of 15- to 18-year olds

The number of people enrolled in secondary and higher education grew faster than the population of that age group. The percentage of people continuing education in the 15-to-18 age group grew from 65 percent in 1960 to 78 percent in 1974 (see Figure 6).

The increase in the number of people receiving secondary school-leaving certificates based on the graduation examination qualifying for higher education caused a sharp rise in the number of candidates for higher education. But the increased output from secondary education was not matched by a corresponding increase in the intake capacity of the institutions of higher education: only 40 percent of the applicants were able to enter higher education between 1960 and 1975 (half of the applicants did not pass the entrance examinations). Even so, in the past 15

Figure 6. The percentage of 15- to 24-years-olds enrolled in school, 1960 to 1975



years there has been an unprecedented growth in the number of higher education students, as we saw earlier (Table 5).

Democratization of education is a long process, starting as early as primary schooling. The very high attendance ratio in the 1970s (nearly 100 percent in the compulsory education age group) shows that full democratization has already been achieved at the compulsory level. In addition, great progress has been made in democratization of secondary education in the past 15 years. It is expected that by introducing 10 years of compulsory schooling by 1980, the process of democratization on the secondary level will have been completed.

The increase in numbers of those attending secondary school is directly connected with:

- geographic distribution of secondary schools
- students' and parents' attitudes toward education
- socioeconomic development of the country—employment opportunities, work prospects, and so on.

The geographic distribution of secondary schools is unsatisfactory, particularly in rural areas inhabited by more than 50 percent of the 15- to 19-year-olds. More than 50 percent of vocational school students have to commute from villages to the nearest towns to attend postelementary schools. In many cases, this is the main reason for dropping out of school. The state provides boarding schools and financial aid for many students to make the higher stages of education accessible to peasant youth, but the number of places in these boarding schools is still insufficient, preventing many young people from continuing their education or forcing them to commute from long distances.

Rural youth are also disadvantaged by the standard of schooling, which is usually lower outside cities. In order to increase the flow of peasant youth into higher education institutions, the educational authorities decided in 1970 to create well-staffed schools in the country with a greater number of students and better-educated teachers. This measure will bring the standard of education in rural areas considerably closer to that in the urban ones and make access to secondary and higher education much easier for youth from rural areas.

The aspirations of youth and the attitudes of parents toward the education of children have been changing over the past 15 years. More and more youth want to take up further studies. Many surveys have revealed that parents are willing to do their best to help their children achieve higher levels of education. Most parents desire their children to acquire a level of education at least one step higher than their own. One-third of parents with elementary education want their children to go through higher education institutions.

The dynamic socioeconomic development of Poland in recent years has created a great demand for people with secondary and higher education attainments. The number of jobs awaiting secondary and higher school graduates has exceeded the number of school leavers, and this situation has been an additional incentive for youth to acquire a higher level of education.

In evaluating the democratization of education, one usually examines (1) the student population from the viewpoint of social background and (2) changes in the pattern of participation that have occurred over the years in favor of those social classes which had been poorly represented in previous years. Table 19 shows the changes in participation of students from working-class and peasant families in various schools between 1960 and 1975. Positive changes in access to all levels of education are most marked in the case of working-class children. The participation of working-class students in all schools was much higher in the 1970s than in the 1960s:

- from 24 percent in 1960 to 36 percent in 1974 in general secondary schools
- from 33 percent in 1960 to 51 percent in 1974 in vocational schools
- from 25 percent in 1960 to 30 percent in 1974 in higher education institutions.

Changes in the participation in secondary and higher education of students from intelligentsia have been slow.

The proportion of peasant children entering secondary and higher education was smaller than that of working-class children and was on decline between 1960 and 1974—partly explained

Table 19. Social origins of students enrolled in secondary and higher education, 1960–61 to 1974–75

Type of school and year	*Social status of parents*				
	Total students	*Workers*	*Peasants*	*Intelligentsia*	*Other*
General secondary schools					
1960–61	100.0%	23.9%	19.4%	41.9%	14.8%
1965–66	100.0	27.2	18.0	43.2	11.6
1970–71	100.0	33.1	15.7	45.2	6.0
1974–75	100.0	36.2	13.4	46.2	4.2
Vocational schools					
1960–61	100.0	33.0	27.9	26.8	12.3
1965–66	100.0	37.6	23.7	28.7	10.0
1970–71	100.0	45.1	21.0	28.0	5.9
1974–75	100.0	51.0	19.7	25.0	4.3
Higher education					
1960–61	100.0	24.6	18.7	44.8	5.2
1965–66	100.0	27.2	17.0	50.4	5.4
1970–71	100.0	29.9	15.5	50.3	4.3
1974–75	100.0	30.1	13.9	52.3	3.7

by a decline in the relative size of the peasant population. The decrease for particular types of schools was as follows:

- from 19 percent in 1960 to 13 percent in 1974 in general secondary education
- from 28 percent in 1960 to 20 percent in 1974 in vocational schools
- from 19 percent in 1960 to 14 percent in 1974 in higher education institutions.

The highest proportion of working-class and peasant youth was in vocational schools—61 percent of total enrollment in 1960 and 71 percent in 1974. Working-class and peasant youth constituted nearly 50 percent of general secondary school students and 44 percent of higher education students in 1974.

The process of democratization needs further development, especially with regard to peasant youth's share in education. Recently, a number of actions have been taken to increase participation of peasant youth in secondary and higher education in the near future. One of them, as we have seen, is the creation of well-staffed schools in rural areas to bring the standard of education there closer to that of the urban areas. Peasant youth candidates have been given some preference in admission to higher levels of education.

Evaluation and Proposals

At the beginning of the 1970s, the government established the Experts' Committee for the Development of a Report on the State of Education in Poland. The committee made a detailed analysis of the present education system and suggested some guidelines for change. Surveys carried out by the committee revealed a number of faults in the education system that hamper implementation of current and future educational goals; the following faults were stressed.

1. unequal opportunities for children and youth from different social backgrounds (particularly for rural youth)
2. an insufficient number and low standards of vocational-guidance and school-orientation institutions
3. too early and haphazard choice of postcompulsory vocational education
4. uneven distribution of postelementary schools, which makes it difficult for rural youth to attend because of long distances and insufficient numbers of boarding schools in the cities
5. different standards of schools—rural schools being worse equipped and staffed than those in the cities
6. high dropout rates in schools, as well as overburdening of pupils with school programs which makes coaching necessary—only 70 percent of secondary school youth finish school in the normal length of time
7. a high percentage of youth who finish education after basic vocational school without undertaking further schooling
8. the low level of education of rural youth employed in agriculture, due to the low standards of agricultural schools

Particular attention has been paid to the problem of proper choice of school, education, and occupation of young people. The present system of youth enrollment and guidance through the school system causes dissatisfaction among parents and often leads to a haphazard choice of school and occupation that is not in accord with young people's abilities and interests. Needless to say, such decisions are costly both in social and individual terms.

It is a great disadvantage of the present school system that some forms of education are relatively unavailable to some groups of youth and that it is difficult to change school when a teenager's choice has proved discordant with interests and abilities. The school system has little effectiveness from a social and pedagogical point of view—that is, the knowledge conveyed through teaching programs is not always adjusted to the constantly changing conditions of economic and social life. Methods of teaching, school equipment, and educational standards of the teaching staff have also been criticized. As a result, a significant number of teachers are now required to complete higher levels of education.

The report on the state of education also criticized general secondary schools, arguing that they prepare students for higher education institutions only, without providing any qualifications that would enable pupils to enter employment on graduation; they are attended mainly by children of the intelligentsia and are situated chiefly in cities. The report suggests that the schools be reformed and included in the system of the 11-year comprehensive schools.

The present system of vocational education, which is the main source of qualified workers and intermediate technological staff, has also attracted several criticisms, among them:

- inadequacy of teaching programs to the current and future economic needs
- little practical training in industrial enterprises
- inadequate enrollment for some schools, the choice of school being haphazard in the case of many youth
- uneven distribution of schools
- overspecialization

Vocational schools have proved to be too time consuming and too expensive, considering their relatively small effectiveness with regard to the graduates' skills.

Higher education institutions have been constantly reorganized over the past few years. Despite the constant changes, however, little improvement has been noted in the quality of the graduates' knowledge. The demand for qualified staff in particular specializations has not been fully satisfied: there have been some discrepancies between the planned demand for qualified staff and the actual number of graduates (surpluses in some specializations and shortages in others).

Detailed analyses of the present education system have revealed many shortcomings and needed changes. The proposed changes put particular emphasis on a closer link between schools and other educational institutions in a given region as well as on the need for extension of the outside-school system of continuous education. The school system is to be linked directly with industrial enterprises, which will take over part of the practical occupational training of youth, and is to be based on the following principles:

- compulsory and universal education until the age of 18
- a system of schooling accessible to all
- an adjustable curriculum
- extensive education
- continuous education

To implement the above principles, the Experts' Committee suggested various changes in secondary education. The optimum solution is introduction of an 11-year compulsory comprehensive school for all children and youth 6 to 18 years old. The new system would make a higher level of education equally accessible for children and youth from all social backgrounds–including those with low levels of education–by way of uniform education and up-bringing, initially from the age of six and later even from the age of five or four. At the same time, it would give an equal chance to all 18-year-olds in making decisions as to their future–that is, whether to undertake work, further occupational education, or education in institutions of higher education.

The program of compulsory comprehensive school would include, apart from the basis of general education, some occupational training (the 9th to 11th forms). A varied program of extracurricular activities would be introduced in the 4th to 8th forms and would be suited to the individual abilities and interests of the children. That would help youth become aware of the general line of their further education and choose the right occupation, while occupational training courses would be organized for youth dropping out of school before the age of 18 to enable them to take up employment.

The new model of school would create better conditions for the pupils' development and decision making as to their future careers, while the knowledge attained by the graduates would facilitate their adaptation to constantly changing social requirements.

3

Employment Policies and Practices

Goals and Instruments of Employment Policy

In the years 1960 to 1970, Polish employment policy had to tackle a very difficult problem. That was the period during which the baby-boom generation was entering the labor force, and the rate of increase in the number of new entrants to the labor market was as follows:

- between 1960 and 1965, 1 million
- between 1966 and 1970, 1.7 million
- between 1971 and 1975, 1.9 million

Employment policy had to adjust to the demographic situation while remaining in close connection with educational policy. There was the problm of directing the baby-boom generation into various types of schools, thus easing pressure on the labor market, as well as of creating conditions for young people to acquire the qualifications that were in demand.

The characteristic feature of employment policy in the years 1960 to 1975 was the development and implementation of employment programs to cater to the increased labor force in accordance with the current and future goals of the economic development of the country. These goals were the full utilization of youthful manpower, effective employment, and constant improvement of the professional qualifications of workers.

Full utilization of manpower means a balance between manpower resources and their absorption by the national economy. Actual manpower—that is, the number of workers and jobseekers—is determined by demographic processes, employment, age, and socioeconomic factors. Of particular importance among socioeconomic factors are investments, wages, respect for labor, professional prestige, development of the education system, improvement of the educational level of the society, development of health service and child-care systems, prolongation of school age or shortening of retirement age, and so forth. Consequently, these factors shape a specific model of occupational activity of the society (the number of economically active people in each age group in relation to the total population). Possibilities of employment are in turn determined by social, technical, and economic factors of the developing economy, including:

- an increase in jobs due to the development of new plants and expansion or modernization of existing ones
- the need to replace manpower losses due to natural causes—deaths, crippling, retirement
- the need to replace manpower losses caused by other factors, such as recruitment for military service, staff mobility, and temporary absence (maternity leaves, sick leaves, and so on)

In planning employment policy, government institutions determine manpower resources, the number of economically active persons, and the number of new entrants to the labor force. Then, according to the birth rate in particular years, they prepare a sufficient number of new jobs. In this way, continuous adjustments can be made in employment to achieve a balance between manpower resources and the opportunities for their utilization in the economy.

In addition to attempting to achieve full employment, emphasis is put on effective employment of manpower—that is, (1) distribution of manpower in accordance with the needs of the national economy and (2) full utilization of the educational attainments and professional qualifications of employees. The policy of effective employment, while granting free choice of occupation and place of work, must at the same time ensure optimum distribution of employees among particular sectors and regions of the economy (in keeping with predetermined national programs for socioeconomic development of the country) and optimum intensification of work processes. Implementation of the principle of full utilization of occupational qualifications is often difficult because it depends (1) on preparing young people to take up their first job, (2) on the process of their social and occupational adaptation, and (3) on maintaining the correspondence between the occupation young people have been trained for and the occupation they actually work in.

The third goal of employment policy is constantly to improve the qualifications of the working people so that the technical qualifications of employees match the technological development of enterprises. Technological innovations require changes in the occupational structure of employees. Adjustment of qualifications to the demand for specialists in specific fields is often carried out by means of occupational training programs within industrial enterprises. Occupational training policy takes into account both the needs of the enterprise and the interests and abilities of the employees.

Implementation of employment policy goals depends on effective methods of adjusting labor-force supply to demand. The essential problem is to avoid actions that might lead to over- or underemployment and to adopt those that secure a balance between labor-force supply and demand in quantitative and qualitative terms. The following instruments, elaborated below, are used to achieve these employment policy goals.

- manpower balance
- employment planning
- vocational guidance
- labor exchange
- wage policy
- staff policy

Manpower balance consists of information on changes in manpower resources in the whole country: in particular administrative regions, in particular occupations, in the educational levels of the population, in the number of new entrants to the labor market, in the number of women employees, and so on. It includes information on numbers, distribution, and utilization of the available manpower. Specific manpower-balance information for young people includes:

- the size and structure of the 15-to-17 and 18-to-24 age groups by sex and place of residence
- the number of in-school youth
- youth migration (particularly from rural areas to cities)
- the number of youth remaining on farms
- the number of working youth and their types of employment
- the number of youth out of school and out of work

Information on in-school youth and their fields of study makes possible forecasts of the number of graduates and of future jobs for them as well as of the distribution of youth among particular branches of the economy, regions, occupations, and so forth.

Employment planning is another instrument of employment policy. The first step in employment planning with regard to youth is to determine the number of youth entering employment on the basis of demographic forecasts. The next step is to assess the demand for graduates with particular types of education in specific branches of the economy and administrative regions resulting from the development of industry and services and different growth rates of investments. A final step is to determine the desirable distribution of young people's qualifications by occupation. Consideration must be given to changes over time in occupational categories and in the hierarchy of particular occupations.

Vocational guidance, which has been developing in Poland since 1956, is an instrument of controlling manpower that affects job orientation, young people's choices among the available types of education, and the occupations most advantageous from the point of view of the current needs of the economy. It consists mainly in providing youth with information about educational and employment systems and is therefore a means of affecting the labor market. The aim of vocational guidance is to help individuals choose a school and an occupation by assessing their abilities and informing them of various opportunities of education and employment.

The actions included under vocational guidance cover both advising and instruction. Advising functions include:

- occupational preorientation—that is, informing parents and youth about the problems connected with choices of jobs
- direct advice to young people on the choice of an occupation
- preparation of students for the proper choice of an occupation in accordance with individual interests and the needs of the national economy
- assessment of an individual's suitability for the occupation by means of psychological tests
- advertising certain occupations through mass media

The goal of the vocational guidance institutions' broad program of instruction is to:

- make young people aware of the social utility of every job and of the equal prestige of all occupations
- inform youth about various branches of the national and regional economy
- provide information on types of schools, occupations, specializations, and opportunities for education on higher levels
- point out advantages and disadvantages of working in some occupations
- inform young people what abilities and characteristics are needed in particular occupations and make them aware that everyone can find a suitable job
- let youth know about changes in the structure of occupations—disappearance of some occupations and emergence of new ones
- suggest the choice of occupations particularly important for the national economy
- inform youth about labor-market situations locally and elsewhere (in rural areas and in cities)

The number of vocational guidance institutions has been constantly growing, increasing from 301 in 1970 to 800 in 1975.

Labor exchange is a way for some youth to find their first job. The labor-exchange system is a means to ensure a constant influx of work candidates to the national economy and to direct the candidates into particular regions and industrial enterprises. The goals of the labor exchange are to:

- direct graduates to preliminary training
- inform job seekers about vacancies in their place of residence or elsewhere
- explain and advise on opportunities of getting a job or of training for one
- assess qualifications of candidates for work
- give preference (in case of two candidates with equal qualifications) to soldiers' wives, sole breadwinners, youth from families with social or financial problems, members of large families, and so on
- organize recruitment of work candidates from outside a particular administrative region
- organize "clearing"–that is, the transfer of people with needed qualifications to other regions where opportunities for employment exist

Wage policy can implement some goals of the employment policy. The level of real wages determines the level of satisfying material and cultural needs of workers and their families. As a result, wages and their differentials (interprofessional, interregional, and so on) affect both the numbers of employed and their disposition. The absolute level of wages and the possibility of satisfying consumption needs affect directly the supply of labor, while conscious regulation of wage differentials affects labor-force distribution according to the structure of demand. Wage differentials are material factors that determine the popularity of particular occupations in the society, putting pressure on well-paid jobs and necessitating regulation of candidates to be trained for them. Regulation of differentials enables the government to control workers' mobility and changes in the employment structure without violating the principle of free choice of work. The determination of wage differentials should be based on the principle of distribution by type of work and according to the needs of the economy as well as the current economic situation. The current needs of the economy and labor market may favor deliberate wage-differentiation policy.

This in turn will cause youth to learn and take up occupations in short supply.

Staff policy implements employment policy goals within a particular enterprise. The main objective of staff policy is to organize recruitment for particular positions and to maintain the optimum employment structure. There are two spheres of activity in organizing recruitment: (1) assessment of actual needs for staff and development of recruitment methods in cooperation with educational institutions, labor-exchange institutions, and so on and (2) formal and legal activities connected with testing the candidates' educational and psychophysical suitability for the job.

Particular tasks of proper recruitment and distribution of staff lie in managing the process of social and occupational adaptation of youth, which contributes to an increase in satisfaction with work stability of personnel. Proper staff policy of the enterprise should encourage workers constantly to improve their qualifications and skills and also to acquire new specializations. Organization of various forms of training is of particular importance in the following cases:

- employment of new workers
- introduction of technological and organizational changes
- opening new production lines
- change of occupation or kind of work
- training practice for pupils (of vocational schools)
- training period for graduates from various types of schools

Stimulating development of young people's qualifications through appropriate staff policy should result in an increased intensity of work, a growth of initiative, a higher degree of integration of employees with their work, an interest in and satisfaction with the job, and an active attitude toward work.

Placement of Youth in Employment

Young people 15 to 24 can be at school, combine school with work, take up work on reaching 18 years of age, be dependent on their parents, or seek a job. The age of taking up work is a function of economic, social, and cultural factors. It depends mainly on legislation, educational development, and living standards. Young people can be included in employment by both general economic policies and those pertaining specifically to youth. Such policies should lead to:

1. maintaining a balance between the spatial distribution of jobs for young people and youth resources
2. proper utilization of young people's qualifications
3. adjustment of production means to the physical and psychological characteristics of youth
4. achievement of individual aspirations of young people connected with the process of work

Employment of 15- to 17-year-olds. The majority of 15- to 17-year-olds continue education in various postelementary schools (65 percent in 1960 and 73.8 percent in 1975). Those 15- to 18-year-olds who take up work, however, are a special group of employees under legal protection (the Child Protection Law). The 1958 employment act allows teenage employment in order to (1) train teenagers for a particular type of work, (2) train them for an occupation, (3) prepare them for an occupation (apprenticeship), or (4) use them in light seasonal or temporary work.

Training for a particular type of work lasts from three months to one year and is used in cases in which the type of work does not require completion of an occupational training course. Training for an occupation lasts from two to four years and ends with a qualifying examination. Completion of training for a particular type of work or of an occupational training course enables a teenager to be employed as an apprentice for an occupation. Such apprenticeship lasts for a period of two months to two years.

Teenagers who have signed a contract with an enterprise to train for an occupation are called "pupils." Pupils in an enterprise are trained individually or in groups, regardless of whether they attend vocational schools for working people or take part in the training organized within the enterprise. In 1960, 111,000 pupils were employed; in 1965 their number increased to 368,000; in 1970 it was 429,000; and in 1975 it grew to 607,000 (Table 20).

Table 20. Number of young persons receiving on-the-job training, by major industry group, 1960–1975[a] (numbers in thousands)

Year	*Total*	*Manufacturing*	*Construction*	*Agriculture*	*Transport and communications*	*Commerce*	*Housing and utilities*
1960	111.9	81.2	9.0	0.6	2.5	11.6	1.1
1965	368.7	242.8	42.5	8.2	19.4	37.3	5.0
1970	429.4	273.4	68.3	9.4	28.9	27.5	7.4
1975	606.7	314.8	115.6	14.9	52.1	84.9	10.6
Percentage change							
1960–1965	229.5%	199.0%	372.2%	1,266.7%	676.0%	221.6%	354.5%
1965–1970	16.5	12.6	60.7	14.6	49.0	-26.3	48.0
1970–1975	41.3	15.1	69.3	58.5	80.3	208.7	43.2
1960–1975	442.2	287.6	1,184.4	2,383.3	1,984.0	631.9	863.6

[a] Includes persons 15 to 18 as well as some persons over 18 who signed training contracts prior to coming of age and continue training on the contract terms.

Youth 15 to 18 may also be employed in light seasonal and temporary jobs that do not require qualifications. A list of such jobs is issued by the Minister of Education and the Central Council of the Trade Unions.

An important problem of employment policy is to stimulate occupational activity for those youth out of school and out of work. In order to do this, various measures are used to encourage those teenagers to learn an occupation through work, including spreading information through elementary schools, mass media (radio, TV, and youth press), contracts with industrial enterprises, and activities of youth organizations.

Youth organizations arrange Voluntary Labor Corps, which teach occupations and are particularly important in supplementing employment in unremunerative branches of the economy and in urgent work (harvests or the building industry, for example). In 1966, 186 corps were organized, with 6,500 young participants; in 1968, 20,000 young people took part in them; and in the 1970s some 30,000 participated yearly. Between 1970 and 1975, about 162,000 jobs were created at different times for youth out of school and out of work within Voluntary Labor Corps to enable them to acquire occupations.

Employment of 18- to 24-year-olds. On reaching 18 years of age, a young person becomes eligible for taking a full-time job, according to Polish labor law. In the age group there are people who:

- begin work after having completed only elementary education
- are graduates from basic vocational, general secondary schools, secondary vocational schools, and higher education institutions
- are recruited for military service
- do not work

The majority of youth in the first group are those who, prior to coming of age, signed contracts with enterprises to be trained for an occupation or a skill and on reaching 18 years of age continue their training or work on the basis of those contracts. Also included in the first group are those who are employed on the basis of work contracts but do not have the required qualifications and who are included in training within employment to prepare them for their occupations, to take part in training courses, or to be sent to schools for working people. There are certain rules to be observed on employing this group of workers (Employment Department).

Employment of graduates of basic vocational, general secondary, or secondary vocational schools falls mainly under planned employment, and these graduates are a valuable source of trained manpower. An act was passed in 1964 regulating employment of graduates of higher education institutions in order to (1) secure workers with higher education attainments for various branches of the economy, (2) improve territorial distribution of staff with higher education attainments, and (3) avoid employment of graduates in positions inappropriate for their specialization. The act requires graduates to work for at least three years in enterprises that have the right to employ graduates from a given field of study; at the same time it ensures that graduates will work in their acquired profession. It applies to most studies except for some humanities and the arts. Labor-exchange representatives in institutions of higher learning maintain contact between the graduates and enterprises. Various enterprises apply to schools for graduates. As a rule, the demand is 20 percent higher than the number of graduates, which enables them to choose their place of work. The Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare distributes jobs among departments and they in turn distribute them among enterprises.

The employment plan is implemented by means of (1) agreements on scholarships, (2) preliminary contracts, and (3) by directing the graduates to work. An agreement on scholarship is a specific contract: a student is obligated to take up work with the scholarship providers, who in turn are obliged to pay the scholarship and employ the student on graduation. Students are informed about opportunities for signing an agreement on scholarship by their education institutions, which receive offers from various enterprises.

A preliminary contract is the first step toward signing a regular work contract. In such a contract, a student is bound to take up work in the enterprise with which the contract is signed and to work there for a period of three years. Preliminary contracts define the duration and terms of employment. Enterprises entitled to employ graudates inform the institutions of higher learning about their preliminary contracts, and the contracts are signed by the students in the last or next-to-last year of studies.

Those students who do not use the above-mentioned opportunities of entering employment are directed to work. They are informed about their prospective employer by the labor-exchange representative in their institution of higher education three months prior to completing studies. Graduates who avoid taking up work with the enterprise they have been directed to are obliged to return half of the cost of their studies—that is, 30,000 to 45,000 zlotys—plus all scholarships received in the course of studies. (The exceptions are the disabled, those recruited for military service, and graduates remaining in their higher education institutioin for a training period.) Once employed, graduates go through a three- to six-month training period that promotes the social and professional adaptation of graduates and acquaints them with the enterprise. After three years of work in a given enterprise, graduates can go to any other enterprise, whether it is entitled to employ higher education graduates or not. Graduates can also break a contract with their enterprise if the latter does not fulfill the terms agreed upon or provided the graduates repay the cost of studies.

A similar system of preliminary contracts has been introduced for vocational school graduates. The contracts are signed by students in the final year of study.

Males 19 to 24 are recruited for two-year military service. For this period they are granted leave from work, but their employers cannot break work contracts with them and are obliged to employ them in the same position or a higher one—depending on the qualifications they acquire in the army—on their return.

Structure of Youth Employment, 1960–1975

Problems of change in the structure of youth employment must be considered within the context of the general changes in the Polish economy. Between 1964 and 1975, employment increased from 7.1 to 11.4 million—that is, by 59.2 percent. The rate of growth from 1964 to 1970 was higher than from 1971 to 1975 (Table 21), because the baby-boom generation entered the labor market. Full employment did not prove difficult, due to the maximum employment policy carried out by enterprises which, in turn, resulted from extensive economic development of the country. For men, the number of jobs exceeded the number of job seekers, with the exception of 1965 and 1970 (Table 22).

Some tension was noted on the labor market as reflected by a shortage of male workers and and a discrepancy between supply and demand for nonqualified workers, particularly among women job seekers. The number of jobs for women was several times lower than the number of women job seekers, of whom three-fourths had no qualifications.

Employment rose in the years 1965 to 1970 twice as rapidly as in the years 1961 to 1965, exceeding the planned estimates; but in the years 1971 to 1975, the growth in the total number of employees was lower than in 1965 to 1970. This resulted from a decrease in the growth of male and female labor force, intensive economy policy, and an increase in per capita income, which eased the pressure of women on the labor

Table 21. Percentages of employees who completed higher education, vocational education, general secondary education, and basic vocational education, 1964 to 1975

Year	*Total number of employees*	*Percentage of persons who had completed*			
		Higher education	*Vocational education*	*General secondary education*	*Basic Vocational education*
1964	7,137,300	4.3	8.4	4.4	11.0
1968	8,527,900	4.7	11.3	4.5	15.3
1970	9,407,700	5.3	13.6	5.6	17.0
1971	9,834,300	5.4	14.3	5.6	17.8
1972	10,260,400	5.6	14.9	5.7	19.0
1973	10,646,300	5.8	15.3	5.8	19.8
1974	11,124,800	6.0	16.0	6.0	20.6
1975	11,366,400	6.3	16.5	6.1	21.6

Table 22. Total number of persons entering employment, persons seeking jobs, and number of jobs available, for both sexes and for women, 1960 to 1975 (numbers in thousands)

	Persons entering employment		*Persons seeking jobs*		*Number of jobs available*	
Year	*Total*	*Women*	*Total*	*Women*	*Total*	*Women*
1960	1,542.0	482.2	37.4	29.9	46.5	6.8
1965	1,604.5	598.3	62.0	54.5	52.9	12.1
1966	1,669.3	641.9	57.6	52.1	64.2	13.6
1968	1,811.5	700.6	53.1	49.2	76.6	15.8
1970	1,555.1	549.5	79.4	71.3	39.5	8.5
1971	1,766.8	660.2	81.7	74.9	84.2	19.4
1972	2,011.0	787.7	51.8	49.3	93.4	24.6
1973	1,881.1	780.5	28.1	26.8	146.9	41.2
1974	1,730.9	690.2	19.0	17.3	77.7	26.0
1975	1,654.0	623.1	15.2	12.7	94.6	30.1

market. The number of jobs becoming available increased significantly between 1973 and 1975, when it was five times higher than the number of job seekers. That was true for the total number of job seekers and, for the first time in the period in question, for women, whose share in the total number of employees increased markedly, to about 44 percent in 1975 (Table 23).

The structure of employment by level of education also changed in the years 1964 to 1975 as a result of some 4 million graduates from secondary schools and higher education institutions entering the labor force. The percentage of employees with higher education increased from 4.3 to 6.3 percent; of those with general secondary education certificates from 4.4 to 6.1 percent; and of those with secondary and basic vocational education the percentage nearly doubled. The share of employees with only elementary education decreased from 71.9 to 49.5 percent (Table 21).

Economic activity of youth grew markedly over the period in question. The percentage of youth below 24 years of age in total employment increased from 14.5 percent in 1964 to 22.1 percent in 1973 (Table 24); the figures for 15- to 18-year-olds

Table 23. Women as a percentage of total workers, by industry group, 1960–1975

Industry	*1960*	*1965*	*1970*	*1975*
Total	33.0%	36.0%	41.3%	43.9%
Manufacturing industry	30.4	32.0	35.4	39.4
Construction	10.2	13.6	16.1	17.9
Agriculture	20.9	21.2	24.3	20.5
Transport and communication	14.9	17.7	21.0	24.3
Commerce and finance	54.9	60.1	66.5	71.3
Health service	75.3	77.3	81.0	80.9
Education	61.3	65.2	77.0	77.8

Table 24. People under 24 years of age as a percentage of the labor force, by sex, 1964 to 1973

Year	*Total*	*Male*	*Female*
1964	14.5%	12.1%	18.8%
1968	17.1	14.0	20.7
1973	22.1	19.0	26.3

were 2.6 percent in 1960 and 4.5 percent in 1975 (Table 25). Women employees below 24 years of age constituted 19 percent of total female employment in 1964 and 26 percent in 1973.

Although the percentage of 15- to 18-year-olds in the total labor force increased, within this age group other changes occurred that were favorable from the point of view of employment policy and economic development. There was (1) an increase in the percentage of youth in school (65 percent in 1960, 74 percent in 1975), (2) a decrease in the percentage of working youth (21 percent in 1960, 18 percent in 1975), and (3) a decrease in the percentage of youth both out of school and unemployed (14 percent in 1960, 8 percent in 1975) (Table 26).

Even though the changes in the second and third groups were not continuous, they suggest a difference in youth attitudes and the growing popularity of prolonged education.

Table 25. Employment of people 15 to 18, both sexes and women, 1960 to 1975

	Total (both sexes)		*Women*	
Year	*Number (in thousands)*	*Percentage of labor force*	*Number (in thousands)*	*Percentage of employed people 15 to 18*
1960	357.2	2.6%	39.1	10.9%
1965	478.8	3.1	91.1	29.0
1970	382.8	3.9	115.1	30.0
1971	402.7	3.9	126.6	31.4
1972	449.1	4.2	149.6	33.3
1975	526.0	4.5	191.4	36.4
Percentage change				
1960–1965	34.0%		133.0%	
1965–1970	-20.1		26.3	
1970–1975	37.4		66.3	
1960–1975	47.3		389.5	

Table 26. **People 15 to 18, by activity status, 1960 to 1975**

	Total persons 15 to 18			
Year	*Number (in thousands)*	*Percentage in school*	*Percentage employed in national industry*	*Percentage out of school and not employed in national industry*
1960	1,695	65.0	21.1	13.9
1965	2,598	73.3	18.4	8.3
1970	2,802	73.4	13.6	13.0
1975	2,850	73.8	18.4	7.8

Economic activity of youth was also conditioned by, among other things, prolongation of elementary education by one year, development of schools, student aid, building new industrial enterprises, the growth of various branches of industry requiring better qualifications, and the exodus of rural youth to cities. There were also some changes in the economic activity of youth in particular age groups. The rate decreased in the 15-to-18 age group, while it increased in the 19-to-24 age group.

The economic activity rate of youth was higher in rural than in urban areas. In 1970, 9 percent of male youth 15 to 17 in the cities were employed, while the corresponding figure for rural areas was 32 percent. For women in the same age group, it was 6 percent in the cities and 31 percent in rural areas. In the 18-to-19 age group, economic activity rates for males were 54 percent in the cities and 66 percent in rural areas and for females, 44 percent and 60 percent, respectively. For males 20 to 24, the rates were 85 percent in the cities and 93 percent in rural areas.

Over the past 15 years, the economic activity rate for women has increased significantly. In 1960, the urban rate for the 20-to-24 age group was 58 percent and in 1970 over 73 percent. Considering that some 10 percent of women studied at that time, the percentage of women out of school and out of work in this age group was only 17 percent.

The number of youth combining work with occupational training has also been growing (Table 27). In 1960, 31 percent of employed youth 15 to 18 were trained within employment, and in 1975 the percentage grew to nearly 94 percent. This growth reveals the tendency among working youth to use the opportunities to improve their qualifications.

Table 27. Employed people 15 to 18 receiving on-the-job training, 1960 to 1975 (numbers in thousands)

Year	*Employed people 15 to 18*	*On-the-job training*	
		Number	*Percentage*
1960	357.2	111.9	31.1
1965	478.8	368.7	77.0
1970	382.8	335.5	87.6
1975	526.0	493.7	93.9

Employment of pupils receiving training in particular sectors of the economy is shown in Table 20. The term "pupils" covers both youth 15 to 18 who have signed contracts to train for an occupation or a skill and youth over 18 who also have signed contracts to train for an occupation or a skill prior to coming of age and who continue training on the contract terms.

The number of youth training for an occupation or skill was six times higher in 1975 than in 1960. Most pupils were employed in manufacturing (81,000 in 1960 and 315,000 in 1975). In terms of numbers, the rate of increase in manufacturing was very high, but in percentage terms rates of increase in other sectors of the economy were even higher. The increase in number of trainees achieved in the years 1960–1965 was much higher than that in 1965–1970 and 1970–1975.

The largest numbers of qualified workers entering work are 18- to 24-year-old graduates from vocational schools. In the years 1965 to 1970, 1.8 million graduates from secondary schools and higher education institutions took up work, and in the years 1970 to 1975 their number grew to 2.5 million. About 210,000 graduates from higher education institutions, 106,000 graduates from postelementary schools, and over 1.7 million graduates from vocational schools began work in the years 1970 to 1975 (Table 28).

Most young people 15 to 18 were employed in industry, building, trade and finance, and transport and communication. Youth employment in building was three times higher in 1975 than in 1965 and in trade and transport it was nearly 2.5 times higher (Table 29). Youth employment in agriculture decreased gradually over the period in question from 19,500 in 1965 to

Table 28. New entrants to employment from postelementary schooling, 1970 to 1975 (numbers in thousands)

		Graduates from				
Year	*Total*	*Higher education*	*Postsecondary*	*Vocational*	*General secondary*	*Basic vocational*
1970	315.7	30.0	19.5	82.5	34.9	148.7
1971	378.1	32.3	19.7	87.9	34.0	204.2
1972	417.7	39.0	13.1	87.5	46.6	231.5
1973	445.9	38.1	15.2	95.9	48.9	247.8
1974	444.2	36.9	17.4	99.0	45.7	245.2
1975	444.0	33.1	21.5	100.5	44.1	244.8

Table 29. Employment of youth 15 to 18, by industry group, 1965 to 1975 (numbers in thousands)

Industry	*1965*	*1970*	*1975*	*Percentage change 1965–1975*
Total	478.8	382.8	526.0	9.9
Manufacturing	219.0	226.2	254.6	16.3
Construction	31.8	55.6	95.6	200.6
Agriculture and forestry	19.5	15.5	16.2	-16.9
Transport and communications	21.3	30.7	50.0	34.7
Commerce and finance	37.5	40.3	92.2	145.9
Housing and utilities	5.6	8.6	10.7	91.1
Public administration	4.9	3.9	6.7	36.7

16,000 in 1975. In some sectors of the economy women employees predominated. In 1975, they constituted 90 percent of total employment in health services, 77 percent in education, 81 percent in finance, 74 percent in trade, and 60 percent in the judiciary.

Some youth 15 to 18 stay out of employment and out of school. Because they pose an important social problem, they are registered by appropriate educational institutions that help them return to school or acquire an occupation through work. Some 40 percent of these young people are elementary school dropouts who do not have any qualifications and who do not take up any occupation. Leading idle lives, they become demoralized and often commit criminal offenses. Some do not take up further education or employment after elementary school until they are recruited for the military service (at the age of 19). It is difficult to determine the size of the group, particularly in rural areas, because some young people help their parents on private farms, either permanently or periodically, without being employed elsewhere.

In the years 1960 to 1975, the number of youth out of employment and out of school decreased steadily. In 1960, some 10 percent of the city youth 15 to 18 belonged to this group; in 1965, their proportion was 8 percent and in 1970 only 6 percent. In 1972, the total number of youth 15 to 18 registered as out of employment and out of school was 51,000, of whom 24,500 were girls; in 1973 the number fell to 35,000 (by 32 percent), and in 1974 it further decreased to 27,000 (by nearly 50 percent in comparison with 1972). In 1973, about 65 percent of these young people were directed to schools to attend occupational training courses, and about 24 percent were directed to on-the-job occupational training or to Voluntary Labor Corps.

The Voluntary Labor Corps were established in 1958 upon the initiative of youth organizations, and their main goal has been to educate and prepare for work those youth 15 to 24 who for various reasons stay out of work and out of school. The corps seems to have contributed to the significant drop in the number of youth out of school and out of work in the 1970s.

The 1960–1975 employment policy, whose main goal was to absorb all youth into the labor market and to provide conditions for full and effective employment of the baby-boom generation, has proved successful owing to the combination of employment policy with the general strategy of the economic development of the country and to the extension of the network of various schools and forms of vocational education of youth. The problem of geographic mobility of youth from areas with a labor surplus to those deficient in labor was also solved. However, this mobility had some negative effects on individual farms; as a result of the influx of rural youth to cities, many farms remained in the hands of elderly people unable to cope with agriculture. In recent years, youth gradually have been returning to the country, prompted by some favorable changes in development and mechanization of agriculture introduced by the state. There also occurred some difficulties regarding employment of women, who acquired occupations traditionally thought of as male. Reluctance of some enterprises to employ them has not been completely overcome. Finally, although all young job seekers were employed, the actual employment was not always in keeping with the planned employment.

There is still much to be done about effective use of youth resources, particularly in view of the expected decline of the population of 15- to 24-year-olds and the drying up of labor-force entrants. Numerous studies carried out among youth have revealed that they are not always employed in accordance with their previous training and that young people often feel that their qualifications have not been properly utilized. However, the policy of planned employment of graduates from secondary schools and higher education institutions has improved the distribution of qualified staff in some less-developed regions of the country.

The level of education of employees improved over the period in question, while the employment structure created favorable conditions for the development of particular branches of the national economy. It is expected that the 4 million young people—better qualified and better prepared for work—who have entered employment in the past 10 years will speed up the economic development of the country, and the tremendous sums invested in youth education and creation of new jobs for them will bring the expected social and economic benefits.

Projected Employment of Graduates

The instruments of employment policy discussed in the preceding sections do not always find practical application, however justified they may be from the theoretical point of view. Institutional activity does not always keep pace with changing reality, and thus there occur some flaws in the policy of effective employment of youth. Imperfect methods of manpower planning do not always consider the future structure of the economy, based on a more modern technology, and thus lead to periodic surpluses or shortages of specialists in a given field.

A disadvantage of the existing employment methods is that demand for qualified staff is expressed mainly in quantitative terms, without taking into account the educational standard of the graduates. A rational policy of employment should ensure not only a sufficient number of qualified staff but also their good quality in accordance with economic needs. The ability of workers to improve their qualifications, or even to qualify for a new job, is also significant. However, the qualitative aspect of planning is difficult to achieve. It has often been hard to find the right people for implementation of planned socioeconomic goals, even though quantitative aspects of labor demand and supply have been observed. There have been many cases of graduates' qualifications being insufficiently utilized or of jobs being taken by people with inadequate preparation for them.

The faults of the educational system and of manpower planning are often accompanied by faulty adjustments of graduates' employment. Planned employment of graduates is based on:

- current information on the number of vacancies as well as the number and qualifications of the students graduating in a particular year, including both local and national data
- the referral of graduates to regions and enterprises of particular significance to the economy
- an individual approach to graduates that considers their personal situations, interests, and aspirations and creates additional privileges for outstanding graduates

Although since 1964 some 90 percent of graduates from higher education institutions and more than 50 percent from secondary vocational schools have been included in a system of planned employment, the goal of which is a rational and even distribution of qualified staff in the national economy and culture, there have been many faults in its implementation.

Surveys carried out in the early 1970s among recent graduates from institutions of higher education and also among selected groups of people who graduated in 1965 and 1966 revealed that the goals of the planned employment of graduates have not been fully achieved: 25 percent of graduates were employed in jobs incompatible with their field of studies, often resulting from the wrong choice of studies and the lack of opportunity to change them. Both the haphazard choice of studies and the training for occupations for which they were unsuited often led to dissatisfaction with work, unfavorable attitudes to work, and frequent job changing.

Many graduates had difficulties in the transition from school to work. Generally speaking, they had imagined their future job to be much better than it actually was in terms of wages, organization of work, and human relations. A clash between ideals and reality at work proved a traumatic experience for 40 percent of graduates; 47 percent pointed to an incomplete utilization of their abilities and knowledge in professional work; and 44 percent of graduates criticized the educational system and complained about insufficient specialist knowledge or information about the principles of work organization.

The graduates' critical remarks reveal discrepancies between their education and professional activities and their qualifications and utilization. This state of affairs calls for a further improvement in the system of choice of profession as well as in teaching methods and employment mechanisms. It can be expected that the number of youth dissatisfied with their work would then decrease, which in turn would increase the social and individual effectiveness of education.

4

Youth Subculture

Aspirations, Life Goals, Values, and Attitudes

Research carried out in the 1960s and 1970s on adolescents has shown a considerable increase in their aspirations, mainly concerning the standard of education and character of work. Adolescents recognize education and employment as instruments for attaining life targets, such as a suitable social position and an occupation satisfying material needs as well as the personal need to feel socially useful. The endeavor to acquire education and raise their qualifications has been a characteristic of most young people in the years 1960 to 1975.

The increase in aspirations has been shown both by a jump up several steps of the social ladder compared with the education and position of their parents and by the belief among youth that after attaining one standard of education one can and should try to go higher. This has been confirmed by the increase in the number of students attending several types of school and by the dynamic development of schools for working youth.

Many young people, who at the age of 18 were satisfied with vocational schools, later return to secondary evening technical schools to realize their higher aspirations. Many of them decide to reenter education on the university level and to obtain a diploma. Fifty percent of the 18-to-24 age group expresses a desire to continue education. The endeavor to achieve a higher level of education may be spread over a considerable period of time; in the existing system of education, individual initiative determines when and whether a student will reach the next stage.

In the hierarchy of aspirations of young people, highest priority is given to completion of their education and finding an occupation congruent with their personal interests, followed by the desire to have a happy family, and then by material prosperity and a high position. Specifically, in a survey of young people, the following goals were expressed:

- self-improvement, acquiring education and a position in the chosen occupation, satisfaction with work and social recognition (30 percent)
- happiness in family life (14 percent)
- advance in social life (8 percent)
- doing something great, achieving fame (6 percent)
- material prosperity (3 percent)

About 81 percent of those who answered stated that the attainment of the desired target in life depended on themselves, on their perseverance, strong character, right selection, wit, and so forth; and about 10 percent stated that they counted on help from their relatives, friends, and favorable circumstances.

The hierarchy of life targets differs among socioeconomic groups. For example, working youth strive in the first place to have a happy family rather than to be successful in work, while rural youth believe more in material prosperity than in acquiring education. An analysis of the system of evaluation and the attitudes of youth in particular groups may determine the specific standards, codes of behavior, interests, and attempts that make up the youth subculture. Even though a certain system of evaluation has been accepted by the majority of the young, their hierarchy of values differs according to whether they are from the working or peasant classes, pupils in secondary schools, technical schools, or higher education, or youth who have failed to adjust.

The personal characteristics mostly prized by the young are of three types:

- values of character (honesty, strong will, righteousness, ambition)
- values of intellect (wisdom, versatile knowledge, intelligence, specialization)

- values ensuring good performance (resourcefulness, hard work, the gift of creating good relations)

The studies carried out in the 1970s by S. Nowak* among youth in two large cities have shown that the scale of values in Polish society is to a great extent uniform not only among youth but also within the society as a whole. There are no great conflicts in the scale of values between the young and their parents. The younger generation has to a considerable degree adjusted to the values of its elders; and the young of the 1970s have no tendencies toward revolutionary change compared with the generation of the 1960s. This is also reflected in the current desire to live a peaceful and happy life in an accepted system of values, directed more inward than outward.

The difference between children and their parents lies mainly in the sphere of manners and morals. Here the generational conflict appears mainly with regard to sex, religion, marriage, and expectations from work. The attitudes and sexual behavior of young people differ to a very great degree from those of the older generation. Research has shown that during the past 20 years there have appeared considerable changes in sexual behavior and in standards of ethics. The most symptomatic changes include:

- beginning of sexual activity before marriage (about 90 percent of boys and 70 percent of girls, though the great majority of the girls start their premarital sexual life with their future husbands)
- a decrease in the age when sexual relations are first experienced to approximately 18 to 19 for men and 19 to 20 for women; this also depends on the standards of education, as youth with higher education begin sexual relations somewhat later (usually over 22 years of age)
- the fact that sexual life follows a prolonged period of "going out together" and becomes an element of youth subculture
- the general belief that religious injunctions are not an important factor influencing sexual behavior

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*S. Nowak, "Niedaleko od jabloni" ("Not Far from the Apple Tree"), *Polityka*, No. 15, 1976.

During the past 20 years, a change has occurred in young people's attitudes toward religion. Studies carried out in this respect have shown that between 1965 and 1973, 80 percent of the young people declared themselves to be religious, although the degree of belief differed in particular groups. Only about 40 percent, however, both believe and practice, while the remaining 40 percent defining themselves as believers do not take part in religious practices and are not directed in life by moral standards resulting from religious doctrine.

Religious attitudes differ according to the standard of education, social background, type of family upbringing, environment, and the like. Research has shown a constant process of secularization of youth. This mainly refers to the code of behavior in life, differing from the religious standards regarding sexual life, abortion, etc.

The attitudes of youth toward the family differ from those of their parents. During the past few years, a certain evolution of attitudes may be noticed. The majority of young people marry for love, and the age of marriage is slowly lowering. The family model is also undergoing certain changes, both in the husband's role in the family and in family planning. Most young couples intend to have one or two children, and only about 10 percent would like to have more. This results in part from the employment of women: over 70 percent of women in the 20-to-24 age group are employed, and about 80 percent of women not engaged in physical work return to work after maternity leave. This increases a sense of partnership between young couples and makes the man take a larger share in housework and in bringing up the children.

Choice of Occupation and Attitudes Toward Work

Free choice of occupation is a generally accepted principle among contemporary youth. Though the decision is influenced by many factors, friends exert the greatest influence, while parental influence has become much more limited. The school no longer plays any considerable role in this respect. Young people choose their occupation mainly on the basis of their own interests and talents, persuasion of their schoolmates, and examples from their peer group, as well as from knowledge of the character of their future occupation and information about the emoluments and social prestige of the work.

The aspirations of young people show a growing tendency toward occupations necessitating secondary and higher education and away from those requiring physical work. In the 1970s the most popular occupations among the pupils of secondary technical schools are electrotechnics, telecommunication, and mechanics. In many cases, however, the choice of occupation is accidental; about 25 percent of youth consider themselves as having no other opportunity. The social consequences of these accidental choices are very great, because young people complain that they are dissatisfied with their work and often change jobs. Proper or improper choice of occupation thus determines future attitudes toward work.

In recent years, the task of proper occupational orientation has been undertaken by several advisory bodies and technical schools, but it is at present difficult to evaluate the effects. Schools, advisory bodies, and institutions dealing with employment try to help young people individually to reconcile their personal abilities and interests with the national economy's need for particular specialists. They determine the occupational aptitudes of the candidates and give information on the kinds of work and the opportunities of employment in particular occupations. The most recent tendency has been to entrust the schools themselves with the task of advising the pupils about future occupations.

Among the motives influencing the choice of further education connected with the future occupation, young people most often mention the prospect of interesting work, the interest and popularity of particular specializations, the facilities for receiving proper education in this field, and the possibility of high earnings. A large percentage of young people undertake further education for family reasons or because of the proximity and accessibility of some school. Some have no special motivation except for the sake of learning itself, to prolong the period before work, or to avoid military service. The education system, the mass media, and youth organizations may form or change attitudes of the younger generation toward different occupations. These institutions are an important link in directing young people to the selection of an occupation that will not only be profitable and satisfying to the individual but also to society as a whole.

Selection of an occupation and of the first job are significant events in the life of a young person, and a great deal of care is taken to ensure compatibility of this job with the individual's education and qualifications. Tests have shown that incompatibility of job and qualifications not only causes social losses but affects attitudes toward work in general, especially in cases in which young people do not feel useful. Contemporary youth expect much more from their occupations than their elders did. Above all they want to believe that their qualifications are being properly used and that they perform independent and responsible work in which they may show what they can do. Most decidedly, young people take up their first job with lively enthusiasm and great expectations, which disappear only too often if the work does not come up to their expectations.

The young generation's attitude toward work in the past was influenced by the character of the activities (the more complicated, the more responsible) and by the compatibility of activities with educational attainments, the system of promotion, and the process of occupational adaptation (based on the conviction of the need for further specialization, self-improvement, and innovation). If these conditions could not be fulfilled, dissatisfaction with work led to attempts to change jobs and made youth passive with regard to work. Nowadays, the active attitude of young people toward work is caused to a great extent by the opportunity to show initiative even more than by higher earnings.

Leisure

Leisure depends on whether young people study or work or do both. Young people in rural areas and those who both work and study have the least free time. Youth in some schools are overloaded with classes, and about 40 percent of young people attending general technical schools must commute, thus wasting approximately two hours daily on travel. Young people who only work are in a much better position, because they can spend their leisure time freely. There are various ways of spending leisure time, depending on personal interests, standards of education and occupation, place of residence, and current fashions among young people. Among the most popular forms of leisure, pupils from secondary schools listed the following in sequence: reading books and magazines (44 percent), the cinema (38 percent), radio (36 percent), television (26 percent), sports and tourism (23 percent), and the theater (19 percent). This order of preference differs according to the age of the pupil and type of school attended. Those 15 to 18 read more books, while those 18 to 24 spend more time reading magazines and journals. About 70 percent of 18- to 24-year-olds state that they read at least six books a year, and about 75 percent listen to the radio about two hours daily. The most popular forms of leisure among students in higher education are first going to the cinema and then sports and tourism.

The ways of spending free time also depend on the upbringing and the patterns existing in the background; for example, youth from the working class or in general technical schools spend more time among their friends in large or small groups. A large group of youth spend their free time in various kinds of clubs at schools or places of employment. In 1970, there were over 8,000 clubs, with over 200,000 members, connected with various creative and artistic amateur movements. Film discussion clubs, singing and dancing ensembles, and the like are particularly popular among higher education students. Various youth organizations, to which about 45 percent of young people belong, organize forms of spending free time, especially sports and tourism. These organizations sponsor sport clubs in towns, villages, factories, student campuses, and so forth.

Social Pathology of Youth

Besides young people who work and study, there are small groups of youth who are not adjusted and as a result cause serious social problems. Fortunately, there has been a steady decrease in their number. In 1972 there were about 51,000 maladjusted youth; in 1973 their number was 35,000; and in 1975 it was only 27,000. Ninety percent of these young people are individuals who dropped out of school and did not enter any employment.

In addition, some youth are misfits (young people who have "gone wrong"). Most come from difficult family backgrounds (family members are often also from the "social margin"), experience difficulties at school, and sometimes end up in criminal circles.

The problems of social maladjustment and criminal behavior of youth have been widely studied by sociologists and psychologists. The term "maladjusted" or "morally neglected" refers to young people who constantly break certain basic rules of social coexistence. The phenomena resulting from maladjustment belong to social pathology and are socially dysfunctional and harmful. Classification of some phenomena as derivations from the norm is relative and refers to a specific social system and values accepted within that system. Pathological forms of behavior among youth are those considered abnormal for this group in the society. Some symptoms of maladjustment and pathological behavior in school youth are, for example: irregular school attendance, dropping out of school, improper behavior at school, aggressive behavior, use of alcohol, or committing criminal offenses. In case of older youth, the symptoms of maladjustment include: various forms of indictable offenses (theft, burglary, homicide), alcoholism and drug addiction, suicide and self-injury, nervous and psychological impairments, sexual deviations (prostitution, sexual perversion), and other forms of dysfunctional behavior (divorce, abortion, illegitimate births).

In the years 1960 to 1975, juvenile delinquency did not tend to grow. The number of court sentences in the 17-to-24 age group did not increase; in fact, it decreased in the 1970s (compared with the 1960s) even though the number of people in this age group increased in relation to the total population.

In 1960, the number of 17- to 20-year-olds sentenced by a court was 24 percent higher than in 1970, and that of 20- to 24-year-olds more than 50 percent higher. The following figures indicate numbers of youths sentenced for indictable offenses:

	Age	
Year	*17–20*	*20–24*
1960	42,073	43,940
1965	33,597	34,657
1970	33,931	27,808
1974	32,379	27,572

At the same time the numbers declined, the delinquency rates per 1,000 inhabitants in this age group also declined:

	Age	
Year	*17–20*	*21–24*
1963	21.1	21.9
1970	12.6	12.4
1975	12.2	11.1

Males constituted over 90 percent of the total number of court-sentenced 17- to 24-year-olds. The number sentenced per 1,000 17- to 20-year-old males dropped from 47.3 in 1960 to 28.2 in 1965, 26.1 in 1970, and 23.6 in 1973. For the 21-to-24 age group the figures were: 42.4 in 1960, 33.0 in 1965, 26.0 in 1970, and 21.8 in 1973.

The incidence of homicide among youth is shown in the following figures:

	Age	
Year	*15–19*	*20–24*
1960	20	50
1970	31	32
1973	19	34

The homicide ratio per 100,000 population in each age group was:

	Age	
Year	*15–19*	*20–24*
1960	1.1	2.3
1970	0.3	1.1
1973	0.5	1.0

Thus, the homicide rate fell for all youth 15 to 24 years of age.

Suicide, an extreme case of self-destructive pathology, has been studied by sociologists, psychologists, psychiatrists, and lawyers. Various studies on suicide problems have attempted to determine the connection between suicide and sociodemographic structure, economic development of the country, social mobility, personality features, and the like. The primary causes of death of 15- to 24-year-olds are accidents, suicide, and homicide—these three constituting 50 percent of all deaths in this age group. Suicide occurs 12 times more often than homicide, the incidence of the latter being relatively small. The number of youth suicides grew significantly in the years 1960 to 1970, as shown below:

	Age	
Year	*15–19*	*20–24*
1960	118	28
1970	243	368
1973	284	463

The suicide rate per 100,000 persons in each age group was:

	Age	
Year	*15–19*	*20–24*
1960	6.1	9.4
1970	7.0	13.0
1973	8.1	14.2

Statistics are also available for suicidal attempts, which also grew among 15- to 20-year-olds in the 1960s and at the beginning of the 1970s. In 1960 their number was 150, rising to 208 in 1965, to 475 in 1970, and to 531 in 1971. After that it decreased gradually to 475 in 1973, 441 in 1974, and 414 in 1975.

Most suicides in Poland are committed in the 31-to-50 age group (nearly three times more often than in the 15-to-20 age group). Suicide ratios for men are much higher than those for women. For example, in 1973 the suicide ratio for the whole group of 15- to 19-year-olds was 8.1 per 100,000 population, and for men it was 12.3. Similarly, for the whole group of 20- to 24-year-olds it was 14.2, and for men it was 24.4.

Marital status and place of residence were found to be related to suicidal behavior. The suicide ratio for the widowed and divorced was higher than for single persons. The suicide ratio was also slightly higher for urban youth than for rural youth (9.6 and 6.3 per 100,000 population in the age group, respectively).

Surveys have revealed that a great number of suicides among youth were connected with alcohol use. The predominant ways of committing suicide in the 15-to-24 age group were hanging and strangulation (some 72 percent of the total). Next came gas poisoning (11 percent), drowning (4 percent), drug poisoning (4 percent), and explosives (3.5 percent).

The nearly twofold increase in suicides in the 15-to-24 age group in 1973 as compared with 1960 caused serious concern. Surveys have revealed that the main reasons for suicide are the difficulties young people have in adapting to family and social conditions that have changed due to intergenerational and intragenerational social mobility. In most cases, suicide was caused by a combination of various family and school troubles. Most numerous suicides were committed by young people in a state of prolonged conflict with their parents. Second numerous were those committed by young people unable to cope with school. The two causes often overlapped.

Alcoholism among youth is a matter of constant study and concern as one of the most serious cases of social pathology, as well as a cause of many offenses committed by young people. The use of alcohol among youth has been constantly growing, but studies have revealed that the large amounts of alcohol used by 18- to 20-year-olds do not differ from the average used by adults.

5

Summary

In the preceding chapters, we have tried to present the situation of Polish youth in the years from 1960 to 1975 on the basis of changes in the demographic structure of the 15-to-24 age group as well as in education and employment policies for this age group. The analysis has been supplemented by a presentation of some elements of the subculture typical of this age group and reflected in the accepted system of values, norms, and principles of behavior, as well as in attitudes toward life and work. Some phenomena connected with maladjustment of youth and leading to social pathology have also been discussed.

Our analysis allows the following conclusions to be drawn. First, the years 1960 to 1975 were characterized by the largest increase in the number of 15- to 24-year-olds in the whole post-World-War II period due to the 1946–1952 baby boom. The share of this age group in the total population increased by 62 percent, while total population grew by approximately 13 percent during the period. In addition, migration of youth from rural areas to cities increased significantly, at an annual rate of 100,000 people, or nearly one-third of rural youth.

In 1967, the requirement of eight years of compulsory schooling was introduced. The percentage of youth continuing education after elementary school rose from 78 to 94 percent. Of these, the number of secondary school youth grew two times and that of higher education students two-and-a-half times. The largest increase, however, occurred in the number of vocational school youth: vocational school graduates grew four times (twice as much as higher education graduates). In general, the level of education of 15- to 24-year-olds was higher than that of the preceding generations.

The following observations may be made about working youth: the number of all working youth enrolled in some kind of education increased three times, while the share of employed working class youth in various types of schools grew from 27 to 39 percent. In addition, working youth had more opportunities to train for an occupation or a skill; 31 percent of 15- to 18-year-olds attended training courses in 1960, and in 1970 this proportion rose to 94 percent.

More youth were able to continue education as a result of the unprecedented growth of the education system. As indications of this development, we note that government expenditures on education increased more than twofold. The number of students receiving financial aid from the state was twice as high in 1975 as in 1970.

The level of education of the labor force rose substantially, owing to the inflow of a young generation characterized by more years of schooling; in 1964, some 4.3 percent of employees had completed higher education, and by 1975 the percentage had grown to 6.3. The percentage of employees with secondary vocational education grew from 8.4 to 16.5, and those with basic vocational education increased from 11 to 21.6. The percentage of employees with only elementary education dropped from 70 to 49 percent.

There were also developments in the economic sector. Due to the various instruments of employment policy and to the dynamic economic growth of Poland, new entrants to the labor market were ensured jobs. A significant number of these new entrants acquired occupational qualifications outside the regular school system, mainly during compulsory military service and in Voluntary Labor Corps. In the years 1970 to 1975, the total of these new entrants was 2.5 million secondary and higher education graduates. The employment structure continued to change in line with long-term trends, that is, employment in industry, building, commerce, and transport continued to rise, while in agriculture it continued to decline. Except for 1970, the number of jobs always exceeded the number of youthful job seekers.

For women there were also a number of changes. The number of women in secondary schools increased three times and in institutions of higher education four times; by 1974, women constituted 72 percent of secondary school attendance and 52 percent of higher education students. Their economic activity increased significantly also: in 1964 women constituted some 36 percent of total employment, while in 1975 it was 44 percent. Women composed more than 70 percent of employees in health services, education, administration and finance, and commerce. In general, the level of education of women employees in the 18-to-24 age group was higher than that of men in the same group.

With respect to the youth culture, the system of values of the young generation is more uniform than ever before. Aspirations of youth and their parents regarding higher levels of education showed a great increase, while changes in youth attitudes towards religion, sex, and the family occurred gradually. There were some changes in occupation orientation and expectations from work—for example, a reluctance to take up manual work and a desire to be employed in a position that gives the chance to use one's education and abilities fully and to get satisfaction from the work itself. The most popular leisure activities of 18- to 24-year-olds are reading books and magazines, going to the cinema, watching TV, participating in sports, and tourism. Youth organizations play an important role in organizing spare-time activities.

Finally, during the period under investigation the number of youth both out of school and out of work decreased significantly. In addition, the number of socially maladjusted youth also decreased, as reflected in a declining number of court sentences. On the negative side, suicide and alcoholism are two predominant and increasing phenomena of youth social pathology. But for the most part, despite the difficult demographic situation, the majority of young people manage to complete secondary education, acquire a profession, and finally find a job. Although quite a lot is still to be done in the areas of better education and the utilization of youth resources, we can now say that the Polish government policies of 1960 to 1975 concerning youth were successful.